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Financial shock transmission to heterogeneous firms:
the earnings-based borrowing constraint channel

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Abstract

We study the heterogeneous impact of jointly identified monetary policy and global risk shocks on corporate funding costs. We disentangle these two shocks in a structural Bayesian Vector Autoregression framework and investigate their respective effects on funding costs of heterogeneous firms using micro-data for the US. We tease out mechanisms underlying the effects by contrasting financial frictions arising from traditional asset-based collateral constraints with the recent earnings-based borrowing constraint hypothesis, differentiating firms across leverage and earnings. Our empirical evidence strongly supports the earnings-based borrowing constraint hypothesis. We find that global risk shocks have stronger and more heterogeneous effects on corporate funding costs which depend on firms’ position within the earnings distribution.

Keywords: corporate spreads; earnings-based borrowing constraint; heterogeneous firms; monetary policy shocks; global risk shocks.

JEL Classification: G12; E43; E52.
Non-technical summary

Heterogeneity in firm fundamentals has been found to play a role in the transmission of monetary policy shocks to firms’ funding constraints. Other types of shocks, such as sudden shifts in global risk sentiment unrelated to monetary policy, may however also matter and transmit heterogeneously across firms, possibly via different channels, but also depending on the type of borrowing constraint that firms face. The literature has identified two types of borrowing constraints: the asset-based and the earnings-based constraints. The former emphasizes the liquidation value of physical assets that firms can pledge as collateral – a building block in the financial accelerator literature. The latter highlights the central role of firms’ cash flows for corporate borrowing, particularly in the US. Understanding how monetary and global risk shocks transmit to firms depending on the type of their borrowing constraints is important because shocks that tighten firms’ funding constraints can adversely affect real outcomes such as investment and production.

The contribution of this paper is threefold. We first propose an identification strategy to separate global risk and monetary policy shocks. Insights into firm-level heterogeneity of funding costs responses to global risk and monetary policy shocks are limited precisely because it is empirically challenging to disentangle the two shocks and their effects. Our shock identification builds on a daily Bayesian Vector Autoregression (BVAR) framework with US financial market variables and a combination of sign, narrative and relative magnitude restrictions. This allows us to obtain both shocks from the same integrated model, while also ensuring that global risk shocks are purged of any confounding effects of actions by the Federal Reserve on global risk appetite.

We then analyse two interrelated dimensions – firm heterogeneity and the type of shock – to understand how firms’ funding costs (bonds and equity) as well as their default prospects respond to these shocks. In so doing, we tease out potential mechanisms underlying the effects by contrasting the asset-based with the earnings-based borrowing constraint, differentiating firms across leverage and earnings. We conjecture that, in case the earnings-based borrowing constraint is more prevalent, the responses of firms’ funding costs to financial shocks are more muted for the tails of firms with above and below average leverage but more pronounced for the tails of firms with above or below average earnings in the distribution of firms. Our empirical evidence strongly supports the prevalence of the earnings-based borrowing constraint hypothesis. Overall, we find that global risk shocks have stronger and more heterogeneous effects on corporate funding costs which depend on firms’ position within the earnings distribution.

Finally, we zoom into the reaction of the pricing components of corporate bonds. We decompose bond spreads into an expected default component, capturing firm fundamentals, and an “excess bond premium” (EBP) component, a proxy for investor risk sentiment. We assess via which of these two components the transmission of shocks is stronger. We find that a large share of the response in bond spreads is driven by their non-fundamental component, the EBP. Using panel local projections, we find that both monetary policy and global risk shocks
have a persistent impact on funding costs and default probabilities, with the global risk shock being relatively stronger.
1 Introduction

Heterogeneity in firm fundamentals has been found to play a role in the transmission of monetary policy shocks to firms’ funding constraints. Other types of shocks, such as sudden shifts in global risk sentiment unrelated to monetary policy, may however also matter and transmit heterogeneously across firms, possibly via different channels. Insights into firm-level heterogeneity of funding costs responses to global risk and monetary policy shocks are limited because it is empirically challenging to disentangle the two shocks and their effects.

In this paper, we first propose an identification strategy to separate global risk and monetary policy shocks in a daily Bayesian Vector Autoregression (BVAR) framework. We then analyse two interrelated dimensions – firm heterogeneity and the type of shock – to understand how firms’ funding costs as well as their default prospects respond to these shocks. We tease out potential mechanisms underlying the effects by contrasting canonical asset-based collateral constraints with the more recent earnings-based borrowing constraint hypothesis, differentiating firms across leverage and earnings. Understanding how monetary and global risk shocks transmit to firms depending on the type of their borrowing constraint matters because shocks that tighten firms’ funding constraints can adversely affect real outcomes such as investment and production.

We add to our understanding of firms’ funding constraints along three avenues. First, we draw a distinction between the effects of monetary policy shocks and global risk shocks. Recent geopolitical events such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine and central bankers’ grappling with inflation have underscored the need to disentangle heightened funding costs due to either “pure” global risk or US monetary policy shocks. While previous papers have focused on firms’ responses to high-frequency monetary policy shocks, recent evidence suggests that changes to the global risk environment that are unrelated to monetary policy also impact asset prices and hence affect firms’ funding conditions (Bekaert, Hoerova, et al., 2021), notably in ways that differ both across firms and across sources of funding (debt versus equity).

Our shock identification builds on a daily Bayesian Vector Autoregression (BVAR) framework with US financial market variables and a combination of sign and narrative restrictions (Brandt et al., 2021). Using a BVAR at daily frequency allows us to obtain both shocks from the same integrated model. This ensures that global risk shocks are purged of any confounding effects of actions by the Federal Reserve on global risk appetite. While US monetary policy has been identified as a driver of the Global Financial Cycle (Rey, 2015) and hence of global risk-off episodes (Miranda-Agrippino & Rey, 2020, 2022), there are numerous episodes of heightened global risk that are disconnected from US monetary policy (Caldara et al., 2023).
In contrast to previous studies, we do not focus exclusively on narrow time windows around FOMC meetings but instead retrieve the entire series of daily shocks to asset markets. Such shocks can stem e.g. from geopolitical events as well as from smaller narrative events. We obtain a continuous series of shocks at daily frequency which allows us to estimate their impact across the entire series of corporate funding costs at each point in the sample period.

Second, we expand on existing insights on the heterogeneous transmission of financial shocks to firms’ funding costs and default prospects across the distribution of firms (Anderson & Cesa-Bianchi, 2023; Palazzo & Yamarthy, 2022). We do so by contrasting traditional financial frictions arising from asset-based constraints with the recent earnings-based borrowing constraint (EBC) hypothesis, differentiating firms across their leverage and earnings distributions, respectively. While firms’ borrowing constraints are typically analysed based on the value of physical assets that firms can pledge as collateral – a building block of the classic financial accelerator literature – recent evidence suggests that borrowing constraints based on earnings have become an increasingly important determinant of firms’ access to financing (Drechsel, 2023; Lian & Ma, 2020). This can have implications for the transmission of adverse financial shocks: financial acceleration through firms’ balance sheet may be dampened under EBCs (Lian & Ma, 2020). Higher earnings can directly relax borrowing constraints when firms’ borrowing capacity is not directly tied to the liquidation value of physical assets. Conversely, firms with low earnings can become relatively more constrained when adverse financial shocks impact both their discounted stream of cash flows and overall funding costs in capital markets.

We therefore conjecture that the responses of firms’ funding costs to financial shocks are more muted for the tails of firms with above and below average leverage but more pronounced for the tails of firms with above or below average earnings in the distribution of firms. We find robust evidence that this is indeed the case. As a further possible determinant of firms’ heterogeneous responses to financial shocks, we also consider firms’ earnings-to-interest, i.e. interest coverage ratio, which can be seen as a hybrid indicator bridging the earnings-based and the collateral-based borrowing constraints (Drechsel & Kim, 2022; Greenwald, 2019).

Using a sample of large US corporates at weekly frequency over the period 2000-2021 and firm panel regressions, we analyse how bond spreads, equity prices and default probabilities of firms in the tails of the distribution respond to monetary policy and global risk shocks along these three dimensions of firm heterogeneity, i.e. leverage, earnings, and interest cover ratios. We find that global risk shocks have stronger and more heterogeneous effects on corporate funding costs which depend on firms’ position within the earnings distribution. A global risk

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3To ensure that we adequately separate the two forces, we show that both identified shocks correlate strongly with conventional measures of monetary policy surprises and global risk. Our global risk shock comoves well with the CBOE volatility index (VIX) and with measures of global uncertainty shocks (Bobasu et al., 2023). Our monetary policy shocks align with policy surprises around FOMC announcement dates.

4Anecdotal evidence suggests that the information content of firm leverage as an indicator of default risk may have lost ground in recent years. See, for example, Financial Times (2021, 2023a, 2023b).

5We obtain dynamic responses from firm-level local projections and confirm robustness of the main results at the bond-level as well.
shock equivalent to a 10 basis point unexpected decrease in US Treasury yields pushes up a firm’s credit spread by an additional 12 basis points and depresses its equity price by additional 3.6 percentage points on average relative to a monetary policy shock.

Third, we zoom into the reaction of the pricing components of corporate bonds. We decompose bond spreads into an expected default risk component, capturing firm fundamentals, and an “excess bond premium” (EBP) component, a proxy for investor risk sentiment, following Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012). We assess via which of these two components the transmission of shocks is stronger. We find that a large share of the response in bond spreads is driven by their non-fundamental component, the EBP. Using panel local projections following Jordà (2005), we assess the persistence of the impact of the identified shocks on funding costs and default probabilities across firms and find persistent effects for both monetary policy and global risk shocks, with stronger impact for the latter.

**Related literature.** This paper is at the intersection of two main strands of literature. The first strand relates to the identification of shocks based on sign restrictions (Arias et al., 2018) and narrative restrictions (Antolín-Díaz & Rubio-Ramírez, 2018). While high-frequency identification of monetary policy shocks has become a widely used approach, such identification does not lend itself to comparing these shocks to global risk shocks as event dates may not overlap. Our approach – a combination of sign, narrative, and relative magnitude restrictions – builds on the concept of “financial conditions”, following in particular Brandt et al. (2021). As an alternative way to identifying global risk shocks, some studies exploit changes in the price of gold around narrative events as an external instrument for uncertainty shocks in proxy SVARs (Bobasu et al., 2023; Georgiadis et al., 2021; Piffer et al., 2018). Our approach in turn does not depend on the strength of an external instrument and related sparsity of narrative events to retrieve a daily shock series.

The second strand of related literature investigates the role of firm heterogeneity in the transmission of shocks to firms’ funding costs and real outcomes. The evidence on heterogeneous firm responses focuses mostly on monetary policy shocks, usually in an event study coupled with high-frequency shock identification frameworks. A common finding of these papers is that firms with weaker fundamentals are worse off following a monetary tightening shock as they experience a more pronounced fall in their investment, employment, sales (Arbatli Saxegaard et al., 2022; Cloyne et al., 2018; Jeenas, 2019; Jungherr et al., 2022; Öztürk, 2022) or a more pronounced increase in credit spreads or default risk (Anderson & Cesa-Bianchi, 2023; Palazzo & Yamarthy, 2022; Smolyansky & Suarez, 2021). An exception is Ottonello et al.\(^6\) The global risk shock captures flight-to-safety dynamics: heightened global risk aversion triggers a shift out of equity and into safe long-term US bonds, while strengthening the US dollar given its status as a safe haven.\(^7\)

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\(^7\)In a similar manner, Cieslak and Schrimpf (2019) combine monotonicity restrictions across maturities in the yield curve with high-frequency comovement in equity prices and interest rates to obtain monetary policy shocks purged of macroeconomic news from monetary policy communication.

\(^8\)Examples of papers that employ high-frequency shock identification in this context include Anderson and Cesa-Bianchi (2023), Arbatli Saxegaard et al. (2022), Cloyne et al. (2018), Fabiani et al. (2022), Jeenas (2019), and Smolyansky and Suarez (2021).

\(^9\)The heterogeneous impact of monetary policy on investment of riskier firms is also found to result from the
(2022) who find that firms with low default risk are the most responsive to monetary shocks because they face a flatter marginal cost curve for financing investment.

Granular evidence from bond prices shows that monetary policy shocks trigger stronger responses of excess bond returns for risky, low-rated corporate bonds. Smolyansky and Suarez (2021) argue that this is due to the Fed’s information effect on fundamentals: an unexpected monetary tightening signals positive news about the state of the economy, thus leading riskier corporate bonds with higher business cycle sensitivity to outperform. Guo et al. (2020) find that heterogeneous responses to monetary policy shocks in bond excess returns are driven more by news about (non-fundamental) risk premia than about cash flows. Ferreira et al. (2023) link heterogeneous responses to monetary policy shocks to ex-ante differences in firms’ excess bond premium which they rationalize through firms’ marginal product of capital curves. Closest to our paper is the work by Anderson and Cesa-Bianchi (2023) who also decompose corporate bond spreads into a fundamental and excess bond premium component and show evidence of a heterogeneous response of these components to monetary policy shocks across the leverage distribution of firms. Our results differ from others in that we find firms’ funding costs to respond rather homogeneously to monetary policy shocks while they respond heterogeneously to global risk shocks, and the differential response can be traced back to heterogeneity in the tightness of firms’ earnings.

Our findings hence speak to the emerging literature that stresses the role of firms’ earnings for access to funding. Earnings-based borrowing constraints have been found to be more prevalent than traditional asset-based collateral constraints particularly among large US firms (Greenwald, 2019; Lian & Ma, 2020). Lian and Ma (2020) show indeed that for large US non-financial firms only 20% of debt by value is collateralized by physical assets, whereas 80% is based predominantly on cash flows from firms’ operations, with implications for firms’ access to finance.10 Drechsel (2023) argues that understanding whether asset repricing occurs as a result of changing expectations about the tightness of earnings-based constraints is also important from a macroeconomic perspective as it could affect policy trade-offs.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines our approach to identify monetary policy and global risk shocks in an integrated BVAR model and validates these shocks in the data. Section 3 presents the analysis of firm heterogeneity, including the firm level data and descriptive statistics, as well as the empirical approach to analyzing the heterogeneous shock transmission. Section 4 presents the results of the firm-level regressions and local projections, including robustness checks and Section 5 concludes.

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10 Other studies show that the earnings-based borrowing constraint is prevalent also among small firms (Caglio et al., 2021) and emerging market firms (Camara & Sangiacomo, 2022).
2 A BVAR model to identify shocks to financial conditions

**BVAR model and identification.** In a first step, we identify two types of shocks: a US monetary policy shock and a global risk shock. We rely on a structural daily Bayesian vector autoregression model (BVAR) whose structural form representation is as follows:

\[ Ay_t = c + \sum_{l=0}^{p} B^l y_{t-l} + \varepsilon_t, \]  

(1)

with vector \( y_t \) containing the endogenous variables, the vector \( c \) stacking the intercepts and \( \varepsilon_t \) containing the structural shocks. The lag length \( p \) is set to 4 to allow for sufficient dynamics in the responses of the endogenous variables.\(^{11}\)

We want to focus on shocks that are important determinants of funding constraints for firms by encompassing a set of key variables that together summarise how costly it is for corporations to finance themselves. For bank-based financing, short- and long-term interest rates matter, while for market-based financing the cost of equity and corporate bond pricing are important determinants of the cost of funding. Also fluctuations in the exchange rate can matter. Various measures of these so-called 'financial conditions' exist, which differ in coverage and setup (see, among others, Hatzius et al. (2010), Brave and Butters (2018), Koop and Korobilis (2014), Arrigoni et al. (2022)). Financial conditions take a central role in monitoring the transmission of monetary policy and the risks to financial stability (Adrian and Liang (2018)).

