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Jean Imbs

27 July 2007
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 785
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Abstract
The New Keynesian Phillips Curve is at the centre of two raging empirical debates. First, how can purely forward looking pricing account for the observed persistence in aggregate inflation. Second, price-setting responds to movements in marginal costs, which should therefore be the driving force to observed inflation dynamics. This is not always the case in typical estimations. In this paper, we show how heterogeneity in pricing behaviour is relevant to both questions. We detail the conditions under which imposing homogeneity results in overestimating a backward-looking component in (aggregate) inflation, and underestimating the importance of (aggregate) marginal costs for (aggregate) inflation. We provide intuition for the direction of these biases, and verify them in French data with information on prices and marginal costs at the industry level. We show that the apparent discrepancy in the estimated duration of nominal rigidities, as implied from aggregate or microeconomic data, can be fully attributable to a heterogeneity bias.
JEL Code
C10 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General→General
C22 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Single Equation Models, Single Variables→Time-Series Models, Dynamic Quantile Regressions, Dynamic Treatment Effect Models &bull Diffusion Processes
E31 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Price Level, Inflation, Deflation
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
Network
ECB/CEPR labour market workshop on wage and labour cost dynamics
29 October 2007
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 826
Details
Abstract
We show that international consumption risk sharing is significantly improved by capital flows, especially portfolio investment. Concomitantly, we show that poor institutions hamper risk sharing, but to an extent that decreases with openness. In particular, risk sharing is prevalent even among economies with poor institutions, provided they are open to international markets. This is consistent with the view that the prospect of retaliation may deter expropriation of foreign capital, even in institutional environments where it is possible. This deterrent is anticipated by investors, who act to diversify risk. By contrast, capital flows headed for closed economies with poor institutions are designed and constrained so as to limit the cost incurred in case of expropriation, and thus achieve little risk sharing. Finally, we show this non-linearity continues to be present in the determinants of international capital flows themselves. Institutions are crucial in attracting capital for closed economies, but are barely relevant in open ones.
JEL Code
F21 : International Economics→International Factor Movements and International Business→International Investment, Long-Term Capital Movements
F30 : International Economics→International Finance→General
G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets