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The optimal quantity of CBDC in a bank-based economy

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Abstract

We provide evidence on the estimated effects of digital euro news on bank valuations and lending and find that they depend on deposit reliance and design features aimed at calibrating the quantity of CBDC. Then, we develop a quantitative DSGE model that replicates such evidence and incorporates key selected mechanisms through which CBDC issuance could affect bank intermediation and the economy. Under empirically-relevant assumptions (i.e., central bank collateral requirements and imperfect substitutability across CBDC, cash and deposits), the issuance of CBDC yields non-trivial trade-offs and effects through an expansion of the central bank balance sheet and profits. The issuance of CBDC exerts a smoothing effect on lending and real GDP by stabilizing deposit holdings. Such "stabilization effect" improves the well-known liquidity services/disintermediation trade-off induced by CBDC and permits to rank different types of CBDC rules according to individual and social preferences. Welfare-maximizing CBDC policy rules are effective in mitigating the risk of bank disintermediation and induce significant welfare gains.

Keywords: central bank digital currency, bank intermediation, DSGE models, welfare.

Non-technical Summary

In recent years, the use of cash for transactions has significantly declined while the demand for digital means of payment for retail purposes has steadily increased. In response, central banks have started to investigate the implications of issuing central bank digital currencies (CBDCs). Among the potential benefits of CBDCs, satisfying the demand for a safe, digital means of payment stands out. One of the most discussed challenges of issuing a CBDC is the risk of bank disintermediation through deposit substitution. Much of the current policy debate focuses on how to calibrate the amount of CBDC in circulation so as to ensure that potential benefits of CBDC materialize without harming monetary and financial stability through bank disintermediation. One challenge in this regard is that advanced economies have no experience with CBDCs and, hence, there is no available data on which empirical analysis can be performed. For this reason, the literature has focused on studying the implications of CBDCs based on theoretical models.

This paper provides novel empirical evidence on the impact of digital euro news on bank stock prices and bank lending behavior. The study finds that such impacts depend on the CBDC design features aimed at calibrating the amount of central bank digital currency in circulation. Due to the perceived substitutability between CBDC and deposits, the magnitude of these effects is sensitive to the reliance of banks on deposit funding.

Then, the paper develops a quantitative macro-banking DSGE model for CBDC analysis that: (i) is calibrated to quarterly data of the euro area for the period 2000:I - 2021:II so as to match a number of first and second moments from banking and macroeconomic aggregates; (ii) replicates the empirical evidence provided in the paper; (iii) incorporates the main trade-offs and key selected transmission channels through which CBDC could affect the banking sector and the macroeconomy; and (iv) allows for a careful quantitative analysis of the macroeconomic and welfare implications of issuing CBDC for both, hypothetical winners (i.e., CBDC holders) and potential losers (i.e., households who do not hold CBDC and rely on bank lending).

The analysis concludes the following. First, as the empirical evidence suggests, adequately calibrating the amount of CBDC in circulation is important to mitigate the impact on the banking sector. Such impact depends on banks’ reliance on deposit funding and the substitutability between CBDC and deposits. Second, the issuance of CBDC exerts a fiscal expansion effect and a bank disintermediation effect through an expansion of the central bank balance sheet and profits. The sign and magnitude of the net impact on bank lending and real GDP depends on the relative size of these two effects. Third, welfare-maximizing CBDC rules are effective in mitigating the risk of bank disintermediation and induce significant welfare gains. They induce a stabilization effect which improves the liquidity services/disintermediation trade-off faced by the economy under the introduction of a CBDC and permits to rank CBDC rules in terms of attainable welfare gains.
1 Introduction

In recent years, the demand for digital means of payment for retail purposes has steadily increased while the use of cash for transactions has gradually declined (Auer et al. 2020). In response to this shift in individual preferences, central banks all over the world have started to investigate the potential benefits and implications of issuing central bank digital currencies (CBDCs). The ultimate goal of introducing a CBDC is to ensure that individuals operating in an increasingly digitalized economy keep having access to the safest form of money, central bank money. Among the many potential benefits CBDCs entail, satisfying the demand for a safe, digital means of payment stands out. The most discussed challenge of issuing a CBDC is the risk of bank disintermediation through deposit substitution (Carapella and Flemming 2020).

Against this background, the current debate focuses on how to calibrate the amount of CBDC in circulation so as to ensure that potential benefits of CBDC materialize without harming monetary and financial stability through bank disintermediation. One challenge in this regard is that advanced economies have no experience with CBDCs and, hence, there is no available data on which empirical analysis can be performed. For this reason, the literature has focused on studying the implications of CBDCs based on theoretical models which can be grouped into three main categories: (i) models of payments and modern monetarist models in the spirit of Lagos and Wright (2005), useful to explore design choices of a CBDC as a means of payment; (ii) banking models in the tradition of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), relevant to study the potential implications of CBDC for the severity of bank runs; and (iii) quantitative DSGE models, important to evaluate the general equilibrium and macroeconomic effects of issuing CBDCs.

The main contributions of this paper are threefold. First, we provide empirical evidence on the impact of digital euro-related news on bank stock prices and lending behavior. Second, we develop and calibrate a quantitative euro area DSGE model that accounts for such evidence and incorporates a selection of key transmission mechanisms through which CBDC can affect banks and the real economy. Finally, we analyze a variety of welfare maximizing CBDC policy rules. Such exercise allows us to give a sensible range of values for the optimal amount of CBDC in circulation.

The response of bank valuations to news about the digital euro project provides insights as to what market participants expect the effect of a digital euro on bank profitability to be. In section 2, we isolate, by means of Fama-French factors, the abnormal returns on euro area banks’ stocks around events related to digital euro news, and look at which bank characteristics are more related to these returns. Moreover, we check whether credit supply was affected by exposure to these events. We find that the impact depends on the CBDC design features aimed at calibrating the amount of central bank digital currency in circulation as well as on bank’s reliance on deposit
funding. Our findings suggest that market participants perceive a certain degree of substitutability between deposits and CBDC.

In section 3, we develop a quantitative DSGE model with a banking sector calibrated to the euro area economy. We model a monetary economy populated by two types of households: patient households who are net savers and hold a variety of financial and monetary instruments, three of which provide them with liquidity services (i.e. bank deposits, cash and CBDC), and impatient households who borrow funds from banks against housing collateral (Iacoviello 2005). Patient households own all firms operating in the economy: capital and final goods producing firms, entrepreneurial firms, and banks. Each entrepreneurial firm is run by a manager, who obtains bank lending against eligible collateral (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997), and a retailer (intermediate good producer) who operates under monopolistic competition in the market of her own variety and sets prices a la Calvo (1983). Banks intermediate funds by borrowing from patient households (in the form of one-period deposits) and lending to impatient households and entrepreneurs (in the form of one-period loans). The banks’ assets (i.e., loans, government bonds and reserves) are funded by equity, deposits and central bank borrowing. The banks operate subject to a capital adequacy constraint (Iacoviello, 2015) and a liquidity (reserves) requirement (Brunnermeier and Koby, 2019), and obtain complementary funding from the central bank against eligible collateral (government bonds). All borrowing and regulatory constraints are binding in a neighborhood of the steady state.

The model is completed with a policy block. Government spending is a constant fraction of steady-state real output. The government finances its deficit by issuing one-period government bonds. Tax revenues, collected in a lump-sum fashion from households, are adjusted in response to changes in the holdings of government debt by banks and patient households. The central bank sets the lending facility rate according to a simple Taylor-type rule and the interest rate on reserves so as to maintain a constant corridor between these two policy rates. Central bank assets (i.e., loans to private banks) are financed by issuing reserves, banknotes and CBDC (central bank’s balance sheet identity) and its profits are transferred to the government. CBDC supply is set by means of simple quantity or interest rate policy rules.

We then calibrate the model to quarterly data of the euro area for the period 2000:I - 2021:II, and match a number of first and second moments from banking and macroeconomic aggregates.

The model captures the following transmission channels of the issuance of CBDC to the economy. Due to the imperfect substitutability between the three assets that provide liquidity services, an increase in the amount of CBDC in circulation is associated with a decline in savers’ holdings.

\footnote{The idea that these monetary instruments provide liquidity services is captured by allowing for money in the utility function (Sidrauski 1967). The substitutability across these means of payment is accounted for by defining liquidity services as a CES aggregator of the three monetary instruments with an elasticity of substitution larger than 1.}
of cash and deposits. In response, banks reduce their holdings of reserves in line with the reserve requirement. This has two main consequences for the accounts of the central bank. First, its balance sheet expands as the issuance of CBDC is not fully offset by the aggregate decrease in reserves and cash. Second, central bank profits soar due to an increase in its assets and a shift towards more profitable (or less costly) liabilities. The former leads to an increased demand for collateral (i.e. government bonds) by banks; there is a reallocation of bank assets towards government bonds and a reallocation of bank liabilities towards central bank funding. As a consequence, bank lending margins compress, which tends to adversely affect bank lending supply and real GDP (bank disintermediation effect). The increase in central bank profits exerts a downward pressure on collected taxes through the government budget constraint, thereby promoting private consumption, economic activity and bank lending (fiscal expansion effect).

In Section 4, we then use the calibrated bank-based DSGE model to analyze the quantitative effects and welfare implications of six different CBDC rules. We compare the results with the baseline case under which there is no CBDC. We consider both quantity and interest rate rules and differentiate between static and dynamic rules. The optimal CBDC policy rule is obtained by maximizing a measure of social welfare - defined as a weighted average of the expected lifetime utility of the two types of households - with respect to the relevant policy parameter vector. We study the steady state and cyclical effects of optimal CBDC policy rules.

CBDC-induced welfare implications and trade-offs are fundamentally driven by three main effects: (i) a liquidity services effect according to which patient households benefit from the availability of a monetary instrument that provides them with liquidity services and for which there is no perfect substitute in the economy; (ii) a bank disintermediation effect by which the relative increase in the weight of government bond holdings and central bank funding in banks’ balance sheets leads to a compression in banks’ net interest margins which adversely affects lending supply and, thus, borrowers’ welfare; and (iii) a stabilization effect according to which the issuance of CBDC stabilizes holdings of the two other monetary instruments (including deposits) - through the liquidity services aggregator - thereby exerting a smoothing effect on bank lending that positively affects borrowers’ welfare. That is, the model permits to identify a cbdc-induced effect that, so far, has remained unexplored in this strand of the literature and which allows for the economy to benefit from an improved liquidity services/disintermediation trade-off (i.e., the stabilization

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2Note that due to the imperfect substitutability between the three forms of money, the issuance of CBDC is not fully offset by the joint decline in cash and bank deposits.

3Since patient households own all financial and non-financial firms in the economy, the welfare analysis can be restricted to (patient and impatient) households without neglecting any consumption capacity generated in the economy.

4With regards to the bank disintermediation effect, it is worth noting that - according to the baseline calibration of the model - the steady state weighted average interest rate on loans is larger than the interest rate on government bonds, whereas the interest rate on central bank funding is larger than that on household deposits. That is, the compression in banks’ net interest margins tends to occur from both the revenues and the funding costs side.
The stabilization effect comprises three components. First, the proportion of the adjustment to exogenous shocks (that hit liquidity services) which is borne by CBDC increases with the amount of this central bank liability in circulation. The magnitude of this component is independent from the type of CBDC rule. Second, such proportion of the adjustment (borne by CBDC) increases with the capacity the policy rule grants the market of CBDC to adjust via quantities. The magnitude of the stabilization effect is larger with CBDC policy rules under which the bulk of the adjustment is made via CBDC quantity (i.e., CBDC interest rate rules). Third, such proportion of the adjustment (borne by CBDC) increases with the degree of countercyclical responsiveness of the CBDC policy rule. Thus, for any given CBDC-to-GDP ratio and two CBDC rules of the same type (quantity or interest rate rules), welfare gains attainable under a CBDC rule that responds in a countercyclical fashion (i.e., dynamic rule) are larger than those associated to a static or a procyclical CBDC policy rule.

The magnitude of the liquidity services effect, the bank disintermediation effect, and the first component of the stabilization effect basically depends on the CBDC-to-GDP ratio in equilibrium and is independent from the type (quantity or interest rate) and specification of the CBDC policy rule. In contrast, the second and third components of the stabilization effect depend on the type and specification of the CBDC policy rule. For any given steady state CBDC-to-GDP ratio, these two components of the stabilization effect are those that permit to rank different types and specifications of CBDC policy rules in terms of attainable welfare gains.

The main findings of the paper can be summarized as follows. First, adequately calibrating the amount of CBDC in circulation is important to mitigate the impact on the banking sector. Such impact depends on the substitutability between CBDC and deposits and on banks’ reliance on deposit funding. Second, the issuance of CBDC exerts a fiscal expansion effect and a bank disintermediation effect through an expansion of the central bank balance sheet and profits. The sign and magnitude of the CBDC-induced net impact on bank lending and real GDP depends on the relative size of each of these two effects. Third, regardless of their type and specification, welfare-maximizing CBDC rules are effective in mitigating the risk of bank disintermediation and induce significant welfare gains for both savers and borrowers. They induce a stabilization effect which improves the liquidity services/disintermediation trade-off faced by the economy under the introduction of a CBDC and permits to rank CBDC rules in terms of attainable welfare gains. Fourth, the optimal amount of CBDC in circulation for the case of the euro area lies between 15% and 45% of quarterly GDP in equilibrium, with the steady state impact of CBDC on bank lending and valuations likely to be moderate under this range of values. By way of contrast, if CBDC were to be supplied under no quantity limits and no remuneration, the amount of CBDC in circulation would be around 65% of quarterly GDP and the steady state effects on banks’ valuations and
lending would be more sizable.

**Related Literature** This paper contributes to a recent and growing literature that studies the consequences of issuing CBDCs. Much of this literature focuses on the trade-off between the potential benefits of CBDC as a safe and innovative means of payment and the risk of bank disintermediation through deposit substitution (see, e.g., Piazessi and Schneider 2020; Keister and Sanches 2021). Brunnermeier and Niepelt (2019) and Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2020) prove that, under certain conditions, there are no allocative and macroeconomic consequences of CBDC-induced bank disintermediation as society is implicitly indifferent between obtaining lending through bank deposit funding and via central bank financing. A key common feature of these models is that they abstract from modelling the central bank’s collateral requirement, a financial friction that has been shown to play a key role in the potential (non-neutral) effects the introduction of a CBDC may trigger on the banking sector and the real economy (see, e.g., Williamson 2019; Assenmacher et al. 2021; Muñoz and Soons 2022). These papers, however, rely on a framework other than a DSGE. Our paper contributes to the strand of the literature that highlights the importance of this transmission channel by showing that if these requirements are binding and the cost of central bank funding relative to that of deposits differs, issuing CBDC has a non-neutral effect on bank lending and the real economy.

Our analysis is complementary to other papers in the literature that emphasize different market imperfections to show the macroeconomic non-neutrality of issuing CBDC. If banks operate in an imperfectly competitive environment, the introduction of a central bank digital currency may actually lead to an expansion in deposits, bank lending and real output (see Andolfatto 2018; Chiu et al. 2019). In our model, the introduction of a CBDC can also have a positive net impact on economic activity, but this is due to a CBDC-induced increase in central bank profits that triggers a fiscal expansion through the government budget constraint.

In particular, this paper relates to recent work that follows a DSGE or business cycle modelling approach to study the macroeconomic transmission and effects of issuing CBDC (see, e.g., Barrdear and Kumhof 2021; Niepelt 2021; Gross and Schiller 2021; Ferrari et al. 2022). A common feature of these models is that they capture the liquidity services/bank disintermediation trade-off by explicitly modelling CBDC as a monetary instrument that provides households with liquidity services and a banking sector that relies on deposit funding. However, these set-ups model neither the simultaneous imperfect substitutability between CBDC, cash and deposits nor the central bank balance sheet. Jointly allowing for these two features is fundamental to capture the main channels through which banks and the economy can adjust in the event of a CBDC issuance.

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5 In particular, these models assume that, together with CBDC, there is only one monetary instrument that provides liquidity services (or with which there is a relationship of substitutability). Generally, CBDC and the other relevant form of money are either independent or perfect substitutes (i.e., extreme cases).
The empirically-relevant imperfect substitutability between CBDC, cash and deposits implies that cash and deposit holdings tend to decline as the amount of CBDC in circulation increases. Outside periods of extreme uncertainty and/or extraordinary unconventional monetary policy measures, the reserve-to-deposits ratio is very stable over time and mainly determined by regulatory requirements. Thus, it is plausible that banks decide to at least partially adjust via reserves in response to a CBDC-induced deposit outflow. Consequently, the modelling of a central bank balance sheet that allows for funding to banks (i.e., central bank assets) and explicitly incorporates the interactions between the three key central bank liabilities in play (i.e., cash, reserves and CBDC), is essential to study how the effects of introducing a CBDC transmit through the accounts of the monetary authority (i.e., balance sheet and profits).

Overall, our paper differs from those in this strand of the literature as: (i) it simultaneously accounts for the substitutability between CBDC, cash and bank deposits, (ii) it captures the interactions among three mechanisms that play a key role in understanding how the banking sector and the macroeconomy may adjust when a CBDC is issued (i.e., the central bank’s balance sheet, its collateral framework and liquidity (reserve) requirements), (iii) it is calibrated to quarterly data of the euro area so as to match a large number of relevant steady state ratios, spreads and second moments, which makes it useful for policy analysis, and (iv) it carries out a welfare analysis of CBDC that investigates the welfare implications of issuing CBDC for both, hypothetical winners (i.e., CBDC holders) and potential losers (i.e., households who do not hold CBDC and rely on bank lending) and provides a sensible range of values for the optimal amount of CBDC in circulation based on a welfare-maximizing CBDC policy rules approach.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents novel empirical evidence on the estimated impact of CBDC news on euro area banks’ stock prices and lending. Section 3 describes the macro-banking DSGE model and the transmission mechanisms of issuing CBDC. Section 4 develops a quantitative exercise to assess the effects of welfare-maximizing CBDC rules under different policy options. Section 5 concludes.

2 Empirical Evidence

Bank valuations provide some insight as to what investors currently think a digital euro might entail for banks’ business models. To the extent that banks’ stock prices reflect also the present discounted value of the future stream of profitability, their changes around events that define agents’ expectations about the digital euro, net of a potential change in discount factors, can be a measure of the impact of the digital euro on bank profitability. Since the digital euro project is still under development, stock market developments might be one of the few, however partial, sources of evidence one can look at to gain insights over expectations over the digital euro and its
consequences for the euro area bank lending conditions.

2.1 Stock Market Reactions to Digital Euro News

We run a cross-sectional event study to analyze banks’ stock price reactions to news related to the digital euro. Following Sefcik and Thompson (1986), we start by estimating banks’ abnormal returns associated with digital euro news using a Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. We fit the model to stock market returns of euro area banks, and we classify returns as abnormal to the extent that they deviate from the returns explained by the regularities captured by Fama-French factors. The sample with data from Iboxxx is based on 134 banks from 1 January 2007 to 31 May 2021. For each bank, we estimate the following model:

\[ R_{b,t} = \alpha_b + \beta_{m,b}R_{m,t} + \beta_{HML,b}R_{HML,t} + \beta_{SMB,b}R_{SMB,t} + \sum_{e=1}^{E} \gamma_b^e D_t^e + \varepsilon_{b,t}, \]  

where \( R_{b,t} \) is the return on the stock of bank \( b \) between the day before and the day after \( t \), \( R_{m,t} \), \( R_{HML,t} \) and \( R_{SMB,t} \) are the excess return on the market portfolio, the value vs. growth factor (i.e., the return on a portfolio long high market-to-book firms and short low market-to-book firms), and the size factor (i.e., the return on a portfolio long small firms and short large firms), respectively. The abnormal daily returns are computed by using the estimated coefficients \( \gamma_b^e \) of the dummy variables \( D_t^e \) for each event \( e = 1, ..., E \), which take value 1 if the event \( e \) takes place in day \( t \).

Figure 1 reports the results of the analysis. We compute the average cumulated abnormal return up to day \( t \) as \( 1/B \sum_b \sum_{e=1}^{e(t)} \hat{\gamma}_b^e \), where \( e(t) \) is the latest event up to day \( t \), \( B \) being the total number of banks, and \( \hat{\gamma}_b^e \) is the abnormal return of bank \( b \) in event \( e \) estimated with model (1). The average cumulated abnormal return has remained relatively stable until 2 October 2020, date in which the ECB stated its intention to intensify work on a digital euro by means of a press release. After that date, every additional communication on the subject has led to a marginal negative return on bank stocks, stabilizing between end October 2020 and the early February 2021 at around 1% below the level prevailing since the beginning of 2020. The trend was inverted after ECB Board member Panetta gave a speech on 10 February 2021, when the potential limit on individual holdings of EUR 3,000 was floated again among other aspects. After that date, events

\[^6\text{For overviews of the event study methodology, see MacKinlay (1997) and Binder (1998).}\]
were associated with positive or neutral reactions of stock market valuations, ending by May 2021 on average at around 1% above the level at the beginning of 2020.

The aggregate picture hides important heterogeneity in the cross-section. Stocks of banks with different business models have been reacting in a systematically different way to digital euro news. In particular, banks with a ratio of deposits over total liabilities above the median have experienced larger drops in valuations in response to digital euro events, summing up to a cumulated drop of over 2% by end-2020 on average. At the same time, they have also experienced a rebound after 9 February 2021, ending the year at the same valuation that they had in early 2020. This reaction is consistent with market participants either discounting a potentially large disintermediation effect or needing several months to absorb the information flow on this subject. The pattern was different for banks less reliant on deposit funding, which instead experienced an increase in valuations since October 2020, followed by a plateau over 2021. This is in line with the considerations on the potential positive impact on bank profitability, related to the potential new business opportunities created by the digital euro like innovative payment services as well as the levelling of the playing field with the digital payment and financial services offered by global tech giants.\(^7\)

Table 1 illustrates further that reliance on deposit funding is the variable that most consistently helps to explain abnormal returns around digital euro events. The model estimated is as follows:

\[
\hat{\gamma}_b^e = \delta \text{Deposit ratio}_{b,e} + \zeta_e + \zeta_b + X_{b,e} + \varepsilon_{b,e},
\]

where the observation is a given bank \(b\) in an event \(e\), \(\hat{\gamma}_b^e\) are the abnormal returns estimated with model (1) for each bank \(b\) and each event \(e\), and \(X_{b,e}\) is a set of (pre-existing) bank characteristics. The fixed effects \(\zeta_e\) and \(\zeta_b\) capture event- and bank-specific unobserved heterogeneity in abnormal returns. Deposit ratio\(_{b,e}\) is the ratio of deposit from the non-financial private sector over main liabilities registered by the end of the month before event \(e\). The controls \(X_{b,e}\) cover several other bank characteristics that may in principle contribute in explaining bank stocks’ abnormal returns, especially if the estimation strategy of model (1) was not successful in ruling out confounding factors. The controls include a proxy for size like bank assets, the ratio of TLTRO over assets to measure reliance on central bank funding, securities holdings over assets to measure exposure to asset purchases by the central bank, excess liquidity over assets to measure exposure to the negative interest rate policy, ROA to proxy for general profitability, the NPL ratio to measure the quality of the loan portfolio and the sensitivity to potential deterioration in the economic outlook, and the CDS spread to measure markets’ assessment of the bank creditworthiness. In the last column we also offer a robustness check based on Fama-French factors for the aggregate European

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economy instead of those computed using stocks of euro area banks.\(^8\) The results show that one standard deviation of difference in the deposit ratio (18 percentage points) is associated with over 1 percentage point of difference in abnormal return in each event. Overall, these findings suggest that market participants perceive a certain degree of substitutability between bank deposits and CBDC.

These early considerations on the perceived impact of the digital euro on banks’ future profitability are subject to some uncertainty. First, it might still be difficult for market participants to gauge the potential relevance that a digital euro might have on banks’ business model. Second, the model used to isolate abnormal returns from otherwise normal fluctuations of banks’ stock prices, however standard, may be misspecified. Third, the period under consideration for quantifying the abnormal returns might also be special, in light of the chronically low price-to-book ratios over the past 5-10 years and the extraordinary environment emerged from the pandemic. Fourth, there may be concomitant events that increase the measurement error of single events. The current approach partially addresses these concerns with a long time period spanning since 2007, considering a wide set of events referring to digital euro that should average out the potential misrepresentation of single events, with both positive and negative news in terms of their likely impact on stock market valuations.

### 2.2 Impact on Lending Conditions

The reaction of stock prices may have conveyed information to banks as to the impact that the digital euro project may have on their business model. Moreover, an adverse assessment by market participants as to the prospects of a given bank in a world with a digital euro may have also directly translated into more expensive market-based funding options for that bank. Hence, there may be scope for the stock market developments in late 2020 to have had a bearing on banks’ lending conditions in the following months. To understand whether that was the case, we look at the developments in loan markets using transaction level data from AnaCredit (the European credit register). We perform a diff-in-diff exercise where the continuous treatment is the bank-level exposure to abnormal returns up to end-October 2020 and the dependent variable is the growth in lending volume since October 2020. In order to control for demand factors, we follow a Khwaja and Mian (2008) strategy, that is, we saturate the model with firm effects, relying on the cross-sectional variation in exposure at the bank level for firms with multiple lenders to achieve identification. For robustness, we also implement industry-location-size (ILS) fixed effects à la Degryse et al. (2019) to include single-lender firms, with no difference in results. The sample is constituted by the banks for which we can isolate the abnormal returns in model (1), which have around 1.6 million

\(^8\)The data for this robustness exercise were retrieved from French’s webpage: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/f-f_3developed.html
outstanding credit relations with 1.3 million firms distributed in 14 euro area countries over 2020 and 2021. We estimate the following model:

$$\Delta^h \log(\text{Volume})_{b,f} = \alpha_{s,g,d}^h + \xi^h \Gamma_{b}^{\text{October 2020}} + X_b + X_f + \varepsilon_{b,f}^h,$$

(3)

where $\Delta^h \log(\text{Volume})_{b,f}$ is the percentage change of outstanding amounts of loans between bank $b$ and firm $f$ occurred in the months after October 2020 up to horizon $h$, $\Gamma_{b}^{\text{October 2020}}$ is our treatment variable defined as the (cumulated) abnormal returns in October 2020, $X_b$ are bank controls and $X_f$ are firm controls, and $\alpha_{s,g,d}^h$ is the ILS fixed effects, which in some specifications we substitute with firm fixed effects $\alpha_f^h$ for robustness. Since our treatment is at the bank level, we control for the spurious correlation in errors introduced in this way by clustering standard errors at the bank level.

In Table 2 we look at changes in loan volumes that occurred in the three months following October 2020, that is, until January 2021. The results show a consistently significant impact across specifications, ranging between 0.1 and 0.4% of ex-ante volumes for each percentage point of additional stock market returns attributable to digital euro news. The impact is also economically meaningful, as one standard deviation in abnormal returns (almost 10 percentage points in our sample) can explain over 7% of the standard deviation of changes in loan volumes (using the coefficient from column 3 as a benchmark). The relation is quite robust to the inclusion of bank-level observables capturing banks’ exposure to confounding factors such as monetary policy, and to a high level of saturation of the model.

In Figure 2 we apply the benchmark specification of column 3 to other horizons. The changes in loan volumes in the months leading up to October 2020 show that there was no differential trend in lending before the actual drop in stock returns of October 2020. Moreover, and consistent with the retrenchment in different patterns of stock market returns due to digital euro news observed since early February 2021, the impact on lending seems to be partially transitory, at least up to the horizon covered in the analysis. The reaction of lending volumes by May 2021 is almost half of the trough reached in January 2021, with progressively widening uncertainty surrounding the coefficient.

3 The Model

Consider a monetary, closed, decentralized and time-discrete economy populated by two types of households. Patient households (net savers) and impatient households (net borrowers). Both of them work, consume and accumulate housing. However, impatient households discount the future more heavily than patient ones (i.e., $\beta_i < \beta_p$) implying that, in the aggregate, patient households
are net savers whereas impatient ones are net borrowers. Impatient households obtain funds from banks against housing collateral. Patient households hold a variety of assets, some of which are forms of money that serve as means of payments and provide them with liquidity services (i.e., bank deposits, cash and central bank digital currency). Net savers own all different types of firms operating in the economy, including banks, entrepreneurial firms, capital goods producers and final goods producers. For each type of agent and firm in the economy, there is a continuum of individuals in the \([0, 1]\) interval.

Banks intermediate financial resources by borrowing from patient households and the central bank and lending to impatient households and non-financial corporations (i.e., entrepreneurial firms). Financial intermediaries have to comply with certain capital and liquidity (reserve) requirements whose modelling is similar to the one proposed in Iacoviello (2015) and Brunnermeier and Koby (2019), respectively. The borrowing capacity of banks with the central bank is tied to the value of government bonds, which serve as the eligible asset within the collateral framework of the monetary authority.\(^9\) For each entrepreneurial firm, there is a manager who obtains bank lending to acquire physical capital and commercial real estate and a retailer who rents such inputs and combines them with labor to produce intermediate goods under monopolistic competition and by setting prices a la Calvo (1983).

The government issues one-period bonds to finance its deficit. Tax revenues respond to changes in government bonds held by patient households and banks whereas government spending is assumed to be a constant fraction of steady state real GDP. The central bank sets two policy rates: the rate that is charged to banks when providing them with funds, which is set according to a simple Taylor-type policy rule, and the rate at which bank reserves are remunerated, which is set to maintain a constant corridor between the two policy rates. The monetary authority issues reserves, cash and CBDC and provides lending to the banking sector.

### 3.1 Main Features

#### 3.1.1 Patient Households: net savers and CBDC holders

Let \(c_{p,t}, n_{p,t}, h_{p,t}\) and \(z_t\) represent consumption, hours worked, housing demand and liquidity services demand by patient households in period \(t\). The representative patient household seeks to maximize

\[
E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta_t^p \left\{ \frac{1}{1 - \sigma_h} \left[ c_{p,t} - \frac{n_{p,t}^{1+\phi}}{(1 + \phi)} \right]^{1-\sigma_h} + j_p t \log h_{p,t} + \chi_{z,t} \log z_t \right\},
\]

\(^9\) The modelling of banks extends the one presented in the extended model proposed in Muñoz (2021) by: (i) allowing for government debt and reserve holdings on the asset side of the balance sheet, as well as central bank funding on the liabilities side; and (ii) incorporating a liquidity (reserves) requirement and a central bank’s collateral requirement.
where $\beta_p \in (0, 1)$ is the patient households’ subjective discount factor, $\sigma_h$ stands for the risk parameter, and $\phi$ refers to the inverse of the Frisch elasticity.  

$\tilde{j}_{p,t}$ and $\chi_{z,t}$ denote possibly time-varying preference parameters for housing and liquidity services, respectively. More precisely, $\tilde{j}_{p,t} = j_p \varepsilon_{h,t}$ is the exogenously time-varying patient households’ preference parameter for housing services, where $j_p > 0$ and $\varepsilon_{h,t}$ captures exogenous housing preference shocks. Similarly, $\chi_{z,t} = \chi_z \varepsilon_{cbdc,t}$ is the time-varying preference parameter for liquidity services, where $\chi_z > 0$ and $\varepsilon_{z,t}$ captures exogenous liquidity preference shocks.

Liquidity services are derived from holding cash, $m_{p,t}$, central bank digital currency, $cbdc_{p,t}$, and bank deposits, $d_t$, according to the following CES aggregator:

$$z_t (m_t, cbdc_t, d_t) = \left[ m_t (n_{z,t}^{-1})/n_{z,t} + \vartheta_t cbdc_t (q_{z,t}^{-1})/q_{z,t} + \omega_d d_t (q_{z,t}^{-1})/q_{z,t} \right] ^ {\eta_{z,t}/(n_{z,t}^{-1})},$$

where $\omega_d$ measures the liquidity of bank deposits relative to central bank money (i.e., cash and central bank digital currency), $\vartheta_t$ captures exogenous CBDC preference shocks and $\eta_{z,t} = \chi_z \varepsilon_{z,t}$ is the possibly time-varying elasticity of substitution across different forms of money.  

Cash, CBDC and deposits provide liquidity and, thus, are substitutes, implying $\eta_z > 1$. Finally, $\varepsilon_{\eta,t}$ captures exogenous shocks to the degree of substitutability between forms of money.

The maximization of (4) is subject to the sequence of budget constraints

$$c_{p,t} + q_t (h_{p,t} - b_{p,t-1}) + m_t + f(m_t) + cbdc_t + d_t + b_{p,t} + \omega_T T_t = \frac{m_{t-1}}{\pi_t} + R_{cbdc,t-1} \frac{cbdc_{t-1}}{\pi_t} + R_{d,t-1} \frac{d_{t-1}}{\pi_t} + R_{g,t-1} b_{p,t-1} + w_t n_{p,t} + \Omega_t,$$  

where $b_{p,t}$ are government bond holdings, $\omega_T T_t$ is the fraction, $\omega_T \in [0, 1]$, of total lump-sum taxes, $T_t$, paid by this type of households and $\Omega_t = \Omega_{e,t} + \Omega_{b,t}$ are dividends obtained from their ownership of non-financial corporations (i.e., entrepreneurial firms) and banks. $\pi_t \equiv p_t/P_{t-1}$ is the gross inflation rate, $q_t$ the real price of housing and $w_t$ the real wage rate. $R_{cbdc,t}$, $R_{d,t}$ and $R_{g,t}$ denote the nominal gross interest rates on CBDC, deposits and government bonds, respectively.

The technological superiority of CBDC (relative to cash) is captured by the existence of cash storage

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10 Households are assumed to have GHH preferences in consumption and hours worked (see Greenwood et al. 1988). This type of preferences - under which wealth effects on labor supply are arbitrarily close to zero - has been extensively used in the business cycle literature as a useful device to match several empirical regularities. As in this paper, GHH preferences have been formulated by other authors, when evaluating macroeconomic policies, in order to prevent a counterfactual increase in labor supply during crises (see, e.g., Bianchi and Mendoza 2018).

11 The specification of the CES aggregator for liquidity services, $z_t$, resembles that of Drechsler et al. (2017): the weighting parameters with which the different forms of central bank money enter the CES aggregator (in this case, cash and CBDC) are normalized to unity and the weighting parameter of bank deposits, $\omega_d$, is allowed to differ and can be calibrated in order to capture the difference in liquidity preferences between public money and private one.
costs, \(f(m_t)\), with \(f_m > 0\) and \(f_{mm} > 0\). In particular, we assume that \(f(m_t) = \left(\frac{\psi_m}{2} m_t^2\right)\).

### 3.1.2 Impatient Households: net borrowers

Let \(c_{i,t}, n_{i,t}\), and \(h_{i,t}\) represent consumption, hours worked and housing demand by impatient households in period \(t\). Then, the representative impatient household maximizes

\[
E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta_t^t \left\{ \frac{1}{1-\sigma_h} \left[ c_{i,t} - \frac{n_{i,t}^{1+\phi}}{(1+\phi)} \right]^{1-\sigma_h} + j_{i,t} \log h_{i,t} \right\},
\]

subject to a sequence of budget constraints and a borrowing limit

\[
c_{i,t} + q_t (h_{i,t} - h_{i,t-1}) + R_{i,t-1} \frac{l_{i,t-1}}{\pi_t} + (1 - \omega_T) T_t = l_{i,t} + w_t n_{i,t}
\]

\[
l_{i,t} \leq m_{H,t} E_t \left( \frac{q_{t+1}}{R_{i,t}} h_{i,t} \pi_{t+1} \right).
\]

where \(\beta_t \in (0, 1)\) is the impatient households’ subjective discount factor \((\beta_i < \beta_p)\) and \(j_{i,t} = j_i \varepsilon_{h,t}\) denotes a possibly time-varying preference parameter for housing, with \(j_i > 0\). Bank loans obtained by impatient households are denoted by \(l_{i,t}\) and the gross interest rate on loans to impatient households by \(R_{i,t}\). According to (8), in each period, impatient households devote their available resources in terms of wage earnings and bank loans to consume, demand housing, repay their debt and pay lump-sum taxes. Expression (9) dictates that the borrowing capacity of impatient households is tied to the value of their collateral. In particular, they cannot borrow more than a possibly time-varying fraction \(m_{H,t}\) of the expected value of their real estate stock. More precisely, \(m_{H,t} = m_H \varepsilon_{mh,t}\) is the exogenously time-varying loan-to-value ratio, where \(m_H \in [0, 1]\) and \(\varepsilon_{mh,t}\) captures exogenous shocks to constrained households’ collateral.

12 \(f_m\) and \(f_{mm}\) denote the first and second derivate of \(f(m_t)\) with respect to cash holdings, \(m_t\), respectively.

13 Alternatively, we could have accounted for the technological superiority of CBDC, relative to cash, by allowing for cash and CBDC to weigh differently in the CES aggregator and in the utility function (see, e.g., Ferrari et al. 2020). Feenstra (1986) shows that there is a broad range of specifications for which assuming a money-in-utility function is equivalent to having liquidity costs in the budget constraint. The motivation for our modelling choice is twofold. First, given the uncertainty about many of the design features that CBDCs will have in advanced economies we remain agnostic about them, to the extent possible, by assigning the same weight in the CES aggregator to cash and CBDC. Second, the assumption of cash storage costs is based on a well documented evidence on which other models also rely (see, e.g., Muñoz and Soons 2022) and captures the idea that costs of holding cash may increase non-linearly (e.g., costs of storage, insurance, security).
3.1.3 Banks

Let $\Lambda_{t,t+1} = \beta p^{\frac{\lambda_{t+1}^p}{\lambda_t^p}}$ be the stochastic discount factor (with $\lambda_t^p$ being the Lagrange multiplier of the patient households’ optimization problem), $\Omega_{b,t}$ earnings distributed by banks and $\sigma$ the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in dividends. Then, the representative bank manager maximizes

$$E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \Lambda_{t,t+1} \ f(\Omega_{b,t}) \tag{10}$$

subject to a balance sheet identity, a sequence of cash flow restrictions, a borrowing constraint, a liquidity (reserves) requirement and a central bank collateral requirement, respectively:

$$L_{i,t} + L_{e,t} + b_{b,t} + \tilde{R}_{b,t} = e_t + D_t + f_t, \tag{11}$$

$$\Omega_{b,t} + e_t - (1 - \delta^e)^{\frac{e_{t-1}}{\pi_t}} = \left( r_{i,t-1} L_{i,t-1} + r_{e,t} L_{e,t-1} + r_{g,t-1} b_{b,t-1} + r_{R,t-1} \tilde{R}_{b,t-1} - r_{d,t-1} D_{t-1} - r_{f,t-1} f_{t-1} \right), \tag{12}$$

$$D_t + f_t \leq \gamma_i L_{i,t} + \gamma_e L_{e,t} + \gamma b_{b,t} + \gamma \tilde{R}_{b,t}, \tag{13}$$

$$\theta_{R,t} D_t \leq \tilde{R}_{b,t}, \tag{14}$$

$$f_t \leq \theta_{b,t} E_t \left( \frac{b_{b,t} \pi_{t+1}}{R_{f,t} \pi_t} \right). \tag{15}$$

Bank assets comprise loans extended to impatient households, $L_{i,t}$, and entrepreneurial firms, $L_{e,t}$, government bonds, $b_{b,t}$, and reserves held at the central bank, $\tilde{R}_{b,t}$. Formally, $A_{b,t} = L_{i,t} + L_{e,t} + b_{b,t} + \tilde{R}_{b,t}$. Identity (11) states that total bank assets are financed by the sum of bank equity, $e_t$ (also referred to as bank capital), deposits held by patient households, $D_t$, and central bank funding, $f_t$.\footnote{Without loss of generality and for empirically-relevant purposes, we assume that $f(\Omega_{b,t}) = \frac{1}{(1 - \frac{1}{\sigma})} \Omega_{b,t}^{\left(1 - \frac{1}{\sigma}\right)}$. According to the evidence, dividend smoothing operates through two main channels; owners (i.e., patient households)’ risk aversion and managers’ propensity to smooth dividends (see, e.g., Wu 2018). See Iacoviello (2015) for a DSGE model with financial institutions maximizing an objective function that is also concave in dividends and Muñoz (2021) for a model that replicates certain moments of euro area bank dividends by assuming that both, owners and managers are risk averse.}

The model assumes full inside equity financing, in the sense that bank equity is solely accumu-
lated out of retained earnings. Formally, the law of motion for bank capital reads\(^\text{15}\)

\[ e_t = J_{b,t} - \Omega_{b,t} + (1 - \delta^e)e_{t-1}/\pi_t, \]  

(16)

where \( J_{b,t} \) stands for bank net profits. Rearranging in expression (16), bank net profits can be decomposed into three terms:

\[ J_{b,t} = (e_t - e_{t-1}/\pi_t) + (\delta^e e_{t-1}/\pi_t) + \Omega_{b,t}, \]  

(17)

where the term \((e_t - e_{t-1}/\pi_t)\) refers to the part of profits made in period \( t \) which are reinvested in the financial intermediation business, and \((\delta^e e_{t-1}/\pi_t)\) is the fraction of bank own resources which, due to exogenous factors, cannot be further accumulated as bank capital into the next period. The term \((\delta^e e_{t-1}/\pi_t)\) can be interpreted in several manners: (i) own resources the banker devotes to manage bank capital and to play its role as financial intermediary, or (ii) equity that erodes due to a variety of factors which are not explicitly accounted for in the model and which may relate to specific characteristics of bank capital such as its quality.

Equation (12) is a flow of funds constraint which states that in each period the banker has to distribute net profits \( J_{b,t} \) between dividend payouts, \( \Omega_{b,t} \), and retained earnings. In the model, bank net profits are defined as the net interest income (i.e., right hand side of equation 12). Note that \( r_{i,t}, r_{e,t}, r_{g,t}, r_{R,t}, r_{d,t} \) and \( r_{f,t} \) denote the net interest rates on loans to households, loans to non-financial corporations, government bonds, reserves, household deposits and central bank funding, respectively.

Expression (13) stipulates that bankers are constrained in their ability to issue liabilities (i.e., deposits and central bank funding). For a given period \( t \), deposits and central bank financing cannot exceed total risk-weighted assets. \( \gamma_i, \gamma_e, \gamma_b \) and \( \gamma_R \) denote the proportions of loans to households, loans to firms, government bonds and reserves that can be financed with debt. Given that this expression is binding in a neighborhood of the steady state, \((1 - \gamma_{b,t})\) can be interpreted as the sectorial capital requirement on holdings of asset class \( h \) (\( \forall h = e, i, b, R \)) and equation (13) as a capital adequacy constraint.

Equation (14) dictates that reserves held by the representative bank in the central bank cannot fall below a certain threshold specified as a possibly time-varying fraction \( \theta_{R,t} \) of deposits, where \( \theta_R \in (0, 1) \) and \( \varepsilon_{\theta_{R,t}} \) captures exogenous shocks to banks’ relative reserve holdings. This expression can be interpreted as a liquidity or reserves requirement faced by banks (see, eg., Brunnermeier

\(^{15}\)Expression (16) for the law of motion for bank capital is identical to the one assumed in Muñoz (2021) and only differs from the one proposed in Gerali et al. (2010) in that these authors assume net profits are fully retained, period by period (i.e., there is no bank payout policy whatsoever).
and Koby, 2019) and it is relevant due to various quantitative and empirically-related reasons. First, an important fraction of total central bank liabilities is represented by reserves and, thus, modelling them allows to improve the model fit (see section 3.3). Second, outside periods of unconventional monetary policy and/or extraordinary uncertainty, the reserves-to-deposits ratio has been notably stable over time in the euro area. Third, expression (14) captures the idea that part of the adjustment banks would have to make in the event of a CBDC-induced deposit outflow could take the form of a shift in their stock of reserves.

Expression (15) dictates that the capacity of the representative bank to obtain funding from the monetary authority is tied to the value of the asset holdings that are eligible as collateral according to the collateral framework of the central bank. In this version of the model, we assume that government bonds are the only eligible asset under such framework. In this model economy, banks cannot borrow from the central bank more than a possibly time-varying fraction, \( \theta_{b,t} \), of the expected value of their government bond holdings. More precisely, \( \theta_{b,t} = \theta_b \varepsilon_{b,t} \) can be interpreted as the complementary of the exogenously time-varying haircut on government bonds, where \( \theta_b \in [0, 1] \) and \( \varepsilon_{b,t} \) captures exogenous shocks to banks’ collateral (for central bank operations).

### 3.1.4 Entrepreneurial Firms

The entrepreneurial firm industry is populated by two types of agents. For each entrepreneurial firm, there is a manager who obtains bank lending to acquire new housing in the form of commercial real estate and a retailer who rents such input and combines it with physical capital and labor (through a Cobb-Douglas technology) to produce intermediate goods under monopolistic competition.

**Entrepreneurial Managers** Let \( \Omega_{e,t} \) be earnings distributed by entrepreneurs. Then, entrepreneurial managers seek to maximize

\[
E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \Lambda_{t,t+1} f(\Omega_{e,t})
\]

subject to a sequence of budget constraints and the corresponding borrowing limit

\[
\Omega_{e,t} + R_{e,t} \frac{l_{e,t-1}}{\pi_t} + q_k(t) [k_{e,t} - (1 - \delta_k) k_{e,t-1}] + q_t(h_{e,t} - h_{e,t-1}) = r_{h,t} h_{e,t-1} + r_{k,t} u_t k_{e,t-1} + l_{e,t} + J_{e,t}, \quad (18)
\]

\[
l_{e,t} \leq m_K E_t \left[ \frac{q_{k,t+1} (1 - \delta_{t+1}) k_{e,t} \pi_{t+1}}{R_{e,t+1}} \right], \quad (19)
\]
where \( l_{e,t} \) is bank loans extended to entrepreneurial firms, \( k_{e,t} \) refers to physical capital, \( u_t \) is its utilization rate and \( J_{e,t} \) are distributed profits obtained from the ownership of intermediate good producing firms (i.e., entrepreneurial retailers). \( R_{e,t} \) denotes the real gross interest rate on bank loans to firms and \( q_{k,t} \) is the real price of physical capital. \( r_{h,t} \) and \( r_{k,t} \) denote the real net interest rates entrepreneurial managers charge when renting physical capital and commercial real estate to entrepreneurial retailers. The depreciation rate of capital is an increasing and convex function of the rate of capacity utilization

\[
\delta^k_t (u_t) = \delta^k_0 + \delta^k_1 (u_t - 1) + \frac{\delta^k_2}{2} (u_t - 1)^2.
\]

According to (18), in each period, entrepreneurial managers devote their available resources in terms of loans and rents to distribute earnings, repay their debt, accumulate physical capital, \( k_{e,t} \), and commercial real estate, \( h_{e,t} \). Expression (19) dictates that the borrowing capacity of entrepreneurial firms is tied to the value of their physical capital collateral. In particular, they cannot borrow more than a possibly time-varying fraction \( m_{K,t} = m_K \varepsilon_{mk,t} \) of the expected value of their capital stock, where \( m_K \in [0,1] \) and \( \varepsilon_{mk,t} \) captures exogenous shocks to entrepreneurial firms’ collateral.\(^{16}\)

**Entrepreneurial Retailers** There is a continuum of entrepreneurial retailers (also referred to as intermediate good producers). Each intermediate good producer \( j \) operates the following Cobb-Douglas production function:

\[
Y_t(j) = A_t \left[ u_t(j) k_{e,t-1}(j) \right]^\alpha h_{e,t-1}(j) x_{e,t-1}^\nu h_{e,t-1}(j) N_t(j)^{(1-\alpha-\nu)},
\]

where \( k_{e,t}(j) \) and \( h_{e,t}(j) \) denote the quantities of physical capital and commercial real estate and labor rented by firm \( j \), \( N_t(j) \) refers to labor demand by the same firm and \( A_t \) captures technology shocks in the intermediate good production sector. Intermediate good producers solve a two-stage problem. In the first stage they choose the trajectories of \( k_{e,t}(j) \), \( h_{e,t}(j) \), and \( N_t(j) \) that minimize total real costs, \( r_{k,t} k_{e,t-1}(j) + r_{h,t} h_{e,t-1}(j) + w_t N_t(j) \), subject to the available technology, represented by (21). Assuming Calvo (1983) price-setting, in the second stage intermediate good producers choose the price, \( P_t(j) \), that maximizes discounted real profits:

\[
E_t \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \left[ \frac{\beta^s}{\lambda_t^s} \right] \left\{ \prod_{\tau=1}^{t} \frac{P_t(j)}{P_{t+s}} - m c_{t+s} \right\} Y_{t+s}(j),
\]

\(^{16}\)As for the case of bank managers and for empirically-relevant purposes, we assume that \( f(\Omega_{e,t}) = \frac{1}{(1 - \frac{1}{\sigma})} \Omega_{e,t}.\)
where $\theta$ is the probability of not adjusting the price, $\chi_\pi \in [0, 1]$ is the indexation parameter, and $mc_t$ denotes the real marginal cost of the intermediate good producer. In each period, a fraction $\theta$ of firms reoptimize their prices. All other firms can only index their prices by past inflation, with $\chi_\pi = 0$ and $\chi_\pi = 1$ referring to the particular cases of no indexation and total indexation, respectively. The first-order condition is standard (see Appendix C), with all time-$t$ price setters choosing a common optimal price $P_t^*$.

### 3.1.5 Capital and Final Goods Producers

The representative, perfectly competitive, final goods producer chooses the trajectory of intermediate good $Y_t (j)$ that maximizes $P_t Y_t - \int_0^1 P_t (j) Y_t (j) \, dj$, where $Y_t$ denotes final production and $P_t$ is the aggregate price level. $Y_t (j)$ denotes demand for intermediate good $j$ and $P_t (j)$ is the corresponding price. The homogeneous final good is produced by means of a Dixit-Stiglitz technology, $Y_t = \int_0^1 \left( \int_0^1 Y_t (j)^{(\varepsilon-1)/\varepsilon} \, dj \right)^{\varepsilon/(\varepsilon-1)}$, where $\varepsilon > 1$ is the elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods. Profit maximization yields demand functions for intermediate good $j$: $Y_t (j) = \left( \frac{P_t (j)}{P_t} \right)^{-\varepsilon} Y_t$, $\forall j$. From the zero profit condition, $P_t Y_{c,t} = \int_0^1 P_{c,t} (j) Y_{c,t} (j) \, dj$, it follows that $P_t$ can be interpreted as the price index: $P_t = \left[ \int_0^1 P_{c,t} (j)^{(1-\varepsilon)} \, dj \right]^{1/(1-\varepsilon)}$.

At the beginning of each period, capital producers demand an amount $I_t$ of final good from entrepreneurs, which combined with the available stock of capital, allows them to produce new capital goods which are then sold back to entrepreneurial firms. Capital producers choose the trajectory of net investment in physical capital, $I_t$, that maximizes $\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \Lambda_{t+1} (q_{k,t} \Delta x_{k,t} - I_t)$, subject to $x_{k,t} = x_{k,t-1} + I_t \left[ 1 - \frac{\psi_t}{2} \left( \frac{I_t}{I_{t-1}} - 1 \right)^2 \right]$, where $\Delta x_{k,t} = K_t - (1 - \delta_t^k)K_{t-1}$ is flow output and $\psi_t = \frac{\psi_t}{2} \left( \frac{I_t}{I_{t-1}} - 1 \right)^2$ an investment adjustment cost function.

### 3.1.6 Government

The government collects tax revenues from households in a lump-sum fashion. Such revenues are determined according to a fiscal rule

$$T_t = \phi_p b_{p,t-1} + \phi_b b_{b,t-1}, \quad (23)$$

where $\phi_p > 0$ and $\phi_b > 0$ determine the response of tax revenues to changes in government bond holdings of patient households and banks, respectively.

Government spending is assumed to be equal to a constant fraction, $\varrho > 0$, of steady state output.
\[ G_t = \varphi Y^{ss}. \] (24)

Consequently, the issuance of short-term government bonds, \( B_{g,t} \), is endogenously determined by the intertemporal budget constraint of the government

\[ R_{g,t-1} \frac{B_{g,t-1}}{\pi_t} + G_t = T_t + B_{g,t} + \Omega_{cb,t}. \] (25)

According to expression (25), in each period, the government devotes its available resources in terms of tax revenues, \( T_t \), central bank profits, \( \Omega_{cb,t} \), and funds obtained from the issuance of bonds, \( B_{g,t} \), to consume, \( G_t \), and to repay its debt, \( R_{g,t-1} \frac{B_{g,t-1}}{\pi_t} \).

### 3.1.7 Central bank

The central bank sets two nominal short-term policy rates: the lending policy rate (also referred to as the lending facility rate), \( r_{f,t} \), and the interest rate on reserves (also referred to as the deposit facility rate), \( r_{R,t} \). The former is the interest rate the central bank charges when providing the banking sector with funding and is set according to a Taylor-type policy rule:

\[ r_{f,t} = \rho_r r_{f,t-1} + (1 - \rho_r) \left( r_{f}^{ss} + \alpha_\pi \tilde{\pi}_t + \alpha_Y \tilde{y}_t \right) + \epsilon_{r_{f,t}}, \] (26)

where \( \rho_r \) is the interest rate smoothing parameter, \( r_{f}^{ss} \) is the steady-state lending policy rate, \( \alpha_\pi > 1 \) determines the response of the lending policy rate to inflation deviations from the target \( \tilde{\pi}_t = \log(\pi_t/\bar{\pi}) \), \( \alpha_Y \geq 0 \) measures the degree of responsiveness of the same policy rate to output growth \( \tilde{y}_t = \log(Y_t/Y_{t-1}) \), and \( \epsilon_{r_{f,t}} \) is a white noise shock to the lending facility rate.

The deposit facility rate is the interest rate at which bank reserves are remunerated. This policy rate is assumed to be set such that a constant corridor of width \( \alpha > 0 \) is maintained between the lending facility rate and the deposit facility rate,

\[ r_{R,t} = r_{f,t} - \mu. \] (27)

Central bank assets consist of lending to banks and are financed by the sum of reserves, cash and central bank digital currency. Formally:

\[ F_t = \tilde{R}_t + M_t + CBDC_t. \] (28)

Central bank net profits are transferred to the government in each period and evolve as
\[
\Omega_{cb,t} = \tilde{R}_t + M_t + CBDC_t + R_{f,t-1} \frac{F_{t-1}}{\pi_t} - R_{\tilde{R},t-1} \frac{\tilde{R}_{t-1}}{\pi_t} - \frac{M_{t-1}}{\pi_t} - R_{cbdc,t-1} \frac{cbdc_{t-1}}{\pi_t} - F_t. \quad (29)
\]

Finally, the central bank issues central bank digital currency according to a policy rule, which - for the most general case - stipulates that CBDC supply in period \( t \) is equal to a constant fraction, \( \phi_Y \geq 0 \), of steady state real output.\(^{17}\) Formally

\[ CBDC_t = \phi_Y Y^{ss}. \quad (30) \]

As discussed in section 4, under the baseline (counterfactual) scenario, the central bank does not issue CBDC (i.e., \( \phi_Y = 0 \)). The quantitative analysis presented in that section considers various alternative CBDC policy scenarios which differ from one another in the specification and/or calibration of the CBDC policy rule in order to carry out a counterfactual analysis and assess the main implications for bank intermediation, the real economy and welfare of various CBDC quantity and interest rate type of policy rules.

### 3.1.8 Aggregation and market clearing

In equilibrium, all markets clear. In the case of the final goods market, the aggregate resource constraint dictates that the income generated in the production process is fully spent in the form of aggregate final private consumption, \( C_t \), final public consumption, \( G_t \), investment, \( q_{k,t}I_t \), and resources to do both; manage the capital position of the bank, \( \delta^e e_{t-1} \) (also interpretable as eroded equity), and hold cash \( f(m_t) \)

\[ Y_t = C_t + q_{k,t}I_t + G_t + \delta^e e_{t-1} + f(m_t). \]

The supply in all markets is endogenous with the exception of housing supply, which is specified as a fixed endowment that is normalized to unity

\[ H_t = h_{p,t} + h_{i,t} + h_{e,t}. \]

\(^{17}\)The choice of this specification for the CBDC policy rule under the most general case is motivated by the wide academic and policy discussion on the desirability of counting with a constant limit on individual CBDC holdings as a tool to calibrate the quantity of central bank digital currency in circulation. See, e.g., Bindseil, U., and F. Panetta (2020), "CBDC remuneration in a world with low or negative nominal interest rates." VoxEU column, 5 October 2020, and Panetta, F., (2021). Interview with Der Spiegel, 9 February 2021 (see table A.1).
3.1.9 Shocks

There are nine different types of zero-mean, AR(1), shocks that hit this model economy under the baseline (no CBDC) scenario: Housing preference shocks, $\varepsilon_{h,t}$; liquidity preference shocks, $\varepsilon_{z,t}$; shocks to the elasticity of substitution across monetary instruments, $\varepsilon_{\eta,t}$; shocks to housing collateral, $\varepsilon_{mh,t}$; shocks to physical capital collateral, $\varepsilon_{mk,t}$; technology shocks, $A_t$; reserves requirement shocks, $\varepsilon_{\theta,R.t}$; and central bank collateral shocks, $\varepsilon_{\theta,R.t}$. Two additional shocks are also considered in very concrete sections of the paper and for particular purposes: (i) a CBDC supply shock, $\varepsilon_{cbdc,t}$, is modelled in section 3.3 to investigate the transmission of CBDC issuance cyclical effects, and (ii) a CBDC preference shock, $\vartheta_t$, is assumed in section 4.3 to study the stabilization capacity of alternative CBDC policy rules in the event of an exogenous shift in the demand for CBDC.

3.2 Calibration

We follow a three-stage strategy in order to calibrate the model to quarterly euro area data for the period 2000:I-2021:II. First, several parameters are set following convention (table 3). The inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor is set to a value of 1, whereas the risk aversion parameter of household preferences is fixed to a standard value of 2. Parameter $\omega_T$ is set to a value of 0.5 so that each group of households accounts for 50% of collected taxes. Regarding the dynamic depreciation rate of physical capital $\delta^k_t$; $\delta^k_0$ is fixed to a standard value of 0.025 while, following convention, $\delta^k_1$ and $\delta^k_2$ are defined as specific fractions of the steady state interest rate on physical capital. Based on the evidence for the euro area and on the literature, the loan-to-value on residential mortgages, $m_H$, is set to a value of 0.7 (see, e.g., Gerali et al. 2010; Munoz 2021). Since the risk weights of reserves and government bonds are both equal to 0 under the Basel III accord, the fraction of bank reserves and government bonds that can be financed with bank debt is assumed to be equal to one (i.e., $\gamma_R = 1$, $\gamma_b = 1$). The elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods is fixed to a value of 6. The Calvo parameter, the inflation indexation parameter and the three parameters of the Taylor rule (i.e., $\rho_r$, $\alpha_Y$, and $\alpha_n$) are fixed to values of 0.82, 0.23, 0.9, 0.1 and 2.5, within the range of values typically obtained when calibrating or estimating a DSGE model to quarterly data of the euro area (see, e.g., Smets and Wouters 2003, Gerali et al. 2010, Coenen et al. 2018). The autoregressive coefficients in the AR(1) processes followed by all shocks are set equal to 0.90.

Second, another group of parameters is calibrated by using steady state targets (tables 4, 5 and 6). Some of these targets are intended to ensure that the size of asset holdings relative to the size of the Eurosystem’s balance sheet and to that of the euro area banking sector’s balance

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18 All time series expressed in Euros are seasonally adjusted and deflated. With regards to the matching of second moments, the log value of deflated time series has been linearly detrended before computing standard deviation targets. All details on the dataset constructed for calibration purposes are available in Appendix B.
sheet is taken into account for all key financial assets and monetary instruments considered in the baseline model.\textsuperscript{19}In this regard, the size of the central bank balance sheet is proxied by the sum of cash (i.e., banknotes in circulation) and reserves (i.e., liabilities to euro area credit institutions related to monetary policy operations denominated in euro), which are the two central bank liabilities available under the baseline scenario.\textsuperscript{20} Similarly, the size of the euro area banking sector’s consolidated balance sheet is proxied by the sum of total bank loans to households and firms, government debt held by credit institutions and bank reserves.

The patient households’ discount factor, $\beta_p = 0.993$, is chosen such that the annual interest rate equals 2.3%. The impatient households’ discount factor is set to 0.980, in order to generate an annualized lending-deposit spread of 3.05%. Household weights on housing utility, $j_p$ and $j_i$, have been calibrated to match the private consumption-to-GDP ratio and the household loans-to-GDP ratio, respectively.

The weight of liquidity services in the utility function of patient households is set to 0.0541, which is consistent with a cash-to-GDP ratio of 0.3443. The weight of deposits and the elasticity of substitution across monetary instruments - both entering the liquidity services aggregator - have been calibrated to match the bank deposits-to-assets ratio and the annualized reserves-deposit spread. The cash storage cost parameter is fixed to a value of 0.002, in order to have a cash-to-central bank assets ratio of 0.51. The loan-to-value ratio on loans to entrepreneurial firms, $m_K$, is set to 0.214, which is consistent with a weight of loans to firms in total bank assets of 0.37. The shares in production of physical capital, $\alpha$, and commercial real estate, $\eta$, are set to match an investment-to-GDP ratio of 0.21 and a corporate loans-to-GDP ratio of 1.78.

With regards to bank parameters, we proceed as follows. The fractions of residential mortgages and corporate loans that can be financed with bank debt are fixed to 0.92 and 0.895, which are consistent with a household lending-to-bank assets ratio of 0.43 and a bank equity-to-loans ratio of roughly 0.105.\textsuperscript{21} The depreciation rate of bank capital, $\delta^e$, is set to 0.071 in order to allow for a bank reserves-to-assets ratio of 0.068. Reserves and central bank collateral requirements, $\theta_R$ and $\theta_b$, are set to 0.0874 and 0.995 to match a reserves-to-GDP ratio of 0.33 and a central bank funding-to-assets ratio of 0.086.

As far as policy parameters are concerned, the response parameters of the fiscal rules, $\phi_{Bp}$ and $\phi_{Bb}$, are chosen to generate a bank government bonds-to-GDP ratio of 0.647 and a bank government...
bonds-to-assets ratio of 0.13, respectively. The parameter of the government spending equation, \( \rho \), is fixed to 0.207 in line with the data target for the steady state consumption-to-GDP ratio. The gross inflation target, \( \pi \), is set to 1.005 so to generate an annualized inflation rate of 2\%, in line with the Eurosystem’s quantitative objective of price stability. The parameter that determines the constant corridor between the lending policy rate and the deposit facility rate, \( \mu \), is set to match an annualized spread between the two policy rates of 1.39\%. Finally the parameter of the CBD quantity rule, \( \phi_{Y_{ss}} \), is fixed to 0 to ensure that, under the baseline scenario, there is no CBDC in circulation and to allow for a reserves-to-central bank assets ratio of 0.49.

Third, the size of shocks and other parameters affecting the dispersion of key aggregates are calibrated to improve the fit of the model to the data in terms of relative volatilities (see tables 7 and 8). The investment adjustment cost parameter \( \psi_I \) is set to target a relative standard deviation of investment of 2.02 \% while the relative volatility of bank dividends is matched by calibrating the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) of banks. The size of the nine different types of shocks that hit this model economy under the baseline scenario have been calibrated to match the second moment (in terms of relative standard deviations) of GDP, total consumption, cash, reserves, central bank assets, bank loans, bank equity, bank deposits and the interest rate on bank deposits.

### 3.3 Transmission

We explore the mechanisms through which aggregate effects of CBDC issuances are transmitted to the banking sector and the real economy for the case of policy rule (30). In order to do so, we consider three CBDC scenarios that differ from one another in their associated CBDC issuance levels. Let \( \Psi = (\phi_{Y_{1}}, \phi_{Y_{2}}, \phi_{Y_{3}}) \) be a vector containing information on the value that CBDC policy parameter \( \phi_{Y_{h}} \) takes under scenario \( h \), for \( h = 1, 2, 3 \). For the purpose of this exercise, we assume that \( \bar{\Psi} = (0.25, 0.45, 0.64) \).

Each of these scenarios CBDC policy scenarios is compared against the baseline scenario of no CBDC supply (i.e., \( \phi_Y = 0.00 \)).

First, we study the transmission of CBDC-induced steady state effects. Figure 3 plots the percentage change in the steady state level of selected aggregates that emerges when comparing each of the three CBDC policy scenarios with the baseline (no CBDC) scenario. This gives us information on how the steady state levels of relevant macro and banking aggregates evolve as the steady state CBDC-to-GDP ratio increases. Due to the imperfect substitutability between the

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22 Under the baseline calibration, the steady state CBDC quantity implied by \( \phi_Y = 0.64 \) is consistent with a steady state CBDC interest rate equal to zero, \( r^{\text{cbdc}} = 0 \). For all \( \phi_Y < 0.64 \), it holds that \( r^{\text{cbdc}} < 0 \).

23 Note that these percentage changes in levels are only attributed to shifts from one steady state (i.e., baseline - no CBDC - scenario) to another (i.e., CBDC policy scenario) and disregard any possible impacts that may occur during the transition.
three monetary instruments, as the amount of CBDC in circulation increases, cash and deposit holdings decline. Expression (14) stipulates that, for every unit of deposits that are withdrawn, bank reserves are going to decrease by \( \theta_R \) units.

These considerations have two main implications for the accounting of the central bank. First, its balance sheet expands since the issuance of CBDC (i.e., a central bank liability) is never fully compensated by the joint decline in cash and reserves. Second, its profits also increase for two reasons: (i) the expansion of the central bank balance sheet is profitable from both, the asset and the liabilities side, since for the three considered policy scenarios it holds that \( r^{es}_j > 0 \) and \( r^{ss}_{cbdc} \leq 0 \); and (ii) there is a change in the composition of central bank liabilities entailing a partial shift from costly liabilities (i.e., reserves) to profitable or costless liabilities (i.e., CBDC).

These implications for the accounts of the monetary authority translate into two effects with consequences for banks’ valuations, lending and economic activity. On the one hand, there is a fiscal expansion effect. As public revenues in the form of central bank profits increase, the government decides to collect less taxes from households (see expression 25), thereby fostering private consumption, real economic activity and demand for bank lending. On the other hand, there is a bank disintermediation effect. To the extent that the central bank collateral requirement is binding in a neighborhood of the steady state, an expansion of central bank assets automatically translates into an increased demand for central bank collateral (i.e., government bonds) through expression (15): \( \frac{\partial b_h}{\partial F} > 0 \). The weight of government bond holdings and central bank funding in the balance sheet of the representative bank increases at the expense of lending to the private sector and deposits, respectively. Given that the weighted average return on loans to households and firms is larger than the return on government bond holdings and the cost of central bank funding is higher than that of household deposits, it follows that banks face a compression in their net interest margins through this channel.

Such negative impact on bank profitability has an adverse effect on bank valuations, lending and real GDP (bank disintermediation effect). Although

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24 Note two important considerations. First, as CBDC supply increases, the substitution for cash and deposits becomes more pronounced since the equilibrium rate at which CBDC holdings are remunerated also increases. Second, the fall in steady state cash holdings is more severe than that in steady state bank deposits mainly due to the spread between the two: Recall the presence of cash storage costs, and the comparatively higher gross return on bank deposits.

25 Recall that, in this model economy, reserve requirements are binding in a neighbourhood of the steady state.

26 Note that this is always going to be the case precisely due to the imperfect substitutability between CBDC and the other two forms of money and the range of values that the reserves requirement parameter, \( \theta_R \in (0, 1) \), can take.

27 Recall that, under the baseline calibration and for the considered CBDC policy scenarios, \( r^{es}_j > 0 \) whereas \( r^{ss}_{cbdc} \leq 0 \).

28 Note that for tax revenues to fall and banks’ government bond holdings to soar as the amount of CBDC in circulation increases it must hold that government debt held by patient households declines.

29 Recall from table 4 how do the main spreads look like under the baseline calibration. Also note that, given the central bank collateral requirement and the baseline parameterization of \( \theta_b \), the interest rate on government bonds is almost identical to the lending facility rate, in equilibrium.
moderate, the net steady state impact of CBDC on bank valuations, lending to NFCs and real GDP is negative as the bank disintermediation effect dominates the fiscal expansion effect.\footnote{These two effects directly follow from the CBDC-induced expansion in central bank profits and balance sheet and highlight the relevance of the fiscal rule’s specification (see equation 23) to understand the transmission. In order for the government budget constraint to hold (expression 25), the increase in funds available to the government via central bank profits and banks’ government bond holdings requires collected taxes to decrease. Since banks’ public debt holdings must increase as the central bank balance sheet expands, it follows that the downward adjustment in tax revenues can only occur through a decline in the supply of government bonds to patient households. From the demand side, as CBDC holdings soar, savers’ holdings of other assets - including government bonds - also tend to decrease (see the first order conditions of the representative saver’s problem in Appendix C).}

These findings resemble three important conclusions that can be drawn from the empirical evidence presented in section 2. First, the magnitude of the CBDC structural impact (or net steady state effect) on banks’ valuations and lending crucially depends on the amount of CBDC in circulation. Second, the dominance of the bank disintermediation effect underscores the importance of the deposit ratio as a key factor to understand the transmission of CBDC-induced net steady state effects on the banking sector. Third, at the aggregate level, the net steady state impact of CBDC on bank valuations, lending to NFCs and real GDP is contained.

Finally, we inspect the transmission of CBDC-induced cyclical effects by studying the impulse responses of key selected aggregates to a CBDC supply shock (see figure 4). In order to do so, we slightly modify equation (30):

\[ CBDC_t = \phi_Y t Y^{ss}, \]  

where CBDC in period \( t \) is now assumed to be a possibly time-varying fraction, \( \phi_Y t = \phi_Y \varepsilon_{cbdc,t} \), of steady state real GDP, with \( \phi_Y \geq 0 \) and \( \varepsilon_{cbdc,t} \) capturing exogenous CBDC supply shocks. The size of these shocks, \( \sigma_{cbdc} \), is set equal to 0.1.\footnote{As for the rest of the shocks that are considered in the paper, the autoregressive coefficient in the AR(1) process followed by these shocks, \( \rho_{cbdc} \), is set equal to 0.90} The transmission channels are analogous to those through which steady state effects are transmitted although in this case the fiscal expansion effect dominates the bank disintermediation effect. As the central bank issues CBDC, savers benefit from increased liquidity services, \( z_t (m_t, cbdc_t, d_t) \).\footnote{Due to the specification of the liquidity services aggregator (see expression 5), the calibration of its parameter values, and the distinctive features of each of the three monetary instruments, the decline in cash and deposit holdings does not fully compensate for the increase in CBDC holdings.} Although the increase in CBDC holdings exerts a downward pressure on cash and deposit holdings, the net impact on the latter is positive due to the large fiscal expansion effect. As taxes collected from households decline and disposable income increases, private consumption and real GDP soar, ultimately leading to a net positive effect on bank profits (and valuations), aggregate lending and real GDP. Note that the sign of these net cyclical effects is positive due to a sufficiently large expansion of bank’s balance sheets and despite the fact that the usual rebalancing effects on the assets and liabilities side still apply (i.e., the
weights of government debt and central bank funding increase at the expense of those of loans and deposits, respectively). As real GDP and inflation increase, monetary conditions tighten through adjustments in the lending policy rate (see expression 26).

4 Welfare Analysis

This section evaluates the welfare effects and trade-offs of issuing CBDC to, then, derive the optimal CBDC policy rule under different welfare criteria and for various types of rules. This quantitative exercise permits us to obtain a sensible range of values for the optimal amount of CBDC in circulation and to study the main steady state and cyclical consequences of supplying CBDC under optimal CBDC policy rules.

4.1 CBDC Policy Regimes

First, we construct various CBDC policy scenarios that are compared with the baseline scenario of no CBDC supply (i.e., expression 30 with $\phi_Y = 0.00$). Each alternative CBDC policy scenario differs from one another in the specification of the CBDC policy rule (i.e., equation 30 for the case of the baseline scenario). Our analysis considers both, CBDC quantity rules and CBDC interest rate rules, and differentiates between dynamic and static rules.

4.1.1 CBDC quantity rules

Quantity rule (i) CBDC in period $t$ is specified as a constant fraction, $\phi_Y > 0$, of quarterly real GDP:

$$CBDC_t = \phi_Y Y_t.$$  \hfill (32)

Quantity rule (ii) Under this scenario, CBDC in period $t$ is specified as a constant fraction, $\phi_Y > 0$, of steady state quarterly real GDP for $t = 0, 1, 2,..$

$$CBDC_t = \phi_Y Y_{ss}.$$  \hfill (33)

While, under quantity rule (i), CBDC supply is time-varying and comoves with real GDP, under quantity rule (ii) CBDC issuance is constant over time. As mentioned in section 3.1, the latter case is particularly relevant from a policy perspective, since this policy option would be similar to adopting a constant limit on individual CBDC holdings, a proposal that has been discussed by policymakers in the recent past.
**Quantity rule (iii)** In this case, the central bank is assumed to set CBDC supply according to the rule:

\[
CBDC_t = \rho_{cbdc} CBDC_{t-1} + (1 - \rho_{cbdc}) \left[ \phi_Y Y^{ss} + \phi_X \bar{X}_t \right],
\]

where \(\rho_{cbdc}\) is the CBDC supply smoothing parameter, \(\phi_Y Y^{ss}\) is the steady-state CBDC quantity (expressed as a proportion of steady state real output), and \(\phi_X\) determines the response of CBDC supply to deviations of a macroeconomic indicator of the choice of the regulator, \(X_t\), from its steady state level, \(\bar{X}\); with \(\bar{X}_t = \log(X_t/\bar{X})\).

### 4.1.2 CBDC interest rate rules

**Interest rate rule (i)** Under this scenario, the interest rate at which CBDC holdings are remunerated is constant and equal to zero. Formally:

\[
r_{cbdc,t} = 0.
\]

The choice of this scenario is motivated by the fact that the existing version of central bank money (i.e., cash) is not remunerated. In what follows, we will also refer to this case as the unconstrained CBDC supply scenario and it will also be taken as a reference when assessing certain effects of optimal CBDC policy rules.

**Interest rate rule (ii)** The central bank sets the interest rate on CBDC holdings in period \(t\) as a constant fraction, \(\phi_r > 0\), of the steady state interest rate on reserves, for \(t = 0, 1, 2, \ldots\):

\[
r_{cbdc,t} = \phi_r r^{ss}_R.
\]

**Interest rate rule (iii)** The monetary authority sets the CBDC interest rate according to the following rule:

\[
r_{cbdc,t} = \phi_r R_{t,K},
\]

where \(\phi_r > 0\) determines the response of the CBDC interest rate to changes in the deposit facility rate.\(^{33}\) While the rate at which CBDC holdings are remunerated under interest rate rules (i) and (ii) is constant over time, under interest rate rule (iii) such rate comoves with the interest rate on reserves. Since the central bank sets \(R_{t,K}\) so to maintain a constant corridor between the

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\(^{33}\)See Bindseil, U., and F. Panetta (2020), "CBDC remuneration in a world with low or negative nominal interest rates." VoxEU column, 5 October 2020 for a policy proposal on a CBDC remuneration scheme that takes the deposit facility rate as a reference (see table A.1).
lending policy rate and the deposit facility rate (i.e., expression 27), it follows that - under interest rate rule (iii) - the interest rate on CBDC holdings comoves with the lending facility rate and, thus, is indirectly set according to a Taylor-type policy rule (i.e., expression 26).

### 4.2 Welfare Effects and Optimal CBDC Policy Rules

Then, we adopt a normative approach to investigate the welfare consequences of issuing central bank digital currency and the main implications of doing so under welfare-maximizing CBDC policy rules. In order to do so, a measure of social welfare - specified as a weighted average of the expected life-time utility of savers and borrowers - is maximized with respect to the corresponding policy parameter/s. Formally:

$$\arg \max_{\Theta} V_0 = \zeta_p V_0^p + \zeta_i V_0^i,$$

where $V_0^p = E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta_p^t u(c_{p,t}, h_{p,t}, n_{p,t}, z_t)$ and $V_0^i = E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta_i^t u(c_{i,t}, h_{i,t}, n_{i,t})$ are the expected life-time utility functions of patient and impatient households, respectively. $\zeta_p$ and $\zeta_i$ denote the utility weights of each household; and $\Theta$ refers to the vector of policy parameters with respect to which the objective function is maximized. Problem (38) is subject to all the competitive equilibrium conditions of the extended model. As in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007), welfare gains of each agent type are defined as the implied permanent differences in consumption between two different scenarios. Formally, and for the case of patient households, consumption equivalent gains can be specified as a constant $\lambda_p$, that satisfies:

$$E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta_p^t u \left( c_{p,t}^a, h_{p,t}^a, n_{p,t}^a, z_t^a \right) = E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta_p^t u \left( (1 + \lambda_p) c_{p,t}^b, h_{p,t}^b, n_{p,t}^b, z_t^b \right),$$

where superscripts $a$ and $b$ refer to the alternative CBDC policy scenario and the baseline case, respectively.

In order to assign values to $\zeta_p$ and $\zeta_i$, we rely on two alternative but complementary criteria that are typically used in the literature. Welfare weighting criterion "A" solves problem (38) by further assuming that $\zeta_p = 0.5$ and $\zeta_i = 0.5$. That is, this criterion assigns the same weight to each of the two agent types.\(^{34}\) Welfare criterion "B" goes one step further in treating both types of agents equally and solves (38) by assuming that $\zeta_p = (1 - \beta_p)$ and $\zeta_i = (1 - \beta_i)$. That ensures the same utility weights across households discounting future utility at different rates.\(^{35}\) For reporting.

\(^{34}\)Since the population weights of savers and borrowers are implicitly assumed to be identical, this criterion is equivalent to assuming a utilitarian social welfare function. For references proposing this welfare criterion in models with the same type of individual heterogeneity see, e.g., Antunes and Cavalcanti (2013) and Elenew et al. (2016).

\(^{35}\)This is a welfare weighting criterion typically considered in the macro-banking literature to prevent an over-
purposes, welfare weights are normalized, \( \hat{\zeta}_x = \frac{(1 - \beta_x)}{(1 - \beta_s) + (1 - \beta_b)} \), so that \( \hat{\zeta}_s + \hat{\zeta}_b = 1 \) also under welfare criterion "B".\(^{36}\)

Figure 5 plots the individual and social welfare effects of changing the value of parameter \( \phi_Y \) for quantity rules (i), (ii) and (iii), and welfare criteria "A" and "B", with \( X_t = Y_t \) and \( \phi_X = -5 \), for the case of quantity rule (iii).\(^{37}\) While there is a considerable range of positive \( \phi_Y \) values for which both agent types are better off than under the baseline (no CBDC) scenario, figure 5 also shows that each type of household faces a different trade-off when being exposed to changes in \( \phi_Y \). The issuance of CBDC induces three key effects that allow for understanding these welfare implications. First, it permits to satisfy the demand for a monetary instrument that provides patient households with liquidity services and for which there is no perfect substitute in the economy (i.e., liquidity services effect). Second, it partially replaces cash and bank deposit holdings, produces an upward pressure on deposit and lending interest rates, and ultimately exerts a negative level effect on lending to households and firms (i.e., bank intermediation effect). Third, it induces a stabilizing effect on cash and bank deposits, ultimately leading to a smoothing effect on lending supply and, thus, on variables of the real economy such as consumption and hours worked (i.e., stabilization effect).

The stabilization effect comprises three components. First, the proportion of the adjustment to exogenous shocks (that hit liquidity services) which is borne by CBDC increases with the amount of this central bank liability in circulation.\(^{38}\) The magnitude of this component is independent from the type of CBDC rule. Second, such proportion of the adjustment (borne by CBDC) increases with the capacity the policy rule grants the market of CBDC to adjust via quantities.\(^{39}\) Third, such proportion of the adjustment (borne by CBDC) increases with the degree of countercyclical responsiveness of the CBDC policy rule. This component of the stabilization effect explains the differences in attainable welfare levels between quantity rules (i), (ii) and (iii) for the case of borrowers and society (see panels B, C and D of figure 5). For any given CBDC-to-GDP ratio and due to its countercyclical responsiveness, attainable welfare gains under quantity rule (iii) are larger than those attainable under quantity rule (ii), which is static. By the same token, attainable welfare gains under quantity rule (ii) are larger than those attainable under quantity rule (i), which is procyclical. By displaying the individual and social welfare effects of simultaneous ceteris paribus changes in \( \phi_Y \) and \( \phi_X \) for the case of quantity rule (iii), figure 6 confirms that allowing

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**Footnotes:**

36. Under the baseline calibration this normalization implies that \( \hat{\zeta}_s = 0.2593 \) and \( \hat{\zeta}_b = 0.7407 \).

37. Note that under this calibration of quantity rule (iii), CBDC supply adjusts in a countercyclical manner.

38. Note that, as the proportion of the adjustment to exogenous shocks (that hit liquidity services, \( z_t \)) which is borne by CBDC holdings increases, the one borne by the other two monetary instruments (including bank deposits) decreases. Such smoothing effect on deposits stabilizes lending supply and aggregates of the real economy.

39. This component only becomes relevant when comparing quantity rules with interest rate rules.
for CBDC supply to adjust in a countercyclical fashion permits borrowers - and the society as a whole - to reach comparatively higher welfare levels. Figure D.1 provides further information on the implications of these three components by reporting the main level and volatility effects that are behind the welfare effects plotted in figure 5.

In the case of savers (i.e., CBDC holders), the liquidity services (level) effect clearly dominates and, thus, welfare increases with the level of CBDC supply. In the case of borrowers (i.e., impatient households), up to a certain level, the stabilization effect dominates and issuing CBDC is welfare-improving also for non-holders of CBDC. Nonetheless, beyond a certain threshold - which depends on the specification of the CBDC quantity rule - the bank disintermediation effect starts to weigh comparatively more and higher values of $\phi_Y$ translate into lower levels of borrowers’ welfare.

Based on the information provided by these welfare trade-offs, we numerically solve problem (38) for the two proposed welfare criteria by searching over the relevant grid of parameter values. For the cases of quantity rules (i) and (ii), the considered grid of parameter values is $\phi_Y \{0.00 - 0.40\}$; whereas for the case of quantity rule (iii) it is $\phi_Y \{0.00 - 0.40\}; \phi_x \{(-5.00) - 0.00\}$. Table 9 reports the corresponding optimized parameter values and the welfare gains. Since the liquidity services effect is quantitatively the most important one, welfare gains attained by savers (i.e., CBDC holders) under optimal CBDC quantity rules are significantly larger than those attained by borrowers. Not surprisingly, under welfare criterion B, optimal quantity rules are associated to comparatively lower amounts of CBDC in circulation; By preventing an overweight of savers’ welfare related to a higher discount factor, this welfare criterion implicitly weighs the bank disintermediation effect more heavily.

The same analysis is carried out for the interest rate rules. Figure 7 plots the individual and social welfare effects of changing the value of parameter $\phi_r$ for interest rate rules (i), (ii) and (iii) under welfare criteria "A" and "B" whereas table 10 reports the corresponding optimized parameter values and the welfare gains. Due to its countercyclical responsiveness through equation (26), for any CBDC-to-GDP ratio, interest rate rule (iii) yields larger welfare gains than interest rate rule (ii), which is static. In addition, for any given CBDC-to-GDP ratio, the welfare gains attainable under optimal interest rate rules are larger than those which can be reached under optimal quantity rules. This is due to the above mentioned second component of the stabilization effect. Under interest rate rules (and as opposed to quantity rules), the bulk of the adjustment in the CBDC market in response to exogenous shocks is made via quantities. Thus, under CBDC interest rate rules the fraction of the adjustment in the face of exogenous shocks (that hit liquidity services)
that is borne by CBDC is larger than under quantity rules.\footnote{Figure D.2 provides complementary information by displaying the main level and volatility effects that are behind the welfare effects induced by the three types of interest rate rules.}

Based on the same vector of CBDC issuance levels proposed in section 3.3, \( \tilde{\Psi} = (0.25, 0.45, 0.64) \), figure 8 plots the percentage changes in the second-order approximation to the stochastic mean of liquidity services, \( z_t \) (panel A), the stochastic mean of quarterly real GDP (panel B), \( Y_t \), and the stochastic standard deviation of bank lending (panel C), \( \sigma_L \), that arise when the economy moves from the no CBDC scenario to each of the three considered CBDC policy scenarios. This is done for quantity rules of types (i), (ii) and (iii) and interest rate rules (ii) and (iii). For any given steady state CBDC-to-GDP ratio, the impact on the levels of liquidity services and real GDP are roughly independent from the type of CBDC rule (panels A and B).\footnote{The aim of reporting the corresponding percentage changes in GDP levels is to capture and synthesize the impact of CBDC on the real economy through the bank disintermediation effect.} By way of contrast, the impact CBDC has on the volatility of bank lending (and, hence, on that of aggregates of the real economy) crucially depends on the type of CBDC rule. Figure 8 reconfirms the main conclusions previously reached on the effects driving the differences in the welfare impacts induced by CBDC under different types of rules. First, since the above mentioned second component of the stabilization effect is more sizable under interest rate rules, these yield larger welfare gains than quantity rules. Second, due to their countercyclical nature, the smoothing effect exerted by CBDC on key aggregates under interest rate rule (iii) is larger than that induced under interest rate rule (ii). The same applies to quantity rule (iii), when being compared to quantity rules (ii) and (i), in this order (third component of the stabilization effect). Third, a joint inspection of the information reported in tables 9 and 10, and figure 8 allows us to conclude that the (social) welfare maximizing quantity of CBDC in equilibrium increases with the size of the stabilization effect. In other words, the magnitude of the bank disintermediation effect (which increases with the amount of CBDC in circulation) that borrowers optimally tolerate increases with the size of the stabilization effect. Since the magnitude of the liquidity services effect increases with the quantity of CBDC, it follows that attainable welfare gains for both, savers and borrowers, increase with the size of the stabilization effect.

This social preference for interest rate rules is reminiscent of the conclusions reached in Poole (1970). CBDC interest rate rules are prefered as they have a stronger capacity to stabilize the other components of money demand (i.e., cash and bank deposits). However, in this case this preference is not driven by the size and type of sources that originate fluctuations. In fact, the presence of the stabilization effect and the relevant trade-off is very robust across all types of shocks in this model economy.\footnote{Arguably, the magnitude of the stabilization effect (and, thus, the presence of}
the stabilization/disintermediation trade-off faced by borrowers) is more sensitive to the elements of the specification and parameterization of equation (5) that govern the imperfect substitutability across different forms of money. The size of the stabilization effect decreases with the degree of substitutability across forms of money (see also section 4.2.3).

4.2.1 Steady State Effects

This section offers an overview of the main steady state effects triggered by the issuance of CBDC under the six CBDC policy rules. Panel A of figure 9 displays the steady state CBDC interest rate-quantity vector, $\Xi = (r_{cbdc}, CBDC)$, associated to each of the six different optimal CBDC policy rules. Panel B shows the steady state impact the introduction of a CBDC has - under each CBDC policy rule - on the present value of banks as well as on bank lending to firms. Three conclusions stand out as they are relevant for the current policy debate and are consistent with the empirical evidence presented in section 2. First, there is a high and positive correlation between the amount of CBDC in circulation and the structural impact of issuing a central bank digital currency on banks’ valuations and lending to firms. Second, by adequately calibrating the amount of CBDC in circulation (through an optimal policy rule), these effects can be significantly mitigated (see the difference between the magnitude of steady state effects on banks’ valuations and lending under the unconstrained CBDC supply scenario - i.e., interest rate rule (i) - and those under optimal CBDC policy rules). Third, regardless of the CBDC policy rule we look at, the optimal quantity of CBDC in equilibrium lies between 15% and 45% of quarterly real GDP.

By steady state effects, we refer to the impacts that are relevant when it comes to the shift from one steady state (i.e., baseline - no CBDC - scenario) to the other (i.e., CBDC policy scenario). That is, this section disregards effects that only occur over the cycle or during the transition from one steady state to the other.

Recall that, strictly speaking, interest rate rule (i) cannot be referred to as an optimal CBDC policy rule (since there is no policy parameter with respect to which it can be optimized), but rather as a CBDC policy scenario.

Note that the choice of these two variables has been inspired by the two variables for which we present our empirical findings in section 2 (i.e., banks’ market valuations and bank lending to firms). In our analysis, the present value of banks is proxied by the objective function of the representative bank.

This number has been obtained after having rounded up the size of the population in the euro area to 340 million citizens and average quarterly GDP in 2021 to EUR 3,000 billions.

In practice, the CBDC-to-GDP ratio under a EUR 3,000 limit on individual holdings would likely be lower than 34% and probably closer to the levels implied by optimal quantity rules (i.e., 15% - 30%) for at least two reasons. First, not all citizens in the euro area hold money and have bank accounts. Second, due to their preferences and/or

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"B".

\(^{45}\)By steady state effects, we refer to the impacts that are relevant when it comes to the shift from one steady state (i.e., baseline - no CBDC - scenario) to the other (i.e., CBDC policy scenario). That is, this section disregards effects that only occur over the cycle or during the transition from one steady state to the other.

\(^{46}\)Recall that, strictly speaking, interest rate rule (i) cannot be referred to as an optimal CBDC policy rule (since there is no policy parameter with respect to which it can be optimized), but rather as a CBDC policy scenario.

\(^{47}\)Note that the choice of these two variables has been inspired by the two variables for which we present our empirical findings in section 2 (i.e., banks’ market valuations and bank lending to firms). In our analysis, the present value of banks is proxied by the objective function of the representative bank.

\(^{48}\)This number has been obtained after having rounded up the size of the population in the euro area to 340 million citizens and average quarterly GDP in 2021 to EUR 3,000 billions.

\(^{49}\)In practice, the CBDC-to-GDP ratio under a EUR 3,000 limit on individual holdings would likely be lower than 34% and probably closer to the levels implied by optimal quantity rules (i.e., 15% - 30%) for at least two reasons. First, not all citizens in the euro area hold money and have bank accounts. Second, due to their preferences and/or
In addition, the analysis further confirms that optimal CBDC interest rate rules are associated to a larger quantity of CBDC in equilibrium and, thus, to a more sizable bank disintermediation effect. It follows, then, that welfare gains under optimal interest rate rules are comparatively larger due to a more beneficial stabilization/bank disintermediation trade-off faced by borrowers.