To capture the wider concept of financial conditions, we include five endogenous variables in \( y_t \) which are key indicators for funding costs for firms: 3-month and 10-year US government bond benchmark yields, the cyclically-adjusted price to earnings ratio as a measure of equity prices (CAPE), the US nominal effective exchange rate and corporate spreads.\(^{12}\) This choice of variables is in line with Arrigoni et al. (2022). We express yields and corporate spreads in plain differences and the other endogenous variables in first differences of the logarithm.

We exploit co-movements in this set of asset prices to identify five different structural shocks to financing conditions. We are mostly interested in the US monetary policy and global risk shock, but we simultaneously identify other important driving factors behind financial conditions to ensure that our shocks of interest are disentangled from these.\(^{13}\) We also estimate the model at daily frequency as financial conditions change at high frequency, and taking longer time intervals would allow more room for the shocks to be confounded by other factors.\(^{14}\)

\(^{11}\)As shown in Table A.1, the results are robust to choosing a smaller or larger number of lags.

\(^{12}\)Data for the yields is taken from Refinitiv; CAPE is based on the US-DataStream Market from Datastream using as deflator US CPI, All Urban Consumers from the US Bureau of Labour Statistics; nominal effective exchange rate (against 48 main trading partners) is taken from J.P. Morgan; corporate spread is the spread between the ICE Bank Of America 15 + Year BBB United States Corporate Index taken from Merrill Lynch and the US 10-year Government Benchmark Bid Yield.

\(^{13}\)As shown in Table A.1, however, only identifying the US monetary policy and global risk shock generates median shock series that are highly correlated with the shocks as estimated in our fully identified model.

\(^{14}\)When testing for firm heterogeneity in the responses to the shocks, the daily shocks are aggregated to match
Table 1: Sign restriction identification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>US monetary policy</th>
<th>US macro risk</th>
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<td>Long-term rate</td>
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<td>Exchange rate</td>
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<td>Corporate spread</td>
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Note: CAPE refers to cyclically-adjusted price to earnings ratio. A US monetary policy (macro risk) shock is assumed to have a stronger impact effect on US yields (US equities) than a foreign monetary policy (macro risk) shock, and a global risk shock is assumed to have a stronger impact effect on the US dollar effective exchange rate compared to a foreign macro risk shock. The narrative restriction imposes that the Lehman collapse in 2008 was characterised by an adverse shock to global risk sentiment and this shock was the largest relative driver of the fall in US equities on the day. All restrictions are imposed on impact.

Shock identification is achieved through a combination of sign, relative magnitude and narrative restrictions, in a similar vein as Brandt et al. (2021), Cieslak and Schrimp (2019) and others. Table 1 summarises the sign restrictions: a + and - denote an increase or decrease respectively in the variable following a specific shock, while empty fields leave that parameter unrestricted. All restrictions are imposed on impact as markets typically react to news within the same day.

First, we identify a tightening US monetary policy shock as driving up US yields while depressing equity prices and appreciating the exchange rate. To better separate it from the foreign shocks, we further restrict that the reaction of long-term yields in the US should be stronger following US monetary policy as compared to foreign monetary policy shocks. Second, similar to Brandt et al. (2021), the global risk shock captures flight-to-safety dynamics that occurs when global investors rotate into safe assets amid heightened global risk aversion, which causes risk asset prices to fall, demand for safe US dollar-denominated assets to rise and the US dollar to appreciate (Ahmed, 2023; Georgiadis et al., 2021). In addition, a narrative event is imposed to strengthen the identification; we assume that on the day of the Lehman Brothers collapse an adverse shock to global risk sentiment occurred which was the largest factor behind the drop in US equity prices on that day. A third type of identified shocks

the weekly frequency of the US corporate dataset.

15 Since the BVAR includes also US demand shocks (macro risk shock), the identified US monetary policy shock should be akin to a “pure” monetary policy shock, net of information effects.

16 This does not exclude that other shocks – such as an adverse US macro risk shock – drove equity prices on that day as well; we only assume that the contribution of adverse global risk sentiment was larger than each of the contributions of the other shocks individually. This restriction is supported by the data; on the day of the Lehman Brothers collapse, the US dollar appreciated, equity prices fell and 10-year US Treasury yields declined, which is how our global risk shock is identified. By contrast, should the domestic US macro shock
are US macroeconomic risk shocks, with a positive shift in macro risk sentiment identified as supporting long-term yields, equity prices and the US dollar, while compressing corporate spreads.\textsuperscript{17} To better separate domestic from foreign shocks, US macro risk shocks are assumed to have a stronger effect on US equity prices than foreign macro risk shocks. Finally, a foreign monetary policy and macro risk shock are identified by assuming similar co-movements between yields and equity prices as their domestic shock counterparts, but with an opposite effect on the exchange rate (as the shock comes from abroad).\textsuperscript{18} This, again, is in line with Brandt et al. (2021). Finally, shocks to global risk sentiment are assumed to have a stronger impact on the US dollar than shocks to foreign macro risk, which reflects the importance of the US as a safe haven currency.\textsuperscript{19}

The BVAR model is estimated over the period January 1995 to October 2022 at daily frequency in order to capture higher frequency changes in the perception of markets of the monetary policy stance of the Fed and global risk sentiment. We use Bayesian techniques for estimation and inference. We follow the techniques proposed by Arias et al. (2018) for the identification of the structural shocks using sign and magnitude restriction identification and assuming a normal-inverse-Wishart prior over the reduced form parameters.\textsuperscript{20} Narrative identification is imposed in line with Antolín-Díaz and Rubio-Ramírez (2018). The structural shocks used in the firm heterogeneity analysis are based on the median over 10,000 draws that satisfy the full set of imposed restrictions.

**Model discussion and validation.** Our model setup has clear advantages for our research question. A first benefit is that we can identify monetary policy and global risk shocks simultaneously, while still controlling for foreign spillovers. Changes in the monetary policy stance often go hand-in-hand with changes in global risk sentiment, particularly in the US given its dominant role in the international financial system (Miranda-Agrippino & Rey, 2020). As these shocks can affect firms differently, it is key to ensure that the identified US monetary policy shock is well separated from shocks to global risk. We need to account for foreign shocks as well, as monetary policy shocks are often correlated across countries. We do this by simultaneously identifying a foreign counterpart for the monetary policy and macro risk shock.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{17}When leaving the restriction on corporate bond spreads out, the identified shocks of interest are not affected, which means that this restriction is well supported by the data, see Table A.1.

\textsuperscript{18}This follows the stylised fact that asset prices such as interest rates and equity prices strongly co-move in advanced economies, also conditional upon monetary policy shocks.

\textsuperscript{19}This restriction is based on the assumption that the US dollar is a safe haven currency and a noticeable part of the variation of the US dollar is driven by shifts in global risk sentiment (see e.g. Georgiadis et al. (2021) and the references therein). As such, a shift in global risk sentiments affects the US dollar directly. A foreign macro risk shock, by contrast, affects the US dollar effective exchange rate only indirectly via the trade weight of the country in question with the US, which on average is small. The shocks are however very robust to leaving this restriction out, see Table A.1, which also indicates that the restriction is well reflected in the data.

\textsuperscript{20}Implemented through the BEAR toolbox by Dieppe et al. (2016).

\textsuperscript{21}An alternative, popular approach to identify monetary policy shifts is through high-frequency movements of interest rates and other asset prices within a narrow time window around the FOMC press release (Jarociński & Karadi, 2020). For our setup, this approach seems less well suited; while the event window is clearly defined for monetary policy shocks, it is less clear which window should be considered for other financial shocks such
Figure 1: Model-based drivers of US financial conditions since the COVID-19 pandemic

Note: This figure shows accumulated contributions of the identified BVAR shocks to the US financial conditions index (FCI). An increase (decrease) in the FCI indicates a loosening (tightening) of financial conditions. The FCI index is constructed as an equally weighted average of the historical decomposition of the individual variables in the BVAR as proposed by Arrigoni et al. (2022).

A second benefit is that the identification within a VAR setting will generate a continuous shock series which allows to incorporate daily dynamics in market pricing. In response to daily news, markets continuously reassess their interpretation of the monetary policy stance of the Federal Reserve and of global risk sentiment, which affects funding costs for firms. Important announcements of the Federal Reserve, as well as nuances in its communication, are often made on days other than those of FOMC meeting (Bauer & Swanson, 2022; Jayawickrema & Swanson, 2021). Moreover, shocks to global risk sentiment such as the 2008 global financial crisis or the COVID-19 pandemic take time to unfold as markets try to assess the economic implications of such a shock. Identifying monetary policy and global risk shocks on a daily basis might therefore capture important dynamics which might otherwise be overlooked.22

The BVAR model results underline that US monetary policy shocks and global risk shocks are key determinants of financial conditions in the US. To illustrate that, Figure 1 shows the drivers of US financial conditions since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, with the financial conditions index calculated as an equally weighted combination of the five endogenous variables in the BVAR following Arrigoni et al. (2022). In the first weeks of the pandemic, financial conditions for US firms tightened substantially due to a combination of a worsening macro outlook and adverse global risk sentiment. When the Fed responded with unprecedented monetary policy stimulus, and global risk sentiment improved due to effective vaccine development, it again became substantially cheaper for firms to finance themselves with financial conditions reaching levels looser than pre-pandemic conditions. In the course of 2022, the steep monetary policy tightening of the Fed to fight record high inflation was effective in tightening

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22Our approach in addition accommodates the limitations of our sample of asset prices, which we obtain at weekly frequency, as well as the length of our sample period, which spans the past 20 years.
financial conditions again. In sum, it is clear that shifts in the Fed’s monetary policy stance and shocks to global risk sentiment are key drivers of financial conditions for firms in the US. The forecast error variance decomposition confirms that US monetary policy and global risk shocks together explain about a third of the total variability in US financial conditions over our sample.\footnote{This is based on the 20-day ahead median forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD), taking the average over the FEVD of the different endogenous variables as a proxy for the FEVD for financial conditions. The variable-specific FEVD ranges between 22-46 percent.}

The identified structural shocks align well with events known to have been related to US monetary policy and global risk shocks. Regarding the US monetary policy shock, there is a close correlation between the monetary policy shocks of our daily BVAR model on the days of FOMC meetings with the high-frequency Fed monetary policy surprises identified in a narrow window around the press conferences of Jarociński and Karadi (2020), as shown in Figure A.1 in Appendix A.\footnote{For this exercise, we focus on the pure monetary policy shocks as filtered from informational effects. This is because in the BVAR model, monetary policy shocks are separated from macro risk shocks, see Table 1.} It is important to note, however, that our set-up attains a wider definition of monetary policy shocks; we also regard changes in investors’ perception about the monetary policy stance as a shock to monetary policy, which can happen following communication of Federal Reserve officials on days other than FOMC meetings or important data releases, or when investors need more time to digest monetary policy decisions. For that reason, our daily BVAR captures a wider set of monetary policy shocks compared to the approach when information is drawn only from a narrow window around the FOMC press conference, as also shown in Figure A.1. Concerning the global risk shock, the shock series co-move well with the US VIX which is often used as an indicator of global uncertainty, and the identified global risk shock spikes on days that are known to have been associated with large shocks to global risk sentiment, such as September 11 attacks and the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, see Figure A.2 in Appendix A. There is also a close correlation of our global risk shocks series and the global economic uncertainty measures as constructed by Bobasu et al. (2023) who proxy global uncertainty by measuring the inherent difficulty to predict economic outcomes, following the work of Jurado et al. (2015). This is shown in Figure A.3 in Appendix A.

3 Analysis of firm heterogeneity

After having identified the two shocks, we next set up a firm-level regression framework to analyze the heterogeneous responses of firms’ funding costs, as captured by their bond spreads and equity prices, together with their default prospects using a rich firm- and bond-level data of a sample of large US corporates.

3.1 Data and descriptive statistics

\textbf{Firm-level data.} The sample comprises listed companies included in the S&P 500 index. We consider both current and historical constituents, i.e. companies that were included in the
S&P 500 index at any point in time between January 2000 and May 2021.\textsuperscript{25} This results in an initial sample of 436 firms.\textsuperscript{26} Focusing on the largest companies is instructive for several reasons. For one, it allows us to zoom in on the subset of US firms where EBCs are particularly likely to matter as documented by Lian and Ma (2020).\textsuperscript{27} Firms selected into the S&P 500 are representative of the bulk of systemic macro-financial risks. They are “granular” as they account for a large share of business cycle activity in the US (Gabaix, 2011) and are exposed to both monetary policy and global risk shocks through their international activities. A sudden tightening in financial conditions is therefore likely to lead to substantial financial amplification in the macroeconomy, which EBCs more than traditional asset-based constraints may be able to dampen (Lian & Ma, 2020). In addition, limiting our attention to only firms that obtain a substantial share of their external financing through capital markets enables us to abstract from substitution effects between market- and bank-based financing which may apply for medium-sized corporations. At the same time, focusing on S&P 500 firms limits the external validity of our results with respect to smaller corporations with potentially less liquid bonds.

We analyze firm heterogeneity along a set of balance sheet indicators collected at quarterly frequency from Thomson Reuters Datastream. To proxy for the extent of collateral-based constraints, we consider a firm’s financial leverage measured by the debt-to-equity ratio (LEV). Arguably, firm leverage is an imperfect proxy for the degree of collateral-based borrowing. However, it reflects the extent to which creditors (relative to shareholders) have claims on the assets of the company in a liquidation scenario and therefore the financial constraints that are tied to the value of assets.\textsuperscript{28} Figure C.1 in the Appendix shows that the debt-to-equity and debt-to-assets ratios of the firms in our sample, as expected, are highly correlated over the sample period and may therefore be used interchangeably.\textsuperscript{29}

As an indicator of the tightness of a firm’s EBC, we use the 12-month forward earnings per share (EPSE). Expected earnings per share is among the most commonly used, forward-looking indicators of profitability that captures the discounted stream of expected profits per share accruing to creditors.\textsuperscript{30} It also facilitates comparison across firms’ market size by way of normalizing earnings to the number of shares outstanding. In addition, we consider a firm’s

\textsuperscript{25}While listing and delisting of firms in the S&P 500 index is endogenous, such events do not occur as frequently as to warrant serious concerns about confounding effects in our analysis at weekly frequency.

\textsuperscript{26}This sample size is similar to Palazzo and Yamarthy (2022) who estimate the reaction of CDS spreads to monetary policy surprises on a sample of 585 non-financial firms with an average of 300 firms around each FOMC announcement date.

\textsuperscript{27}Lian and Ma (2020) find that cash-flow based borrowing is less common among small firms as they tend to exhibit low or negative earnings.

\textsuperscript{28}Looking at the incidence of key terms in loan covenants, Drechsel (2023) finds that the maximum leverage ratio is the most common term that is unrelated to earnings (accounting for 21% of all covenants).

\textsuperscript{29}While basic accounting would imply a perfect correlation between the two, in practice there can be measurement error and differences in data treatment. In our analysis, we confirm that our results are not driven by the choice of proxy for financial leverage.

\textsuperscript{30}Alternative measures such as the return on equity (ROE) come with the caveat that they are backward looking and reflect book values as compared to market values (e.g. price-earnings ratio). Since EPS are scaled by the number of shares outstanding of a given firm, there may be concerns about comparability across firms. In Appendix F.5, we additionally classify firms according to their ROE and PE ratio as well as the growth rates of expected and realized EPS.
EBIT-to-interest expense ratio or “interest coverage ratio” (ICR) as a hybrid indicator of asset-based and earnings-based borrowing constraints. The ICR reflects a firm’s ability to service debt out of current earnings. Because it is a function of both earnings as well as outstanding debt obligations, it can be interpreted as a hybrid indicator between leverage and profitability.\(^{31}\)

We also collect weekly data on equity prices from the same source. To obtain a measure of firms’ fundamental default risk, we use the expected default frequencies (EDFs) of publicly listed firms from Moody’s KMV CreditEdge database.\(^{32}\) We aggregate the daily series of EDFs to weekly averages. For robustness purposes, we complement the data with an additional model-free measure of a firm’s credit risk by retrieving firm-level spreads on credit default swaps (CDS) with a 5-year tenor from Bloomberg.

**Bond-level data.** We obtain data from Bloomberg covering information on corporate bonds issued by our sample of firms. Bonds are selected according to the following criteria: (i) active or matured, traded on any day between 7 January 2000 and 17 December 2021, (ii) issued by non-financial firms, (iii) denominated in USD, (iv) excluding private placements, (v) subject to a fixed coupon schedule, (vi) a remaining time to maturity between one and 30 years, and (vii) a minimum volume of USD 1 mn and a maximum volume of USD 5 bn. Criteria (i)-(iv) yield an initial sample of 12,996 bonds.

Cross-sectional information on bond characteristics as well as weekly time series of option-adjusted spreads (OAS) and option-adjusted bond duration are obtained from Bloomberg. An OAS is a model-based measure of a bond’s credit risk above and beyond the maturity-matched risk-free rate (a zero-coupon US Treasury yield).\(^{33}\) The underlying spread model takes embedded options such as early redemption into account. These options change the stream of discounted cash flows in the spread calculation. OAS therefore not only control for credit risk but also for contingent cash flow risk and make bonds of various different characteristics more comparable.\(^{34}\)

\(^{31}\)Some may argue that high leverage or low profitability may not necessarily be a clear sign of weak firm fundamentals. High leverage can, on the one hand, be costly because it can affect investors’ expectations of the firm’s ability to remain in business; on the other hand, it can be beneficial by improving managerial incentives (Asgharian, 2003; Jensen, 1986; Wruck, 1990). A high leverage/low profitability firm could also be a successful, possibly young, firm that based on its good expected performance is able to borrow a large multiple of its equity/profits. What matters for our question, however, is the relative position of a firm in the leverage or profitability distribution, with leverage and profitability used as (indirect) proxies of the asset-based vs earnings-based borrowing constraints, respectively. Moreover, the growth prospects of a young firm should be captured by the forward-looking nature of expected earnings. Finally, the fact that we look at large S&P500 firms demands a certain level of maturity from firms in the sample that distinguishes them from the “high-leverage, low-profitability” type of start-ups.

\(^{32}\)Moody’s Analytics (2011) derive EDFs from a proprietary model of corporate default in the spirit of Merton (1974). The model takes a firm’s market value of asset, its asset volatility, and leverage as inputs, defines a default threshold, and converts the resulting distance to default into a model-implied probability of default over a 12-month horizon. The EDF is thus a market-based summary statistic of publicly available information on corporate credit risk.

\(^{33}\)For further details about OAS, see Gabaix et al. (2007) and O’Kane and Sen (2005). OAS have been used in similar contexts e.g. by Anderson and Cesa-Bianchi (2023), Caballero et al. (2019), Cavallo and Valenzuela (2009) and others.

\(^{34}\)Appendix D details how our data choices and estimation deviate from Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012).
Table 2: Bond and firm characteristics – Summary statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>P25</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>P75</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Bond characteristics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of bonds per firm/week</td>
<td>38.24</td>
<td>82.29</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>23.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bond volume (mil)</td>
<td>640.72</td>
<td>636.10</td>
<td>250.00</td>
<td>500.00</td>
<td>800.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maturity at issue (years)</td>
<td>15.73</td>
<td>10.02</td>
<td>9.50</td>
<td>10.03</td>
<td>29.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term to maturity (years)</td>
<td>10.49</td>
<td>8.61</td>
<td>3.93</td>
<td>7.31</td>
<td>16.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BB Composite Bond Rating</td>
<td>BBB+</td>
<td>BBB</td>
<td>BBB+</td>
<td>A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS spread (bsp)</td>
<td>174.25</td>
<td>167.40</td>
<td>85.56</td>
<td>138.24</td>
<td>209.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration (years)</td>
<td>6.91</td>
<td>4.53</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>5.91</td>
<td>10.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coupon rate (pct)</td>
<td>5.18</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>6.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bond options (pct)</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                          |        |       |       |        |       |
| (b) Firm characteristics  |        |       |       |        |       |
| EDF 1-Year (%)            | 0.41   | 1.95  | 0.03  | 0.05   | 0.19  |
| Leverage ratio            | 47.68  | 38.77 | 30.70 | 42.46  | 57.51 |
| Realized earnings per share| 4.04  | 8.68  | 1.51  | 2.68   | 4.60  |
| Expected earnings per share| 4.52  | 9.91  | 1.69  | 2.94   | 5.03  |
| Interest coverage ratio   | 12.92  | 46.56 | 3.45  | 7.25   | 13.72 |
| S&P Issuer Rating         | BBB+   | BBB-  | BBB+  | A-     |       |

Note: Sample period: 2000/01/07 – 2021/12/17; Number of bond-week observations: 2,274,822; Number of bonds: 7,674; Number of firms: 407. The sample statistics are based on trimmed data following the procedure described in Appendix Table B.1.

As an additional measure of credit risk at the bond level, we retrieve bond-level composite credit ratings, a measure of the average credit rating of a security across four major rating agencies, from Bloomberg.\footnote{The Bloomberg Composite Credit Rating is an equally weighted average of the ratings by Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, Fitch, and DBRS.} Due to limited data availability, the sample of bonds for which the weekly OAS and duration series can be obtained reduces to 10,679 bonds. We run additional cleaning steps on the series of OAS to ensure that stale bonds, i.e. bonds traded infrequently, do not bias the analysis. Appendix Table B.1 outlines the steps and how they affect the sample size. Cleaning as well as filtering the data according to criteria (v)-(viii) further reduces the sample to 7,364 bonds with which we proceed our analysis. Notwithstanding the reduction in the sample size, the overall count of bond-week observations at each point in time is sufficient and well-distributed across the distribution of credit risk (see Appendix Figure C.2).

Descriptive statistics. Table 2 presents summary statistics for the sample of cleaned and matched bonds. The median bond has a volume of USD 500 mn, a 10-year tenor, a BBB+ composite credit rating, and trades at a 138 basis point spread. The median firm has 12 bonds outstanding in an average week with some firms trading more than 23 bonds in a given week. About 46% of bonds feature embedded options, which makes the use of OAS all the more salient. Note that the distribution of OAS is fairly skewed, ranging from 86 basis points to 209 basis points for the 25\textsuperscript{th} and 75\textsuperscript{th} percentiles with some values above 1500 basis points in...
the right tail. This is partly mechanical due to the underlying pricing model used to compute OAS.\footnote{The OAS is not the price at which the security is exchanged. It reflects the net present value of the bond’s cash flows once state-contingent claims are taken into account.} It also reflects the overall distribution of default risk in the sample that is skewed towards a tail of very risky firms. The bottom panel of Table 2 shows that this skew in firms’ default risk is also reflected in the EDF.

We also verify that the distribution of firms across our measures of LEV, EPSE, and ICR are not identical or overlapping. In other words, those firms that are at the top of the leverage distribution and hence closer to their asset-based borrowing constraint are not at the same time also at the bottom of the earnings distribution and hence close to their earnings-based constraint. Figure 2 plots quantiles of EPSE against quantiles of LEV and ICR. The scatter cloud is very dispersed, suggesting that firms do not necessarily have the same position in the ICR/LEV-distribution as they have in the EPSE-distribution. The stronger bunching of observations along the 45-degree line in panel (ii) also supports the role of ICR as a hybrid indicator of both collateral-based and earnings-based borrowing constraints. It may add information above and beyond a firm’s expected earnings.

Figure 3 illustrates the development of credit spreads across the leverage (left panel) and earnings distribution (right panel) of firms. Up until the Great Recession, highly levered and cash-flow constrained firms paid a multiple of safer firms’ credit spreads on their debt. However, the decade following the GFC saw a strikingly less pronounced difference in credit spreads across firms with strong versus weak fundamentals. In particular, the period of monetary policy normalization indicates that investors demanded little compensation for bearing highly levered firms’ credit risk. These compressed spreads may not come as a surprise: companies were able to tap cheap funding during a period of abundant liquidity provided by central banks. Yet, it may cast doubts on whether our empirical framework is truly able to capture differences in collateral- versus earnings-constrained firms. Section 4 discusses these concerns and possible remedies. At the same time, however, Figure 3 also highlights that investors nevertheless did price risk across the earnings distribution of firms during the past decade. One possible reason for greater attention to profitability measures could stem from the increasing sensitivity of indebted firms’ cash flows and debt servicing costs to changes in interest rates. This observation motivates us to explore the sensitivity of corporate funding costs to monetary policy and global risk shocks.

### 3.2 Decomposing Credit Spreads into Fundamental and Excess Bond Premium Components

Since credit spreads are ultimately a summary statistic of various types of risk, we are also interested in shedding light on how monetary policy and global risk shocks move different components of credit spreads. To better understand the transmission channels of these shocks, we follow the seminal approach of Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) and decompose corporate
bond spreads into a fundamental component that captures expected default risk based on firm fundamentals and a non-fundamental component, the so-called “excess bond premium” (EBP). The EBP is the compensation required by investors beyond the risk of default. Narrowly interpreted, the EBP captures investor risk sentiment. However, it has also been shown to relate to the liquidity constraints faced by financial intermediaries in the intermediation of corporate bonds (Gilchrist & Zakrajšek, 2012).

Our spread model linearly relates an individual firm j’s credit spread $s_{j,t}[k]$ paid on bond k to the firm’s probability of default $EDF_{j,t}$, a vector of bond characteristics capturing the bond’s liquidity risk $X_{j,t}[k]$, and an industry fixed effect $a_j$,

$$s_{j,t}[k] = a_j + \Lambda^j EDF_{j,t} + \Lambda^k X_{j,t}[k] + u_{j,t}[k]$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)

where $u_{j,t}[k]$ denotes the pricing error.\(^{37}\) The vector of bond characteristics $X_{j,t}[k]$ comprises the option-adjusted bond duration, the coupon rate, the age of the traded bond since issuance, the bond volume, and an indicator variable for bonds with underlying options. Appendix D presents results of the estimation of (2) in Table D.1 as well as an overview of how our spread model and data deviate from Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012).\(^{38}\)

Having obtained the pricing errors $u_{j,t}[k]$ of bonds from (2), we compute the predicted spread and the EBP at the firm level,

$$\hat{s}_{j,t} = \sum_k w_{j,t}[k] \hat{s}_{j,t}[k] \quad \text{and} \quad EBP_{j,t} = \sum_k w_{j,t}[k] \hat{u}_{j,t}[k]$$  \hspace{1cm} (3)

\(^{37}\)We refrain from using the natural logarithm of the credit spread as the dependent variable because the transformation would eliminate all observations of negative spreads. Negative OAS observations are not uncommon since the spreads are produced by an underlying model. We confirm in separate robustness checks that using spreads in logs does not change our conclusions.

\(^{38}\)Several robustness checks in Section 4 however confirm that small departures from their setup still deliver qualitatively similar results.
where the weight is \( w_{j,t} = 1/N_{j,t} \), i.e. we take the simple average over all bonds of firm \( j \).\(^{39}\)

Defining the predicted spread and EBP at the firm-level instead of the aggregate level allows us to study the heterogeneous responses of these components to financial shocks depending on firms’ risk profile in the next section.

### 3.3 Estimating Heterogeneous Responses to Risk and Monetary Policy Shocks

We quantify the impact of identified US monetary policy shocks and global risk shocks on corporate funding costs in a panel local projections framework following Jordà (2005). Specifically, we are interested in the heterogeneous responses of corporate bond spreads (and their components) and equity prices depending on whether firms are relatively closer to their earnings constraint (low EPSE) or to their asset-based constraint (high LEV). We dynamically sort firms according to these weak/strong fundamentals and include interaction terms with the respective shocks to test for differential sensitivities.\(^{40}\) To that end, we specify a model that interacts the shocks with indicator variables for “tail firms”, i.e. firms at the bottom and top of the distribution of leverage and earnings.

To identify tail firms, let \( z_{j,t} \) be the firm-level metric of leverage or profitability, respectively, that we use to categorize firms into “buckets”. We compute the top and bottom \( \tau \)th

---

\(^{39}\)For robustness, we verify that the weighting is immaterial by defining the weight on each individual bond \( k \) by its face value \( V_{j,c,t}[k] \) relative to the total volume of bonds of firm \( j \) outstanding at time \( t \), \( w_{j,c,t}[k] = V_{j,c,t}[k]/\sum V_{j,c,t}[k] \).

\(^{40}\)In contrast to Arbatli Saxegaard et al. (2022) who define leverage cutoffs according to the average over the entire sample period, we dynamically sort firms into weak and strong categories every five years. This approach allows us to strike a balance between on the one hand ensuring that firms are correctly represented in the distribution when their risk profile changes as they grow and mature, and on the other hand ensuring stability in the estimation.
quantiles \( q \in \{ \tau, 1 - \tau \} \) of the distribution of \( z_t \) over roughly five-year subperiods between January 2000 and December 2021. For each subperiod \( t_i \in \{ t_1, t_2, t_3, t_4 \} \), we then categorize firms into quantile buckets based on their median value \( \bar{z}_{j,t_i} \) in subperiod \( t_i \). Note that we do not re-assign firms to quantile buckets at each point in time but only every subperiod \( t_i \) to guarantee a long enough time series for each firm in the estimation. At the same time, computing quantiles over subperiods rather than over the sample period ensures that firms are correctly classified according to their time-varying risk profile. We define the indicator variable that classifies firm \( j \) in the \( \tau \)th quantile,

\[
1_{z,\tau,t} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \bar{z}_{j,t_i} \leq \tau_{t_i}(\tau) \text{ for } t_i \in \{ t_1, t_2, t_3, t_4 \} \\ 0 & \text{else} \end{cases}
\]

where \( \tau_{t_i}(\tau) \) denotes the cutoff value at quantile \( \tau \) for subperiod \( t_i \) in the firm distribution of \( z_{j,t} \). Analogously, we define the indicator variable that classifies firm \( j \) in the \( 1 - \tau \)th quantile,

\[
1_{z,1-\tau,t} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \bar{z}_{j,t_i} \geq \tau_{t_i}(1 - \tau) \text{ for } t_i \in \{ t_1, t_2, t_3, t_4 \} \\ 0 & \text{else} \end{cases}
\]

In our benchmark analysis, we consider the top and bottom 20th percentiles, i.e. \( \tau = 0.2 \), of the firm distribution according to their debt-to-equity ratio, \( LEV_{j,t} \), their interest coverage ratio, \( ICR_{j,t} \), and their expected earnings per share, \( EPSE_{j,t} \), i.e. \( z \in \{ LEV, ICR, EPSE \} \).

The objective is to analyze whether levered and unprofitable firms in the tails are particularly sensitive to global risk and monetary policy shocks. This would manifest in significant effects of these shocks when interacted with the indicator variables for tail firms, \( 1_{z,\tau,t} \) and \( 1_{z,1-\tau,t} \). Let \( y_{j,t} \) represent our asset price variable of interest of firm \( j \) at time \( t \). We are interested in estimating the dynamic multiplier, or cumulative response, of \( \Delta_h y_{j,t-1} = y_{j,t+h} - y_{j,t-1} \) for \( h = 0, 1, \ldots, H \) with respect to an exogenous shock \( s_t \). We thus estimate a series of panel regressions for each horizon \( h \),

\[
\Delta_h y_{j,t-1} = \beta_h \varepsilon_t^i + \sum_{q \in \{ \tau, 1-\tau \}} \beta_{h,q} \varepsilon_t^i \times 1_{z,q,t} + \phi_{j,h}(L) X_{j,t-1} + e_{j,t+h} \quad h = 0, \ldots, H
\]

where \( \varepsilon_t^i \) denotes the respective identified monetary policy or global risk shock (\( i \in \{ m, r \} \)), \( X_{j,t-1} \) is a vector of control variables, and \( \phi_{j,h}(L) \) denotes its polynomial lag operator. The specification controls for economic activity, interest rates, and market uncertainty. More precisely, the vector \( X_{j,t-1} \) includes four lags of the VIX, the 2-year US Treasury yield, and the Citigroup Economic Surprise Index (CESI), as well as crises dummies for the peak weeks of

\[41\]For example, a firm whose median leverage ratio over the period 2000-2005 is below the 20th percentile leverage ratio computed over the same period will remain in the bottom quantile bucket over this five-year period. In addition, as pointed also by Gomes et al. (2016), since leverage is sticky, one would assume there are no frequent substantial changes.
the Global Financial Crisis and of the Covid-19 pandemic, and industry fixed effects.42

4 Results

Baseline results. This section presents the baseline results of the responses of firm-level bond spreads and equity prices to monetary policy and global risk shocks. We are particularly interested in whether firms with different risk profiles exhibit heterogeneous sensitivities to the two shocks. Table 3 presents the responses of the estimated series of local projections in model (6) following a shock from tighter monetary policy \( s_{mt} \) (panel a) and higher global risk \( s_{rt} \) (panel b) at horizon \( h = 1 \), i.e. upon impact of the respective shocks. Columns (1) through (4) show the responses of corporate spreads, the excess bond premium, the probability of default, and (log) equity price. The shocks are calibrated to a 10-basis point negative (positive) impact on long-term Treasury yields over 5 days for the global risk shock (monetary policy tightening shock).

We first consider the dynamic responses based on the full sample of firms in the first row of panel (a) in Table 3. Monetary tightening leads to a significant initial jump in corporate spreads by 7 basis points. Most of this reaction is driven by the response of the non-fundamental component to the shock in column (2) – the excess bond premium accounts for around 6 basis points of the increase in spreads. Unexpected monetary tightening raises firms’ probability of default on average by about 0.03 percentage points (column (3)), albeit with little statistical significance. Equity prices drop significantly in response to the shock: on average a 10 basis point equivalent increase in US yields leads to a fall in a firm’s equity price by 3.5 percent.43 Overall, the results are in line with a typical reaction of asset prices to an unexpected monetary contraction. Similar results obtain for the global risk shock in the first row in panel (b). A sudden spike in global risk aversion triggers a sharp rise in spreads, with the brunt of the spread reaction again being driven by the non-fundamental EBP. The responses are about twice as large in magnitude compared to the monetary policy shock.

To shed light on how these responses differ across the distribution of firms, we repeat the exercise by augmenting the baseline specification with interaction terms of the shock with dummies for tail firms (see Section 3.3). Table 3 reports the estimates of the augmented models in subsequent rows below the baseline estimates for both the monetary policy shock (panel a) and global risk shock (panel b). As described in Section 3.3, we classify firms by their dynamic position in the distribution of firms according to leverage (LEV), the interest coverage ratio (ICR), and expected earnings per share (EPSE). Firms between the 20% and 80% percentile of this distribution, henceforth denoted the “average” firms, constitute the base relative to the firms in the 10% and 90% percentiles in the distribution of firms (see Section 3.3). The baseline estimates are close to invariant to whether industry or firm fixed effects are used. Note also that in the current setting with \( N < T \), the fixed effects estimator may yield biased estimates, in particular when the sample is split into subsamples.44

As the response of equity prices is restricted for shock identification, a significant response is expected. The magnitude of the effect, and the relative strength of the response of equity following monetary policy versus global risk shocks, is left over to the data.

42 The specification is estimated with pooled OLS and industry fixed effects rather than with a firm fixed effects estimator. The baseline estimates are close to invariant to whether industry or firm fixed effects are used. Note also that in the current setting with \( N < T \), the fixed effects estimator may yield biased estimates, in particular when the sample is split into subsamples.

43 As the response of equity prices is restricted for shock identification, a significant response is expected. The magnitude of the effect, and the relative strength of the response of equity following monetary policy versus global risk shocks, is left over to the data.
Table 3: Sensitivity of asset prices of tail firms upon impact of shocks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel (a): Monetary policy shock $\varepsilon^m_t$</th>
<th>(1) $\Delta$ Spread</th>
<th>(2) $\Delta$ EBP</th>
<th>(3) $\Delta$ EDF</th>
<th>(4) $\Delta \ln(PI)$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon^m_t$</td>
<td>7.395***</td>
<td>5.889***</td>
<td>0.028*</td>
<td>-0.035***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowLEV $\times \varepsilon^m_t$</td>
<td>-1.167</td>
<td>-1.277</td>
<td>0.028*</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighLEV $\times \varepsilon^m_t$</td>
<td>1.842</td>
<td>-0.537</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon^m_t$</td>
<td>7.001***</td>
<td>6.145***</td>
<td>0.016**</td>
<td>-0.034***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowICR $\times \varepsilon^m_t$</td>
<td>2.670</td>
<td>-1.178</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>-0.007*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighICR $\times \varepsilon^m_t$</td>
<td>-0.358</td>
<td>-0.126</td>
<td>-0.005**</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon^m_t$</td>
<td>7.140***</td>
<td>5.938***</td>
<td>0.021**</td>
<td>-0.034***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowEPSE $\times \varepsilon^m_t$</td>
<td>1.861</td>
<td>-0.652</td>
<td>0.048*</td>
<td>-0.004*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighEPSE $\times \varepsilon^m_t$</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.468</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.001*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel (b): Global risk shock $\varepsilon^r_t$</th>
<th>(1) $\Delta$ Spread</th>
<th>(2) $\Delta$ EBP</th>
<th>(3) $\Delta$ EDF</th>
<th>(4) $\Delta \ln(PI)$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon^r_t$</td>
<td>18.628***</td>
<td>15.472***</td>
<td>0.056*</td>
<td>-0.069***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowLEV $\times \varepsilon^r_t$</td>
<td>-4.942</td>
<td>-5.107**</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighLEV $\times \varepsilon^r_t$</td>
<td>10.456</td>
<td>5.000*</td>
<td>0.099</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon^r_t$</td>
<td>15.858***</td>
<td>14.366***</td>
<td>0.027**</td>
<td>-0.065***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowICR $\times \varepsilon^r_t$</td>
<td>18.773**</td>
<td>9.504**</td>
<td>0.176*</td>
<td>-0.022*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighICR $\times \varepsilon^r_t$</td>
<td>-3.616**</td>
<td>-2.995*</td>
<td>-0.011*</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon^r_t$</td>
<td>16.439***</td>
<td>14.232***</td>
<td>0.037**</td>
<td>-0.065***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowEPSE $\times \varepsilon^r_t$</td>
<td>15.194***</td>
<td>8.416***</td>
<td>0.126**</td>
<td>-0.019***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighEPSE $\times \varepsilon^r_t$</td>
<td>-1.695</td>
<td>-0.788</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry FE</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>222,060</td>
<td>219,513</td>
<td>220,710</td>
<td>220,964</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table presents the estimates of model (6) at horizon $h = 0$, i.e. upon impact of the identified monetary policy shock $\varepsilon^m_t$ (panel (a)) and the global risk shock $\varepsilon^r_t$ (panel (b)). The columns indicate the dependent variable. The indicator variables for the tails of firms (20th and 80th percentiles) are computed as formally outlined in (4)-(5). The shocks are calibrated to a 10 basis point increase (panel (a)) and decrease (panel (b)) in the 10-year US Treasury yield. The sample period covers 2000/01/07 – 2021/12/17. Standard errors and controls are omitted to preserve space. The excess bond premium (EBP) and fitted spread are obtained from a decomposition of corporate spreads following the methodology of Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) which is estimated over the sample period. The asterisks denote statistical significance (** for $p < 0.01$, * for $p < 0.05$, * for $p < 0.1$).
firm dummies. We emphasize again that both the interest coverage ratio – the ability to cover debt payment out of current earnings – and expected earnings per share – investors’ stake in the profits of the firm for each share owned – essentially serve as indicators of profitability. A number of instructive comparisons can be drawn along several dimensions.

First, we start by comparing the overall responses to monetary policy (panel a) and global risk shocks (panel b). Interactions with tail firms are largely insignificant, suggesting that monetary tightening does not transmit disproportionately more or less to the funding conditions of strong or weak firms. This result obtains broadly across both bond and equity prices as well as fundamental and non-fundamental credit risk components. By contrast, global risk shocks hit the tail of least profitable firms disproportionately more. Weak firms, both defined by a low ICR and low expected earnings per share, see their funding costs increase significantly more relative to all other firms. The additional cost paid in terms of credit spreads can amount to 15 to 19 basis points more relative to their peers.

Second, we compare the heterogeneous responses according to leverage (LEV) and profitability indicators (EPSE) of firm risk, while also considering the interest cover ratio as a hybrid indicator bridging the earnings-based and the asset-based borrowing constraints, in a similar spirit as Greenwald (2019) and Drechsel and Kim (2022). Overall, investors do not appear to differentiate much across highly and weakly levered firms, neither in response to monetary tightening nor during global risk-off episodes. The interaction terms for LEV are largely insignificant. Conversely, investors seem to discount least profitable firms relatively more. Weak firms with low expected earnings (low EPSE) see their debt funding costs increase and their equity prices fall significantly more when global risk sentiment deteriorates. This pattern also emerges for weak firms with lower ability to cover their interest expense out of current earnings (low ICR), albeit with modest statistical significance. Overall, we find that global risk shocks have stronger and more heterogeneous effects on corporate funding costs which depend on firms’ position within the earnings distribution. These findings suggest that the earnings-based borrowing constraint discussed above appears to be more binding relative to the asset-based borrowing constraint. This is in line with evidence by Jeenas (2019) who finds that liquid asset holdings more than leverage explain the heterogeneous pass-through of monetary policy shocks to borrowing costs of listed US firms.

Third, we compare strong versus weak firm responses. Overall, we find significant evidence supporting a greater sensitivity to shocks for weak firms but not for strong firms. When looking at the profitability distribution of firms, only the less profitable firms seem to be more sensitive to global risk shocks but very profitable firms are not significantly better off. When splitting firms by interest coverage ratio, however, strong firms with high ICR are hit relatively less by global risk shocks. They pay on average 4 basis points less on their bonds relative to the average firm upon impact of the shock and their expected default probability deteriorates

However, they are forward-looking complements rather than substitutes as the ICR captures the extent to which debt and additional future borrowing are sustainable while expected earnings per share feature in the overall valuation of a company.
by less relative to average and weak firms. This observation may suggest some rebalancing behavior by investors away from risky towards the least risky firms, to the extent that the rebalancing occurs within the corporate bond markets.\footnote{There is some indication of rebalancing behavior of investors, e.g. the response of the EBP of highly levered firms to a global risk shocks is a mirror image of the response of less levered firms (-5.0 vs. + 5.1). This is only suggestive and could be due to different reasons however.}

Flights to safety, in particular to quality in the US corporate bond market, have been documented for example by Baele et al. (2019).

Finally, we compare asset price reactions across columns (1) to (4). It is worth noting that all asset pricing variables and components significantly respond to monetary policy and global risk shocks. The strong reactions provide backing for the identification of shocks through the BVAR based on financial conditions. A large share of the response in credit spreads is driven by the non-fundamental component, the EBP. This suggests that both types of shocks tend to move investor sentiment beyond fundamental considerations of firms’ riskiness. However, while monetary policy transmits through the non-fundamental component to all firms’ funding conditions, shifts in global risk sentiment disproportionately affect investors’ sentiment to invest in weak, risky firms. We also find a significant response of firms’ default probability (EDF) to both shocks, as well as a strong negative equity price reaction of firms, which remains significant even after allowing for heterogeneous exposure, in most cases.

Overall, we find that investors tend indeed to discount the least profitable firms to a greater extent but they do not tend to differentiate much across highly or weakly levered firms. Only the least profitable firms tend to be more sensitive to global risk shocks, while very profitable firms are not symmetrically better off, with a few exceptions. Funding costs responses of least profitable firms to global risk shocks are not only strongly significant but also much larger in magnitude.

While the previous findings provide important insights into the responses of asset prices upon impact of the shocks, we also explore the persistence of the dynamic responses over time. Figure 4 presents the impulse responses of the estimated series of local projections following a shock from tighter monetary policy (panel (a)) and higher global risk (panel (b)) for the full baseline sample of firms. Again, the responses represent the reaction of asset prices and their components to a 10 basis point exogenous tightening (panel (a)) and easing (panel (b)) of US yields. Appendix E.1 presents the impulse responses for the subsets of weak and strong firms.\footnote{We caveat that the estimation on subsamples suffers from lack of power due to the smaller sample size of tail firms. Results should therefore be interpreted with caution.}

Appendix E.2 presents an additional exercise of asymmetric responses to tightening versus easing shocks of both monetary policy and global risk.\footnote{We note that overall the persistence in asset price responses to both shocks remains overall symmetric around zero. One exception is the EBP which tends to persistently decline over the next 12 weeks following a monetary easing shock.}

As seen in the first chart in panels (a) and (b), credit spreads jump by 7 and 19 basis points, respectively, upon impact of the shock and further rise to 15 and 35 basis points during the first weeks after the shocks. They remain persistently elevated for at least 12 weeks.
Figure 4: Cumulative responses of asset pricing variables to identified shocks

Note: This figure presents the impulse responses of a set of asset pricing variables to a monetary policy shock $\epsilon_m$ and a global risk shock $\epsilon_r$. The responses are obtained from estimating model (6) over a 12-week horizon $h = 12$ over the sample period from 01/2000-12/2021. The shocks are calibrated to a 10 basis point increase (panel (a)) and decrease (panel (b)) in the 10-year US Treasury yield. The excess bond premium and fitted corporate spread are obtained from a decomposition of corporate spreads following the methodology of Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) which is estimated over the period 01/2000-12/2021. Shaded areas denote 95% and 68% confidence bands.

weeks. The responses of the EBP and the probability of default in the second and third chart indicate that the spike in credit spreads is mainly driven by forces that are disconnected from fundamentals. In particular at longer horizons, firms’ probability of default declines but the EBP remains persistently elevated. Financial shocks thus do not merely affect the expected default risk of firms but more so the risk sentiment of investors and the risk-bearing capacity of financial intermediaries, as reflected in the EBP (Gilchrist & Zakrajšek, 2012). Equity prices are similarly adversely affected upon impact of both shocks but recover slightly faster. Thus, while pessimistic sentiment in equity markets in response to tighter monetary policy and heightened global risk halves within three months, risk-averse sentiment in corporate bond markets remains persistently scarred for longer. This in turn suggests that corporate funding becomes particularly strained in debt markets.

Extensions and Robustness. We perform several robustness tests. The baseline firm-level results remain broadly robust with respect to (i) shortening the sample period to 2005-2021 to exclude earlier observations with fewer bonds outstanding (Table F.3), (ii) changing the estimation specification to include lagged dependent variables to account for autocorrelation in asset prices (Table F.4), (iii) adding week fixed effects (Table F.5) and week-industry fixed effects (Table F.6) to control for systematic variation in macro variables and time-varying
Figure 5: Difference in option-adjusted spreads (OAS) between the tail of weakest firms and the median firm computed based on leverage and profitability

Note: This figure shows the difference between the average option-adjusted spread (OAS) for the bottom 5\textsuperscript{th} and the 50\textsuperscript{th} (median) of firms computed based on the distribution of firms across leverage (blue) and expected earnings (red). Leverage is measured as the debt-to-equity ratio. Expected earnings are based on earnings per share projected 12 months forward. The tail of weakest firms is the top 95\textsuperscript{th} percentile for leverage and the bottom 5\textsuperscript{th} percentile for expected earnings.

industry-exposure, and (iv) using alternative measures of firm profitability (Table F.7).

We also sort firms not only according to the bottom and top 20\textsuperscript{th} percentiles, but also according to the 15\textsuperscript{th} percentiles and resort into groups every 2 years instead of every 5 years. While the results of the panel regressions remain broadly qualitatively similar, we note that statistical power starts to diminish as fewer firms in the tails are considered in each subgroup.\textsuperscript{48} Relatedly, one might hence argue that our sample including only S&P 500 non-financial firms may pose limitations, as making statements about the tails of the distribution of these firms may not be fully representative of the wider distribution of small and large firms. However, as already previously mentioned, we need large firms to enable us to pick up and test the earnings-based borrowing constraint hypothesis. Other recent studies also use large, well-established firms (Anderson and Cesa-Bianchi (2023), Gürkaynak et al. (2022)).\textsuperscript{49} Having a large degree of heterogeneity in the sample is the crucial requirement to allow us to identify the effects of financial shocks on those firms which are relatively more financially constrained than others, as argued also in Anderson and Cesa-Bianchi (2023). This is indeed the case as shown above. Finally, the “granular hypothesis” put forward in Gabaix (2011) suggests that

\textsuperscript{48}The dynamic sorting of firms into groups every two years makes the panel of firms more unbalanced, hence worsening the problem for statistical inference. The same holds when we sort firms into the top and bottom tails based on the 20\textsuperscript{th} and 80\textsuperscript{th} percentiles computed once over the entire sample period. The results remain however qualitatively similar also in this case. They are not reported here for sake of conciseness, but are available upon request from the authors.

\textsuperscript{49}For instance, Gürkaynak et al. (2022) also consider firms that were part of the S&P500 to analyse their stock price reactions to monetary policy announcements.
aggregate phenomena can be rationalized by looking at the behavior of large firms.\footnote{Gabaix (2011) shows that idiosyncratic movements of the largest 100 US firms appear to explain about one-third of variations in output growth.} Unlike other studies (e.g. Anderson and Cesa-Bianchi (2023) and Palazzo and Yamarthy (2022)), we run our baseline analysis at the firm-level rather than at the security-level. As already explained above, we aggregate spreads and the EBP to the firm-level to make estimates across bonds and equities comparable. The impact of such aggregation should be negligible considering that the spread decomposition accounts for bond-specific characteristics. We nevertheless confirm that our results do not suffer from aggregation bias by rerunning the analysis at the bond-level. Table G.1 in Appendix G presents the results of model (6) estimated at the bond-level including bond, firm, and industry fixed effects. The results remain broadly in line with the firm-level results in Table 3.

A further cause for concern could be that the strong differential response of the non-fundamental component, the EBP, to shocks could be the omission of leverage and profitability from the spread model. That is, if systematic variation in leverage and earnings that is not controlled for drove the bond-level residual, this would mechanically lead to a stronger reaction of the EBP of more levered and less profitable firms. In other words, if fundamental risk factors like leverage and profitability were already fully captured in the spread model, then any remaining differential impact of shocks on the EBP should represent truly non-fundamental reasons for investors pricing reactions. To ensure that our results are not driven by these potentially omitted variables, we run the spread decomposition on an augmented model where we include leverage and profitability in turn. Neither do they turn out significant in bond-level regressions, nor do they change the results of the firm-level analysis.\footnote{Similarly, the results remain robust to a number of other checks, including (i) an alternative specification of the spread model that interacts regressors with an indicator variable, CALL_{j,t}[k], to account for differential sensitivity of bonds with embedded options; (ii) augmenting the spread model with additional balance sheet indicators; (iii) including firm fixed effects instead of industry fixed effects; (iv) restricting the sample to only senior unsecured bonds.}

5 Conclusion

In this paper, we study the heterogeneous impact of jointly identified monetary policy and global risk shocks on corporate funding costs and their default prospects. We disentangle these two shocks in a structural Bayesian Vector Autoregression framework and investigate their respective effects on funding costs of heterogeneous firms using micro-data for the US. We tease out mechanisms underlying the effects by contrasting financial frictions arising from traditional asset-based collateral constraints with the recent earnings-based borrowing constraint hypothesis, differentiating firms across leverage and earnings. Our empirical evidence strongly supports the earnings-based borrowing constraint hypothesis. We find that global risk shocks have stronger, persistent and more heterogeneous effects on corporate funding costs which depend on firms’ position within the earnings distribution.
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Jungherr, J., Meier, M., Reinelt, T., & Schott, I. (2022). *Corporate Debt Maturity Matters For Monetary Policy* (Mimeo No. -).


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Appendices

Appendix A  BVAR Model Validation

Figure A.1: Comparison BVAR monetary policy shocks versus high-frequency approach

Note: The left panel shows the correlation between the US monetary policy shocks identified in the BVAR and the high-frequency shocks on days of FOMC meetings following Jarociński and Karadi (2020), using the contribution of the US monetary policy shocks to the 10-year interest rate of the BVAR model on the day of the FOMC meeting and the 10-year interest rate instrument for the high-frequency shocks. This scatter plot leaves out the monetary policy shock linked to the strong reaction of the Fed in the wake of the global financial crisis, which in terms of magnitude is an outlier but which is very similarly identified in both empirical approaches and makes the correlation stronger than depicted on the chart. The right panel compares the histogram of the daily US monetary policy shock contribution to 10-year yields of the BVAR with that of the high-frequency shocks on FOMC dates using the 10-year rate as instrument.
Table A.1: Robustness BVAR: shock correlations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test</th>
<th>US monetary policy shock</th>
<th>global risk shock</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Test 1: no rel. restriction on US NEER</td>
<td>0.9993</td>
<td>0.9910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test 2: corp. spread not restricted after US macro</td>
<td>0.9944</td>
<td>0.9865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test 3: US policy and global risk shock only</td>
<td>0.9634</td>
<td>0.9671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test 4: 1 lag</td>
<td>0.9972</td>
<td>0.9792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test 5: 2 lags</td>
<td>0.9991</td>
<td>0.9817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test 6: 3 lags</td>
<td>0.9988</td>
<td>0.9838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test 7: 5 lags</td>
<td>0.9979</td>
<td>0.9834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test 8: 6 lags</td>
<td>0.9973</td>
<td>0.9838</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The table shows the correlation between the US monetary policy and global risk shock of the benchmark BVAR model and the shocks as identified in alternative versions. Test 1 does not impose the relative magnitude restriction that a global risk shock should have larger effects on the US nominal effective exchange rate than a foreign macro risk shock; test 2 leaves out the sign restriction on corporate bond spreads following a US macro risk shock; test 3 only identifies the US monetary policy and the global risk shock in the BVAR model (using the same restrictions for the two shocks as in Table 1), leaving the other shocks unidentified; test 4-8 test the structural shock correlations for different lag lengths of the endogenous variables in the BVAR.
Figure A.2: Comparison global risk shocks series with VIX

Note: The chart shows the 60-day moving average of the global risk shock obtained from the daily BVAR, the CBOE volatility index (VIX), and selected narrative events.

Figure A.3: Comparison global risk shocks with global uncertainty measure

Note: This chart shows the 9-month moving average of the global risk shock obtained from the daily BVAR and the measure of global uncertainty by Bobasu et al. (2023).
Appendix B  Details of Bond- and Firm-Level Data

Table B.1: Reduction in OAS bond-week observations for each data trimming step

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. OAS observations before trimming</th>
<th>No. of remaining bond-week obs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i) Drop volume $&lt; 1$ mil and volume $&gt; 5$ bn</td>
<td>2,272,931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Drop term-to-maturity $&lt; 1$ year and $&gt; 30$ years</td>
<td>2,194,404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) Drop OAS $&lt; -500$ and OAS $&gt; 4,500$</td>
<td>2,186,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iv) Drop OAS if illiquid $&gt; 26$ weeks in a row</td>
<td>2,186,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(v) Drop bond if there exist $&lt; 26$ consecutive bond-week obs.</td>
<td>2,185,478</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No. OAS observations after trimming 2,185,478

Note: This table presents the total count $N$ of bond-week observations of option-adjusted spreads (OAS) after each step in the data trimming process. The cut-offs in steps (i) and (ii) are calibrated in line with Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012). The cut-offs in steps (iii)-(v) are conservatively chosen to remove extreme outliers and stale bond observations, yet preserve important characteristics of the tails of the OAS distribution.

Table B.2: Industry coverage of estimation sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Unique bonds</th>
<th>Unique firms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic Industry</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital Goods</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer Cyclical</td>
<td>914</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer Non-Cyclical</td>
<td>1913</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurance</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Gas</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Industrial</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table presents details on the unique number of bonds and firms by industry covered in the estimation sample that is used in the credit spread decomposition. The estimation sample is an unbalanced panel at the bond-firm level.
Appendix C  Additional Descriptive Statistics

**Figure C.1:** Distribution of balance sheet proxies for financial leverage

Note: This chart presents the median (solid line) and 20th and 80th percentiles (shaded area) of the debt-to-equity and debt-to-asset ratios across the sample of S&P 500 firms.

**Figure C.2:** Count of bond-week observations by rating category and the distribution of option-adjusted spreads (OAS) across ratings

Note: The left panel shows the count of bond-week observations for which the option-adjusted spread (OAS) series is available across Bloomberg composite bond rating categories. The right panel shows the average OAS across subsets the same rating categories.
Appendix D  Spread Decomposition

D.1 Comparison with GZ spread model

Our estimation of the excess bond premium (EBP) differs from Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) (GZ) in two ways. First, the choice of data and resulting sample differ. While we use S&P500 firms, GZ use a broader set of firms. Our sample period spans weekly observations from January 2000 to December 2021, GZ’s monthly data starts in 1973 and ends in 2010. GZ use month-end credit spreads and estimate at monthly frequency. We use week-end credit spreads and estimate the EBP at weekly frequency. We believe that the high frequency feature of our data is more conducive to studying the reactions of asset prices to financial shocks and their channels. Note also that it is unclear how often GZ update their sample of bonds used to compute the EBP. We include all bonds issued before 28 May 2021 with a remaining term to maturity of at most 30 years.

Our measure of spreads is the option-adjusted spread (OAS) and our measure of credit risk is based on Moody’s EDFs. By contrast, GZ employ a bottom up approach to both of these measures. They construct the so-called “GZ spread” based on a synthetic risk-free security that mimics exactly the cash flows of the corresponding corporate debt instrument (following Gürkaynak, Sack and Wright, 2007). Moreover, they estimate the distance to default based on a Merton-type model. Following the choice of spread measure, GZ spreads range from 5 bsp to 3500 bsp. Our trimmed spreads range from -500 bsp to 4500 bsp due to the nature of OAS spreads.

Second, our estimation of the EBP departs from GZ’s spread model in a number of ways. GZ use bond characteristics and, additionally, interaction terms of callable bond indicator variables with bond characteristics. We use only bond characteristics as option-adjusted spreads correct for pricing effects of embedded options. GZ also control for liquidity premia by interacting regressors with the slope, level, and curvature of the yield curve. Again, the OAS already accounts for these liquidity premia. Notwithstanding, we ascertain in Section 4 that the results of the panel LP exercise remain virtually invariant to augmenting the spread model with additional interaction terms. By virtue of the distribution of positive as well as negative OAS values, we refrain from estimating the spread model with log-spreads in contrast to GZ. Robustness checks however indicate that excluding bonds with negative OAS values from the sample does not materially affect the results.

To control for systematic variation across firms and industries, GZ include firm-level ratings fixed effects (S&P rating) and industry fixed effects based on three-digit NAICs industry codes. We limit the granularity of industry fixed effects by using Bloomberg’s BICS industry classification. Irrespective of the exclusion of firm fixed effects, our EBP remains highly correlated with the GZ-EBP at the aggregate level. While not part of the baseline specification, for some specifications we include bond-level ratings fixed effects based on Bloomberg’s composite bond rating. The results remain robust to this inclusion.
D.2 Estimation results of spread model

Table D.1: Credit spread decomposition based on the full sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th></th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Est.</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>Est.</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDF_{j,t}</td>
<td>59.396***</td>
<td>9.207</td>
<td>54.617***</td>
<td>17.333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration_{j,t}[k]</td>
<td>3.316***</td>
<td>0.448</td>
<td>4.680***</td>
<td>0.681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coupon_{j}[k]</td>
<td>27.350***</td>
<td>2.312</td>
<td>20.905***</td>
<td>2.901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age_{j,t}[k]</td>
<td>-1.986***</td>
<td>0.565</td>
<td>-0.684</td>
<td>0.601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volume_{j}[k]</td>
<td>-5.979</td>
<td>4.838</td>
<td>-9.527</td>
<td>6.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CALL_{j}[k]</td>
<td>3.599</td>
<td>4.657</td>
<td>-34.402**</td>
<td>13.505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDF_{j,t} x CALL_{j}[k]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7.258</td>
<td>16.264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration_{j,t}[k] x CALL_{j}[k]</td>
<td>-2.257***</td>
<td>0.674</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coupon_{j}[k] x CALL_{j}[k]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12.778***</td>
<td>2.881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age_{j,t}[k] x CALL_{j}[k]</td>
<td>-4.463***</td>
<td>0.871</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volume_{j}[k] x CALL_{j}[k]</td>
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<td></td>
<td>7.611</td>
<td>5.961</td>
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<td>YES</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>2,207,373</td>
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<td>2,207,373</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R^2</td>
<td>0.424</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.430</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The sample period covers 2000/01/07 – 2021/12/17. The dependent variable is the option-adjusted spread (OAS). Standard errors are clustered in the firm and time dimension following Cameron et al. (2011). Daily expected default frequencies (EDFs) at the 1-year horizon are converted into weekly averages. The indicator variable CALL_{j}[k] is one for bonds with any type of underlying call option. Industry fixed effects are based on the BICS industry level 3 classification system.

