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Balázs Zsámboki

15 May 2024
FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - ARTICLE
Financial Stability Review Issue 1, 2024
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Abstract
The emergence of generative artificial intelligence (AI) tools represents a significant technological leap forward, with the potential to have a substantial impact on the financial system. Conceptually, AI brings both benefits and risks to the financial system. Practically, the overall impact will depend on how the challenges related to data, model development and deployment are addressed – both at the level of financial institutions and for the financial system as a whole. If new AI tools are used widely in the financial system and AI suppliers are concentrated, operational risk (including cyber risk), market concentration and too-big-to-fail externalities may increase. Furthermore, widespread AI adoption may harbour the potential for increased herding behaviour and market correlation. Should concerns arise that cannot be tackled by the current regulatory framework, targeted initiatives may need to be considered.
JEL Code
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G10 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General
G14 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Information and Market Efficiency, Event Studies, Insider Trading
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G41 : Financial Economics
6 December 2023
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - FOCUS - No. 23
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Abstract
This box aims at contributing to the discussion on creating more macroprudential space via a higher amount of releasable capital buffers by proposing a simple and broad quantitative indicator to measure effective macroprudential space which takes into account that releasable buffers might be constrained by overlapping parallel capital requirements. The indicator is defined as a measure of effective releasability of capital buffers, expressed as a percentage of banks’ risk weighted assets. The box further highlights both conceptual and practical implication of considering capital overlaps when assessing macroprudential space for macroprudential authorities.
JEL Code
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
20 September 2023
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 329
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Abstract
This paper analyses banks’ ability to use capital buffers in the euro area, taking into account overlapping capital requirements between the risk-based capital framework and the leverage ratio capital framework from 2016 to 2022. This analysis is the first to quantify buffer usability in multiple jurisdictions and across various bank types, identify key drivers of buffer usability and assess the impact of various policy measures using longer time series. The paper shows that while both risk-based and leverage frameworks play a key role in enhancing the resilience of the banking system and ensuring financial stability, their simultaneous application creates interactions that may affect the functioning of capital buffers. In this regard, we investigate to what extent banks could have drawn down regulatory capital buffers in the risk-based framework without breaching current leverage ratio requirements, which is in line with the approach to buffer usability taken in ESRB (2021b). We show that buffer usability was partially constrained in the period examined and is expected to remain so under the current regulatory framework and if risk weight densities (RWDs) remain low. This finding indicates that the leverage ratio constitutes an effective backstop to the risk-based framework, both as regards minimum requirements and capital buffers. Limited buffer usability was identified especially for global systemically important institutions (G-SIIs) that rely largely on internal modelling approaches to calculate risk-based capital requirements, leading to comparably low risk weights and making the leverage ratio relatively more binding. Adding to previous contributions, we find that banks’ ability to use capital buffers fluctuated over time, generally increasing before 2019 and decreasing after the start of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, with substantial heterogeneity across countries. Furthermore, we provide new insights into the relationship between the RWD of a bank and its buffer usability and find that there is a critical RWD range between 25%
JEL Code
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
28 June 2021
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 13
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Abstract
This article provides an overview of the actions aimed at reducing or suspending banks’ distributions on a system-wide basis. It finds that such measures imply a number of pros and cons which deserve further analysis. On the one hand, system-wide restrictions on distributions complement and enhance the effectiveness of other public support measures, including prudential relief measures, by ensuring that the “freed-up” capital is used for the purposes of supporting the real economy and absorbing losses. Furthermore, system-wide measures simultaneously address adverse incentives to deleverage by removing the stigma effects associated with institution-specific restrictions. On the other hand, the implementation of system-wide restrictions on distributions presents several concomitant drawbacks and challenges. In particular, investors may be reluctant to invest in banks which are subject to restrictions, which may hamper banks ’ability to raise capital in the longer term. Other challenges include interference with the smooth functioning of the internal market and the possibility of the measures becoming less effective over time when introduced via soft-law instruments.
JEL Code
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G35 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Payout Policy
30 April 2018
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 5
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Abstract
The European Commission’s proposals for the reform of EU banking rules aim to complete the post-crisis reform agenda and to address shortcomings in the current regulatory framework, notably in the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) and the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV). Once implemented, the changes will strengthen the regulatory architecture in the European Union, thereby contributing to the reduction of risks in the banking sector and paving the way for commensurate progress in completing the banking union. This article outlines and explains the ECB’s key messages concerning these proposals that are of particular importance for macroprudential regulation and policy. In particular, the ECB considers that the ongoing discussions on the CRR/CRD IV package provide the opportunity to make targeted changes to the macroprudential toolkit to make it more efficient and consistent. In the medium term, a comprehensive review of the macroprudential toolkit is still necessary to streamline procedures within the framework and to complement it with tools to address risks in the real estate and non-banking sectors.
JEL Code
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
17 June 2015
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1812
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Abstract
In this study, we explore the relationship between certain structural features of the banking sectors in EU Member States and the performance of the respective banking sectors over the financial cycle. Using the financial cycle indicator developed by Stremmel (2015), we estimate the impact of the structural features of the banking sector on the amplitude of the financial cycle. Our results suggest that the concentration of the banking sector, the share of foreign banks, the size and stability of financial institutions, the share of foreign currency loans and financial inter-linkages contribute to the amplitude and hence the variability of financial cycles. This study provides important insights into the appropriate design of various structural and cyclical policy instruments as well.
JEL Code
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E61 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Policy Objectives, Policy Designs and Consistency, Policy Coordination
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation