Macroprudential regulation of investment funds

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Abstract

The investment fund sector, the largest component of the non-bank financial system, is growing rapidly and the economy is becoming more reliant on investment fund financial intermediation. This paper builds a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with banks and investment funds. Without regulation, investment funds hold insufficient amounts of liquid bank deposits and must sell bonds when hit by large redemptions. Even when accounting for side effects related to a reduction of deposits held by households, a macroprudential liquidity requirement improves welfare by reducing bond liquidation and by increasing macroeconomic resilience to financial shocks as in March 2020.

Keywords: Non-Bank Financial Intermediation, Macroprudential Policy, Liquidity Regulation

JEL Classification: E44, G18, G23
Non-Technical Summary

The investment fund sector grew significantly over the last years, both in the euro area and at a global level. Funds are very active in less liquid market segments, such as high-yield corporate bonds, but usually hold low liquidity buffers even though their shares are often redeemable at a very short notice. The combination of these factors creates a liquidity mismatch that makes funds vulnerable to sudden large-scale outflows, such as those registered in March 2020 during the Covid-19 market event. Against this backdrop, policymakers are discussing ways to address these risks, including a regulatory liquidity buffer for funds.

This paper develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model to study the macroeconomic effects of liquidity risk in the investment fund sector and a regulation that can address this risk. In our model, non-financial firms issue bonds and receive bank loans to finance investment. Households invest in fund shares and bank deposits. Banks raise deposits to grant loans to firms. Investment funds issue shares, purchase corporate bonds and can hold a liquidity buffer in the form of bank deposits.

Investment funds are exposed to periodic redemptions. When a fund’s outflows exceed its liquidity buffer, the fund must sell bonds to households who, as second-best users, purchase the assets at a discounted price. Individual fund managers do not internalise the aggregate impact of their liquidation of corporate bonds on market prices and, as a result, hold inefficiently low liquidity buffers. Hence, there is a pecuniary externality. Bond liquidation is socially costly, as it implies resource losses and depresses financial intermediation through investment funds.

We calibrate the model to the euro area economy in the late 2010s. Without fund regulation, the liquidity buffer held by funds is 2% of funds’ assets under management, in line with euro area data. We show that the introduction of a higher regulatory minimum liquidity buffer improves upon the unregulated economy. The welfare-maximising optimal buffer amounts to 8% of assets under management. Regulation has benefits and costs. On the one hand, the liquidity buffer reduces assets in liquidation and the associated resource losses, which ultimately depress consumption. On the other hand, by forcing funds to hold a larger fraction of their assets in bank deposits, the regulation is associated with lower bond intermediation, which at a certain point implies a drop in output. In addition, having funds demanding more deposits crowds out households’ deposits, who extract liquidity benefits from holding deposits though.

We also consider the response of our economy to a sudden change in household saving preferences for liquid assets in form of bank deposits, with the aim to capture some of the dynamics observed during March 2020. This shock leads to a shift of households’ asset allocation towards bank deposits and away from investment fund shares. As a response, investment funds reduce deposits relatively more than their bond holdings, because deposits pay a lower return. Smaller liquidity buffers lead to higher bond sales and resource losses, thereby compressing the
return on fund shares. This reduces households’ savings in investment funds further and, thus, the ability of the latter to invest in corporate bonds. While the change in preference implies more funding for banks, the loss in bond financing cannot be replaced in full. The overall effect is an amplification of the initial shock that leads to a drop in output and consumption. We show that the optimal regulatory liquidity buffer substantially reduces these effects: redemptions lead to smaller bond sales and resource losses, while output drops by less and consumption is stabilised.
1 Introduction

The investment fund sector has grown rapidly over the last two decades. In the euro area, assets held by investment funds increased almost fourfold, from around 3.6 EUR trillion in 2002 to more than 14 EUR trillion in 2020 (Figure 1, top left panel). As a result, the sector’s total assets now amount to 35% of those of the banking sector.¹ This growth went hand in hand with the rising importance of market-based finance instruments for firms, such as corporate bonds (see Darmouni and Papoutsi, 2023). Investment funds are the single largest holding sector of corporate bonds, holding about one third of the total amounts outstanding in the euro area (Figure 1, top right panel).

These developments make the euro area financial system – traditionally heavily bank-based – more diverse and possibly more resilient. But vulnerabilities associated to investment funds’ activities are on the rise as well. Although fund shares are often redeemable at a very short notice, funds have progressively intensified their search for yield and became more active in less liquid market segments, such as high-yield corporate bonds. At the same time, funds’ liquidity buffers, i.e., the share of cash and cash-like instruments in total assets, markedly declined (Figure 1, bottom left panel). Small liquidity buffers in combination with large-scale redemption requests, such as those registered in March 2020 during the Covid-19 market event (Figure 1, bottom right panel), can force funds to sell relatively illiquid assets.² This can amplify asset price deterioration, leading to broader adverse effects on the financing of the economy (see Falato et al., 2021b, Morris et al., 2017 and Chernenko and Sunderam, 2016). The massive outflows at the onset of the pandemic gave additional momentum to the policy debate on macroprudential regulatory options, including minimum liquidity buffers, that address vulnerabilities in investment funds.³ Such a regulation aims to contain adverse spill-overs from the investment fund sector to wider financial markets and the real economy.

In this paper, we study the interactions of the investment fund sector with the wider macroeconomy and consider the effects of a regulatory macroprudential liquidity buffer. In a first step, we provide empirical evidence on the effects of outflows from investment funds on the macroeconomy. As the main contribution of the paper, we then develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model (DSGE) to study the macroeconomic effects of liquidity risk in the investment fund sector. We use this model to analyse the macroeconomic and welfare effects of a regulatory macroprudential liquidity buffer for investment funds. We also discuss the different mechanisms through which the regulation affects the model economy. To the best of our knowledge, this is

¹Similar trends are visible at the global level (see, e.g., FSB, 2020a). Investment funds, also abbreviated as “funds” in the following when ambiguity can be ruled out, are the largest component of the non-bank financial intermediation sector, formerly known as “shadow banking system”.

²Market tensions ceased and outflows reversed only when central banks intervened in financial markets, for example, by means of the ECB’s Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP) (see Breckenfelder and Hoerova, 2023). For an overview of the US case and the interventions of the Federal Reserve, see Falato et al. (2021a).

³See, for example, IMF (2021), FSB (2017, 2020b, 2023), the US Securities and Exchange Commission (2022), and Cominetta et al. (2018).
Our empirical analysis is based on a vector-autoregression (VAR) model and studies the effects of an aggregate outflow shock from corporate bond funds in the euro area. We show that such outflows, by reducing the amount of financial intermediation investment funds can conduct on corporate bond markets, lead to persistent adverse effects on real economic activity. Specifically, an outflow shock of one percentage point predicts a reduction of industrial production by 0.4 percent six months after impact. We also find that bank lending is not able to fully compensate for the loss of financing from the investment funds. These results demonstrate the macroeconomic relevance of the investment fund sector and motivate our subsequent DSGE model-based analyses.

In our model, non-financial firms issue bonds and receive bank loans to finance investment.
Both forms of refinancing are imperfectly substitutable, implying that large shifts in financing conditions negatively affect production. Households invest in fund shares and bank deposits. We assume that the latter also provide liquidity benefits to households in terms of utility, as in Begenau and Landvoigt (2022) and motivated in Begenau (2020). Banks issue deposits and use the proceeds to invest into loans directly. Investment funds issue shares, purchase corporate bonds, and can hold liquidity in the form of bank deposits. We capture liquidity risk in investment funds by assuming that funds periodically face stochastic investor redemptions. When outflows exceed the liquidity buffer in terms of deposit holdings, the fund must sell bonds to households who, as second-best users, incur management cost and purchase the assets at a discount, leading to resource losses as in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015) in the context of bank runs.

Our model includes a pecuniary externality: individual fund managers do not internalise the aggregate price impact of their bond sales. Instead, they only consider how their sales reduce their own profits via a liquidity cost. As a result, funds hold inefficiently low liquidity buffers, which generate bond liquidation. Bond liquidation in turn implies resource losses and depresses investment fund intermediation.

We calibrate the model to the euro area economy between 2007 and 2019. Central to our welfare analysis is the financial sector, including in particular the behaviour of investment funds when hit by redemptions, and the liquidity preferences of households. Accordingly, we target the profitability of investment funds as well as moments for their asset side and the portfolio choice of households. Aside from evaluating the model fit against non-targeted macroeconomic moments, we additionally show that our model reconciles microeconometric estimates of the reaction of investment funds and bond prices after redemptions.

Our main results can be summarised as follows. In the unregulated economy, investment funds hold inefficiently low liquidity buffers because of the pecuniary externality. We calibrate the model such that investment funds voluntarily hold a liquidity buffer of 2% of their assets under management, in line with euro area data (see Figure 1, bottom left panel). A higher regulatory liquidity buffer helps to meet periodic redemptions and improves upon the unregulated economy. We find that the optimal regulatory liquidity buffer is more than three times higher than in the unregulated economy, amounting to 7.2% of funds’ assets under management.

We study both benefits and costs of this regulation. On the one hand, the liquidity buffer improves welfare by reducing periodic bond liquidation and the associated resource losses, which ultimately depress consumption. On the other hand, the regulation also implies welfare costs. By forcing investment funds to hold a larger fraction of their assets in bank deposits, the regulation

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4 Empirically, bank deposits represent the biggest portion of liquidity reserves held by investment funds (see Chernenko and Sunderam, 2016). Such deposits usually include call accounts, call money, as well as secured and unsecured money market instruments, such as repurchase agreements and short-term certificates of deposits.

5 For empirical evidence on the relevance of this externality, see Chernenko and Sunderam (2016, 2020) and Falato et al. (2021b).

6 Notably, our result compares well with the recent proposal by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (2022) according to which funds should be required to hold at least 10% of their net assets as a liquidity buffer.
is associated with lower bond intermediation. Already for intermediate values of the regulatory liquidity buffer, this implies a drop in output due to a change in the firm financing mix. In addition, if funds hold more deposits, less deposits are held by households, who extract utility benefits from them. Tighter regulation induces investment funds to demand deposits at lower interest rates, thereby increasing households’ opportunity cost to hold them. Altogether, fund liquidity regulation trades off the resource gains from lower bond sales against a reduction in (i) bond intermediation and (ii) households’ utility from holding deposits. We find that the reduction of household deposits is the main welfare cost associated with the liquidity regulation.\footnote{This result is similar to findings by Begenau (2020), who assumes household utility benefits from holding bank deposits, in the context of optimal bank capital regulation.}

We show that, in absence of this latter mechanism, e.g., in an economy where an alternative storage of liquidity is available to investment funds, the optimal liquidity buffer is much higher, at around 11.6% of assets under management.

We also consider the response of our economy to a sudden change in household saving preferences for liquid assets (similarly to Fisher, 2015). This shock leads to a shift of households’ asset allocation towards bank deposits and away from investment fund shares. The exercise captures some key dynamics around the unprecedentedly high outflows from the fund sector during March 2020. Investment funds respond to the resulting loss of funding by reducing their asset side, i.e, deposit and bond holdings. In the absence of the regulation, funds reduce deposits relatively more than bonds given deposits’ lower return. This exposes funds to periodic redemptions by more, ultimately magnifying resource losses from bond sales and reducing investment fund profits. As a consequence, investment funds attract less savings from households and must scale down their bond portfolios as well. At the same time, households’ higher preference for bank deposits implies more funding for banks and a lower loan rate. This beneficial effect on firm financing and production is dampened by the imperfect substitutability of loans and bonds.

The overall effect is an amplification of the initial shock, which leads to a drop in output and consumption that is consistent with the empirical evidence from our VAR analysis. The optimal regulatory liquidity buffer eliminates this amplification, as investment funds cannot reduce deposits as much as they would want to in absence of the regulation. Redemptions then lead to smaller bond sales and resource losses. As a result, the regulation stabilises output and consumption, which improves welfare compared to the unregulated economy.

**Related Literature** – Closest to our paper is the work by Begenau and Landvoigt (2022). In their model, non-banks face runs that force them to sell capital to households, who are less productive users of capital such that output contracts. Non-banks can default, in which case additional resource losses in terms of capital depreciation and default cost occur. Non-bank leverage is an important aspect to generate default and model dynamics. To reduce the magnitude of sales of capital, the authors propose a tax on non-bank borrowing.

Our analysis, instead, focuses on the liquidity risk of investment funds, the largest and fastest-growing sector in the non-bank universe. For these entities, and in line with the recent
policy discussion, liquidity mismatch rather than leverage is the key vulnerability. In fact, most types of investment funds are legally prohibited from using leverage at a significant scale. Our paper is the first contribution that explicitly analyses investment fund liquidity risks and the effects of macroprudential liquidity regulation of investment funds in a macroeconomic model.

Leverage or insufficient risk-controls have been used extensively in other studies to model non-banks in the context of the 2007-2009 crises, where both features played a prominent role. Verona et al. (2013) show that the presence of shadow banks that differ from banks by the markets they serve and their propensity to underestimate risk leads to a boom-bust cycle in financial markets. Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015) and Gertler et al. (2016) highlight that non-banks are more efficient in financial intermediation at the cost of higher risk, since they are prone to funding shocks. They show that caps on non-bank leverage can reduce such roll-over risk. Based on Gertler et al. (2016), several papers extend the analysis of shadow banks and potential regulatory responses. Rottner (2023) proposes a leverage tax on shadow banks to limit their risk-taking, similar to Begena and Landvoigt (2022). Poeschl (2023) considers an intervention of central banks on the wholesale funding market after shadow bank runs that are induced by excessive leverage. None of these papers discusses optimal policy responses.

Fève et al. (2019) and Meeks et al. (2017) study the role of non-banks in asset securitisation, which relaxes funding constraints of banks. Meeks et al. (2017) introduce central bank asset purchases to address asset price deterioration and the propagation of losses. Ferrante (2018) assumes that non-banks have a superior ability in risk diversification; yet, since they are highly leveraged and subject to runs, their presence adds fragility to financial markets. Ferrante (2018) finds that central bank asset purchases can prevent negative price spirals during runs. As a policy tool, our paper instead considers the macroprudential regulation of non-banks, rather than central bank support interventions. While a fully-fledged comparison between these different policy options is beyond the scope of our paper, regulation can have several advantages, e.g., in terms of moral hazard that is usually associated with ex-post central bank support.

In Gebauer (2021) and Gebauer and Mazelis (2023) tighter capital regulation of banks leads to leakages of financial intermediation to the non-bank sector. Consistent with this result, we find that fund intermediation falls and bank intermediation rises, when a macroprudential liquidity regulation for funds is introduced.

There is also considerable work on non-banks in microeconomic models. For example, based on the work by Stein (2012), Hanson et al. (2015) assume that traditional banking and shadow banking are different ways to create safe claims. In their setting, shadow bank liabilities are subject to fire sales that give rise to a pecuniary externality. Di Iasio and Kryczka (2021) build a model with banks and non-banks, where investment funds are subject to a pecuniary externality and hold inefficiently low amounts of liquidity. In line with our results, the liquidity regulation

8While non-bank securitisation vehicles played a large role in the global financial crisis, especially in the United States, their importance has receded afterwards. In European markets, securitisation vehicles only make up a small share of the non-bank financial sector, so that we abstract from this feature.
of funds improves upon competitive equilibrium allocations.

A limited number of further papers empirically studies the links between the investment fund sector and the macroeconomy. This related literature arrives at similar conclusions as we do in our empirical analysis. For example, Ben-Rephael et al. (2021) find that flows towards high-yield bond mutual funds are a highly informative lead indicator for the business cycle. Kaufmann (2023) shows that shocks to global investment fund flows affect global financial conditions as well as real economic activity in both the United States and the euro area. Barauskaite et al. (2022) estimate the effects of bank and market-based (non-bank) credit supply shocks on euro area GDP in a Bayesian VAR model, where shocks are identified using sign restrictions. They find that both types of credit supply shocks are important drivers of the business cycle and have a similar explanatory power for output.

Outline — The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide empirical evidence on the macroeconomic relevance of the investment fund sector. Section 3 describes our model. The calibration of the model, all results, and robustness checks are discussed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes.

2 The Macroeconomic Effect of Fund Outflows

In this section, we empirically assess the impact of aggregate outflows from the investment fund sector on macroeconomic outcomes in euro area data. As outflows reduce the amount of financial intermediation that investment funds can conduct on corporate bond markets, this measure constitutes in essence a non-bank credit supply shock.

We use a VAR model to estimate the effects of fund outflows on macroeconomic and financial variables in monthly data between April 2007 and June 2019. We consider a VAR with seven variables in the following ordering: the annual inflation in the harmonized index of consumer prices, the log of industrial production, the annual growth of bank lending, cumulative flows to European corporate bond funds, the spread between BBB-rated euro non-financial corporate bond yields and the 5-year German government bond yield, the yield of the 5-year German Bund itself, and the VSTOXX volatility measure.9

Our analysis focuses on funds domiciled in the euro area that have an investment focus on European corporate bond markets. Cumulative flows are measured in percent and are scaled by lagged assets under management. Using flows instead of changes in total asset allows to analyse actual investor decisions and control for changes in the market value of the assets held. The corporate bond spread serves as a measure for the severity of financial frictions that has been shown to be a relevant ingredient for deriving sensible macro responses in VAR analyses (see, e.g., Gertler and Karadi, 2015 and Jarociński and Karadi, 2020). The 5-year German Bund is used as a proxy for euro area risk-free interest levels and to capture effects of monetary

9See Appendix A.1 for a detailed description of all variables as well as the data sources.
policy in the model. Corporate bond spreads and German Bunds are measured in percent. The VSTOXX – the 30-day implied volatility of the EURO STOXX 50 – captures investor risk sentiment, widely acknowledged as a major determinant of fund flows.

We choose a lag length of four based on comparing Akaike and Bayesian information criteria. The VAR is conventionally estimated with ordinary least squares. We use the estimated VAR

\footnote{By including a yield with a long maturity, we also capture the effects of unconventional monetary policy when short-term interest rates are close to their effective lower bound.}
to compute impulse responses to a shock to the corporate bond fund flows. The shock is identified via Cholesky ordering. The ordering of variables reflects the assumption that industrial production, inflation, and bank lending can respond to changes in the fund flows only with a lag, while financial variables can react immediately.

Figure 2 shows the impulse responses to a 1%-shock on corporate bond fund flows. The shock implies higher financing costs for firms on corporate bond markets, as visible from the increase in the bond spread. The positive response of the VSTOXX indicates increased uncertainty and a reduction of risk appetite in financial markets. Bank lending does not respond significantly to the shock in the first 11 months, after which it starts falling. Banks are, accordingly, not able to fully compensate for the reduction in non-bank financial intermediation. The macroeconomic variables react significantly to the shock, from both an economic and statistical perspective. The decrease in fund flows reduces real economic activity, as measured by industrial production, by about 0.4% after six months before reaching a trough of -0.6% after one year. Inflation falls by up to 0.15 percentage points one year after the shock. In Appendix A.2, we show that all findings are highly robust to a change in the ordering of the variables, e.g., with fund flows ordered first (Figure 8), and to the inclusion of less and more lags (Figures 9 and 10). The results continue to hold also in a sample excluding the global financial crisis (Figure 11).

Our results show that a decrease in investment fund financing leads to persistent adverse macroeconomic effects. In this way, the analysis demonstrates the macroeconomic relevance of the investment fund sector and motivates our subsequent simulations in the DSGE model.

3 The Model

The model consists of households, a financial sector with banks and investment funds, a firm sector that is made up of entrepreneurs, intermediate, capital and final goods producers, and a macroprudential regulator (see Figure 3 for an overview). All derivations are provided in Appendix B. Unless stated differently, all variables are formulated in real terms.

3.1 Households

The representative household derives utility from consumption $c_t$ and from holding bank deposits $d_t^{bh}$, which provide liquidity services for transactions. The household has dis-utility from labour $n_t$, which is supplied to the final good producer. Period-$t$ utility is given by

$$U(c_t, d_t^{bh}, n_t) = c_t^{\frac{1-\sigma}{1-\sigma}} + \delta_t^d \left( d_t^{bh} \right)^{1-\sigma_d} - \psi_n d_t^{\frac{1+\sigma_n}{1+\sigma_n}},$$

where $\sigma, \sigma_n, \sigma_d \geq 0$ denote the relative risk aversion, the inverse Frisch elasticity, and a liquidity preference parameter, respectively. Utility weights for labour and liquidity are given by $\psi_n$ and $\delta_t^d$. We assume that the latter can be stochastic to capture a shock to household’s preferences.

The inclusion of deposits in the utility function is a standard way to rationalize the benefit of holding a liquid asset. Having insufficient liquidity when an idiosyncratic consumption need arises may necessitate the costly liquidation of assets, i.e., illiquidity is costly (see Baumol, 1952; Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Whalen, 1966). Feenstra (1986) shows the equivalence of models featuring such cost and those including the liquid asset directly in the utility function. For recent adaptations of this modelling approach, see Begena (2020), Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012), and Nagel (2016).

Besides holding bank deposits, households can save in investment fund shares $s_t$ at price $q_t^s$, which pay dividends $\text{div}^{if}_t$ but carry no liquidity benefit.\footnote{This assumption can be relaxed without changing our results, as long as deposits grant a sufficiently higher liquidity benefit than fund shares.}

The period-$t$ real budget constraint is

$$c_t + d_{t}^{hh} + q_t^s s_t + f (\tilde{b}_t) = w_t n_t + (1 + r_{t-1}^d) d_{t-1}^{hh} + (q_t^s + \text{div}^{if}_t) s_{t-1} + \Pi_t ,$$

where $w_t$ is the real wage, $\Pi_t$ are total profits of the financial and non-financial sectors, and $r_{t-1}^d$ is the deposit rate, which is agreed in period $t-1$ and paid in period $t$. The term $f (\tilde{b}_t) = (\kappa_{hh}/2) \tilde{b}_t^2$ captures costs that are associated with intra-period bond sales $\tilde{b}_t$ from investment funds. We assume that households are second-best users of bonds and face convex management costs when holding corporate bonds sold by investment funds. These costs represent a resource loss as in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015), who use this modelling approach in the context of bank runs.

\section{Figure 3: Model Overview}
Intuitively, bond investment requires information acquisition about the firm or the market, which is costly to collect for non-experts. These costs increase in the amount traded and become higher at the margin due to the complexity of managing a large portfolio. This not only reflects direct cost from information acquisition, e.g., gaining access to information and processing it, but also that agents might have specific risk preferences and need to choose bonds accordingly (see Gârleanu and Pedersen, 2007).

In comparison to households, we assume that bond purchases via investment funds are costless, since they are specialised professional investors. While we assume that households are the counter-party of investment funds in the secondary bond market, our results do not depend on this choice. Any other agent can have this role as long as it is a second-best user due to management cost. A related approach that assumes that households are less productive users of capital purchased in forced asset sales is used in Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) and Begenau and Landvoigt (2022). Section 3.2.2 describes the mechanism behind bond sales in details.

Households maximise the discounted sum of life-time utility

$$\mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U(c_t, d_{th}^t, n_t),$$

subject to the sequence of period budget constraints (2), where $\beta$ is the discount factor. The first-order conditions (FOCs) of the household for deposits, fund shares, and labour are given by

$$c_t^{-\sigma} = \delta_t (d_{th}^t)^{-\sigma} + \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \beta c_{t+1}^{-\sigma} (1 + i_d) \right],$$

$$c_t^{-\sigma} = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \beta c_{t+1}^{-\sigma} \left( q_{t+1}^s + \frac{div_{t+1}}{q_t^s} \right) \right],$$

$$\psi_n(c_t)^\sigma n_t^{\sigma_n} = w_t. \tag{6}$$

Equation (4) is the Euler equation related to deposits. The left-hand side represents the opportunity cost of investing in deposits in terms of forgone marginal utility. The right-hand side denotes the marginal utility benefit from holding deposits plus the expected marginal utility of repayment. Equation (5) is the asset-pricing equation for investment fund shares. Equation (6) describes the labour supply decision. We define $\Lambda_{t,t+s} \equiv \beta^s (c_{t+s}/c_t)^{-\sigma}$ as the stochastic discount factor of households.

### 3.2 Financial Sector

There are two types of financial intermediaries, banks and investment funds. Besides their specialisation on different types of financial intermediation (loans and bonds, respectively), they differ across important dimensions.

First, by issuing deposits, banks engage in liquidity creation, which provides a utility benefit
to households and, as a result, gives banks access to a cheap form of funding.

Second, we assume that households never redeem bank deposits before maturity. This can be motivated by an implicit assumption that bank liabilities are backed by some form of government guarantee, such as a deposit insurance. Investment funds, in turn, are subject to liquidity risk in the form of early redemptions, which can only be settled with liquid assets in the form of deposits or by selling bonds on secondary markets.

### 3.2.1 Banks

Since the focus of the paper is on investment funds, we consider a very stylised banking sector. Appendix F proposes a version of the model where banks have more structure, but we show that this affects our results only marginally.

The banking sector finances loans with deposits \( d_t \). Households’ non-pecuniary benefit from deposits drives down the deposit rate \( i^d_t \), and, thus, banks’ cost of funding. Banks grant loans \( l_t \) to entrepreneurs at the loan rate \( i^l_t \).

Banks are owned by households to whom they transfer their profits as dividends. They maximise the discounted sum of cash-flows \( div^b_t \),

\[
\max_{d_t, l_t} \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \Lambda_{0,t} \left[ d_{t+1} - \left(1 + i^d_t\right) d_t + (1 + i^l_t) l_t - l_{t+1}\right],
\]

subject to a balance sheet constraint \( d_t = l_t \). After repeated substitutions, this leads to the static bank problem

\[
\max_{d_t, l_t} i^l_t l_t - i^d_t d_t,
\]

where \( i^l_t l_t \) denotes revenues from lending and \( i^d_t d_t \) are the interest payments to depositors. FOCs imply that the deposit rate equals the loan rate,

\[
i^l_t = i^d_t. \tag{7}
\]

### 3.2.2 Investment Funds

Investment fund \( j \) issues shares to households and invests in bonds \( b_{j,t} \) and bank deposits \( d_{j,t} \).

Fund shares are subject to redemption risk that we capture with a two sub-period setup, similarly to Kara and Ozsoy (2020).

**Sub-Period I** – In the first sub-period, the only market that opens is the secondary market for bonds, where investment funds can sell bonds to households. Fund \( j \) enters the sub-period

\[12\]In practise, investment funds use various types of short-term call accounts as well as unsecured and secured money market instruments, including repos and certificates of deposits, for their liquidity management. Banks are found to be main counterparties for the investment funds in this respect. We, therefore, model these instruments as short-term bank deposits.
I of period \( t \) with its end-of-\( t - 1 \) period positions. In the spirit of Bianchi and Bigio (2022), a stochastic fraction \( \phi_{j,t} \) of the fund’s shares is redeemed by households.\(^{13}\) When faced with redemptions, the fund either uses its deposit holdings or sells a fraction \( 1 - \vartheta_{j,t} \) of its bonds,

\[
\phi_{j,t} q_{j,t-1} s_{j,t-1} \leq d_{j,t-1}^f + (1 - \vartheta_{j,t}) \tilde{q}_b b_{j,t-1} .
\]  

(8)

Investment funds sell bonds to households that value the bonds at the secondary market price \( \tilde{q}_b \). As selling bonds is costly, investment funds only do so when deposits are insufficient to cover the liquidity need. This pecking order in liquidity management to meet redemptions is also in line with the empirically-observed behaviour of investment fund managers (see Chernenko and Sunderam, 2016; Choi et al., 2020; Jiang et al., 2021).\(^{14}\) Investment funds with insufficient deposits choose to retain the maximum share of bonds \( \vartheta_{j,t} \). For these investment funds the redemption constraint (8) holds with equality,

\[
1 - \vartheta_{j,t} = \frac{\phi_{j,t} q_{j,t-1} s_{j,t-1} - d_{j,t-1}^f}{\tilde{q}_b b_{j,t-1}} .
\]

The fraction of forced bond sales to households rises in the size of the redemption draw \( \phi_{j,t} \) and in the value of fund shares issued. Larger deposits or a higher secondary market bond price imply that a smaller fraction of bonds needs to be sold. Bond sales by fund \( j \) are given by

\[
\tilde{b}_{j,t} \equiv (1 - \vartheta_{j,t}) b_{j,t-1} = \frac{\phi_{j,t} q_{j,t-1} s_{j,t-1} - d_{j,t-1}^f}{\tilde{q}_b} .
\]

Let \( \tilde{\phi}_t \equiv d_{t-1}^f / (q_{t-1}^s s_{t-1}) \) denote the redemption threshold above which investment funds must sell bonds. Since all investment funds hold equal positions at the start of a period, the threshold is not fund-specific. The aggregate forced bond sales are given by the sum of sales by individual funds with a redemption draw above \( \tilde{\phi}_t \)

\[
\tilde{b}_t (q_{t-1}^s s_{t-1}, d_{t-1}^f) = \int_{\tilde{\phi}_t}^{1} \tilde{b}_{j,t} g(\phi_{j,t}) d\phi_{j,t} ,
\]  

(9)

where \( g(\phi_j) \) denotes the probability density function of the stochastic redemptions \( \phi_{j,t} \).\(^{15}\)

When purchasing bonds, households face convex costs \( f(\tilde{b}_t) \). These can be seen as management costs that reflect households’ lack of expertise that increase with bond holdings. As the

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\(^{13}\)As in De Fiore et al. (2019) one may think of (not modelled) random idiosyncratic consumption needs of households. Intuitively, households would not use deposits to cater to the consumption needs as they would lose the utility benefit. An alternative interpretation is that households may adjust their portfolio in response to (temporary) changes in risk preferences.

\(^{14}\)This approach to fund liquidity management is also referred to as ‘horizontal slicing’ (see, e.g., Claessens and Lewrick, 2021). Under the alternative approach of ‘vertical slicing’, funds reduce holdings of all asset classes in proportion to their portfolio weights. Introducing vertical slicing in our model would imply larger bond sales and bond price deterioration in the secondary market.

\(^{15}\)See Appendix B.3 for further details on the derivation, including a closed-form solution for \( \tilde{b}_t \) in (9).
value of a bond just before maturity is one, we derive the bond price schedule on the secondary market as
\[ \tilde{q}_t^b = 1 - f'(\tilde{b}_t). \]

Since households have convex costs from accepting bonds, the secondary market price is decreasing in the amount of sales. We assume households sell their bond holdings back to investment funds at the end of sub-period I. Hence, the liquidity need of investment funds is only temporary and positions are equal again across investment funds at the end of the sub-period.\textsuperscript{16}

**Sub-Period II** – In the second sub-period, all markets open and investment funds make their portfolio choice. Investment funds are all identical again at this stage and maximise the discounted sum of dividends
\[
\mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \Lambda_{0,t} \text{div}_t^{i,f}, \tag{10}
\]
where real dividends are
\[
\text{div}_t^{i,f} = b_{t-1} - q_t^0 b_t - d_t^{i,f} + (1 + i_{t-1}^d) d_{t-1}^{i,f} - L(\tilde{b}_t). \tag{11}
\]

In each period, investment funds invest in bank deposits and purchase bonds in the primary market at the price \(q_t^0\). The last term \(L(\tilde{b}_t) = (\kappa_{i,f}/2) \cdot \tilde{b}_t^2\) represents a convex function that captures costs from trading bonds with households on an illiquid secondary market in sub-period I. The literature models bilateral or over-the-counter trading using matching frictions or transaction costs in search and matching frameworks (see, e.g., Duffie et al., 2005, Geromichalos and Herrenbrueck, 2016, or Bianchi and Bigio, 2022). These imply rising price discounts induced by agents’ bargaining power or market tightness as captured by the convex formulation of the cost function. A related interpretation is suggested by the results of Chen et al. (2010). Sales after redemptions decrease profits due to price changes, deviations from the own investment strategy, or commissions. The authors show that the adverse impact on the return of investment funds from outflows rises with higher investment fund illiquidity, i.e., the higher the bond sales are through the lens of our model.

Instead of taking a structural route, we capture such frictions parsimoniously by assuming the convex costs \(L\) that increase in the amount of trading similar to Chernenko and Sunderam (2020).\textsuperscript{17} Ultimately, the cost \(L\) creates a motive for investment funds to voluntarily hold

\textsuperscript{16}This follows De Fiore et al. (2019), who assume that a reverse redemption shock hits financial intermediaries at the end of the sub-period, such that households re-invest the redemptions. This assumption greatly reduces the model’s complexity with only minor effects on dynamics and the results as we will discuss later on.

\textsuperscript{17}In Appendix G, we discuss a more structural version of the model that provides a microfoundation of the liquidity cost and that does not require the assumption of reverse redemption shocks from De Fiore et al. (2019). While this less parsimonious framework allows to track financial flows more rigorously, it yields very
Table 1: Investment Fund Balance Sheet

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assets</th>
<th>Liabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bonds $q^b_b$</td>
<td>Shares $q^s_s$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deposits $d^f_f$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Investment funds maximise (10) subject to the balance sheet constraint

$$q^s_s s_t = q^b_b b_t + d^f_f ,$$

which is also depicted in Table 1. This leads to the following FOCs for deposits and bonds:

$$1 + \lambda^f_f = E_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} \left[ (1 + i^d_t) - \frac{dL}{db_{t+1}} \frac{dbh_{t+1}}{dd^f_f} \right] ,$$  \hspace{1cm} (13)

$$1 + \lambda^f_f = E_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} \frac{1}{q^d_d} .$$  \hspace{1cm} (14)

Equation (13) captures investment funds’ deposit investment trade-off. Investing today reduces available resources and tightens the balance sheet constraint (12), whose Lagrange multiplier is given by $\lambda^f_f$. Next period, the deposits yield interest income $i^d_t$. The second term of the right-hand side is the reduction in liquidity costs. These costs fall because bond sales in sub-period I are reduced for any additional unit of deposits, $dbh_{t+1}/d^f_f < 0$. Equation (14) is the FOC related to bond investment. Taking both FOCs together, the deposit choice of investment funds follows a trade-off between the lower relative return on deposits and the expected cost from selling bonds similar to Chernenko and Sunderam (2020).

3.3 Non-Financial Sector

Entrepreneurs produce inputs for the final good producer. The latter combines labour with the entrepreneur inputs into the final good that is sold to households and capital producers. The capital producers provide capital to the entrepreneurs and face investment adjustment cost.

3.3.1 Entrepreneurs

In each period, there is a unit mass of entrepreneurs who raise funding from banks or investment funds to purchase capital from capital producers at the price $q^{k,\tau}_t$ with $\tau = l, b$. We assume that financing is obtained from one type of financial intermediary only. Accordingly, we distinguish between bond- and loan-financed entrepreneurs. To retain the notion of an endogenous financing choice while limiting model complexity, we assume both entrepreneur types sell their good to an
intermediate good producer that aggregates their output and sells it to the final good producer.

**Bond-users** – Bond-using entrepreneurs buy new capital $K^b$ from and sell old depreciated capital to specialised capital producers at the end of a period. They finance the acquisition of new capital by issuing one-period bonds. Entrepreneurs sell their production $z_t^b = (K_{t-1}^b)^\gamma$ at price $p_t^b$ to the intermediate good producer, where $\gamma$ is the return to scale parameter. Their profits are

$$div_t^b = p_t^b \left(K_{t-1}^b\right)^\gamma - b_{t-1} + q_t^b b_t + (1 - \delta)q_t^{k,b} K_{t-1}^b - q_t^{k,b} K_t^b$$

with $q_t^b = q_t^{k,b} K_t^b$,

where $\delta$ denotes the rate of capital depreciation. The FOCs yield

$$\mathbb{E}_t \left[\Lambda_{t,t+1} \frac{1}{q_t^b}\right] = \mathbb{E}_t \left[\Lambda_{t,t+1} \gamma p_t^b (K_{t-1}^b)^{\gamma - 1} + (1 - \delta)q_t^{k,b} \right].$$

The marginal value from investing into capital, including its marginal product and the re-sale value, is equated with the capital financing cost on bond markets.

**Loan-users** – These entrepreneurs operate the same technology but finance their capital with loans. Profits are given by

$$div_t^l = p_t^l \left(K_{t-1}^l\right)^\gamma - (1 + i_{t-1}) l_{t-1} + l_t + (1 - \delta)q_t^{k,l} K_{t-1}^l - q_t^{k,l} K_t^l$$

with $l_t = q_t^{k,l} K_t^l$,

where $K_t^l$ and $p_t^l$ denote loan-user capital and the price of their output $z_t^l$, respectively. The FOCs imply

$$\mathbb{E}_t \left[\Lambda_{t,t+1} (1 + i_{t-1})\right] = \mathbb{E}_t \left[\Lambda_{t,t+1} \gamma p_t^l (K_{t-1}^l)^{\gamma - 1} + (1 - \delta)q_t^{k,l} \right].$$

**Intermediate good producer** – Both types of entrepreneurs sell to an intermediate good producer that aggregates these inputs using a CES-technology

$$z_t = \left(\nu(z_t^b)^\epsilon + (1 - \nu)(z_t^b)^\epsilon\right)^{\frac{1}{\epsilon}},$$

where $\nu$ denotes a production weight and $\epsilon$ guides the elasticity of substitution. Input demand follows as

$$z_t^l = (\nu)^{\frac{1}{1+\epsilon}} \left(\frac{p_t^l}{p_t}\right)^{\frac{1}{1+\epsilon}} z_t,$$
Both entrepreneur types operate the same technology but use different sources of funding (bonds or loans). One can think of the optimal input mix chosen by the intermediate good firm as an endogenous financing choice since the input prices indirectly reflect the cost of finance with bonds or loans via (15) and (16). The demand of the intermediate good producer for the bond- and loan-financed inputs, thus, varies over time, depending on the financing conditions. The technology parameters $v$ and $\hat{c}$ play an important role to determine the relative sizes of bond and loan finance as well as the ability to switch between financing choices. The intuition underpinning the imperfect substitutability, as implied by the CES function, is that entrepreneurs could face frictions to switch across financing options, including the time and costs needed to arrange a bond issuance or effort and time to build a bank-relationship.

### 3.3.2 Capital Good Producers

At the end of each period, capital producers purchase depreciated capital from bond- and loan-financed entrepreneurs and refurbish it into new capital. They purchase the final good to invest into new capital. Their technology only allows them to do so subject to quadratic adjustment cost $\Phi (I^\tau_t / I^\tau_{t-1}) = \frac{q^\tau_t}{2} (I^\tau_t / I^\tau_{t-1} - 1)^2$ with $\tau = l, b$. Capital evolves as follows:

$$K^\tau_t = (1 - \delta) K^\tau_{t-1} + I^\tau_t \left( 1 - \Phi \left( \frac{I^\tau_t}{I^\tau_{t-1}} \right) \right).$$

New capital is sold to entrepreneurs at price $q^{k,\tau}_t$. Given that the marginal rate of transformation between existing and new capital is one, old capital is also valued at this price. The FOC for investment is

$$q^{k,\tau}_t \left[ 1 - \Phi \left( \frac{I^\tau_t}{I^\tau_{t-1}} \right) - \frac{I^\tau_t}{I^\tau_{t-1}} \Phi' \left( \frac{I^\tau_t}{I^\tau_{t-1}} \right) \right] - \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} r^{k,\tau}_{t+1} \left( \frac{I^\tau_{t+1}}{I^\tau_t} \right)^2 \Phi' \left( \frac{I^\tau_{t+1}}{I^\tau_t} \right) = 1.$$

### 3.3.3 Final Good Producer

There is a final good producer owned by households that produces the good $Y_t$. It is produced using the intermediate good $z_t$ and labour of households $n_t$. The production technology reads

$$Y_t = A_t (n_t)^\alpha (z_t)^{1-\alpha}, \quad (18)$$

where $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ is the labour share and $A_t$ is the total factor productivity that evolves according to an AR(1) process. The final good producer pays $p^*_t$ for intermediate inputs $z_t$ and the real
wage $w_t$ per unit of labor. Profits in period $t$ are

$$\Gamma_t = Y_t - w_t n_t - p^*_t z_t.$$  

FOCs equalise marginal products with marginal cost,

$$\alpha \frac{Y_t}{n_t} = w_t,$$  

(19)  

$$1 - \alpha) \frac{Y_t}{z_t} = p^*_t.$$  

(20)  

### 3.4 Resource Constraint and Market Clearing

The aggregate resource constraint is given by

$$Y_t = c_t + \sum_{\tau = l, b} I^\tau_t + f(\tilde{b}_t) + L(\tilde{b}_t).$$  

(21)  

We define net output, i.e., the usage of production aside from cost terms, as

$$Y^\text{net}_t = c_t + \sum_{\tau = l, b} I^\tau_t.$$  

(22)  

Market clearing for deposits implies

$$d_t = d_t^{dh} + d_t^{df}.$$  

(23)  

Further, without loss of generality we normalize the number of investment fund shares to one at all times. The equilibrium conditions of the model as well as the derivation of the steady state are given in Appendix C.

### 3.5 Macroprudential Liquidity Regulation

In this section, we discuss the rationale behind a macroprudential liquidity regulation of investment funds and describe how we integrate it to the model.

Investment funds are subject to a pecuniary externality because of which they operate with an inefficiently low liquidity buffer. In each sub-period I, funds face stochastic redemptions. When the latter are sufficiently high, funds must liquidate bonds, thereby depressing bond prices. Individual funds take the secondary market bond price as given but they do not internalise the price impact of their deposit choice that ultimately determines sales. They only consider the impact on their own expected liquidity cost $L$ that they face in sub-period II (see Chernenko and Sunderam (2016, 2020) and Falato et al. (2021b) for empirical evidence on this externality).

In other terms, there is a ‘wedge’ between the private and social valuation of holding deposits. From a social perspective, this has two adverse effects. First, bond sales bring about resource
losses that depress consumption via the cost terms $f$ and $L$ in the resource constraint (21). Second, bond sales decrease investment fund dividends and the value of fund shares via the cost term $L$. Eventually, this makes investment fund shares less attractive to households and, thereby, reduces total bond intermediation via the balance sheet constraint of investment funds (12).

The pecuniary externality can be addressed by a regulation that imposes a liquidity buffer for investment funds. This intervention is macroprudential, as it considers the general equilibrium effects of the individual investment fund choices on financial markets and the economy. The regulation reduces bond sales and the associated drop in bond prices. This implies lower resource losses and higher dividends paid by investment funds, which increase the market value of shares, $q_t^s s_t$. This can lead to higher bond intermediation if $q_t^s s_t$ increases relatively more than the deposit holdings.

For our model economy, consider a macroprudential regulator who requires investment funds to hold a fraction $\varrho$ of its fund shares in the form of bank deposits, i.e., a liquidity buffer,

$$d_t^f = \varrho q_t^s s_t .$$

(24)

Importantly, while the regulatory requirement (24) must be met at the end of each period, within periods the liquidity buffer is usable, in the sense that funds can deplete deposits to meet the periodic redemptions.

Under the regulation, investment funds attach extra value to deposit holdings, which is also reflected in first-order conditions. The equilibrium conditions for the model with regulation are given in Appendix D. In the next section, we discuss the effects of regulation in a calibrated version of the model.

4 Quantitative Analysis

Section 4.1 presents the calibration of the model and provides evidence that the model can reconcile the impact of redemptions on investment funds observed in the data. We conduct a welfare analysis and solve for the optimal regulatory liquidity buffer in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 analyses the effects of the regulation in stabilising the economy after a shock to households’ liquidity preferences. This aims to capture some of the dynamics experienced in financial markets during the Covid-19 event in March 2020. Finally, Section 4.4 provides an analysis where an alternative asset is used for the liquidity buffer.

4.1 Calibration

We calibrate the model to euro area data between 2007 and 2019 and our period length is one quarter. Some parameters are set in line with the relevant literature, while those that affect the financial sector, the preference of households for deposits, and the financing behaviour of firms
are set to target data moments.\textsuperscript{18} We put particular emphasis on those parameters, as they are key for the outcome of the welfare analysis. For our computations, we solve the model using Dynare (see Adjemian et al., 2021).

Table 2: Calibration of Parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(A) Independently determined parameters</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Source/Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Households</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma$ Risk aversion</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Broader literature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_n$ (Inverse) Frisch elasticity</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Broader literature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\psi_n$ Utility weight labour</td>
<td>66.51</td>
<td>Steady state labour $1/3$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Firms</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta$ Depreciation rate of physical capital</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>Gerali et al. (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma$ DRS parameter of entrepreneurs</td>
<td>0.627</td>
<td>Hennessy and Whited (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha$ Labor share</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>Labor income share 67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financial Sector</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda$ Scale Lomax Distribution</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>Bond fund flow data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha$ Shape Lomax Distribution</td>
<td>57.02</td>
<td>Bond fund flow data</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| (B) Jointly determined parameters      |       |               |
| **Households**                         |       |               |
| $\beta$ Household discount factor      | 0.994 | Annual fund return 2.5% |
| $\delta^d$ Steady state utility weight on liquidity | 0.026 | Fraction of savings in fund shares |
| $\sigma_d$ Liquidity preference parameter | 1     | Deposit rate 99bp |
| $\kappa_{hh}$ HH cost parameter       | 2.84  | Bond share HH 2.5 % |
| **Firms**                              |       |               |
| $\sigma$ Production weight             | 0.678 | Bond to loan finance: 29% |
| $\epsilon$ Entrepreneur Aggregator     | 0.499 | Loans-to-GDP 1.5 |
| $\kappa^I$ Investment Adjustment Cost | 0.25  | $\sigma_I/\sigma_Y = 3.35$ |
| **Financial Sector**                   |       |               |
| $\kappa_{if}$ IF cost parameter       | 0.25  | Deposit share in IFs' AuM 1.96 % |
| **Shock processes**                    |       |               |
| $\rho_s$ Persistence preference shock  | 0.60  | Auto-correlation deposits (HH) 0.86 |
| $\sigma_s$ Std. dev. preference shock  | 0.001 | $\sigma_s/\sigma_Y = 0.59$ |
| $\rho_c$ Persistence TFP shock         | 0.96  | Auto-correlation GDP 0.85 |
| $\sigma_c$ Std. dev. TFP shock         | 0.0054| $\sigma_Y = 0.72$ |

We use the following abbreviations. DRS: decreasing returns to scale; AuM: assets under management; IF: investment fund; HH: household; TFP: total factor productivity; Std. dev.: standard deviation; $\sigma_Y, \sigma_c, \sigma_I$: standard deviations of output, consumption, investment.

Table 2 provides an overview of the calibrated parameters. Panel (A) of the table focuses on parameters that we determine independently from each other. We assume log-utility from consumption by setting the risk aversion parameter $\sigma = 1$, which allows to calculate a closed-form expression for the welfare measure in Section 4.2. The Frisch elasticity of labour supply is set to $\sigma_n = 3$. Both values are within the range of common choices. Likewise, we set $n = 1/3$ in the steady state and choose the utility weight of labour $\psi_n$ accordingly. The labour share is

\textsuperscript{18}See Appendix E for additional information on data sources and definitions.
set to $\alpha_n = 0.67$, in accordance with European data. Productivity $A$ is normalised to a value of 1 in the steady state. The entrepreneur return to scale parameter is $\gamma = 0.627$, based on the estimates of Hennessy and Whited (2007).

The periodic redemptions of investment fund shares are drawn from a distribution, which is calibrated to data on outflows from euro area corporate bond funds between 2007 and 2019 taken from the data provider EPFR Global. We fit a Lomax distribution to the aggregate quarterly outflows using a methods of moments approach. We set the shape parameter of the distribution to $\tilde{\alpha} = 57.02$ and the scale parameter to $\tilde{\lambda} = 2.23$. This allows us to match the quarterly median redemptions of 2.48% (of total assets) and a standard deviation of 4.05% in the data.\footnote{Appendix B.3 shows in detail how the Lomax distribution enters our model.}

The parameters in Panel (B) of Table 2 are derived jointly by minimizing the distance between data and model moments over a discrete grid.

The discount factor is set to $\beta = 0.994$ to target an annualized investment fund share return of 2.5%, based on data for representative corporate bond indices from Markit that cover both the investment grade and high yield segments for the period 2010 to 2019.

Investment funds and households are subject to quadratic costs. The parameter $\kappa_{hh}$ in the household bond management cost $f$ directly affects the willingness of households to pay for bonds and thereby the amount of bonds sold as well as the secondary market price. We calibrate $\kappa_{hh}$ to match the household share in non-financial corporate bond holdings, which is equal to 2.5% in the euro area.\footnote{Chernenko and Sunderam (2020) instead use an exponential distribution to model outflow draws. While its shape is comparable to the one of the Lomax distribution, the latter makes it easier to derive a closed-form solution for the integral in (9). See Figure 12 in Appendix E for the fit to the data on bond fund outflows.} The investment fund cost parameter $\kappa_{if}$ affects the willingness of investment funds to hold deposits and governs the adverse impact of forced bond sales on investment fund performance. We calibrate the parameter by targeting the median liquidity share in the portfolio of euro area corporate bond funds between 2015 and 2019 of 1.96% (see Figure 1). The parameters $\kappa_{if}$ and $\kappa_{hh}$ both affect investment funds’ deposits and households’ bond holdings. We perform sensitivity checks and verify that no other combination of parameters offers a better fit. As we outline below, our calibration implies empirically plausible reactions of investment funds and bond prices after forced asset sales, which further supports our choice of parameters.

The production function of the intermediate good producer (17) features two parameters, $v$ and $\tilde{\epsilon}$. Both matter for the degree to which one form of firm financing can be substituted for the other. While we do not model a fully endogenous financing choice, assuming full financing of capital with debt in conjunction with the CES-production function implies that the bond price and loan rate determine the time-variant size of bond- and loan-financed production. To the extent that the macroprudential regulation affects those prices, these parameters can matter for the welfare analysis. We set $v$ by targeting the relative size of firm financing via bonds relative

\footnote{Chernenko and Sunderam (2020) instead use an exponential distribution to model outflow draws. While its shape is comparable to the one of the Lomax distribution, the latter makes it easier to derive a closed-form solution for the integral in (9). See Figure 12 in Appendix E for the fit to the data on bond fund outflows.}

\footnote{In Begenau and Landvoigt (2022) households are calibrated as four times less productive than financial intermediaries. Similar to our formulation, a resource loss occurs as soon as households hold capital.}
to loans, which is 29%. The ability to substitute bond- and loan-finance is captured by the parameter $\hat{\epsilon}$, which we set to target a loan-to-GDP ratio of 1.5. Accordingly, our calibration ensures that the split between different forms of financing is in line with the data.

The utility weight and curvature of households’ preference for deposits, $\delta_d$ and $\sigma_d$, are also relevant parameters for our analysis. They govern the reaction of households to variations in the deposit rate and matter for the portfolio allocation of households into investment fund shares and deposits. Using data on deposits and fund shares, we target the fraction of household savings in investment fund shares of 21.5%. We also target a steady state deposit rate of 99 basis points, taken from data on euro area household deposits along a range of maturities (as detailed in Appendix E). We obtain the values of $\delta_d = 0.026$ and $\sigma_d = 1$, which are in line with values used in the literature (see, e.g., Begenau, 2020).

The model dynamics are driven by two types of shocks. On the supply side, there is a shock to total factor productivity $A_t$, entering (18). On the demand side, we use a shock to the households’ preferences for liquid assets in the form of bank deposits $\delta_d^t$, entering (1):

\[
\log(A_t) = (1 - \rho_a) \log(A) + \rho_a \log(A_{t-1}) + \sigma_a \epsilon_a ,
\]

\[
\log(\delta_d^t) = (1 - \rho_\delta) \log(\delta_d) + \rho_\delta \log(\delta_d^{t-1}) + \sigma_\delta \epsilon_\delta .
\]

We calibrate the standard deviations and persistence of the shocks by setting the four parameters $\sigma_a, \rho_a, \sigma_\delta, \rho_\delta$. In particular, we target moments to fit general macroeconomic dynamics (the standard deviation and auto-correlation of output, and the relative standard deviation of consumption to output) and the persistence of household deposits. Deposits matter for bank financing and are an input into household utility, which makes its persistence relevant for our welfare analysis.

Finally, we set the investment adjustment cost parameter $\kappa^I$ by targeting the relative standard deviation of investment to GDP.

**Model Fit and Macroeconomic Dynamics** – Table 3 compares the targeted moments, discussed in Panel (B) of Table 2, in the model and the data. Overall, the targeted first and second moments match the data well. This includes, in particular, targets related to the asset side of investment funds and household savings, which will matter for the welfare analysis.

We also match several non-targeted moments that are relevant to our analysis. The bond-to-GDP ratio fits its data counterpart so that, taken together with the targeted loan-to-GDP ratio, the overall size of the financial sector is in line with the data. Moreover, we closely match the investment-to-GDP ratio. Investment is debt-financed in our model so that changes in the cost and availability of finance directly affect real economic activity. A realistic relative size of investment is therefore important to neither over- nor understate the effect of investment fund regulation.

Furthermore, we assess the match of several non-targeted second moments. The relative
Table 3: Empirical and Model-Implied Moments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Targeted Moments</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IF return</td>
<td>2.50 %</td>
<td>2.50 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bond to loan finance</td>
<td>29 %</td>
<td>27.86 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deposits in IF assets</td>
<td>1.96 %</td>
<td>1.96 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IF shares in HH saving</td>
<td>21.50 %</td>
<td>22.22 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loan-to-GDP</td>
<td>150 %</td>
<td>143 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bond share HH</td>
<td>2.50 %</td>
<td>2.65 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deposit rate (ann.)</td>
<td>99 bp</td>
<td>100 bp</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-Targeted Moments</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bonds-to-GDP</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment-to-GDP</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We calculate theoretical moments after solving and simulating the model under the productivity and the liquidity preference shock. We compare the model moments to Hodrick-Prescott-filtered data of the euro area. \( \sigma_Y, \sigma_c, \sigma_t, \sigma_{dhh}, \sigma_s, \sigma_l, \sigma_b; \): standard deviations of output, consumption, investment, household deposits, fund shares, bank loans, bonds; IF: investment fund; HH: household.

The volatility of the components of household savings, deposits and fund shares, is higher in the model than it is in the data. Still, the model predicts that deposits are relatively less volatile than fund share holdings. In the same vein, we compare the relative volatility between the two financing instruments, bank loans and bonds. In the data, the volatility of aggregate bond financing is about nine times higher than bank loan volatility. In our model, bond financing is also relatively more volatile, though to a smaller extent. Moreover, we also assess the auto-correlation of consumption, the savings components and the financing instruments. Besides a good fit for the targeted consumption volatility, we also match the auto-correlation of consumption reasonably well. This is important given the role of consumption for the welfare analysis. The auto-correlations for investment fund shares (as well as the targeted one for household deposits), bonds and loans are also matched rather well. Obtaining plausible moments for these variables, implies that both the asset and liability side of the financial sector behaves realistically.

In Appendix E, we check the robustness of our calibration by calculating the sensitivity of the model fit to changes in calibrated parameters.
Microeconometric Evidence on the Model Mechanism – To further corroborate the external validity of our analysis, we compare the model-implied reactions after investment fund outflows to the empirical literature. In our model, an investment fund needs to sell bonds on the secondary bond market if it experiences outflows that exceed its liquidity position. Sales lead to a deterioration of the secondary market bond price, trigger more sales, and weigh negatively on investment fund profitability. Ultimately, this leads to less demand for fund shares, a less efficient resource allocation and less bond intermediation to the real economy. For a credible welfare analysis it is, therefore, essential that the model-implied price and quantity reactions to outflows fall within empirically plausible bounds. In particular, the degree to which investment funds reduce cash and bond positions after an outflow, the reaction of bond prices to outflows, and their impact on investment fund performance matter for the welfare impact of forced sales. We now survey the microeconometric literature on these aspects. We summarize this literature’s findings Table 4.

We begin with reviewing the literature on the reaction of investment funds to outflows. Because of their key role in our model mechanism, we focus on the change in the liquid assets of investment funds and the degree to which investment funds sell bonds. Chernenko and Sunderam (2016) investigate the extent to which investment funds engage in liquidity transformation. One of their results is that corporate bond funds use cash extensively before selling assets after an outflow. For each dollar of outflows, cash is reduced by 0.33 cents (see their Table 2), implying a reduction of funds’ other asset holdings by 0.67 cents. The extensive usage of cash before selling assets is a general result of the literature and in line with our model assumption that investment funds sell bonds only after depleting their liquidity buffer. Choi et al. (2020) shed light on changes of cash and bond positions after outflows in corporate bond funds. One percent of investor outflows (over total assets) is associated with a statistically significant 1.81% reduction of the cash and a 0.84% reduction of the bond position (see their Table 6). In a similar vein, Giuzio et al. (2019) consider the reaction of euro area bond fund’s asset side to outflows and document a reduction of the cash position of 1.85% and of the bond position of 2% following outflows of 1% of total assets (see their Chart A). Finally, Giannetti and Jotikasthira (2022) estimate that for 1% of outflows the bond position of corporate bond funds declines by 0.72% (see their Table 3).

Regarding the yield impact of asset sales, Jiang et al. (2021) show that a 1% increase in flow-implied selling from corporate bond funds raises the returns of the corporate bonds in their portfolio by 30 basis points on average, i.e., sales lower the bond price (see their Table 9). For the group of corporate bond funds that are most affected by redemptions, Choi et al. (2020) estimate that treated bonds experience a 36 basis point (annualized) increase in yield relative to bonds that are not affected by forced asset sales during quarters with heavy sell-off (see their Table 7). For a sample of French corporate bond funds, Coudert and Salakhova (2020) find that for 1% of outflows (over total assets) the yield of sold corporate bonds increases by 17 basis
Table 4: Reaction of Investment Funds and Bond Markets to Outflows

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cash</th>
<th>Bonds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Estimate</td>
<td>Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choi et al. (2020)</td>
<td>1.81 %</td>
<td>1.85 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giuzio et al. (2019)</td>
<td>1.85 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giannetti and Jotikasthira (2022)</td>
<td>0.72 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chernenko and Sunderam (2016)</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bond yield</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jiang et al. (2021)</td>
<td>30 bp</td>
<td>31 bp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choi et al. (2020)</td>
<td>36 bp</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coudert and Salakhova (2020)</td>
<td>17 bp</td>
<td>16 bp</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fund Performance</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chen et al. (2010)</td>
<td>19 bp</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goldstein et al. (2017)</td>
<td>7 - 10 bp</td>
<td>12 bp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jin et al. (2022)</td>
<td>5.5 bp</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table compares findings of the empirical literature regarding the reaction of investment funds and bond markets to higher outflows with counterparts from our DSGE model. Results on cash and bond holdings and on fund performance depict reductions of the respective items. The model reactions for cash, bonds, and fund performance are based on the impact of 1% higher average outflows. The model impact on bond yields is based on 1% higher flow-implied sales $b$ for comparison with Jiang et al. (2021) and Choi et al. (2020). It is also based on 1% higher average outflows for the comparison with Coudert and Salakhova (2020). The estimates for changes in cash and bond holdings are measured in % of the holding amounts. The cash (and implied bond) estimate of Chernenko and Sunderam (2016) refers to the share of a redemption that is settled using cash (bonds). The model counterpart is the steady state fraction of settlement with deposits over total redemptions.

Another strand of the literature investigates the impact of forced asset sales on the subsequent performance of investment funds. In our model, sales hurt investment fund dividends which will in turn affect the attractiveness of fund shares as a saving instrument and the incentive of investment funds to hold deposits. As part of their analysis of strategic complementarities, Chen et al. (2010) assess the impact of redemptions on future investment fund performance. For equity funds that hold large illiquid positions (the 25% least liquid funds), outflows in the past month lead to a reduction in returns in the current month of 19 basis points (see their Table 7). Goldstein et al. (2017) conduct this analysis for underperforming corporate bond funds. They find that a 1% increase in outflows lowers returns by 7 to 10 basis points for illiquid funds (see their Table 8). Similarly, Jin et al. (2022) find that for UK corporate bond funds, a 1% increase in outflows lowers returns of illiquid investment funds by 5.5 basis points (see their Table 12).

Next, we compare the empirical benchmarks to model-implied reactions to an increase in outflows. Specifically, we calculate the model-implied effect of a 1% increase in the average outflow from the investment fund sector. In our model, we implement such higher average outflows by changing the scale parameter $\lambda$ of the Lomax distribution that governs the fund redemptions.
We assume that this change is unanticipated, realises immediately, and is permanent. To be consistent with the definition used in parts of the reviewed literature, for the reaction of the bond yield, we also simulate a 1% increase in flow-implied sales (as opposed to outflows as before), again implemented via a variation of $\lambda$. We summarise the results in Table 4 as well. The model-implied impact on cash positions, the secondary market bond price, and the performance of investment funds fall within the range of the empirical estimates. Bond sales are below but close to the range found in the related literature.22

Aside from the reaction of investment funds to outflows, the reaction of households to changes in the deposit rate will matter for our welfare analysis. As we will show below, a higher mandatory cash buffer of investment funds increases the demand for bank deposits and, thereby, lowers their return in equilibrium. As a result, households hold fewer deposits, which implies a loss in welfare since holding deposits provides utility to households. Estimates of households’ deposit demand elasticity range from close to 0% to 0.56% (see Egan et al., 2017 and Tanner et al., 2021), where the lower bound of estimates is associated with the more recent years. To construct a model-implied counterpart, we include a deposit rate shock into the model via Equation (7). A one-off 1% increase of the deposit rate is associated with a 0.01% increase in household deposits on impact. Again, the model-implied reaction lies within the empirical bounds, though at the lower end.

Overall, this comparison shows that our model is able to produce reactions of key variables for our analysis that are consistent with empirical evidence. To this end, we have put particular emphasis to the calibration of the key parameters in the cost functions $f$ and $L$ as well as the parameters of the utility function, such as $\delta_d$.

4.2 Optimal Liquidity Regulation

In this section, we show that the macroprudential liquidity regulation expressed in (24) can improve welfare in the economy and discuss the welfare-relevant trade-offs of the regulation. To this end, we solve a second-order approximation of the model and simulate the economy under the productivity and the deposit preference shocks for different levels of the liquidity buffer.

We compute a utilitarian measure of welfare based on conditional expected utility (3) and compare welfare in the economy without the liquidity regulation, $V^{woreg}$, to welfare in the economy with the regulation, $V^{reg,\varrho}$. We then derive consumption equivalents (CE) for different levels of the liquidity buffer $\varrho$,

$$ CE_{\varrho} = 100 \cdot (\exp (1 - \beta)(V^{reg,\varrho} - V^{woreg}) - 1), $$

where $CE_{\varrho}$ represents the fraction of ‘no regulation’ consumption that the household would be willing to forego to live in an economy with liquidity regulation $\varrho$.

---

22In our model we assume that investment funds first reduce deposits before selling bonds. Empirically, this assumption is fulfilled most of the time. Alternatively, investment funds could reduce all asset positions proportionally after outflows. In this case, sales in our model would be higher.
Figure 4 plots the welfare measure and long-run means of key variables for different levels of the liquidity buffer. Welfare follows a hump-shaped curve (top left panel). A liquidity buffer of 7.2% is associated with the highest welfare. This optimal buffer is more than three times higher than the median value of 1.96% observed in the data (see Figure 1).\(^{23}\) In the following, we discuss the mechanisms and intuition behind this result.

The regulation increases welfare by reducing resource losses, which in turn allows higher consumption (top middle panel). Without regulation, funds hold ‘too little’ deposits because of the pecuniary externality and need to sell bonds. The bond sales lead to resource losses via the liquidity and management costs of investment funds and households. The sales also make fund shares less attractive by decreasing dividends (11). Instead, the liquidity regulation \(\rho\) forces investment funds to hold a higher liquidity buffer, thereby reducing bond sales and increasing secondary market bond prices (top right panel). The regulatory buffer raises the redemption threshold \(\tilde{\phi}\) above which sales occur, i.e., less funds must liquidate bonds. At the optimal buffer, only 15% of investment funds draw a shock in excess of their deposits and must sell bonds, compared to 60% in the equilibrium without regulation. This mechanism is responsible for most of the reduction in bond sales.

The regulation has two adverse effects on welfare. The first one is related to household savings. By imposing mandatory deposit holdings to investment funds, the regulation lowers the return on deposits, thereby inducing households to hold less of them (bottom left panel, blue line). Households’ utility from holding deposits, therefore, falls with higher regulatory liquidity buffers.

A second downside of the regulation is due to changes in the financing mix of the economy that can lead to lower net output. Although the regulatory buffer boosts fund dividends and makes fund shares more attractive (bottom left panel, red line), it eventually reduces bond intermediation (bottom middle panel, red line). This is because funds’ deposit holdings increase relatively more than the market value of fund shares when the regulatory buffer rises. This implies a drop in bond holdings according to the balance sheet constraint (12). Overall, the regulation prompts a shift in credit intermediation from funds towards banks.\(^{24}\) A higher demand for deposits from investment funds lowers the deposit rate, reducing the funding costs for banks and making loans and, thus, the goods produced by loan-financed entrepreneurs cheaper. The relative increase of loan-financed goods boosts intermediate good production (bottom right panel) for lower values of the buffer, which supports the increase in consumption. But for liquidity buffers above 5.7%, and, hence, before reaching the optimal buffer, intermediate output starts falling due to the imperfect substitutability of loan- and bond-financed inputs in (17). The increase in loan-finance is not sufficient to maintain higher production. The drop in output

\(^{23}\)When simulating the model without regulation for a large number of periods, we find that the buffer held by funds voluntarily fluctuates between 1.84% and 2.08%, i.e., one can interpret our optimal 7.2%-buffer as a minimum regulatory buffer consistent with the policy discussion.

\(^{24}\)Vice versa, studies that discuss bank regulation in the presence of non-bank financial intermediaries predict leakages of activity from banks to non-banks (see Begenauf and Landvoigt, 2022; Gebauer and Mazelis, 2023).
We solve a second-order approximation of the model and simulate the economy under a productivity and a preference shock for different levels of the macroprudential liquidity buffer. We calculate conditional welfare to derive consumption equivalents (CE) in terms of the final good. The solid lines depict theoretical long-run means for each simulation. The x-axes start at 1.96%, which is the liquidity buffer voluntarily held by investment funds in absence of regulation. The vertical dashed lines denote the welfare-maximising liquidity buffer of 7.57%.

Figure 4: Optimal Liquidity Regulation Trade-Offs

Then weighs down on consumption and welfare.

Figure 5 sheds light on the relevance of the mechanisms through which the buffer affects welfare. The left panel focuses on the welfare effects of the reduction of households’ deposits. The blue line shows welfare under the regulation, as in Figure 4. Using the same model specification, the red line depicts an alternative welfare measure in which household deposits are kept constant. The vertical distance between the two curves captures the change in welfare associated with the reduction of household deposits. Ignoring the drop in household deposits, the optimal buffer is 10.3% (red dashed line), well above the 7.2% that is optimal in the baseline case.

It is important to put this deposit channel into perspective. First, a key role for available household liquidity in welfare analysis is also found in the analysis of bank regulation in Begenau (2020) and Begenau and Landvoigt (2022). Second, while in our model households suffer a direct welfare loss, adverse effects are also conceivable for other agents that have a demand for safe and liquid assets. For example, banks need to hold sufficient amounts of high-quality liquid assets in compliance with bank regulation or want to hold such assets to maintain access to secured lending. Similarly, various types of non-banks that are active in derivative trading need to hold...
We solve a second-order approximation of the model and simulate the economy under a productivity and a preference shock for different levels of the macroprudential liquidity buffer. We calculate conditional welfare to derive consumption equivalents (CE) in terms of the final good. The x-axes start at 1.96%, which is the liquidity buffer voluntarily held by investment funds in absence of regulation. The left panel compares baseline welfare (blue line) to an alternative welfare measure that keeps household deposits fixed (red line). The dashed lines depict the respective optimal buffers. The right panel shows a decomposition of the resource cost components in (21) related to household bond management cost $f$ (red) and fund liquidity cost $L$ (blue).

liquid assets to comply with regulation. Hence, different agents have a demand for those assets and raising those assets’ opportunity cost can reduce the amounts held, lead to substitution with less liquid assets, and tighten those actors’ constraints. Taken together, this effect is an important driver of the welfare trade-off associated with the regulation and we further explore it in Section 4.4.

The right panel of Figure 5 shows how the resource losses evolve when regulatory liquidity buffers rise. The reduction of resource losses leads to higher welfare, as it allows for higher consumption. The coloured areas provide a decomposition of the resource cost components in the resource constraint (21). These are the household bond management cost $f$ (red area) and the fund liquidity cost $L$ (blue area). Most of the drop in resource costs is achieved via lower household bond management cost, while the liquidity costs of funds play a limited role.

To highlight the contribution of different channels to the welfare trade-off and as a robustness check, Table 5 shows optimal buffers, welfare, and long-run means of relevant variables that result from variations in a selected set of key parameters. To ensure comparability, we express values in terms of the percentage deviations from the long-run means of the respective economies without regulation. For reference, Column I of the table shows results for our baseline calibration with regulation.

In Column II, the weight on utility benefits $\delta^d$ that households derive from bank deposits is
Table 5: Sensitivity of Optimal Liquidity Buffers to Calibration Changes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>(I)</th>
<th>(II)</th>
<th>(III)</th>
<th>(IV)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>Deposit utility</td>
<td>Household cost</td>
<td>Redemptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optimal buffer (%)</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CE (%)</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH Deposits (d_{hh})</td>
<td>-1.21</td>
<td>-0.96</td>
<td>-1.19</td>
<td>-0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fund shares (qs)</td>
<td>4.98</td>
<td>4.65</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>4.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital (b)</td>
<td>-0.58</td>
<td>-0.82</td>
<td>-0.59</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital (l)</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bond price (qb)</td>
<td>5.30</td>
<td>6.26</td>
<td>13.85</td>
<td>10.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate output (z)</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Values denote percentage deviations from the respective long-run means of the economies without regulation. Column I “Baseline”: calibration as in Section 4.1; Column II “Deposit utility”: \(1.5 \cdot \delta_d\); Column III “Household Cost”: \(2 \cdot \kappa_{hh}\); Column IV “Redemptions”: \(2 \cdot \lambda\).

increased by 50%, implying a deposit rate of 40 instead of 100 basis points. As banks become more important as creators of liquidity for households, the welfare trade-off changes: the drop in deposits demanded by households induced by the regulation implies a more sizeable loss in welfare. Consequently, the optimal liquidity buffer falls somewhat to 6.5%.

In Column III, we vary the parameter of household bond management cost, since this cost is responsible for the majority of the resource losses in the economy (Figure 5, right panel). Specifically, we increase \(\kappa_{hh}\) by a factor of two, which implies an increase of the secondary market bond yield from 31 bp to 69 bp after 1% higher flow-implied sales \(\tilde{b}\) (see Table 4). As a result, the optimal buffer increases to 7.5%, since any reduction in the amount sold to households has a bigger impact on the secondary market price. Despite the strong change of the parameter, the resulting optimal buffer is still close the one in Column I.

Finally, in Column IV, we consider larger periodic redemptions. Specifically, we increase the parameter \(\lambda\) that is governing the random draws from the Lomax distribution. In this calibration, redemptions are on average twice as high as in the baseline. The amount of bonds sold by investment funds rises, implying higher resource losses. Reducing the price dislocation from bond sales, thus, becomes even more important. The optimal liquidity buffer accordingly rises to 10.70%.

Overall, the results in Table 5 show that the general level of the optimal buffer is robust to variations in key parameters.

4.3 Liquidity Regulation and Aggregate Outflow Shocks

Regulation alleviates the adverse welfare effects of periodic idiosyncratic redemptions by limiting the fraction of investment funds that must liquidate bonds in every period. To gain further intuition for the findings of the welfare analysis in the last section, we now turn to the analysis of
an aggregate shock that triggers a shift in household savings from fund shares into bank deposits. This would test the ability of the optimal liquidity regulation to reduce adverse macroeconomic outcomes related to the investment fund sector. The analysis is motivated by the large-scale outflows from investment funds in March 2020 that can be interpreted as an abrupt change in savers’ risk preferences (see Figure 1, bottom right panel).

Figure 6 shows the impulse response functions of a positive shock to the liquidity weight $\delta^t$ in (1) that generates an outflow from the investment fund sector of 1% on impact. Blue solid lines represent the effects of the shock in the economy without regulation. The shock leads to an overall increase of household savings, but to a reduction of those allocated to investment funds (middle panel). This implies lower financial intermediation through investment funds, as shown by a decline in bond-financed capital investment (bottom left panel), as well as a drop in deposits held by funds (middle right panel). They reduce their deposit holdings disproportionately more than their bond investment, given the return differential between the two assets. This decreases the amount of liquidity available to serve periodic redemptions.
so that the amount of bonds that investment funds must sell to cover the periodic redemptions rises. As a result, the secondary market price drops sharply (top right panel), while secondary market bond sales and resource losses increase. This lowers consumption (top middle panel) beyond the decline from the overall shift into savings. Dividends paid by funds fall, leading to a further reduction in the market value of fund shares and, hence, investment funds’ asset holdings.

The increase in deposits held by households (middle left panel) more than compensates for the drop in fund deposits. Thus, bank lending and loan-financed investment (bottom middle panel) increase. Although bond and loan finance are imperfectly substitutable, the rise in loan-financed investment, driven by falling loan and deposit rates (bottom right panel)\(^{25}\), more than compensates the drop in bond-financed investment such that aggregate investment increases slightly. However, output (top left panel) still falls because of the drop in consumption.

At this point, it is important to emphasize that our analysis does not aim for a full quantitative comparison between the impulse responses from the DSGE model in Figure 6 and the empirical findings from the VAR model in Figure 2. In qualitative terms, notably, the empirical and simulation results are consistent with each other on a macro level. In both cases, output contracts, the yields on liquid assets drop and bond spreads rise after outflows from the investment fund sector.\(^{26}\)

Before analysing the effects of regulation in the DSGE model, we display the amplification effect of our model’s key inefficiency, i.e., the liquidity risk from periodic redemptions in the investment fund sector that generates bond liquidation. The blue dashed lines in Figure 6 refer to an economy without such periodic redemptions. In this case, investment funds do not need to sell bonds on secondary markets and they have no reason to hold deposits. The amplification effect via funds does not exist. As a result, the decline in fund shares is significantly smaller than in the corresponding solid blue line for a same-sized \(\delta_t^q\) shock. Bond-financed investment, accordingly, falls by less.\(^{27}\)

The initial declines of output and consumption are of similar size as in case of the solid blue lines. But while in the case without redemptions both start recovering immediately after the shock, output and consumption decline further in presence of the redemption risk. The reason is that the amplification through resource-wasting bond sales becomes relevant in the period after impact, when investment funds have reduced their deposits.\(^{28}\)

As compared to the economy without regulation (solid blue lines), the optimal liquidity buffer

\(^{25}\)Recall from (7) that \(\dot{i}_t = i_t^d\).

\(^{26}\)Differences in the size of the output drop could, for example, be due to the differing responses of bank lending. While the latter only increases insignificantly in the empirical model, bank lending and, thus, loan-financed investment increase sharply in our DSGE simulations.

\(^{27}\)The increase in loan-financed investment after impact is in fact higher, since the dampening effect on loan provision from a decrease in fund deposits (implying a loss of funding for banks) in the model with redemptions is now absent.

\(^{28}\)Recall our timing assumption: in sub-period I, investment funds receive and serve redemptions while in sub-period II they make their portfolio choice and all shocks occur. The impact of a reduction of deposits on bond sales, thus, only arises in sub-period I of the period after impact.

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of 7.2% alleviates the shock’s impact on fund shares considerably (red lines). The fall in the deposits of the investment funds is almost absent, as deposits are now a fixed fraction of the value of fund shares by regulation. As a result, less bonds need to be sold and the secondary market price hardly reacts. Accordingly, resource losses decline as well. Bond-financed investment, however, reacts similar compared to the economy without redemptions (dashed blue lines). This is because under the regulation investment funds always need to maintain the mandatory amount of deposits so that they cannot fully invest in bonds. Loan-financed investment increases by more relative to the unregulated economy since banks’ total deposits, and, thus, their balance sheet size, grow by more.

Overall, the introduction of the liquidity buffer dampens the negative effects of the shock not only in the investment fund sector but also on the macroeconomic aggregates, consumption and output. Under the optimal regulation, the response of the economy closely follows the one where redemptions do not take place at all. In other terms, the model suggests that the macroprudential liquidity regulation is an effective instrument to address the wider economic ramifications of the liquidity risks in the investment fund sector.\(^{29}\)

To assess the dynamic impact of regulation on welfare, we follow Gertler and Karadi (2011) and compute the welfare gains from the optimal liquidity buffer compared to the unregulated economy. More specifically, based on the second-order approximation of the model, we assume the economy is hit with the single aggregate deposit preference shock and calculate the CE in every period afterwards, for the regulated and unregulated economies. As we are considering a one-off event – as opposed to a sequence of shocks in the previous section – we discount and add up the single CE in every period following the shock. We are interested in any welfare gains beyond those taking place in the long-run (see Section 4.2) and, therefore, deduct the long-run CE. Our result is that, when the economy faces the aggregate outflow shock, the optimal buffer increases welfare beyond the long-run gain. A household in the unregulated economy is willing to forego an additional 0.02% of long-run consumption to switch to an economy with the optimal buffer.

### 4.4 Alternative Storage of Liquidity

The previous sections showed that an important effect of the liquidity regulation on welfare is associated with the reduction of deposits held by households (see Figure 5). In our model, bank deposits are the only ‘liquid’ asset. In this section, we instead consider a case where funds have access to an alternative asset to store liquidity.\(^{30}\) The key change is that investment funds do not compete with households for bank deposits.

\(^{29}\)Ma et al. (2022) find that in March 2020 investment funds with more illiquid portfolios registered greater outflows. Consistent with this finding, investment funds in our regulated economy maintain more liquid assets after the shock impact and, thereby, avoid the stronger aggregate outflow that investment funds face in the unregulated economy.

\(^{30}\)In practice, asset managers use a variety of instruments to hold liquidity, including bank deposits, reverse repos with banks, as well as short-term government securities.
To minimise changes to the model, we assume that investment funds can hold one-period government debt $m_t$ as the alternative asset. Since households are now the only investor in bank deposits, aggregate deposits and household deposits coincide, $d_t = d_{hh}^t$, replacing the previous deposit market clearing condition (23). To close the model, we add a public budget constraint

$$m_t + t_t = \left(1 + \frac{i_d^t}{i_t}ight) m_{t-1},$$

where $t_t$ is a lump-sum tax paid by households that clears the government budget. We assume the interest rate on government debt is equal to the deposit rate, as in Gertler and Karadi (2011), while we keep parameters unchanged.

Figure 7: Optimal Liquidity Regulation Trade-Offs: Government Debt

We solve a second-order approximation of the model and simulate the economy under a productivity and a preference shock for different levels of the macroprudential liquidity buffer. We calculate conditional welfare to derive consumption equivalents (CE) in terms of the final good. The solid lines depict theoretical long-run means for each simulation. The x-axes start at 1.96%, which is the liquidity buffer voluntarily held by investment funds in absence of regulation. The simulations are based on a model version where government debt is used to fulfill the regulatory liquidity buffer. The vertical dashed lines denote the welfare-maximising liquidity buffer of 11.6%.

Figure 7 shows results for the welfare analysis with government debt. The optimal liquidity buffer is at 11.6%, which is significantly higher than the level of 7.2% in the baseline case of Section 4.2. Importantly, bank deposits held by households no longer decrease, but increase instead (bottom left panel). This finances the increase in bank loans (bottom middle panel), whereas in our baseline case, the increased loan origination is financed by additional deposits held by investment funds.

This difference affects the intermediate good production (bottom right panel). When compared to Figure 5, intermediate production declines already for small regulatory buffers. The
reason is that bank loans become more expensive when fund regulation tightens, while they get cheaper in the economy of Figure 5. Since household deposits rise, the deposit rate increases due to a falling marginal utility from deposits. As a result, loan finance is more expensive, leading to a reduction of production in equilibrium. The optimal liquidity buffer is reached as soon as the resource gain from reducing bond sales is more than offset by the reduction in output. In the baseline case, the utility loss from the decline in household’s deposit holdings drives the hump-shape of the welfare curve (see Figure 5, left panel), which is basically absent in the model with government debt.

In an economy with an alternative storage of investment fund liquidity, the adverse welfare effects of regulation are weakened. Regulation no longer lowers deposit returns and, effectively, pushes households out of deposits. This shows that there are important interactions between the scarcity of liquid assets and the liquidity regulation of non-bank financial intermediaries. The result can also inform the complex debate on the possibility to grant certain non-banks access to central bank liabilities (see, for instance, Stein, 2012). Indeed, when liquid assets such as bank deposits or short-term government debt are scarce, central banks could expand the supply of such assets to certain non-banks by establishing dedicated deposit facilities. Examples include the Reverse Repo Facility introduced by the US Federal Reserve in 2013 (see Anderson and Kandrac, 2018 for an overview).