Table D.2: Credit spread decomposition based on a restricted sample of only senior unsecured bonds

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>(1)</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Est.</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>Est.</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDF_{j,t}</td>
<td>55.651***</td>
<td>12.542</td>
<td>47.456***</td>
<td>16.470</td>
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<tr>
<td>Duration_{j,t}[k]</td>
<td>3.131***</td>
<td>0.561</td>
<td>3.715***</td>
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<td>Coupon_{j}[k]</td>
<td>26.266***</td>
<td>2.879</td>
<td>22.747***</td>
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<td>Age_{j,t}[k]</td>
<td>-1.598***</td>
<td>0.559</td>
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<td>CALL_{j}[k]</td>
<td>-3.497</td>
<td>4.620</td>
<td>-31.098**</td>
<td>13.678</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDF_{j,t} x CALL_{j}[k]</td>
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<td></td>
<td>17.568</td>
<td>14.931</td>
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<tr>
<td>Duration_{j,t}[k] x CALL_{j}[k]</td>
<td>-0.875</td>
<td>0.910</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coupon_{j}[k] x CALL_{j}[k]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7.545**</td>
<td>3.498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age_{j,t}[k] x CALL_{j}[k]</td>
<td>-2.783***</td>
<td>0.911</td>
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<td>Volume_{j}[k] x CALL_{j}[k]</td>
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<td>7.070</td>
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<td>Industry FE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<td>1,776,736</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R^2</td>
<td>0.403</td>
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<td>0.411</td>
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</table>

Note: The sample period covers 2000/01/07 – 2021/12/17. The dependent variable is the option-adjusted spread (OAS). Standard errors are clustered in the firm and time dimension following Cameron et al. (2011). Daily expected default frequencies (EDFs) at the 1-year horizon are converted into weekly averages. The indicator variable CALL_{j}[k] is one for bonds with any type of underlying call option. Industry fixed effects are based on the BICS industry level 3 classification system.
Appendix E Supplementary results: firm-level local projections

E.1 Responses to shocks across weak and strong firms

![Graphs of asset pricing variables responses to shocks](image)

**Figure E.3:** Cumulative responses of asset pricing variables to identified shocks for weak/strong firms by leverage (LEV)

Note: This figure presents the impulse responses of a set of asset pricing variables to a monetary policy shock $s^{tm}_t$ and a global risk shock $s^r_t$. The responses are obtained from estimating model (6) over a 12-week horizon $h = 12$ over the sample period from 01/2000-12/2021. The shocks are calibrated to a 10 basis point increase (panel (a)) and decrease (panel (b)) in the 10-year US Treasury yield. The excess bond premium and fitted corporate spread are obtained from a decomposition of corporate spreads following the methodology of Gilchrist and Zakriješek (2012) which is estimated over the period 01/2000-12/2021. Shaded areas denote 95% and 68% confidence bands.
Figure E.4: Cumulative responses of asset pricing variables to identified shocks for weak/strong firms by interest coverage ratio (ICR)

Note: This figure presents the impulse responses of a set of asset pricing variables to a monetary policy shock $s_t^m$ and a global risk shock $s_t^g$. The responses are obtained from estimating model (6) over a 12-week horizon $h = 12$ over the sample period from 01/2000-12/2021. The shocks are calibrated to a 10 basis point increase (panel (a)) and decrease (panel (b)) in the 10-year US Treasury yield. The excess bond premium and fitted corporate spread are obtained from a decomposition of corporate spreads following the methodology of Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) which is estimated over the period 01/2000-12/2021. Shaded areas denote 95% and 68% confidence bands.
Figure E.5: Cumulative responses of asset pricing variables to identified shocks for weak/strong firms by expected earnings per share (EPSE)

Note: This figure presents the impulse responses of a set of asset pricing variables to a monetary policy shock $s^m_t$ and a global risk shock $s^r_t$. The responses are obtained from estimating model (6) over a 12-week horizon $h = 12$ over the sample period from 01/2000-12/2021. The shocks are calibrated to a 10 basis point increase (panel (a)) and decrease (panel (b)) in the 10-year US Treasury yield. The excess bond premium and fitted corporate spread are obtained from a decomposition of corporate spreads following the methodology of Gilchrist and Zakrjašek (2012) which is estimated over the period 01/2000-12/2021. Shaded areas denote 95% and 68% confidence bands.
E.2 Asymmetric responses to tightening and easing shocks

(a) Monetary policy tightening (+) and easing (−) shocks $s^m_t$

(b) Global risk tightening (−) and easing (+) shocks $s^r_t$

Figure E.6: Cumulative responses of asset pricing variables to identified tightening and easing shocks

Note: This figure presents the impulse responses of a set of asset pricing variables to a monetary policy shock $\epsilon_m^m$ and a global risk shock $\epsilon_r^r$. The responses are obtained from estimating model (6) over a 12-week horizon $h = 12$ over the sample period from 01/2000-12/2021. The shocks are calibrated to a 10 basis point increase (panel (a)) and decrease (panel (b)) in the 10-year US Treasury yield. The excess bond premium and fitted corporate spread are obtained from a decomposition of corporate spreads following the methodology of Gilchrist and Zakrašek (2012) which is estimated over the period 01/2000-12/2021. Shaded areas denote 95% and 68% confidence bands.
Appendix F  Robustness: firm-level panel regressions

F.1 Baseline results: Extended set of estimates of asset price reactions

Table F.1: Baseline results: estimated shock impact on corporate spreads (1), their predicted and excess bond premium components (2-3), CDS spreads (4), equity prices (5), and default probabilities (6).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
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<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>∆Spread</td>
<td>∆Spread</td>
<td>∆EBP</td>
<td>∆CDS</td>
<td>∆ln(PI)</td>
<td>∆EDF</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Panel (a): Monetary policy shock</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon_m t$</td>
<td>7.395***</td>
<td>1.547*</td>
<td>5.889**</td>
<td>3.118***</td>
<td>0.028*</td>
<td>-0.035***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowLEV $\times \varepsilon_m t$</td>
<td>7.261***</td>
<td>1.106**</td>
<td>6.220***</td>
<td>2.932***</td>
<td>0.020**</td>
<td>-0.035***</td>
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<tr>
<td>HighLEV $\times \varepsilon_m t$</td>
<td>1.842</td>
<td>2.462</td>
<td>-0.537</td>
<td>1.351</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon_m t$</td>
<td>7.001***</td>
<td>0.850**</td>
<td>6.145***</td>
<td>2.795***</td>
<td>0.016**</td>
<td>-0.034***</td>
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<tr>
<td>LowICR $\times \varepsilon_m t$</td>
<td>2.670</td>
<td>4.182</td>
<td>-1.178</td>
<td>2.494</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>-0.007*</td>
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<td>HighICR $\times \varepsilon_m t$</td>
<td>-0.358</td>
<td>-0.219*</td>
<td>-0.126</td>
<td>-0.722**</td>
<td>-0.005**</td>
<td>0.001</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon_m t$</td>
<td>7.140***</td>
<td>1.166**</td>
<td>5.938***</td>
<td>2.894***</td>
<td>0.021**</td>
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<td>LowEPSE $\times \varepsilon_m t$</td>
<td>1.861</td>
<td>2.715*</td>
<td>-0.652</td>
<td>1.544*</td>
<td>0.048*</td>
<td>-0.004*</td>
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<tr>
<td>HighEPSE $\times \varepsilon_m t$</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>-0.385</td>
<td>0.468</td>
<td>-0.149</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.001*</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Panel (b): Global risk shock</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon_r t$</td>
<td>18.628***</td>
<td>3.200*</td>
<td>15.472***</td>
<td>6.615***</td>
<td>0.056*</td>
<td>-0.069***</td>
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<tr>
<td>LowLEV $\times \varepsilon_r t$</td>
<td>17.502***</td>
<td>2.246**</td>
<td>15.406***</td>
<td>6.125***</td>
<td>0.039**</td>
<td>-0.068***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighLEV $\times \varepsilon_r t$</td>
<td>-4.942</td>
<td>-0.357</td>
<td>-5.107**</td>
<td>-1.195*</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon_r t$</td>
<td>15.858***</td>
<td>1.542**</td>
<td>14.366***</td>
<td>5.558***</td>
<td>0.027**</td>
<td>-0.065***</td>
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<tr>
<td>LowICR $\times \varepsilon_r t$</td>
<td>18.773**</td>
<td>9.965*</td>
<td>9.504**</td>
<td>7.758*</td>
<td>0.176*</td>
<td>-0.022*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighICR $\times \varepsilon_r t$</td>
<td>-3.616**</td>
<td>-0.628*</td>
<td>-2.995*</td>
<td>-2.036***</td>
<td>-0.011*</td>
<td>0.002</td>
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<td>$\varepsilon_r t$</td>
<td>16.439***</td>
<td>2.139**</td>
<td>14.232***</td>
<td>5.872***</td>
<td>0.037**</td>
<td>-0.065***</td>
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<tr>
<td>LowEPSE $\times \varepsilon_r t$</td>
<td>15.194***</td>
<td>7.041**</td>
<td>8.416***</td>
<td>5.023**</td>
<td>0.126**</td>
<td>-0.019***</td>
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<td>HighEPSE $\times \varepsilon_r t$</td>
<td>-1.695</td>
<td>-0.700</td>
<td>-0.788</td>
<td>-0.603</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
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<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
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<td>Observations</td>
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<td>219,575</td>
<td>219,513</td>
<td>219,821</td>
<td>220,710</td>
<td>220,964</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table presents the estimates of model (6) at horizon $h = 0$, i.e. upon impact of the identified monetary policy shock $\varepsilon_m t$ (panel (a)) and the global risk shock $\varepsilon_r t$ (panel (b)). The columns indicate the dependent variable. The indicator variables for the tails of firms (20th and 80th percentiles) are computed as formally outlined in (4)-(5). The shocks are calibrated to a 10 basis point increase (panel (a)) and decrease (panel (b)) in the 10-year US Treasury yield. The sample period covers 2000/01/07 – 2021/12/17. Standard errors and controls are omitted to preserve space. The excess bond premium (EBP) and fitted spread are obtained from a decomposition of corporate spreads following the methodology of Gilchrist and Zakravšek (2012) which is estimated over the full sample period. The asterisks denote statistical significance (** for p < 0.01, * for p < 0.05, * for p < 0.1).
Table F.2: Baseline results: estimated shock impact on corporate spreads (1), their predicted and excess bond premium components (2-3), CDS spreads (4), equity prices (5), and default probabilities (6) normalized to 1 stddev.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel (a): Monetary policy shock</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon^m_t$</td>
<td>1.989***</td>
<td>0.416*</td>
<td>1.584**</td>
<td>0.839***</td>
<td>0.008*</td>
<td>-0.009***</td>
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<tr>
<td>LowLEV $\times \varepsilon^m_t$</td>
<td>-0.314</td>
<td>-0.037</td>
<td>-0.343</td>
<td>-0.116**</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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<td>HighLEV $\times \varepsilon^m_t$</td>
<td>0.495</td>
<td>0.662</td>
<td>-0.145</td>
<td>0.363</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
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<td>$\varepsilon^m_t$</td>
<td>1.883***</td>
<td>0.229**</td>
<td>1.653***</td>
<td>0.752***</td>
<td>0.004**</td>
<td>-0.009***</td>
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<td>LowICR $\times \varepsilon^m_t$</td>
<td>0.718</td>
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<td>-0.317</td>
<td>0.671</td>
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<td>HighICR $\times \varepsilon^m_t$</td>
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<td>-0.001**</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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<td>$\varepsilon^m_t$</td>
<td>1.920***</td>
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<td>1.597***</td>
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<td>0.501</td>
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<td>0.009</td>
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<td>-0.040</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Panel (b): Global risk shock</th>
<th>(1)</th>
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<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon^r_t$</td>
<td>2.643***</td>
<td>0.454*</td>
<td>2.195***</td>
<td>0.939***</td>
<td>0.008*</td>
<td>-0.010***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowLEV $\times \varepsilon^r_t$</td>
<td>-0.701</td>
<td>-0.051</td>
<td>-0.725**</td>
<td>-0.170*</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighLEV $\times \varepsilon^r_t$</td>
<td>1.484</td>
<td>0.762</td>
<td>0.709*</td>
<td>0.517</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon^r_t$</td>
<td>2.250***</td>
<td>0.219**</td>
<td>2.038***</td>
<td>0.789***</td>
<td>0.004**</td>
<td>-0.009***</td>
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<td>LowICR $\times \varepsilon^r_t$</td>
<td>2.664**</td>
<td>1.414*</td>
<td>1.348**</td>
<td>1.101*</td>
<td>0.025*</td>
<td>-0.003*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighICR $\times \varepsilon^r_t$</td>
<td>-0.513**</td>
<td>-0.089*</td>
<td>-0.425*</td>
<td>-0.289***</td>
<td>-0.002*</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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<td>$\varepsilon^r_t$</td>
<td>2.332***</td>
<td>0.303**</td>
<td>2.019***</td>
<td>0.833***</td>
<td>0.005**</td>
<td>-0.009***</td>
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<td>LowEPSE $\times \varepsilon^r_t$</td>
<td>2.156***</td>
<td>0.999**</td>
<td>1.194***</td>
<td>0.713*</td>
<td>0.018**</td>
<td>-0.003***</td>
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<td>HighEPSE $\times \varepsilon^r_t$</td>
<td>-0.240</td>
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<td>-0.112</td>
<td>-0.085</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Industry FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Observations | 222,060 | 219,575 | 219,513 | 219,821 | 220,710 | 220,964 |

Note: This table presents the estimates of model (6) at horizon $h = 0$, i.e., upon impact of the identified monetary policy shock $\varepsilon^m_t$ (panel (a)) and the global risk shock $\varepsilon^r_t$ (panel (b)), normalized to a 1 standard deviation adverse shock. The columns indicate the dependent variable. The indicator variables for the tails of firms (20th and 80th percentiles) are computed as formally outlined in (4)-(5). The sample period covers 2000/01/07 – 2021/12/17. Standard errors and controls are omitted to preserve space. The excess bond premium (EBP) and fitted spread are obtained from a decomposition of corporate spreads following the methodology of Gilchrist and Zakrjaček (2012) which is estimated over the full sample period. The asterisks denote statistical significance (** for p < 0.01, * for p < 0.05, * for p < 0.1).
F.2 Results of baseline model for shorter sample period 2005-2021