**Steady State Effects of Related Policies** Importantly, regulators and the central bank have the capacity to alter the magnitude (and even the sign) of certain steady state effects not only by calibrating the amount of CBDC in circulation through a policy rule but also by changing the design of other related policies. Panel A of figure 10 displays the steady state impact that ceteris paribus changes in the reserve requirement parameter, $\theta_R$, have on the size of the central bank balance sheet, $F$.\(^50\) As the reserve requirement increases, a larger proportion of the adjustment in the face of a CBDC issuance is made via a reduction in the stock of bank reserves and, hence, a lower fraction of the adjustment is made by means of a central bank’s balance sheet expansion. That is, as the proportion of the adjustment made via drawing down reserves increases, the magnitude of the bank disintermediation effect diminishes. This is valid for any circumstance that motivates banks to increase the fraction of the adjustment to be made via reducing their stock of reserves.\(^51\)

Finally, note that the net steady state impact of CBDC on bank lending crucially depends on the design and calibration of the central bank collateral framework (captured by expression 15). In practice, a central bank collateral framework often allows for different eligible asset classes, usually differing from one another in their associated haircut and in their weight in the collateral pool. Consider the following general version of equation (15):

$$f_t \leq \sum_{i=0}^{N} \theta_{i,t} E_t \left( \frac{Q_{i,t}}{R_{f,t}} \pi_{t+1} \right),$$

where $Q_{i,t}$ denotes holdings of eligible asset ”$i$” by the representative bank in period $t$, $N$ is the number of eligible assets, and $\theta_{i,t}$ refers to the possibly time-varying fraction of asset ”$i$” holdings that can be financed with central bank funding. Interestingly, under specification (40) of collateral requirements, $\theta_{i,t}$ can be interpreted not only as the complementary of the haircut on asset ”$i$” holdings, but also as the weight of such asset in the collateral pool.

Depending on which assets are eligible as collateral in monetary policy operations with the central bank and on how they weigh in the collateral pool, the steady state rebalancing effects on banks’ balance sheets may vary and the impact on bank lending may differ. Consider the following to their availability of funds, not all citizens are likely to exhaust the regulatory limit. See Adalid et al. (2022).

\(^{50}\)Without loss of generality, the steady state effects illustrated in figure 10 are those that apply under welfare criterion B for optimal CBDC policy rule within the class of quantity rules (ii).

\(^{51}\)For instance, as the stock of reserves has been increasing in advanced economies over the last years (mainly due to the implementation of certain unconventional monetary policy measures), when compared to the pre-Global Financial Crisis era, it could be that in the current situation banks decided to more prominently adjust via reserves.
particular case within the general class of collateral requirements referred by expression (40):

\[ f_t \leq \theta_{b,t}\mathbb{E}_t \left( \frac{b_{b,t}}{R_{f,t}} \pi_{t+1} + \theta_{l,t}\mathbb{E}_t \left( \frac{L_{e,t}}{R_{f,t}} \pi_{t+1} \right) \right), \]  \hspace{1cm} (41)

where \( \theta_{l,t} = \theta_{l,\varepsilon_{\theta_{l,t}}} \) provides information on the haircut on loans to firms as well as on the weight of this asset class in the collateral pool. Panel B of figure 10 plots the steady state effect of ceteris paribus changes in \( \theta_l \) on bank lending to firms, \( L_{e,t} \). As \( \theta_l \) (and, thus, the weight of \( L_{e,t} \) in the collateral pool) increases, the structural impact of issuing CBDC on bank lending to non-financial corporations diminishes.

### 4.2.2 Impulse Responses

As shown in section 3.3, while the magnitude of CBDC cyclical effects also depends on the amount of central bank digital currency in circulation, even the sign of these effects may differ from that of steady state impacts. In this section we give a brief overview of how key selected aggregates respond to exogenous shocks under optimal CBDC policy rules. We differentiate between two broad groups of shocks. First, shocks which - due to the absence of data on CBDC holdings and flows - have been omitted from the baseline calibration and the welfare analysis, but which are a key determinant of CBDC supply and demand dynamics (i.e., CBDC supply shocks, \( \varepsilon_{\text{cbdc},t} \), and CBDC preference shocks, \( \vartheta_t \)).\(^{52}\) Second, all other shocks; which are considered in the baseline calibration and the welfare analysis and whose impacts (especially on real aggregates) through the issuance of CBDC are of a different order of magnitude.

On the similarities between the implications of these two main groups of shocks under optimal CBDC policy rules and regardless of the particular type of shock under consideration, it is worth noting that the same transmission channels described in section 3.3 apply. On the differences, there are two aspects that stand out. First, CBDC policy rules clearly matter for economic stabilization only under CBDC supply and preference shocks. Figures 4 and 11 suggest that, the magnitude of the response of real GDP and other aggregates of the real economy to exogenous CBDC supply and preference shocks increases with the amount of CBDC in equilibrium (which depends on the specification and calibration of the policy rule). Second, a positive CBDC (supply or preference) shock tends to have a positive net cyclical impact on bank lending and real GDP as the fiscal expansion effect dominates the bank disintermediation effect. This is the case due to the fact that these types of shocks have a relatively more sizable impact on the central bank balance sheet and profits (and, thus, on tax revenues).

With regards to the rest of the shocks (i.e., those considered in the baseline calibration), the difference in the impact exogenous shocks have on real economic activity across different CBDC

\(^{52}\) As for the case of CBDC supply shocks, the size of CBDC preference shocks, \( \sigma_{\theta} \), is set equal to 0.1.
policy scenarios tends to be moderate to negligible. These shocks only indirectly affect CBDC dynamics and, hence, the transmission through the central bank balance sheet and profits is more moderate despite the fact that the stabilization effect applies to all types of shocks (recall figure D.3). Figure D.4 illustrates these results by plotting the responses of selected aggregates to a negative technology shock. First, the increase in CBDC holdings does not lead to an economic expansion and the choice of the CBDC policy rule has no significant consequences from a stabilization perspective. Second, the bank disintermediation effect is present, and the increase in CBDC holdings leads to the previously discussed readjustment in the composition of banks’ assets and liabilities. Third, the stabilization effect applies and the deviation of bank deposits from their steady state levels is more moderate under CBDC policy scenarios. In line with the previously discussed findings on the welfare effects of CBDC policy rules, such stabilization effect is more sizable under interest rate rules (starred and dotted lines) than under optimal quantity rules (diamond lines).

4.2.3 Robustness Checks

In this section, we first investigate the robustness of the welfare effects of a CBDC quantity rule of type (i) to changes in key parameters.\(^{53}\) First, our empirical findings highlight the sensitivity of CBDC-induced effects not only to design features aimed at calibrating the quantity of this central bank liability but also to banks’ reliance on deposit funding. Against this backdrop, we consider the preference weight parameter of deposits (in the liquidity services CES aggregator), \(\omega_d\), as a depositors’ preference-driven proxy for banks’ reliance on deposit funding. As shown in figure 12, for any given CBDC-to-GDP ratio welfare levels increase with banks’ reliance on deposit funding due to an increased relevance of the stabilization effect (which operates through deposit and lending smoothing). However, and as highlighted in section 2, a more prominent reliance on deposit funding translates into a more sizable bank disintermediation effect. Thus, as \(\omega_d\) increases: (i) deposit holdings increase and the liquidity services effect becomes more sizable (panel A); while (ii) the welfare trade-off faced by borrowers - and the society as a whole - worsens and CBDC-induced attainable welfare gains decline (panels B, C and D). That is, the optimal quantity of CBDC in equilibrium decreases with the relative preference for deposits and, thus, with banks reliance on deposit funding.

Second, the paper focuses the attention on assessing the effects and trade-offs of issuing CBDC under different policy rules. Nevertheless, there are other CBDC design features which we have not explicitly modelled but which can fundamentally affect parameters that greatly matter to CBDC demand. These parameters include the elasticity of substitution across monetary instruments, \(\eta_z\), and the cash storage cost parameter, \(\psi_m\) (which captures the technological superiority of CBDC).

\(^{53}\) In order to do so, and without loss of generality, we consider quantity rule of type (i).
relative to cash).

As the elasticity of substitution across different forms of money declines (lower $\eta_{z}$), the lower weight of bank deposits, $\omega_{D}$, in the liquidity services CES aggregator, $z_{t}$, implies that the premium deposits need to offer for the marginal utility of holding the different monetary instruments to remain unchanged is higher. Deposit holdings decrease even if the rate at which they are remunerated is higher under an equilibrium with a lower $\eta_{z}$. The interest rate on CBDC adjusts downwards to also allow for the required premium on bank money holdings, given the fixed CBDC supply. Cash holdings increase up to the point that a higher marginal cash storage cost keeps ensuring that, in the margin, savers are indifferent between holding any type of monetary instrument. Savers benefit from an overall increase in liquidity services. Borrowers are worse-off due to a more sizable bank disintermediation effect but face an improved trade-off driven by a larger stabilization effect (see figure 13). The optimal amount of CBDC in circulation decreases with the degree of substitutability across monetary instruments or the ease with which CBDC can be replaced with different form of money.

As the value of parameter $\psi_{m}$ decreases, welfare levels unambiguously increase (see figure 14). Savers benefit from, overall, higher levels of liquidity services as holding cash (and adjusting its level) becomes less costly. Consequently, the fraction of the adjustments that is borne by cash holdings increases, thereby exerting a smoothing effect on deposit holdings and bank lending. Borrowers benefit from such credit smoothing effect. Intuitively, the optimal quantity of CBDC in equilibrium increases with the technological superiority of this form of money when compared to cash, which is captured in the model by cash storage costs.

Similarly, the value of certain parameters associated to the design and calibration of related policies plays an important role in determining the optimal quantity of CBDC in equilibrium. Motivated by the previous discussion on the key transmission mechanisms, this section focuses on the sensitivity of the main welfare and macroeconomic effects to changes in the value of the central bank collateral requirement parameter, $\theta_{b}$. Figure 15 shows that, as the central bank collateral requirement tightens (i.e., decrease in $\theta_{b}$ or higher haircut on government bonds), the welfare level of CBDC holders increases whereas that of borrowers declines. For a given size of the central bank balance sheet required to supply a certain quantity of CBDC, banks now need to hold more public debt. Even if the balance sheet of the representative bank expands there is a crowding out of bank loans, which negatively affects borrowers’ welfare. Under a more stringent collateral policy, there is a fraction of government bond holdings which was previously financed by central bank funding that is now financed via deposits. Savers benefit from larger liquidity services. To summarize, for any given amount of CBDC in circulation, a tightening in the central bank constraint leads to an increase in the magnitude of the bank disintermediation effect and, hence, to a decrease in the optimal quantity of CBDC in equilibrium.
Lastly, figure 16 displays - for interest rate rule (i) - the same impulse responses as in figure 11. As the collateral policy of the central bank becomes more restrictive (i.e., lower $\theta_b$), the deviation of central bank funding and banks’ government holdings from their steady state levels become more moderate and the effects of the fiscal expansion on real output and bank lending are mitigated.

In a nutshell, although quantitative differences may arise, the main conclusions of this section are robust across key parameter values that depend on CBDC design features and related policies. Regardless of the policy rule under consideration, the issuance of CBDC is subject to certain welfare trade-offs and, from this perspective, there is an optimal quantity of central bank digital currency which is sensitive to the design of the CBDC policy rule as well as to that of other related policies.

5 Conclusion

The recent and growing literature on central bank digital currencies identifies a trade-off between the benefits of having access to a digital currency issued by a central bank for retail payment purposes and the potential risk of bank disintermediation through deposit substitution. We present novel evidence on bank stock price reactions to CBDC news in the euro area suggesting that market participants expect the impact of introducing a CBDC on the banks’ valuations and lending conditions to crucially depend on the design features aimed at controlling the amount of central bank digital currency in circulation as well as on their reliance on deposit funding.

Against this background, we develop a quantitative macro-banking DSGE model that incorporates these trade-offs and a selection of mechanisms through which the issuance of a CBDC is expected to affect bank intermediation and the real economy. Liquidity (reserves) requirements, the central bank’s balance sheet and profits, as well as the collateral framework of the monetary authority are mechanisms that interact with one another and play a key role in the transmission of CBDC-induced effects to the banking sector and the macroeconomy.

Welfare-maximizing CBDC policy rules are effective in mitigating the risk of bank disintermediation and induce significant welfare gains for both, patient households (i.e., CBDC holders) and impatient households (i.e., borrowers who do not hold CBDC). Based on a social welfare maximization approach, the model suggests that the optimal amount of CBDC in circulation for the case of the euro area would lie between 15% and 45% of quarterly real GDP in equilibrium. In line with what our empirical analysis suggests, if CBDC were to be issued under no quantity limits and no remuneration, the amount of CBDC in circulation would be larger (i.e., of roughly 65% of quarterly real GDP) and the steady state effects on banks’ valuations and lending would be comparatively more sizable. While changes in the value of key parameters could quantitatively affect these results to some extent, the main findings of our quantitative analysis are shown to be
particularly robust across different CBDC policy scenarios, welfare criteria and parameterizations of the model.

The simplicity of the model is instrumental to clearly identify the effects of issuing CBDC and the mechanisms through which they are transmitted. Yet, it comes at the cost of omitting ingredients which are present in reality and that could possibly change some of the results. The model could be extended along different dimensions so as to allow for a more accurate quantification of the impact issuing a certain amount of CBDC could have on bank intermediation.

On the one hand, there are assumptions of the model which could possibly be leading to an overstatement of the potential risk of bank disintermediation. Among others, the design of the central bank’s collateral requirement (which only considers public debt as eligible asset) and the implicit assumption that it is always binding in a neighborhood of the steady state; the simplifying assumption according to which banks do not obtain revenues from offering CBDC-related services; the absence of other digital currencies and payment methods that would in practice compete with a CBDC in the segment of retail payments; and the omission of a more explicit modelling of some of the unconventional monetary policy measures which had contributed to the build-up of a large stock of excess reserves in the system of many advanced economies, a channel through which a larger proportion of the adjustment could take place in practice.

On the other hand, there are other assumptions due to which the model could be underestimating the impact of introducing a CBDC on the banking sector and the macroeconomy. First, the simple specification of the liquidity (reserves) requirement implies that, in practice, banks are likely to be more limited when deciding how to rebalance the asset and liabilities sides of their balance sheets in the face of a CBDC issuance. Second, the fiscal expansion effect could in practice be of a different nature and order of magnitude, not having the impact on private consumption and real GDP that the model predicts.