5 Conclusion

The last two decades witnessed an extraordinary growth of the investment fund sector and of its importance in the financing of the real economy. The Covid-19 event in March 2020 showed that investment funds can amplify macroeconomic and financial shocks. Large-scale outflows put extreme pressure on funds that were forced to sell assets in increasingly illiquid markets. These developments catalysed the debate on the systemic relevance of investment funds and regulatory options to mitigate vulnerabilities in the sector.

In this paper, we analyse the role of the investment fund sector in the macroeconomy as well as its regulation from two angles. First, in a motivational empirical analysis, we document that outflows from investment funds, by reducing the sector’s financial intermediation capacity, have significant and persistent adverse macroeconomic effects. Second, as the main contribution of the paper, we develop a DSGE model with two types of financial intermediaries, banks and investment funds. The latter are subject to stochastic periodic redemptions that can lead to costly bond sales. Individual funds fail to internalise the full impact of sales on the bond price and hold inefficiently low liquidity buffers. This pecuniary externality eventually results in lower bond intermediation and resource losses.

We show that a macroprudential liquidity buffer improves upon the unregulated economy by limiting bond sales. The optimal liquidity buffer is 7.2%, which is more than three times the median liquidity holdings of investment funds in the euro area, to which we calibrate our model.
Our model allows us to identify different channels through which the regulation affects welfare and we disentangle benefits and costs of the regulation. Aside from reducing welfare losses stemming from the periodic redemptions, the regulation successfully contains the amplification of financial shocks and limits their adverse macroeconomic effects in a scenario reminiscent of the March 2020 episode.

Our paper constitutes the first analysis of macroprudential policies that address the liquidity risk of investment funds in a macroeconomic model. In future research, our analysis could be enriched to explore other policy measures to address liquidity mismatch in open-ended investment funds as well as interactions between monetary policy and macroprudential policies for the non-bank financial sector.

References


Online Appendix

A Vector-Autoregression Model

A.1 Data Sources and Description

This appendix provides a description of all variables used in the empirical VAR analysis presented in Section 2 together with their source and the transformation applied.

- **Investment funds**: Monthly nominal net portfolio flows of investment funds calculated as cumulative percentage flows of lagged assets under management relative to the sample starting point in April 2007. The investment funds focus on corporate bonds, have the regional investment focus “Western Europe”, and are domiciled in the euro area. Source: EPFR Global.

- **EA industrial production**: Industrial production for the euro area; total industry (excluding construction) - NACE Rev2; monthly index. Source: ECB Short-Term Statistics; data set mnemonic [STS]. Transformed to logs.


- **EA bank lending**: Loans reported by monetary financial institutions excluding ESCB in the euro area; outstanding amounts in EUR. Source: ECB Balance Sheet Item Statistics; data set mnemonic [BSI]. Transformed to annual growth rates.


- **VSTOXX volatility index**: Source: Datastream; mnemonic [VSTOXXI]. No further transformations.

- **EA BBB-spread**: Spread between iBoxx Euro BBB-rated non-financial corporates yield index; residual maturity 5 years; and 5-year German government benchmark bond yield. Source: ECB Financial Market Data; data set mnemonic [FM]. No further transformations.
A.2 Additional Empirical Results

Figure 8: Impulse Responses to a Fund Outflow Shock, Ordered First

Impulse response functions to a 1 percentage point shock to bond fund flows obtained from a structural VAR model identified via Cholesky ordering, where fund flows are ordered first. The blue (grey) areas show 68% (90%) confidence intervals. The y-axes are given in percent for the first four variables, in percentage points for the bond spread and the 5-year yield, and in index points for the VSTOXX. The x-axis shows months after the shock. Data is taken from EPFR Global (Investment fund flows), Markit (bond spread), Datastream (VSTOXX) and various ECB datasets (industrial production, inflation, bank lending, Bund yield).
Figure 9: Impulse Responses to a Fund Outflow Shock with One Lag

Impulse response functions to a 1 percentage point shock to bond fund flows obtained from a structural VAR model identified via Cholesky ordering with one lag. The blue (grey) areas show 68% (90%) confidence intervals. The y-axes are given in percent for the first four variables, in percentage points for the bond spread and the 5-year yield, and in index points for the VSTOXX. The x-axis shows months after the shock. Data is taken from EPFR Global (Investment fund flows), Markit (bond spread), Datastream (VSTOXX) and various ECB datasets (industrial production, inflation, bank lending, Bund yield).
Figure 10: Impulse Responses to a Fund Outflow Shock with Eight Lags

Impulse response functions to a 1 percentage point shock to bond fund flows obtained from a structural VAR model identified via Cholesky ordering with eight lags. The blue (grey) areas show 68% (90%) confidence intervals. The y-axes are given in percent for the first four variables, in percentage points for the bond spread and the 5-year yield, and in index points for the VSTOXX. The x-axis shows months after the shock. Data is taken from EPFR Global (Investment fund flows), Markit (bond spread), Datastream (VSTOXX) and various ECB datasets (industrial production, inflation, bank lending, Bund yield).
FIGURE 11: Impulse Responses to a Fund Outflow Shock using a sample without the global financial crisis

Impulse response functions to a 1 percentage point shock to bond fund flows obtained from a structural VAR model identified via Cholesky ordering. The blue (grey) areas show 68% (90%) confidence intervals. The y-axes are given in percent for the first four variables, in percentage points for the bond spread and the 5-year yield, and in index points for the VSTOXX. The x-axis shows months after the shock. Data is taken from EPFR Global (Investment fund flows), Markit (bond spread), Datastream (VSTOXX) and various ECB datasets (industrial production, inflation, bank lending, Bund yield). The sample starts after the end of the recession following the global financial crisis (June 2009).
B Model Derivations

B.1 Household

Households maximize the discounted value of life-time utility subject to the real period budget constraints. The Lagrangian reads

\[ \mathcal{L} = \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[ c_t^{1-\sigma} + \delta^{1-\sigma_d} d_t^{1-\sigma_d} - \psi_t n_t^{1+\sigma_n} + \lambda_t \left( w_t n_t + \left( 1 + i_{t-1}^d \right) d_{t-1}^{bh} \right) \right. \]

\[ \left. + \left( q_t^s + div_t^{if} \right) s_{t-1} + \Pi_t - c_t - d_t^{bh} - q_t^s s_t - f(\bar{b}_t) \right] . \]

The FOCs are

\[ \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial c_t} = c_t^{1-\sigma} - \lambda_t = 0, \]

\[ \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial d_t^{bh}} = \delta d_t^{1-\sigma_d} - \lambda_t + \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \lambda_{t+1} (1 + i_t^d) \right] = 0, \]

\[ \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial s_t} = - \lambda_t + \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \lambda_{t+1} q_{t+1}^s + div_{t+1}^{if} \right] = 0, \]

\[ \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial n_t} = - \psi_t n_t^{\sigma_n} + \lambda_t w_t = 0. \]

B.2 Banks

The representative bank faces the balance sheet constraint \( d_t = l_t \) in every period and maximizes the discounted sum of profits. Repeated substitution of the balance sheet renders its problem static. It maximizes the cash-flow from its portfolio in period \( t \)

\[ \max_{d_t, l_t} i_t^d l_t - i_t^d d_t . \]

subject to the balance sheet constraint. The FOCs are

\[ \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial d_t} = - i_t^d + \lambda_t = 0, \]

\[ \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial l_t} = i_t^d - \lambda_t = 0, \]

where \( \lambda_t \) denotes the multiplier on the period \( t \) balance sheet constraint.

B.3 Investment Funds

Investment funds maximize the discounted value of their dividend income. They issue fund shares and invest into bonds and bank deposits. In the first part of a period, they are subject to redemption risk in the sense that a fraction of their fund shares is redeemed early by households
which requires an immediate settlement. Settlement of redemptions is done through deposits or selling bonds to households.

Redemptions occur for all investment funds but differ in size. The i.i.d. draws follow a Lomax distribution with parameters $\tilde{\alpha}$ and $\tilde{\lambda}$. Note that given $g(\phi_{j,t}) = \tilde{\alpha} \tilde{\lambda} \left( 1 + \frac{\phi_{j,t}}{\tilde{\lambda}} \right)^{-\tilde{\alpha}+1}$,

$$\int_{\tilde{\phi}_t}^{\infty} \phi_{j,t} g(\phi_{j,t}) d\phi_{j,t} = \left[ -\phi_{j,t} \left( 1 + \frac{\phi_{j,t}}{\tilde{\lambda}} \right)^{-\tilde{\alpha}} - \frac{\tilde{\lambda}}{\tilde{\alpha} - 1} \left( 1 + \frac{\phi_{j,t}}{\tilde{\lambda}} \right)^{-\tilde{\alpha}+1} \right]_{\tilde{\phi}_t}^{\infty},$$

$$\int_{\tilde{\phi}_t}^{\infty} g(\phi_{j,t}) d\phi_{j,t} = \left[ 1 - \left( 1 + \frac{\phi_{j,t}}{\tilde{\lambda}} \right)^{-\tilde{\alpha}} \right]_{\tilde{\phi}_t}^{\infty}.$$

Aggregating across all draws gives the aggregate redemption,

$$\int_{0}^{\infty} \phi_{j,t} g(\phi_{j,t}) d\phi_{j,t} = \frac{\tilde{\lambda}}{\tilde{\alpha} - 1},$$

which is just the average redemption. Note that we use an unbounded Lomax distribution, that is draws above one are technically possible. However, given the fitted parameters of our distribution the probability to have draws above one is $7\ e - 8\%$ so that we stick with the general distribution instead of a bounded Pareto distribution. Investment fund $j$ sells the fraction,

$$1 - \vartheta_{j,t} = \phi_{j,t} q_{s,j,t-1} - q_{s,j,t-1} - d_{j,t-1} \cdot \tilde{q}_b,$$

of beginning-of-period bonds. The amount sold by investment fund $j$ is then,

$$\tilde{b}_{j,t} \equiv (1 - \vartheta_{j,t}) b_{j,t-1} = \frac{\phi_{j,t} q_{s,j,t-1} - d_{j,t-1} \cdot \tilde{q}_b}{q_{s,j,t-1} b_{j,t-1}}.$$ 

Aggregating across i.i.d draws gives (using that all investment funds hold the same initial positions, e.g., $s_{j,t-1} = s_{t-1}$ and $q_{s,j,t-1} = q_{s,t-1}$),

$$\tilde{b}_t = \frac{1}{q_{s,t}} \left( 1 + \varrho_t \right)^{-\tilde{\alpha}} \left( \frac{\tilde{\lambda} + \tilde{\alpha} \varrho_t}{\tilde{\alpha} - 1} q_{s,t-1} s_{t-1} - d_{j,t-1} \cdot \tilde{q}_b \right).$$

$G$ denotes the cumulative density function of the redemption distribution. Since the probability of a draw above the threshold value is given by $1 - G = \left( 1 + \frac{\varphi_t}{\tilde{\lambda}} \right)^{-\tilde{\alpha}}$, the amount of bonds sold is weighted by the probability of a (sufficiently) high draw. Intuitively, cost fall in the amount of deposits and increase in the amount of fund shares issued. The latter is multiplied by a factor that corresponds to the average redemption plus a term that increases in the threshold draw above which investment funds start to sell bonds. Theoretically, a high threshold has an ambiguous effect. While it lowers the probability that sales occur, it also implies that, if sales occur, redemptions are higher. However, given $\tilde{\alpha} > 1$ the net effect can be shown to be negative.
The secondary market price can be expressed as

\[
\tilde{q}_t^b = 1 - \kappa_{hh} \tilde{b}_t .
\]

Investment funds further obey a balance sheet constraint \( q_t^b b_t + d_t^f = q_t^s s_t \). At the end of a period, they transfer all income as dividends to households,

\[
div_t^f = b_{t-1} - q_t^b b_t - d_t^f + (1 + \phi_{t-1}^d) d_t^f - L(\tilde{b}_t) ,
\]

where we assume \( L(\tilde{b}_t) = \frac{\kappa_{if}^f}{2} (\tilde{b}_t)^2 \). The problem of investment funds can then be written as follows:

\[
\mathcal{L} = \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \Lambda_{0,t} \left[ b_{t-1} - q_t^b b_t - d_t^f + (1 + \phi_{t-1}^d) d_t^f - \frac{\kappa_{if}^f}{2} (\tilde{b}_t)^2 + \lambda_t^f (q_t^s s_t - q_t^b b_t - d_t^f) \right].
\]

FOCs for bonds and bank deposits follow,

\[
\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial b_t} = - q_t^b + \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} - \lambda_t^f q_t^b = 0,
\]

\[
\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial d_t^f} = \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} \left( (1 + \phi_t^d) + \frac{1}{q_t^b} \left( \kappa_{if} \tilde{b}_{t+1} \left( 1 + \frac{\phi_{t+1}^d}{\lambda} \right)^{-\phi_{t+1}^d} \right) \right) - 1 - \lambda_t^f = 0,
\]

with \( \lambda_t^f \) denoting the multiplier on the balance sheet constraint.

### B.4 Entrepreneurs

The problem of loan-financed entrepreneurs reads

\[
\max_{l_t, K_t^l} \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \Lambda_{0,t} \left[ p_t^l \left( K_t^l \right)^\gamma - (1 + \phi_t^l) l_{t-1} + l_t + (1 - \delta) q_t^l k_t^l K_{t-1}^l - q_t^l K_t^l \right]
\]

subject to \( l_t = q_t^l K_t^l \).

The FOCs for capital and loans from maximizing the discounted value of dividends are

\[
1 - \lambda_t^l = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \Lambda_{t,t+1} \frac{\gamma p_{t+1}^l (K_{t+1}^l)^{\gamma-1} + (1 - \delta) q_{t+1}^l k_t^l}{q_t^l} \right],
\]

\[
1 - \lambda_t^l = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \Lambda_{t,t+1} (1 + \phi_t^l) \right],
\]

where \( \lambda_t^l \) is the multiplier on the financing constraint. Similarly, for bond-financed entrepreneurs we have,

\[
\max_{b_t, K_t^b} \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \Lambda_{0,t} \left[ p_t^b \left( K_t^b \right)^\gamma - b_{t-1} + q_t^b b_t + (1 - \delta) q_t^b K_{t-1}^b - q_t^b K_t^b \right]
\]
subject to \( q_t^b b_t = q_t^{k,b} K_t^b \).