Table F.3: Shorter time period 2005-2021: estimated shock impact on corporate spreads (1), their predicted and excess bond premium components (2-3), CDS spreads (4), equity prices (5), and default probabilities (6).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>∆Spread</td>
<td>∆Spread</td>
<td>∆EBP</td>
<td>∆CDS</td>
<td>∆ln(PI)</td>
<td>∆EDF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel (a): Monetary policy shock</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon_m$</td>
<td>7.507***</td>
<td>1.563*</td>
<td>5.985**</td>
<td>3.195***</td>
<td>0.028*</td>
<td>-0.035***</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon_r$</td>
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<td>1.110**</td>
<td>6.321***</td>
<td>2.994***</td>
<td>0.020**</td>
<td>-0.035***</td>
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<tr>
<td>LowLEV × $\varepsilon_m$</td>
<td>-1.297</td>
<td>-0.139</td>
<td>-1.432</td>
<td>-0.468**</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighLEV × $\varepsilon_m$</td>
<td>2.002</td>
<td>2.528</td>
<td>-0.433</td>
<td>1.461</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon_r$</td>
<td>7.068***</td>
<td>0.846**</td>
<td>6.214***</td>
<td>2.853***</td>
<td>0.016**</td>
<td>-0.034***</td>
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<tr>
<td>LowLEV × $\varepsilon_r$</td>
<td>-5.054</td>
<td>-0.370</td>
<td>-5.211**</td>
<td>-1.176</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighLEV × $\varepsilon_r$</td>
<td>10.520</td>
<td>5.316</td>
<td>5.136*</td>
<td>3.676</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
</tr>
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<td>$\varepsilon_r$</td>
<td>7.216***</td>
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<td>6.036***</td>
<td>2.951***</td>
<td>0.021**</td>
<td>-0.034***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowICR × $\varepsilon_r$</td>
<td>2.910</td>
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<tr>
<td>HighICR × $\varepsilon_r$</td>
<td>-0.369</td>
<td>-0.253*</td>
<td>-0.107</td>
<td>-0.796***</td>
<td>-0.005**</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon_r$</td>
<td>18.886***</td>
<td>3.249*</td>
<td>15.684***</td>
<td>6.724***</td>
<td>0.056*</td>
<td>-0.069***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowEPSE × $\varepsilon_r$</td>
<td>2.060</td>
<td>2.928*</td>
<td>-0.646</td>
<td>1.705*</td>
<td>0.049*</td>
<td>-0.004*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighEPSE × $\varepsilon_r$</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>-0.370</td>
<td>0.457</td>
<td>-0.186</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel (b): Global risk shock</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon_r$</td>
<td>17.767***</td>
<td>2.308**</td>
<td>15.610***</td>
<td>6.225***</td>
<td>0.039**</td>
<td>-0.069***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowLEV × $\varepsilon_r$</td>
<td>-5.054</td>
<td>-0.370</td>
<td>-5.211**</td>
<td>-1.176</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighLEV × $\varepsilon_r$</td>
<td>10.520</td>
<td>5.316</td>
<td>5.136*</td>
<td>3.676</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon_r$</td>
<td>16.085***</td>
<td>1.585**</td>
<td>14.546***</td>
<td>5.662***</td>
<td>0.027**</td>
<td>-0.066***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowICR × $\varepsilon_r$</td>
<td>18.983**</td>
<td>9.962</td>
<td>9.783**</td>
<td>7.791*</td>
<td>0.173*</td>
<td>-0.022*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighICR × $\varepsilon_r$</td>
<td>-3.717**</td>
<td>-0.615*</td>
<td>-3.099*</td>
<td>-2.065***</td>
<td>-0.011*</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon_r$</td>
<td>16.627***</td>
<td>2.143**</td>
<td>14.418***</td>
<td>5.949***</td>
<td>0.037**</td>
<td>-0.065***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowEPSE × $\varepsilon_r$</td>
<td>15.674***</td>
<td>7.260**</td>
<td>8.705***</td>
<td>5.187**</td>
<td>0.125**</td>
<td>-0.019***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighEPSE × $\varepsilon_r$</td>
<td>-1.736</td>
<td>-0.657</td>
<td>-0.880</td>
<td>-0.582</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry FE</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>204,863</td>
<td>202,558</td>
<td>202,521</td>
<td>202,654</td>
<td>203,245</td>
<td>203,608</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table presents the estimates of model (6) at horizon $h = 0$, i.e. upon impact of the identified monetary policy shock $\varepsilon_m$ (panel (a)) and the global risk shock $\varepsilon_r$ (panel (b)), for a shorter time period from 2005 to 2021. The columns indicate the dependent variable. The indicator variables for the tails of firms (20th and 80th percentiles) are computed as formally outlined in (4)-(4). The shocks are calibrated to a 10 basis point increase (panel (a)) and decrease (panel (b)) in the 10-year US Treasury yield. The sample period covers 2005/01/07 – 2021/12/17. Standard errors and controls are omitted to preserve space. The excess bond premium (EBP) and fitted spread are obtained from a decomposition of corporate spreads following the methodology of Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) which is estimated over the full sample period. The asterisks denote statistical significance (** for p < 0.01, * for p < 0.05, * for p < 0.1).
F.3 Results of baseline model augmented with lagged dependent variable

Table F.4: Lagged dependent variables: estimated shock impact on corporate spreads (1), their predicted and excess bond premium components (2-3), CDS spreads (4), equity prices (5), and default probabilities (6).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Spread</th>
<th>(2) Spread</th>
<th>(3) EBP</th>
<th>(4) CDS</th>
<th>(5) ln(PI)</th>
<th>(6) EDF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel (a): Monetary policy shock</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon^m_t$</td>
<td>7.228***</td>
<td>1.567*</td>
<td>5.718**</td>
<td>3.166***</td>
<td>0.029*</td>
<td>-0.035***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowLEV $\times \varepsilon^m_t$</td>
<td>-1.065</td>
<td>-0.146</td>
<td>-1.100</td>
<td>-0.420**</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighLEV $\times \varepsilon^m_t$</td>
<td>1.666</td>
<td>2.297</td>
<td>-0.674</td>
<td>1.268</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon^r_t$</td>
<td>6.811***</td>
<td>0.900**</td>
<td>5.963***</td>
<td>2.855***</td>
<td>0.017**</td>
<td>-0.034***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowLEV $\times \varepsilon^r_t$</td>
<td>-4.825</td>
<td>-0.377</td>
<td>-4.924**</td>
<td>-1.176</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighLEV $\times \varepsilon^r_t$</td>
<td>10.482</td>
<td>5.067</td>
<td>5.106*</td>
<td>3.456</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon^r_t$</td>
<td>6.993***</td>
<td>1.186**</td>
<td>5.782**</td>
<td>2.942***</td>
<td>0.021**</td>
<td>-0.034***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowEPSE $\times \varepsilon^r_t$</td>
<td>1.822</td>
<td>2.691*</td>
<td>-0.670</td>
<td>1.545*</td>
<td>0.049*</td>
<td>-0.004*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighEPSE $\times \varepsilon^r_t$</td>
<td>-0.040</td>
<td>-0.366</td>
<td>0.399</td>
<td>-0.151</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel (b): Global risk shock</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon^r_t$</td>
<td>18.189***</td>
<td>3.235*</td>
<td>15.093***</td>
<td>6.634***</td>
<td>0.058*</td>
<td>-0.069***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowLEV $\times \varepsilon^r_t$</td>
<td>-4.825</td>
<td>-0.377</td>
<td>-4.924**</td>
<td>-1.176</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighLEV $\times \varepsilon^r_t$</td>
<td>10.482</td>
<td>5.067</td>
<td>5.106*</td>
<td>3.456</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon^r_t$</td>
<td>15.226***</td>
<td>1.655**</td>
<td>13.841***</td>
<td>5.614***</td>
<td>0.028**</td>
<td>-0.065***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowICR $\times \varepsilon^r_t$</td>
<td>19.565**</td>
<td>9.533*</td>
<td>10.146**</td>
<td>7.486*</td>
<td>0.171*</td>
<td>-0.022*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighICR $\times \varepsilon^r_t$</td>
<td>-3.413*</td>
<td>-0.616**</td>
<td>-2.866*</td>
<td>-1.983**</td>
<td>-0.010**</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon^r_t$</td>
<td>15.948***</td>
<td>2.193**</td>
<td>13.795***</td>
<td>5.897***</td>
<td>0.038**</td>
<td>-0.064***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowEPSE $\times \varepsilon^r_t$</td>
<td>15.778***</td>
<td>6.875**</td>
<td>9.011**</td>
<td>4.950**</td>
<td>0.125**</td>
<td>-0.019***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighEPSE $\times \varepsilon^r_t$</td>
<td>-1.974</td>
<td>-0.641</td>
<td>-1.056</td>
<td>-0.562</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry FE</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>222,060</td>
<td>219,575</td>
<td>219,513</td>
<td>219,821</td>
<td>220,710</td>
<td>220,964</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table presents the estimates of model (6) at horizon $h = 0$ augmented with 4 lags of the dependent variable. Hence the results show the initial impact of the identified monetary policy shock $\varepsilon^m_t$ (panel (a)) and the global risk shock $\varepsilon^r_t$ (panel (b)). The columns indicate the dependent variable. The indicator variables for the tails of firms ($20^{th}$ and $80^{th}$ percentiles) are computed as formally outlined in (4)-(4). The shocks are calibrated to a 10 basis point increase (panel (a)) and decrease (panel (b)) in the 10-year US Treasury yield. The sample period covers 2000/01/07 – 2021/12/17. Standard errors and controls are omitted to preserve space. The excess bond premium (EBP) and fitted spread are obtained from a decomposition of corporate spreads following the methodology of Gilchrist and Zakrás (2012) which is estimated over the full sample period. The asterisks denote statistical significance (** for $p < 0.01$, * for $p < 0.05$, * for $p < 0.1$).
### F.4 Results with additional fixed effects

**Table F.5:** Week fixed effects: estimated shock impact on corporate spreads (1), their predicted and excess bond premium components (2-3), CDS spreads (4), equity prices (5), and default probabilities (6).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel (a): Monetary policy shock</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LowLEV × $\varepsilon^m_{it}$</td>
<td>-0.450</td>
<td>-0.188</td>
<td>-0.385</td>
<td>-0.592**</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighLEV × $\varepsilon^m_{it}$</td>
<td>2.203</td>
<td>2.447</td>
<td>-0.200</td>
<td>1.302</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowICR × $\varepsilon^m_{it}$</td>
<td>2.466</td>
<td>4.174</td>
<td>-1.518</td>
<td>2.458*</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>-0.007*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighICR × $\varepsilon^m_{it}$</td>
<td>-0.468*</td>
<td>-0.165</td>
<td>-0.298</td>
<td>-0.627**</td>
<td>-0.004**</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowEPSE × $\varepsilon^m_{it}$</td>
<td>1.986</td>
<td>2.730*</td>
<td>-0.597</td>
<td>1.529*</td>
<td>0.048*</td>
<td>-0.004*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighEPSE × $\varepsilon^m_{it}$</td>
<td>0.374</td>
<td>-0.380</td>
<td>0.767</td>
<td>-0.175</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel (b): Global risk shock</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LowLEV × $\varepsilon^r_{it}$</td>
<td>-3.329</td>
<td>-0.429</td>
<td>-3.173</td>
<td>-1.611*</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighLEV × $\varepsilon^r_{it}$</td>
<td>11.232*</td>
<td>5.351</td>
<td>5.759**</td>
<td>3.503</td>
<td>0.099</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowICR × $\varepsilon^r_{it}$</td>
<td>18.292**</td>
<td>9.950*</td>
<td>8.821***</td>
<td>7.715*</td>
<td>0.175*</td>
<td>-0.021*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighICR × $\varepsilon^r_{it}$</td>
<td>-3.962**</td>
<td>-0.559**</td>
<td>-3.403**</td>
<td>-1.941***</td>
<td>-0.010**</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowEPSE × $\varepsilon^r_{it}$</td>
<td>15.542***</td>
<td>7.078**</td>
<td>8.675***</td>
<td>4.944**</td>
<td>0.126**</td>
<td>-0.019***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighEPSE × $\varepsilon^r_{it}$</td>
<td>-1.005</td>
<td>-0.686</td>
<td>-0.227</td>
<td>-0.734</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Industry FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Week FE     | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Observations | 222,060 | 219,575 | 219,513 | 219,821 | 220,710 | 220,964 |

Note: This table presents the estimates of model (6) at horizon $h = 0$ with week fixed effects. Hence the results show the initial impact of the identified monetary policy shock $\varepsilon^m_{it}$ (panel (a)) and the global risk shock $\varepsilon^r_{it}$ (panel (b)) for the tails of firms. The columns indicate the dependent variable. The indicator variables for the tails of firms (20th and 80th percentiles) are computed as formally outlined in (4)-(4). The shocks are calibrated to a 10 basis point increase (panel (a)) and decrease (panel (b)) in the 10-year US Treasury yield. The sample period covers 2000/01/07 – 2021/12/17. Standard errors and controls are omitted to preserve space. The excess bond premium (EBP) and fitted spread are obtained from a decomposition of corporate spreads following the methodology of Gilchrist and Zakraješek (2012) which is estimated over the full sample period. The asterisks denote statistical significance (** for $p < 0.01$, ** for $p < 0.05$, * for $p < 0.1$).
Table F.6: Week-industry fixed effects: estimated shock impact on corporate spreads (1), their predicted and excess bond premium components (2-3), CDS spreads (4), equity prices (5), and default probabilities (6).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ΔSpread</td>
<td>ΔSpread</td>
<td>ΔEBP</td>
<td>ΔCDS</td>
<td>Δln(PI)</td>
<td>ΔEDF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel (a): Monetary policy shock</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowLEV × εₘᵣᵗ</td>
<td>-1.297</td>
<td>-0.928*</td>
<td>-0.587</td>
<td>-0.718**</td>
<td>-0.016*</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighLEV × εₘᵣᵗ</td>
<td>2.325</td>
<td>2.500</td>
<td>-0.128</td>
<td>1.199</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>-0.003***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowICR × εₘᵣᵗ</td>
<td>2.151</td>
<td>4.535*</td>
<td>-2.200</td>
<td>2.217</td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td>-0.007**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighICR × εₘᵣᵗ</td>
<td>-0.896</td>
<td>-0.531**</td>
<td>-0.366</td>
<td>-0.499***</td>
<td>-0.010**</td>
<td>0.002***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowEPSE × εₘᵣᵗ</td>
<td>1.335</td>
<td>2.177*</td>
<td>-0.701</td>
<td>1.253**</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>-0.004**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighEPSE × εₘᵣᵗ</td>
<td>0.519</td>
<td>-0.241</td>
<td>0.820</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel (b): Global risk shock</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowLEV × εᵣᵣᵗ</td>
<td>-7.243**</td>
<td>-2.449**</td>
<td>-5.258**</td>
<td>-2.676**</td>
<td>-0.043**</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighLEV × εᵣᵣᵗ</td>
<td>11.432*</td>
<td>5.606</td>
<td>5.707**</td>
<td>3.357*</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowICR × εᵣᵣᵗ</td>
<td>18.221**</td>
<td>10.680*</td>
<td>8.157***</td>
<td>7.063*</td>
<td>0.185*</td>
<td>-0.023***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighICR × εᵣᵣᵗ</td>
<td>-6.708***</td>
<td>-1.642***</td>
<td>-5.031**</td>
<td>-2.065***</td>
<td>-0.029***</td>
<td>0.009***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowEPSE × εᵣᵣᵗ</td>
<td>12.797**</td>
<td>5.602*</td>
<td>7.400***</td>
<td>3.528**</td>
<td>0.100*</td>
<td>-0.015**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighEPSE × εᵣᵣᵗ</td>
<td>-0.397</td>
<td>-0.360</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>-0.164</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry FE</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Week x Industry FE</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>221,914</td>
<td>219,429</td>
<td>219,367</td>
<td>219,675</td>
<td>220,564</td>
<td>220,818</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table presents the estimates of model (6) at horizon h = 0 with week-industry fixed effects. Hence the results show the initial impact of the identified monetary policy shock sₘᵣᵗ (panel (a)) and the global risk shock sᵣᵣᵗ (panel (b)) for the tails of firms. The columns indicate the dependent variable. The indicator variables for the tails of firms (20th and 80th percentiles) are computed as formally outlined in (4)-(4). The shocks are calibrated to a 10 basis point increase (panel (a)) and decrease (panel (b)) in the 10-year US Treasury yield. The sample period covers 2000/01/07 – 2021/12/17. Standard errors and controls are omitted to preserve space. The excess bond premium (EBP) and fitted spread are obtained from a decomposition of corporate spreads following the methodology of Gilchrist and Zakraješ (2012) which is estimated over the full sample period. The asterisks denote statistical significance (** for p < 0.01, *** for p < 0.05, * for p < 0.1).
### F.5 Results with alternative earnings-based measures

**Table F.7:** Earnings-based tails of firms: estimated shock impact on corporate spreads (1), their predicted and excess bond premium components (2-3), CDS spreads (4), equity prices (5), and default probabilities (6).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>∆Spread</td>
<td>∆Spread</td>
<td>∆EBP</td>
<td>∆CDS</td>
<td>∆ln(PI)</td>
<td>∆EDF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel (a): Monetary policy shock</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(s^m_t)</td>
<td>7.007***</td>
<td>1.048*</td>
<td>5.982***</td>
<td>2.790***</td>
<td>0.019**</td>
<td>-0.035***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowROE (\times s^m_t)</td>
<td>2.026</td>
<td>3.227**</td>
<td>-0.988</td>
<td>2.531*</td>
<td>0.057**</td>
<td>-0.004*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighROE (\times s^m_t)</td>
<td>0.351</td>
<td>-0.037</td>
<td>0.367</td>
<td>-0.427</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.002*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(s^m_t)</td>
<td>6.838***</td>
<td>0.782**</td>
<td>6.018***</td>
<td>2.770***</td>
<td>0.014***</td>
<td>-0.034***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowPE (\times s^m_t)</td>
<td>4.269*</td>
<td>4.455**</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>2.281</td>
<td>0.076**</td>
<td>-0.009**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighPE (\times s^m_t)</td>
<td>0.680</td>
<td>1.348</td>
<td>-0.549</td>
<td>0.662</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>-0.002*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel (b): Global risk shock</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(s^r_t)</td>
<td>16.414***</td>
<td>1.979*</td>
<td>14.521***</td>
<td>5.686***</td>
<td>0.035*</td>
<td>-0.068***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowROE (\times s^r_t)</td>
<td>15.342***</td>
<td>7.769***</td>
<td>8.024**</td>
<td>7.423*</td>
<td>0.135***</td>
<td>-0.015***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighROE (\times s^r_t)</td>
<td>-1.553</td>
<td>-0.028</td>
<td>-1.568</td>
<td>-1.543*</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.010*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(s^r_t)</td>
<td>14.898***</td>
<td>1.294*</td>
<td>13.516***</td>
<td>5.329***</td>
<td>0.023**</td>
<td>-0.064***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowPE (\times s^r_t)</td>
<td>25.218**</td>
<td>11.454***</td>
<td>14.385**</td>
<td>8.297**</td>
<td>0.194***</td>
<td>-0.036***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighPE (\times s^r_t)</td>
<td>5.048**</td>
<td>2.856</td>
<td>2.364</td>
<td>2.143</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(s^r_t)</td>
<td>16.652***</td>
<td>2.134*</td>
<td>14.653***</td>
<td>5.605***</td>
<td>0.038*</td>
<td>-0.065***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowEPSEgrowth (\times s^m_t)</td>
<td>18.337***</td>
<td>7.637***</td>
<td>10.039**</td>
<td>8.501***</td>
<td>0.128***</td>
<td>-0.025***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighEPSEgrowth (\times s^m_t)</td>
<td>6.455</td>
<td>5.267*</td>
<td>0.889</td>
<td>3.607</td>
<td>0.093*</td>
<td>-0.020**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(s^r_t)</td>
<td>15.756***</td>
<td>2.447*</td>
<td>13.431***</td>
<td>5.810***</td>
<td>0.044*</td>
<td>-0.065***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowEPSTgrowth (\times s^m_t)</td>
<td>21.520**</td>
<td>5.583***</td>
<td>15.593**</td>
<td>6.133***</td>
<td>0.093***</td>
<td>-0.028***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighEPSTgrowth (\times s^m_t)</td>
<td>9.726*</td>
<td>2.656</td>
<td>6.816*</td>
<td>2.673</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>-0.018***</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Industry FE</strong></td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observations</strong></td>
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<td>219,575</td>
<td>219,513</td>
<td>219,821</td>
<td>220,710</td>
<td>220,964</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table presents the estimates of model (6) at horizon \(h = 0\), i.e. upon impact of the identified monetary policy shock \(\varepsilon^m_t\) and the global risk shock \(\varepsilon^r_t\). The columns indicate the dependent variable. The indicator variables for the tails of firms (20\(^{th}\) and 80\(^{th}\) percentiles) are computed as outlined in (4)-(5). ROE \(\equiv\) return on equity, PE \(\equiv\) price-earnings ratio, EPSEgrowth \(\equiv\) y-o-y percentage change in expected earnings-per-share, EPSTgrowth \(\equiv\) y-o-y percentage change in realized earnings-per-share. The shocks are calibrated to a 10 basis point increase (panel (a)) and decrease (panel (b)) in the 10-year US Treasury yield. Sample period: 2000/01/07 – 2021/12/17. Standard errors and controls are omitted to preserve space. The excess bond premium (EBP) and fitted spread are obtained from a decomposition of corporate spreads following the methodology of Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) which is estimated over the full sample period. The asterisks denote statistical significance (** for \(p < 0.01\), *** for \(p < 0.05\), * for \(p < 0.1\).
# Appendix G  Robustness: Bond-level Results of Shock Impact

Table G.1: Impact of shocks on the change $\Delta_{t,t-1}$ in corporate and CDS spreads

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel (a): Monetary policy shock $\varepsilon_t^m$</th>
<th>(1) $\Delta_{t,t-1}$ Spread</th>
<th>(2) $\Delta_{t,t-1}$ Pred. Spread</th>
<th>(3) $\Delta_{t,t-1}$ EBP</th>
<th>(4) $\Delta_{t,t-1}$ CDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon_t^m$</td>
<td>9.835***</td>
<td>1.832**</td>
<td>7.977***</td>
<td>3.020***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon_t^m$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowLEV $\times \varepsilon_t^m$</td>
<td>-2.187**</td>
<td>-0.186</td>
<td>-2.270**</td>
<td>-0.285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighLEV $\times \varepsilon_t^m$</td>
<td>0.338</td>
<td>0.835</td>
<td>-0.466</td>
<td>0.639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon_t^m$</td>
<td>8.394***</td>
<td>0.687***</td>
<td>7.676***</td>
<td>2.507***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowICR $\times \varepsilon_t^m$</td>
<td>3.404*</td>
<td>2.765*</td>
<td>0.863</td>
<td>2.151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighICR $\times \varepsilon_t^m$</td>
<td>-0.079</td>
<td>-0.325**</td>
<td>0.264</td>
<td>-0.542***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon_t^m$</td>
<td>9.109***</td>
<td>0.935**</td>
<td>8.152***</td>
<td>2.709***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowEPSE $\times \varepsilon_t^m$</td>
<td>0.939</td>
<td>1.709</td>
<td>-0.699</td>
<td>1.214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighEPSE $\times \varepsilon_t^m$</td>
<td>-0.631</td>
<td>-0.180</td>
<td>-0.489</td>
<td>-0.203</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel (b): Global risk shock $\varepsilon_t^r$</th>
<th>(1) $\Delta_{t,t-1}$ Spread</th>
<th>(2) $\Delta_{t,t-1}$ Pred. Spread</th>
<th>(3) $\Delta_{t,t-1}$ EBP</th>
<th>(4) $\Delta_{t,t-1}$ CDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon_t^r$</td>
<td>23.454***</td>
<td>3.918**</td>
<td>19.461***</td>
<td>6.487***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon_t^r$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowLEV $\times \varepsilon_t^r$</td>
<td>-6.105***</td>
<td>-0.350</td>
<td>-6.266***</td>
<td>-0.485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighLEV $\times \varepsilon_t^r$</td>
<td>6.542**</td>
<td>1.682</td>
<td>4.879***</td>
<td>2.351**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon_t^r$</td>
<td>18.037***</td>
<td>1.911***</td>
<td>16.829***</td>
<td>4.962***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowICR $\times \varepsilon_t^r$</td>
<td>18.623***</td>
<td>6.769**</td>
<td>12.086***</td>
<td>6.638**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighICR $\times \varepsilon_t^r$</td>
<td>-2.925*</td>
<td>-0.806**</td>
<td>-2.080</td>
<td>-1.779***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon_t^r$</td>
<td>19.308***</td>
<td>1.624**</td>
<td>17.629***</td>
<td>5.313***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowEPSE $\times \varepsilon_t^r$</td>
<td>14.909***</td>
<td>4.837*</td>
<td>10.169**</td>
<td>4.950**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighEPSE $\times \varepsilon_t^r$</td>
<td>-2.646</td>
<td>-0.224</td>
<td>-2.453</td>
<td>-0.613</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table presents the estimates of bond-level regressions upon impact of the identified monetary policy shock $\varepsilon_t^m$ (panel (a)) and the global risk shock $\varepsilon_t^r$ (panel (b)). The columns indicate the dependent variable in levels: (1) credit spreads $s_t$, (2) predicted credit spread $\hat{s}_t$, (3) excess bond premium component $\hat{e}_t$, and (3) CDS spreads. The indicator variables for the tails of firms (20th and 80th percentiles) are computed as formally outlined in (4)-(5). The shocks are calibrated to a 10 basis point increase (panel (a)) and decrease (panel (b)) in the 10-year US Treasury yield. The sample period covers 2000/01/07 – 2021/12/17. Standard errors and controls are omitted to preserve space. The excess bond premium (EBP) and fitted spread are obtained from a decomposition of corporate spreads following the methodology of Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) which is estimated over the sample period. The asterisks denote statistical significance (** for $p < 0.01$, * for $p < 0.05$, * for $p < 0.1$).
Table G.2: Impact of shocks on the change $\Delta_{t+1,t-1}$ in corporate and CDS spreads

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) $\Delta_{t+1,t-1}$ Spread</th>
<th>(2) $\Delta_{t+1,t-1}$ Pred. Spread</th>
<th>(3) $\Delta_{t+1,t-1}$ EBP</th>
<th>(4) $\Delta_{t+1,t-1}$ CDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel (a): Monetary policy shock</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon^m_t$</td>
<td>12.213***</td>
<td>2.018**</td>
<td>10.232***</td>
<td>3.591***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowLEV $\times \varepsilon^m_t$</td>
<td>-2.237**</td>
<td>-0.163</td>
<td>-2.288**</td>
<td>-0.271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighLEV $\times \varepsilon^m_t$</td>
<td>1.359</td>
<td>1.077</td>
<td>0.316</td>
<td>0.747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon^m_t$</td>
<td>10.380***</td>
<td>0.742***</td>
<td>9.608***</td>
<td>2.968***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowICR $\times \varepsilon^m_t$</td>
<td>5.197</td>
<td>3.162</td>
<td>2.269</td>
<td>2.560*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighICR $\times \varepsilon^m_t$</td>
<td>-0.771</td>
<td>-0.371**</td>
<td>-0.385</td>
<td>-0.676***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon^m_t$</td>
<td>11.332***</td>
<td>1.148**</td>
<td>10.160***</td>
<td>3.255***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowEPSE $\times \varepsilon^m_t$</td>
<td>1.848</td>
<td>1.474</td>
<td>0.449</td>
<td>1.178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighEPSE $\times \varepsilon^m_t$</td>
<td>-1.206</td>
<td>-0.318</td>
<td>-0.937</td>
<td>-0.211</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Panel (b): Global risk shock</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon^r_t$</td>
<td>29.829***</td>
<td>4.158**</td>
<td>25.737***</td>
<td>7.553***</td>
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<tr>
<td>LowLEV $\times \varepsilon^r_t$</td>
<td>-6.134***</td>
<td>-0.477</td>
<td>-6.051***</td>
<td>-0.097</td>
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<tr>
<td>HighLEV $\times \varepsilon^r_t$</td>
<td>8.289</td>
<td>1.820</td>
<td>6.418*</td>
<td>2.663</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon^r_t$</td>
<td>21.985***</td>
<td>0.827**</td>
<td>21.159***</td>
<td>5.778***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowICR $\times \varepsilon^r_t$</td>
<td>27.560***</td>
<td>8.234**</td>
<td>19.661***</td>
<td>7.729**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HighICR $\times \varepsilon^r_t$</td>
<td>-4.556**</td>
<td>-0.944**</td>
<td>-3.581**</td>
<td>-2.078**</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon^r_t$</td>
<td>23.504***</td>
<td>1.371**</td>
<td>22.089***</td>
<td>6.164***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LowEPSE $\times \varepsilon^r_t$</td>
<td>23.012**</td>
<td>5.840*</td>
<td>17.337***</td>
<td>5.681**</td>
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<tr>
<td>HighEPSE $\times \varepsilon^r_t$</td>
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<td>-0.298</td>
<td>-3.121</td>
<td>-0.533</td>
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<td>Firm FE</td>
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<td>YES</td>
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<td>Industry FE</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

Note: This table presents the estimates of bond-level regressions upon impact of the identified monetary policy shock $\varepsilon^m_t$ (panel (a)) and the global risk shock $\varepsilon^r_t$ (panel (b)). The columns indicate the dependent variable in levels: (1) credit spreads $s_t$, (2) predicted credit spread $\hat{s}_t$, (3) excess bond premium component $\hat{e}_t$, and (3) CDS spreads. The indicator variables for the tails of firms (20th and 80th percentiles) are computed as formally outlined in (4)-(5). The shocks are calibrated to a 10 basis point increase (panel (a)) and decrease (panel (b)) in the 10-year US Treasury yield. The sample period covers 2000/01/07 – 2021/12/17. Standard errors and controls are omitted to preserve space. The excess bond premium (EBP) and fitted spread are obtained from a decomposition of corporate spreads following the methodology of Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) which is estimated over the sample period. The asterisks denote statistical significance (** for p < 0.01, * for p < 0.05, * for p < 0.1).
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