The FOCs for capital and bonds are

\[
1 - \lambda_t^b = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \Lambda_{t,t+1} \left( \frac{\gamma p_t^{k,b} (K_t^b)^{\gamma-1} + (1 - \delta) q_t^{k,b}}{q_t^b} \right) \right],
\]

\[
1 - \lambda_t^b = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \Lambda_{t,t+1} \frac{1}{q_t^b} \right],
\]

where \( \lambda_t^b \) is the multiplier on the financing constraint. The intermediate good producer buys input from both types and uses a CES-technology. It maximises

\[
\text{div}_{t}^{\text{ent}} = p_t^z (z_t^l) \gamma + (1 - \nu) (z_t^b) \gamma - p_t^z z_t^l - p_t^z z_t^b.
\]

The FOCs yield the demand equations

\[
z_t^l = (\nu)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \left( \frac{p_t^l}{p_t^z} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} z_t,
\]

\[
z_t^b = (1 - \nu)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \left( \frac{p_t^l}{p_t^z} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} z_t.
\]

### B.5 Capital Good Producer

There are two types of capital good producers that purchase depreciated capital from loan- and bond-financed firms, invest into new capital subject to adjustment cost, and resell the new capital to entrepreneurs. Derivations hold for \( \tau = l, b \). Capital evolves as

\[
K_t^\tau = (1 - \delta) K_{t-1}^\tau + I_t^\tau \left( 1 - \frac{\kappa^l}{2} \left( \frac{I_t^\tau}{I_{t-1}^\tau} - 1 \right)^2 \right).
\]

New capital is sold at price \( q_t^{k,\tau} \) to entrepreneur of type \( \tau \). The problem of the capital good producer is given by maximizing real profits

\[
\max_{I_t^\tau} \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \Lambda_{0,t} \left[ \frac{q_t^{k,\tau} (1 - \delta) K_{t-1}^\tau + I_t^\tau \left( 1 - \frac{\kappa^l}{2} \left( \frac{I_t^\tau}{I_{t-1}^\tau} - 1 \right)^2 \right)}{-I_t^\tau - \frac{q_t^{k,\tau} (1 - \delta) K_{t-1}^\tau}{1}} \right].
\]

The FOC with respect to investment reads

\[
q_t^{k,\tau} \left[ 1 - \frac{\kappa^l}{2} \left( \frac{I_t^\tau}{I_{t-1}^\tau} - 1 \right) - \frac{I_t^\tau}{I_{t-1}^\tau} \kappa^l \left( \frac{I_t^\tau}{I_{t-1}^\tau} - 1 \right) \right] + \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} q_{t+1}^{k,\tau} \left( \frac{I_{t+1}^\tau}{I_t^\tau} \right)^2 \left( \frac{I_{t+1}^\tau}{I_t^\tau} - 1 \right) = 1.
\]
B.6 Final Good Firms

The final good producer uses labour and the intermediate good to produce the final good. Their profits read

$$\Gamma_t = A_t \left( n_t \right)^{\alpha} \left( z_t \right)^{1-\alpha} - w_t n_t - p_t^z z_t.$$  

FOCs for labour and intermediate goods equate the input prices with their marginal products:

$$\frac{Y_t}{n_t} = w_t,$$  \hspace{1cm} (28)

$$\frac{(1-\alpha) Y_t}{z_t} = p_t^z.$$  \hspace{1cm} (29)

B.7 Derivation of Resource Constraint

When deriving the resource constraint, we take the household budget and insert profits of entrepreneurs, the intermediate good producer, the final good producer, capital producers, and banks,

$$c_t + d_t^{hh} + q_t^s s_t + f(\tilde{b}_t) = w_t n_t + (1 + i_{t-1}^{d}) d_{t-1}^{hh} + \left( q_t^s + div_t^{ij} \right) s_{t-1} + p_t^z z_t - p_t^b b_t - p_t^l l_t$$

$$+ p_t^b b_t - b_{t-1} + q_t^b b_t + (1-\delta)q_t^{k,b} K_t - q_t^{k,b} K_{t-1} + p_t^{l,j} l_t - (1-\delta)q_t^{k,l} K_{t-1}^l$$

$$+ l_t - q_t^{k,l} K_t^l + Y_t - p_t^z z_t - w_t n_t + div_t^b + \sum_{\tau=l,b}^{} \left( q_t^{k,\tau} K_t^\tau - I_t^\tau - q_t^{k,\tau} (1-\delta) K_{t-1}^\tau \right).$$

Many terms cancel directly. We normalise $s_t = 1$.

$$c_t + d_t^{hh} + f(\tilde{b}_t) = (1 + i_{t-1}^{d}) d_{t-1}^{hh} + div_t^{ij} - b_{t-1} + q_t^b b_t$$

$$- (1 + i_{t-1}^{d}) l_{t-1} + l_t + Y_t - \sum_{\tau=l,b}^{} I_t^\tau + div_t^b.$$ 

Next, we eliminate bank-related terms. Recall $d_t = d_t^{hh} + d_t^{ij}$ and $d_t = l_t$ so $d_t^{hh} = l_t - d_t^{ij}$,

$$c_t + l_t - d_t^{ij} + f(\tilde{b}_t) = (1 + i_{t-1}^{d}) d_{t-1}^{hh} + div_t^{ij} - b_{t-1} + q_t^b b_t$$

$$- (1 + i_{t-1}^{d}) l_{t-1} + l_t + Y_t - \sum_{\tau=l,b}^{} I_t^\tau + div_t^b.$$ 

Using the bank balance sheet for $t-1$, $d_{t-1}^{hh} = l_{t-1} - d_{t-1}^{ij}$ and that $i_{t-1}^{d} = i_{t-1}^{d}$ yields

$$c_t - d_t^{ij} + f(\tilde{b}_t) = (1 + i_{t-1}^{d}) (l_{t-1} - d_{t-1}^{ij}) + div_t^{ij} - b_{t-1} + q_t^b b_t$$

$$- (1 + i_{t-1}^{d}) l_{t-1} + Y_t - \sum_{\tau=l,b}^{} I_t^\tau.$$
Next, we insert investment fund dividends

\[ div_t^{if} = b_{t-1} - q_t^b b_t - d_t^{if} + (1 + i_t^{d})d_{t-1}^{if} - L(\tilde{b}_t). \]

Inserting yields:

\[ Y_t = c_t + \sum_{\tau=\iota,\tilde{\tau}} I_{\tau}^e + f(\tilde{b}_t) + L(\tilde{b}_t). \]

## C Equilibrium Without Regulation

### Households

\[ c_t^{-\sigma} = \delta^d (d_{hh})^{-\sigma_d} + \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \beta c_{t+1}^{-\sigma} (1 + i_t^{d}) \right], \quad (30) \]

\[ c_t^{-\sigma} = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \beta c_{t+1}^{-\sigma} q_{t+1}^b + div_{t+1}^{if} \right], \quad (31) \]

\[ \psi_n(c_t)^{\sigma_n} q_t^{\sigma_n} = w_t, \quad (32) \]

\[ \Lambda_{t,t+1} = \beta \left( \frac{c_t}{c_{t+1}} \right)^{\sigma}. \quad (33) \]

### Banks

\[ i_t^l = i_t^d, \quad (34) \]

\[ d_t = l_t, \quad (35) \]

\[ d_t = d_{hh}^d + d_t^{if}. \quad (36) \]

### Investment Funds

\[ div_t^{if} = b_{t-1} - q_t^b b_t - d_t^{if} + (1 + i_t^{d})d_{t-1}^{if} - L(\tilde{b}_t), \quad (37) \]

\[ 1 + \lambda_t^{if} = \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} \left( (1 + i_t^{d}) + \kappa_t b_{t+1}^{\lambda} \left( 1 + \frac{\tilde{q}_t^{s+1}}{\lambda} \right) \right) ^{-\tilde{\alpha}}, \quad (38) \]

\[ q_t^b = - q_t^b \lambda_t^{if} + \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1}, \quad (39) \]

\[ q_t^{s} s_t = q_t^b b_t + d_t^{if}, \quad (40) \]

\[ \phi_t = \frac{d_{t-1}^{if}}{q_{t-1}^{s} s_{t-1}}. \quad (41) \]

### Bond Sales

\[ \tilde{b}_t = \frac{1}{q_t} \left( 1 + \frac{\tilde{\phi}_t}{\lambda} \right) ^{-\tilde{\alpha}} \left( \frac{\lambda + \tilde{\alpha} \tilde{\phi}_t}{\tilde{\alpha} - 1} q_{t-1}^{s} s_{t-1} - d_{t-1}^{if} \right), \quad (42) \]

\[ \tilde{q}_t^b = 1 - \kappa_{hh} \tilde{b}_t. \quad (43) \]
Loan Using Entrepreneur

\[ l_t = q_{k,l}^l K_t^l, \]
\[ z_t^l = (K_{t-1}^l)^\gamma, \]
\[ \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \Lambda_{t,t+1} (1 + i_t^l) \right] = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \Lambda_{t,t+1} \frac{\gamma p_t^l (K_t^l)^\gamma - 1}{q_{k,l}^l} \right]. \] (44)

Bond Using Entrepreneur

\[ q_{k,b}^b = q_{k,b}^b K_t^b, \]
\[ z_t^b = \left( K_{t-1}^b \right)^\gamma, \]
\[ \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \Lambda_{t,t+1} \frac{1}{q_t^b} \right] = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \Lambda_{t,t+1} \frac{\gamma p_t^b (K_t^b)^\gamma - 1}{q_{k,b}^b} + (1 - \delta) q_{t+1}^{k,b} \right]. \] (45)

Intermediate Good Producer

\[ z_t = \left( \nu (z_t^l)^\gamma + (1 - \nu) (z_t^b)^\gamma \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma}}, \]
\[ z_t^l = \left( \nu \frac{p_t^l}{p_t^b} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma - 1}} z_t, \]
\[ z_t^b = \left( (1 - \nu) \frac{p_t^b}{p_t^b} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma - 1}} z_t. \] (46)

Capital Producer

\[ K_t^l = (1 - \delta) K_{t-1}^l + I_t^l \left( 1 - \Phi \left( \frac{I_t^l}{I_{t-1}^l} \right) \right), \]
\[ 1 = q_{k,l}^l \left[ 1 - \frac{\kappa^l}{2} \left( \frac{I_t^l}{I_{t-1}^l} \right) - 1 \right] - \frac{I_t^l}{I_{t-1}^l} \kappa^l \left( \frac{I_t^l}{I_{t-1}^l} - 1 \right) \]
\[ + \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} q_{t+1}^{k,l} \left( \frac{I_{t+1}^l}{I_t^l} \right)^2 \left( \frac{I_{t+1}^l}{I_{t-1}^l} - 1 \right), \] (50)

\[ K_t^b = (1 - \delta) K_{t-1}^b + I_t^b \left( 1 - \Phi \left( \frac{I_t^b}{I_{t-1}^b} \right) \right), \]
\[ 1 = q_{k,b}^b \left[ 1 - \frac{\kappa^b}{2} \left( \frac{I_t^b}{I_{t-1}^b} \right) - 1 \right] - \frac{I_t^b}{I_{t-1}^b} \kappa^b \left( \frac{I_t^b}{I_{t-1}^b} - 1 \right) \]
\[ + \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} q_{t+1}^{k,b} \left( \frac{I_{t+1}^b}{I_t^b} \right)^2 \left( \frac{I_{t+1}^b}{I_{t-1}^b} - 1 \right). \] (51)
Final Good Producer

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{Y_t}{n_t} &= w_t, \quad (57) \\
(1 - \alpha) \frac{Y_t}{z_t} &= \bar{p}_t, \quad (58) \\
Y_t &= A_t \left( n_t \right)^\alpha \left( z_t \right)^{1 - \alpha}. \quad (59)
\end{align*}
\]

Resource Constraint

\[
Y_t = c_t + \sum_{\tau=l,b} \kappa_t \left( \frac{I_t^\tau}{I_{t-1}^\tau} - 1 \right)^2 I_t^\tau + \sum_{\tau=l,b} q_t^{K^\tau} (K_t^\tau - (1 - \delta) K_{t-1}^\tau) + f(\tilde{b}_t) + L(\tilde{b}_t). \quad (60)
\]

Shocks

\[
\begin{align*}
\log A_{t+1} &= (1 - \rho^a) \log A^* + \rho^a \log A_t + \epsilon_t, \\
\log \delta^d_{t+1} &= (1 - \rho^d) \log \delta^{d,s} + \rho^d \log \delta^d_t + \epsilon_d.
\end{align*}
\]

We set \( s_t = 1 \) at all times. This gives 33 equations and 33 unknowns:

- Quantities: \( c, n, z, z^b, z^l, K^b, K^l, l, b, Y, q^s, d, d^f, d^{hh}, I^l, I^b, \tilde{b}_t, \text{div}^f \)
- Prices & Interest Rates: \( w, i^d, i^l, p^s, p^b, p^l, q^b, \tilde{q}^b, \bar{q}^k, q^k, q^{k,b} \)
- Shocks: \( \delta^d, A \)
- Auxiliary: \( \Lambda, \tilde{\phi}, \chi^f \)

Steady State

The capital price is \( q^{k^\tau} = 1 \) in the steady state. Further, \( \Lambda = \beta \). Consider the final good producer. Inserting equation (58),

\[
z = (1 - \alpha) \frac{Y_t}{p^s},
\]

into the production function (59) gives

\[
Y = n \cdot A^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} \left( \frac{1 - \alpha}{p^s} \right) \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha},
\]

where \( Y \) and \( p^s \) are unknown. Equating with the resource constraint (60) yields

\[
n \cdot A^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} \left( \frac{1 - \alpha}{p^s} \right) \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} = c + \delta (l + q^b b) + f(\tilde{b}) + L(\tilde{b}), \quad (63)
\]
where we use that $K^l = l$ and $K^b = q^b b$. We will use this equation at a later stage. Next, consider the equilibrium conditions of banks. Note (34)

$$i^l = i^d .$$

Using $K^l = l$ and $K^b = q^b b$ as well as the entrepreneur production functions, the entrepreneur and intermediate good producer equilibrium conditions yield

\[
\frac{(i^d + \delta)}{\gamma p^l} = l \tag{64}
\]

\[
\frac{1/q^b - 1 + \delta}{\gamma p^b} = q^b d \tag{65}
\]

where we use $z = \left(1 - \alpha \frac{A}{p^z}\right)^{\frac{1}{n}}$ and $i^l = i^d$.

The deposit and investment fund share demand of households read

\[
1 = \delta^a \left(\frac{d^b}{c - \sigma} \right) + \beta (1 + i^d), \tag{69}
\]

\[
1 = \beta q^s + (1 - q^b) b + i^d d^f - L(\tilde{b}) \tag{70}
\]

Finally, consider the equilibrium conditions of investment funds:

\[
\frac{1}{\beta} = (1 + i^d) + \frac{1}{q^b} \left(1 + \frac{\hat{\phi}}{\hat{\lambda}}\right)^{-\hat{\alpha}} \kappa f \tilde{b}, \tag{71}
\]

\[
q^b = q^b \lambda^f \beta, \tag{72}
\]

\[
q^s = q^b b + d^f, \tag{73}
\]

\[
\hat{\phi} = \frac{d^f}{q^s}, \tag{74}
\]

\[
\tilde{b} = \frac{1}{q^b} \left(1 + \frac{\hat{\phi}}{\hat{\lambda}}\right)^{-\hat{\alpha}} \left(\frac{\lambda + \hat{\alpha} \hat{\phi}}{\hat{\alpha} - 1} q^s - d^f\right), \tag{75}
\]

\[
\tilde{q}^b = 1 - \kappa_{hh} \tilde{b}. \tag{76}
\]
We use (63)-(76) and deposit market clearing
\[ d = l = d_{hh} + d_{if}, \]
to solve for the unknowns \( c, p^l, l, \check{\phi}, p^b, b, q^b, i^d, p^b, q^s, d_{hh}, \tilde{b}, \lambda_{if}, q^b \). We use the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labour (32) to choose \( \psi_n \) to satisfy \( n = \frac{1}{3} \).

**D Equilibrium with Regulation of Investment Funds**

The equilibrium is the same as without investment fund regulation except for the following equations:

**Investment Funds** – The FOC for deposits is changed and a regulatory constraint is added:

\[
1 + \lambda_{if} = \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} \left( (1 + i^d_t) + \frac{\kappa_{if} \check{b}_{t+1}}{q^b_{t+1}} \left( 1 + \frac{\check{q}_{t+1}}{\lambda} \right)^{-\check{\phi}} \right) + \mu_t, \tag{77}
\]
\[
\varrho q^s_t s_t = d_{if} \tag{78}
\]

where \( \mu_t \) is the multiplier on the regulatory constraint. This adds one equation and one unknown \( \mu \) to the calculation of the steady state.

**Table 6: Data Sources**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Var.</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( d_{hh} )</td>
<td>Overnight deposits, Total</td>
<td>BSLM.U2.N.A.L21.A.1.U2.2250.EUR.E</td>
<td>ECB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deposits with agreed maturity, &lt;2Y</td>
<td>BSLM.U2.N.A.L22.L.1.U2.2250.EUR.E</td>
<td>ECB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deposits redeemable at notice, &lt;3M</td>
<td>BSLM.U2.N.A.L23.D.1.U2.2250.EUR.E</td>
<td>ECB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( i^d )</td>
<td>Overnight deposits, Total</td>
<td>MIR.M.U2.B.L21.A.R.A.2250.EUR.N</td>
<td>ECB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deposits with agreed maturity, &lt;2Y</td>
<td>MIR.M.U2.B.L22.L.R.A.2250.EUR.N</td>
<td>ECB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deposits redeemable at notice, &lt;3M</td>
<td>MIR.M.U2.B.L23.D.R.A.2250.EUR.N</td>
<td>ECB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( Y_t )</td>
<td>GDP at market prices</td>
<td>MNA.Q.Y.I8.W2.S1.S1.B.B1GQ.Z.Z.EUR.V.N</td>
<td>ECB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corp. bond fund (IG): Ann. Yield</td>
<td>iBoxx € Non-Financials</td>
<td>Markit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corp. bond fund (HY): Ann. Yield</td>
<td>iBoxx EUR High Yield core Non-Financials ex crossover LC</td>
<td>Markit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IF: investment fund; MFI: monetary financial institutions; GFCF: gross fixed capital formation; IG: investment grade; HY: high yield.
E Data and Calibration

Data Sources – We take most data from the Statistical Data Warehouse of the ECB. We employ a broad definition of bank-based and investment fund-based finance. We aggregate loans and listed shares vis-a-vis non-financial corporations held by monetary financial institutions (MFIs) excluding euro area central banks to obtain the measure for bank-financing. To obtain a measure of investment fund-finance, we aggregate debt securities and listed shares vis-a-vis non-financial corporations held by investment funds. Our measures encompass debt securities, loans, and equity, since in the context of our model, we do not discriminate between debt and equity funding sources for the firm sector. Our loan and bond measures are used to calculate the size of bond-to-loan finance, loans- and bonds-to-GDP as well as the autocorrelation of bonds.

To obtain household deposits, we follow Gerali et al. (2010) who obtain deposits as the sum of different series of short-term deposits (all with maturity below three months). The deposit rate is computed as a weighted average across the corresponding interest rates. To obtain the size of the investment fund sector in our model, we proceed as follows. Using our measure of bond finance and the data on the liquidity share of corporate bond investment funds (see Figure 1), we back out the consistent amount of deposits by applying the balance sheet constraint of investment funds \( d = \text{Liq.Share} \cdot (d + b) \). This eventually yields fund shares \( s = d + b \). We use the measure of household deposits and investment fund shares to calculate the fraction household save in investment fund shares. We also use fund shares to obtain their autocorrelation.

We use the GDP deflator and total employment to calculate real per capita series for output, consumption, investment, shares, loans, bonds, and deposits. Second moments are calculated based on the log of the respective series using a Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing parameter 1600 and discarding the first and last 1.5 years of data.

Finally, we target the return on investment fund shares using the annual yield on Markit indices that reflect the non-financial corporate bond universe in the euro area.

Redemptions – To parameterise the distribution of fund redemptions, we use weekly data on corporate bond investment fund flows from EPFR Global from 2007 to 2019. We obtain quarterly flows by aggregating across the weekly flows and dividing by assets under management of all funds at the start of a quarter. We focus on the outflow episodes to obtain a measure for the redemptions in the model. We match the histogram of the empirical outflow distribution to a Generalised Pareto distribution in Figure 12. As we obtain a location parameter of zero, we obtain a Lomax distribution, which is a special case of Generalised Pareto distributions.

Robustness of the Calibration to Parameter Changes – Table 7 shows the sensitivity of our calibration targets to changes in the calibrated parameters. All parameters are increased by one percent except for the liquidity and management cost parameters, which are increased by two percent, and for the parameters governing the preference shock. Due to their relatively small
Figure 12: Empirical and Fitted Distribution of Corporate Bond Fund Outflows

Blue bars show empirical distribution of quarterly outflows from euro area corporate bond funds between 2007 and 2019. The red line shows the fitted Lomax (Generalised Pareto) distribution.

size, we increase the persistence by fifty percent and increase the shock standard deviation by one-half. Values denote the percentage change of the target. We highlight in bold the respective parameter targets. The responses of targets to their main parameter have the expected sign and are not unusually large.

Table 7: Robustness of Calibration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>( \nu )</th>
<th>( \tilde{\epsilon} )</th>
<th>( \kappa_f )</th>
<th>( \kappa_{bh} )</th>
<th>( \rho_a )</th>
<th>( \sigma_a )</th>
<th>( \rho_h )</th>
<th>( \sigma_h )</th>
<th>( \kappa_l )</th>
<th>( \delta_q )</th>
<th>( \sigma_d )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bond-to-Loan Finance</td>
<td>-4.248</td>
<td>-0.557</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.171</td>
<td>0.199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deposits in IF Assets</td>
<td>-2.603</td>
<td>-0.347</td>
<td>1.848</td>
<td>0.299</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.812</td>
<td>0.955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IF shares in HH saving</td>
<td>-3.404</td>
<td>-0.443</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.150</td>
<td>0.175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loan-to-GDP</td>
<td>0.937</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.129</td>
<td>-0.149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bond Share HH</td>
<td>1.071</td>
<td>0.142</td>
<td>-0.931</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.410</td>
<td>-0.480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deposit rate (ann.)</td>
<td>1.448</td>
<td>0.190</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-1.273</td>
<td>1.483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \sigma_l/\sigma_Y )</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-4.462</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.087</td>
<td>-0.053</td>
<td>0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \sigma_c/\sigma_Y )</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>4.490</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>-0.030</td>
<td>0.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \sigma_Y )</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>-0.394</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto-correlation ( Y' )</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto-correlation ( d^{hh} )</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>1.346</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>-0.298</td>
<td>-0.052</td>
<td>0.034</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table shows percentage change in calibration targets from their baseline in Table 3 after small changes in parameters. IF: investment fund; HH: household; \( \sigma_Y, \sigma_c, \sigma_l \): standard deviations of output, consumption, investment.
**F Model With Bank Frictions**

As a robustness check, we add more structure to the banking sector in this section. Specifically, we assume that banks are subject to capital regulation that constrains their ability to issue loans: banks must have equity $e_t$ to extend loans. This would constrain banks’ ability to substitute for lower bond intermediation that results from tighter investment fund regulatory liquidity buffers.

The banking sector finances loans with deposits $d_t$ and equity $e_t$ accumulated out of retained earnings. Loans $l_t$ are granted to entrepreneurs at the loan rate $i^l_t$. Following Gerali et al. (2010), banks incur quadratic cost when deviating from the target capital ratio $\nu$:

$$\frac{\kappa}{2} \left( \frac{e_t}{l_t} - \nu \right)^2 e_t,$$

where $\kappa$ is a cost parameter. These costs are proportional to bank’s equity and impose a limit to the size and the speed of adjustment of the balance sheet. Banks are owned by households to whom they pay a fraction $\psi$ of their profits as dividends. They maximise the discounted sum of cash-flows $div^b_t$,

$$\max_{d_t, l_t} \psi \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \Lambda_{0,t} \left[ d_{t+1} - \left( 1 + i^d_t \right) d_t + \left( 1 + i^l_t \right) l_t - l_{t+1} - \frac{\kappa}{2} \left( \frac{e_t}{l_t} - \nu \right)^2 e_t \right],$$

subject to a balance sheet constraint $d_t + e_t = l_t$. After repeated substitutions, the static bank problem is

$$\max_{d_t, l_t} \psi \cdot (i^l_t l_t - i^d_t d_t - \frac{\kappa}{2} \left( \frac{e_t}{l_t} - \nu \right)^2 e_t),$$

where $i^l_t l_t$ denotes revenues from lending and $i^d_t d_t$ are the interest payments to depositors. The last term captures the costs of deviations from the target capital ratio. The fraction $1 - \psi$ of dividends that is retained is used to build equity capital, which evolves as:

$$e_t = (1 - \delta^b) e_{t-1} + (1 - \psi) div^b_{t-1}.$$

The parameter $0 < \delta^b < 1$ captures exogenous factors that erode bank capital in every period, such as resources used to manage the bank or equity losses due to defaulting loans. It is chosen to ensure that bank equity equals the target $\nu$ in the steady state.

---

31 This ratio can be seen as the result of limited commitment or bank capital regulation. Intuitively, this could be the result of moral hazard on the bank’s side. For example, in a model in which the borrower (bankers) can misbehave, lenders (depositors) are willing to lend only if the borrower has sufficient pledgeable income, which increases with its equity capital (see Gertler and Karadi, 2011).
We solve a second-order approximation of the model and simulate the economy under a productivity and a preference shock for different levels of the macroprudential liquidity buffer. We calculate conditional welfare to derive consumption equivalents (CE) in terms of the final good. The x-axis starts at 1.96%, which is the liquidity buffer voluntarily held by investment funds in absence of regulation. We compare the welfare in our full model (blue line) to the one in an economy with bank frictions (red line). The dashed lines depict the optimal buffers in the two economies.

From the FOCs we can derive

\[ i_t^d = i_t^d - \kappa \left( \frac{e_t}{l_t} - \nu \right) \left( \frac{e_t}{l_t} \right)^2. \]

Equation (79) is the loan supply schedule and defines the spread between the loan and the deposit rate. Whenever the bank increases lending, this implies a costly deviation from the capital ratio target, as equity builds up only sluggishly out of the retained earnings. This leads to a higher loan rate that, in turn, contributes to increasing dividends and lowering loan demand. These two factors support the capital ratio, which can converge back to the target. Finally, the resource constraint changes to

\[ Y_t = c_t + \frac{\kappa}{2} \left( \frac{e_t-1}{l_t-1} - \nu \right)^2 e_{t-1} + \sum_{\tau=L_b} I_{\tau}^f + f(\tilde{b}_t) + L(\tilde{b}_t) + \delta^b e_{t-1}. \]

Figure 13 depicts our welfare measure for the baseline economy (blue) and an economy without bank frictions (red). With the bank frictions, the optimal buffer is 6.9%, only slightly

\[ \text{We follow Gerali et al. (2010) and set } \kappa = 11. \text{ We set the dividend payout ratio of banks to 0.6 to match the euro area data for 2010-2019 in Muñoz (2021). According to ECB supervisory banking statistics, the Core Equity Tier 1 ratio of euro area banks is around 15%, hence the ratio of bank equity to loans is } \nu = 0.15. \text{ Other parameters are re-calibrated to retain a good fit of the model.} \]
below our optimal buffer in the full model. These findings reveal that bank frictions are not an important driver of our results.

G Model Without Liquidity Cost and Reverse Redemptions

In this section, we discuss a more detailed version of our model with periodic investment fund redemptions. In contrast to the main text, we abstract from two simplifying assumptions. First, we remove the assumption of reverse shocks at the end of sub-period I so that we need to explicitly account for all flows of fund shares, deposits, and bonds across agents. Second, we refrain from using the liquidity cost function $L$. Nonetheless, the resulting FOCs will be similar to the one used in the main text and will lead to qualitatively equivalent results.

As in the main text, in the first sub-period households redeem a random fraction of shares $\phi_{j,t}q_{j,t-1}s_{j,t-1}$ from investment fund $j$. If its deposits are insufficient to cover the redemption, the investment fund sells bonds. Sales at the end of the first sub-period are

$$\tilde{b}_{j,t} = (1-\theta_{j,t})b_{j,t-1} = \frac{\phi_{j,t}q_{j,t-1}s_{j,t-1} - d_{j,t-1}^b}{\tilde{q}_{t}^b},$$

and the aggregate amount of sales equals the sum of sales by individual funds with a redemption draw above $\tilde{\phi}_t = d_{t-1}^b/(q_{t-1}s_{t-1})$.

$$\tilde{b}_t = \int_{\tilde{\phi}_t}^{1} \tilde{b}_{j,t} g(\phi) d\phi,$$

where $g(\phi)$ denotes the probability density function of the stochastic redemptions $\phi_j$. We explicitly calculate the amount of deposits used for redemptions, which equals

$$d_t = \int_{\tilde{\phi}_t}^{\tilde{\phi}} \phi_{j,t}q_{j,t-1}s_{j,t-1} g(\phi) d\phi + \int_{\tilde{\phi}_t}^{\infty} d_{t-1}^b g(\phi) d\phi = \frac{\tilde{\lambda}}{\tilde{\alpha} - 1} \tilde{q}_{t-1}s_{t-1} \left(1 - \left(1 + \frac{\tilde{\phi}_t}{\tilde{\lambda}}\right)^{-\tilde{\alpha}+1}\right),$$

where we use that all investment funds are equal at the start of a period (i.e., $q_{j,t-1}s_{j,t-1} = q_{t-1}s_{t-1}$), evaluate the integrals (see also Appendix B.3), and use the definition of the threshold redemption $\tilde{\phi}_t$.

Next, we consider investment fund dividends in the second sub-period. After bond sales, redemptions, and the transfer of deposits in the first sub-period, dividends are given by

$$(1-\tilde{\phi})div_{t}^{IF} = b_{t-1} - q_{t}^b b_t - d_{t}^f + (1 + \tilde{v}_{t-1}^d)(d_{t-1}^f - \tilde{d}_t) - (1 - \tilde{\phi}_t \tilde{b}_t + \tilde{\phi} q_{t}^s s_t).$$

We note the following differences to the formulation of dividends in the main text. Since households redeem a share of investment fund shares $\tilde{\phi} = \tilde{\lambda}/(\tilde{\alpha} - 1)$, less dividends are paid out to
households. Investment funds also do not receive principal and interest for deposits they used to settle redemptions in the first sub-period. Dividends are reduced by the losses from selling bonds in the secondary market. Finally, in the second sub-period, investment funds also re-issue the redeemed fraction of fund shares at the period-t fund share price to ensure that the amount of fund shares is again normalised to unity at period end.

The maximization problem of the investment funds reads

$$\max_{d_{t+j}^f, b_{t+j}} \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \Lambda_{t,t+j}(1 - \delta)div_{t+j}^f$$

s.t. $q_{t+j}^s s_{t+j} = d_{t+j}^f + q_{t+j}^b b_{t+j}$ and (81).

We obtain the following FOC for deposits

$$1 + \lambda_t^f = \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} \left(1 + i_t^d + \frac{1 - \hat{q}_{t+1}^b}{\hat{q}_{t+1}^b} \left(1 + \frac{\tilde{\phi}_{t+1}}{\lambda}\right)^{-\tilde{\alpha}} - (1 + i_t^d) \left(1 + \frac{\tilde{\phi}_{t+1}}{\lambda}\right)^{-\tilde{\alpha}}\right).$$

Using the secondary market price $\hat{q}_{t+1} = 1 - \kappa_{hh} \tilde{b}_t$, we can rewrite the FOC as

$$1 + \lambda_t^f = \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} \left[(1 + i_t^d) + \frac{\kappa_{hh} \tilde{b}_{t+1}}{\hat{q}_{t+1}^b} \left(1 + \frac{\tilde{\phi}_{t+1}}{\lambda}\right)^{-\tilde{\alpha}} - (1 + i_t^d) \left(1 + \frac{\tilde{\phi}_{t+1}}{\lambda}\right)^{-\tilde{\alpha}}\right]. \quad (82)$$

The first part on the right-hand side closely resembles the baseline formulation in (38) (confer also (13)) that carries the factor $\kappa_{hh} \tilde{b}_{t+1}/\hat{q}_{t+1}^b$ instead of $\kappa_{hh} \tilde{b}_{t+1}/\hat{q}_{t+1}^b$. In addition, the last term of the equation shows the foregone principal and interest of deposits that are used to settle redemptions. This FOC, nevertheless, implies a similar behaviour of investment funds as (13) in the main text: an additional unit of deposit yields a return and reduces the cost associated with bond sales. However, the return is reduced because a part of the extra unit of deposit is used to settle redemptions. Specifically, (82) and (38) will imply qualitatively similar behaviour as long as the net pecuniary return from deposits is positive, i.e.:

$$1 + i_t^d > (1 + i_t^d) \left(1 + \frac{\tilde{\phi}_{t+1}}{\lambda}\right)^{-\tilde{\alpha}}.$$

This relation is easily fulfilled in equilibrium for our calibration.

The formulation of the household side changes as well, but without affecting model dynamics, as we show in the following. As a result of the bond trades in the first sub-period, households do not only own the deposits they invested in in the previous period, but also those obtained from investment funds to settle redemptions. Similarly, they also own the bonds they purchased on the secondary market that mature in the current period. As a result, their budget reads

$$c_t + d_{t}^{hh} + q_t^ss_t + f \left(\tilde{b}_t\right) = w_t n_t + (1 + i_{t-1}^d)d_{t-1}^{hh} + (q_t^s + div_t^f)(1 - \phi)s_{t-1} + \Pi_t.$$
\[ + (1 + \bar{r}^{d}_{t-1}) d_t + (1 - \bar{q}^{d}_{t}) \tilde{b}_t. \]

The household’s FOC for investment fund shares changes to

\[
1 = \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1}(1 - \bar{\phi}) \left( \frac{q^{s}_{t+1} + d_{it}^{bf}}{q^{s}_t} \right),
\]

which is equivalent to (5) in the main text up to the constant term \((1 - \bar{\phi})\).
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