Finally, the tractability of the model allows for a more detailed and extended inspection of the interactions between CBDC policy and other related policies and regulations (e.g., monetary policy and the associated collateral framework, fiscal policy, capital and liquidity regulation).
References


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Notes: The specification is as in model (2). Dependent variable is bank-specific abnormal returns identified with the estimation of model (1). Observations are an unbalanced sample of 53 banks and 28 events. All controls are lagged by one month with respect to the month in which each event took place. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 2: Impact on lending from digital euro events

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<td>0.112</td>
<td>0.112</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.454</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The specification is as in model (3). Dependent variable is the percentage change in corporate loan volumes. Reaction of stock prices is the (cumulated) abnormal returns in October 2020. All controls are measured in September 2020. Standard errors clustered at the bank level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\varphi$</td>
<td>Inverse of the Frisch elasticity</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_h$</td>
<td>HH Risk aversion param</td>
<td>2.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\omega_T$</td>
<td>Fraction of taxes paid by HH$_p$</td>
<td>0.5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta^k_0$</td>
<td>Depreciation rate of physical capital</td>
<td>0.0250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta^k_1; \delta^k_2$</td>
<td>Endogenous depr. rate params $r_{ke}^{ss}; 0.1x r_{ke}^{ss}$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$m_H$</td>
<td>LTV ratio on HH housing</td>
<td>0.7000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma_{\bar{R}}$</td>
<td>Debt-to-assets, reserves risk-adjusted</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma_b$</td>
<td>Debt-to-assets, gov. bonds risk-adjusted</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varepsilon$</td>
<td>Elast. of subst. intermediate goods</td>
<td>6.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta$</td>
<td>Calvo probability</td>
<td>0.8200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi_\pi$</td>
<td>Inflation indexation parameter</td>
<td>0.2300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho_r$</td>
<td>Taylor rule: smoothing parameter</td>
<td>0.9000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha_{\pi}$</td>
<td>Taylor rule: inflation response param</td>
<td>2.5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha_y$</td>
<td>Taylor rule: GDP growth response param</td>
<td>0.1000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Parameters are set to standard values in the literature. Abbreviations HH, HH$_p$ and LTV refer to households, patient households and loan-to-value, respectively.
Table 4: Baseline calibrated parameter values: Part I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Target ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_p$</td>
<td>Savers’ discount factor</td>
<td>0.9930</td>
<td>$R_d^s = (1.023)^{1/4}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_i$</td>
<td>Borrowers’ discount factor</td>
<td>0.9800</td>
<td>$(r_{ls}^s - r_d^s)x 400 = 3.0474$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$j_p$</td>
<td>Savers’ housing services weight</td>
<td>0.0100</td>
<td>$C_{ls}^s / Y_{ls}^s = 0.5479$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$j_i$</td>
<td>Borrowers’ housing services weight</td>
<td>8.7902</td>
<td>$l_i^s / (Y^s) = 2.0918$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi_z$</td>
<td>Savers’ liquidity services weight</td>
<td>0.0541</td>
<td>$M_{ls}^s / Y_{ls}^s = 0.3443$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\omega_d$</td>
<td>Deposits weight in liquidity services</td>
<td>0.7100</td>
<td>$D_{ls}^s / A_{ls}^s = 0.8081$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\eta_z$</td>
<td>Elast. of subst. liquidity services</td>
<td>3.5800</td>
<td>$(r_{ls}^s - r_d^s)x 400 = 0.2650$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\psi_m$</td>
<td>Cash storage cost parameter</td>
<td>0.0020</td>
<td>$M_{ls}^s / F_{ls}^s = 0.5118$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$m_K$</td>
<td>LTV ratio on NFC physical capital</td>
<td>0.2140</td>
<td>$l_e^s / A_{ls}^s = 0.3675$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha$</td>
<td>Capital share in production</td>
<td>0.3300</td>
<td>$I_{ls}^s / Y_{ls}^s = 0.2124$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\nu$</td>
<td>Real estate share in production</td>
<td>0.0100</td>
<td>$l_e^s / Y_{ls}^s = 1.7820$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma_e$</td>
<td>Debt-to-assets, NFC risk-adjusted</td>
<td>0.8950</td>
<td>$e_{ls}^s / l_{ls}^s = 0.1050$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma_i$</td>
<td>Debt-to-assets, HH risk-adjusted</td>
<td>0.9200</td>
<td>$l_i^s / A_{ls}^s = 0.4313$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta_e$</td>
<td>Depreciation rate of bank capital</td>
<td>0.0710</td>
<td>$R_{ls}^b / A_{ls}^s = 0.0677$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta_R$</td>
<td>Banks’ liquidity (reserves) requirement</td>
<td>0.0874</td>
<td>$R_{ls}^b / Y_{ls}^s = 0.3284$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta_b$</td>
<td>Central bank funding collateral requirement</td>
<td>0.9950</td>
<td>$f_{ls}^s / A_{ls}^s = 0.0861$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_{Bp}$</td>
<td>Fiscal rule: HH gov. bonds response param</td>
<td>0.4010</td>
<td>$b_{ls}^b / Y_{ls}^s = 0.6473$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_{Bb}$</td>
<td>Fiscal rule: Banks’ gov. bonds response param</td>
<td>0.2300</td>
<td>$b_{ls}^b / A_{ls}^s = 0.1335$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho$</td>
<td>Public consumption-to-GDP ratio</td>
<td>0.2070</td>
<td>$C_{ls}^s / Y_{ls}^s = 0.2070$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\bar{\pi}$</td>
<td>Gross inflation target</td>
<td>1.0050</td>
<td>$(\pi - 1)x 400 = 2.0000$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu$</td>
<td>Lending-deposit facility corridor param</td>
<td>0.0059</td>
<td>$(r_f^s - r_R^s)x 400 = 1.3860$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_Y$</td>
<td>CBDC quantity rule: CBDC supply parameter</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>$R_{ls}^s / F_{ls}^s = 0.4882$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Parameters are calibrated to match steady state data targets. Abbreviations HH, NFC and LTV refer to households, non-financial corporations (entrepreneurs) and loan-to-value, respectively.
Table 5: Steady state ratios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$l_i^{ss} / Y^{ss}$</td>
<td>HH loans-to-GDP ratio</td>
<td>2.0431</td>
<td>2.0918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$l_c^{ss} / Y^{ss}$</td>
<td>NFC loans-to-GDP ratio</td>
<td>1.7585</td>
<td>1.7820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$b_b^{ss} / Y^{ss}$</td>
<td>Bank government bonds-to-GDP ratio</td>
<td>0.6825</td>
<td>0.6473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$l_i^{ss} / A^{ss}$</td>
<td>HH loans-to-bank assets ratio</td>
<td>0.4243</td>
<td>0.4313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$l_c^{ss} / A^{ss}$</td>
<td>NFC loans-to-bank assets ratio</td>
<td>0.3652</td>
<td>0.3675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R_b^{ss} / A^{ss}$</td>
<td>Reserves-to-bank assets ratio</td>
<td>0.0671</td>
<td>0.0677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$b_b^{ss} / A^{ss}$</td>
<td>Bank government bonds-to-bank assets ratio</td>
<td>0.1417</td>
<td>0.1335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$D^{ss} / A^{ss}$</td>
<td>Deposits-to-bank assets ratio</td>
<td>0.7877</td>
<td>0.8081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$f^{ss} / A^{ss}$</td>
<td>Central bank funding-to-bank assets ratio</td>
<td>0.1400</td>
<td>0.0861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$e^{ss} / l^{ss}$</td>
<td>Equity-to-risk weighted assets ratio</td>
<td>0.0916</td>
<td>0.1050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^{ss} / Y^{ss}$</td>
<td>Reserves-to-GDP ratio</td>
<td>0.3315</td>
<td>0.3284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M^{ss} / Y^{ss}$</td>
<td>Cash-to-GDP ratio</td>
<td>0.3428</td>
<td>0.3443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^{ss} / F^{ss}$</td>
<td>Reserves-to-CB assets ratio</td>
<td>0.4917</td>
<td>0.4882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M^{ss} / F^{ss}$</td>
<td>Cash-to-CB assets ratio</td>
<td>0.5083</td>
<td>0.5118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C^{ss} / Y^{ss}$</td>
<td>Private consumption-to-GDP ratio</td>
<td>0.5549</td>
<td>0.5479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$I^{ss} / Y^{ss}$</td>
<td>Gross fixed capital formation-to-GDP ratio</td>
<td>0.2125</td>
<td>0.2124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$G^{ss} / Y^{ss}$</td>
<td>Public consumption-to-GDP ratio</td>
<td>0.2070</td>
<td>0.2070</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All series in Euros are seasonally adjusted and deflated. Data targets have been constructed from euro area quarterly data for the period 2000:I-2021:II. The exception is the target for the bank capital-to-risk weighted assets, which has been based on the Basel III regime. Abbreviations HH, NFC refer to households, and non-financial corporations (entrepreneurs), respectively. Data sources are Eurostat and ECB.
Table 6: Steady state rates and spreads

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$(r_{ls}^{ss} - r_d^{ss}) \times 400$</td>
<td>Annualized Bank lending (to NFCs) spread</td>
<td>3.2316</td>
<td>3.0474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(r_f^{ss} - r_R^{ss}) \times 400$</td>
<td>Annualized lending-deposit facility corridor</td>
<td>2.3600</td>
<td>1.3860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(r_R^{ss} - r_d^{ss}) \times 400$</td>
<td>Annualized Reserves-deposits spread</td>
<td>0.2682</td>
<td>0.2650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r_d^{ss} \times 400$</td>
<td>Annualized interest rate on bank deposits</td>
<td>2.2376</td>
<td>2.3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(\pi - 1) \times 400$</td>
<td>Inflation target</td>
<td>2.0000</td>
<td>2.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data targets for spreads and interest rates have been constructed from euro area quarterly data. While the period for which data targets for spreads have been constructed is 2000:I-2021:II, as standard in this strand of the macro-banking literature, the data target for the nominal interest rate on bank deposits is based on the pre-crisis period. The data target for the inflation target corresponds to the quantitative definition of the ECB’s price stability objective. Abreviation NFC refers to non-financial corporations (entrepreneurs). Data sources are Eurostat and ECB.

Table 7: Baseline calibrated parameter values: Part II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Source/Target ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\psi_I$</td>
<td>Investment adj. cost param</td>
<td>0.0920</td>
<td>$\sigma_I/\sigma_Y = 2.0193$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma$</td>
<td>Banker EIS</td>
<td>6.4000</td>
<td>$\sigma_{\Omega_0}/\sigma_Y = 9.6434$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_A$</td>
<td>Std. productivity shock</td>
<td>0.0016</td>
<td>$\sigma_Y \times 100 = 3.3368$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_h$</td>
<td>Std. housing pref. shock</td>
<td>0.0090</td>
<td>$\sigma_C / \sigma_Y = 1.1626$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_\eta$</td>
<td>Std. elast. of subst. liquidity services shock</td>
<td>0.0012</td>
<td>$\sigma_D / \sigma_Y = 2.4620$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_z$</td>
<td>Std. liquidity pref. shock</td>
<td>0.0043</td>
<td>$\sigma_M / \sigma_Y = 2.6871$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_{mh}$</td>
<td>Std. HH collateral shock</td>
<td>0.0072</td>
<td>$\sigma_L / \sigma_Y = 2.4741$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_{mk}$</td>
<td>Std. NFC collateral shock</td>
<td>0.0201</td>
<td>$\sigma_e/\sigma_Y = 2.8820$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_{\theta_R}$</td>
<td>Std. reserves requirement shock</td>
<td>0.1540</td>
<td>$\sigma_R / \sigma_Y = 11.8348$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_{\theta_b}$</td>
<td>Std. Central bank funding collateral shock</td>
<td>0.0015</td>
<td>$\sigma_F / \sigma_Y = 5.0259$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_r$</td>
<td>Std. interest rate shock</td>
<td>0.0008</td>
<td>$\sigma_{rd} / \sigma_Y = 7.1691$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Parameters are calibrated to match second moment data targets. Abreviations HH, NFC, EIS and Std refer to households, non-financial corporations (entrepreneurs), elasticity of intertemporal substitution and standard deviation, respectively.
Table 8: Second moments (relative volatilities)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_{\Omega_b} / \sigma_Y$</td>
<td>Std. bank dividends/Std(GDP)</td>
<td>9.7168</td>
<td>9.6434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_L / \sigma_Y$</td>
<td>Std. bank loans/Std(GDP)</td>
<td>2.3979</td>
<td>2.4741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_e / \sigma_Y$</td>
<td>Std. bank capital/Std(GDP)</td>
<td>2.1877</td>
<td>2.8820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_D / \sigma_Y$</td>
<td>Std. bank deposits/Std(GDP)</td>
<td>2.7164</td>
<td>2.4620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_{rd} / \sigma_Y$</td>
<td>Std. bank deposit interest rate/Std(GDP)</td>
<td>5.1142</td>
<td>7.1691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_M / \sigma_Y$</td>
<td>Std. banknotes/Std(GDP)</td>
<td>3.2769</td>
<td>2.6871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_R / \sigma_Y$</td>
<td>Std. reserves/Std(GDP)</td>
<td>11.9641</td>
<td>11.8348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_F / \sigma_Y$</td>
<td>Std. central bank assets/Std(GDP)</td>
<td>5.2022</td>
<td>5.0259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_I / \sigma_Y$</td>
<td>Std. investment/Std(GDP)</td>
<td>2.5411</td>
<td>2.0193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_C / \sigma_Y$</td>
<td>Std. consumption/Std(GDP)</td>
<td>0.8208</td>
<td>1.1626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_Y \times 100$</td>
<td>Std(GDP) x 100</td>
<td>3.3593</td>
<td>3.3368</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Series expressed in Euro amounts are seasonally adjusted and deflated, and their log value has been linearly detrended before computing standard deviation targets. These data targets have been constructed from euro area quarterly data for the period 2000:I-2021:II. For each variable, its relative volatility has been computed by dividing its standard deviation (Std) by the standard deviation of quarterly real GDP. The standard deviation of GDP is in quarterly percentage points. The standard deviation of bank dividends has been taken from the dataset used in Muñoz (2021).
### Table 9: Welfare gains of optimal CBDC quantity rules

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(A) Welf criterion &quot;A&quot; (i.e., $\zeta = 0.5$)</th>
<th>Savers</th>
<th>Borrowers</th>
<th>Social</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i) $\phi_Y^* = 0.241$</td>
<td>1.2519</td>
<td>0.0603</td>
<td>0.6561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) $\phi_Y^* = 0.276$</td>
<td>1.3808</td>
<td>0.0658</td>
<td>0.7233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) $\phi_Y^* = 0.279; \phi_X^* = -5$</td>
<td>1.3917</td>
<td>0.0771</td>
<td>0.7344</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(B) Welf criterion &quot;B&quot; (i.e., $\zeta = 1 - \beta$)</th>
<th>Savers</th>
<th>Borrowers</th>
<th>Social</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i) $\phi_Y^* = 0.178$</td>
<td>1.0046</td>
<td>0.0675</td>
<td>0.3105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) $\phi_Y^* = 0.204$</td>
<td>1.1087</td>
<td>0.0738</td>
<td>0.3421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) $\phi_Y^* = 0.206; \phi_X^* = -5$</td>
<td>1.1164</td>
<td>0.0852</td>
<td>0.3526</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Second-order approximation to the welfare gains associated to the optimal CBDC quantity rules and the corresponding optimized policy parameter for each of the two proposed welfare criteria. Welfare gains are expressed in percentage permanent consumption. Policy parameter values marked with an asterisk correspond to those for which social welfare is maximized under the corresponding welfare weighting criterion.

### Table 10: Welfare gains of CBDC interest rate rules

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(A) Welf criterion &quot;A&quot; (i.e., $\zeta = 0.5$)</th>
<th>Savers</th>
<th>Borrowers</th>
<th>Social</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i) $\phi_r = 0.000$</td>
<td>2.5483</td>
<td>0.0773</td>
<td>1.3128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) $\phi_r^* = -0.313$</td>
<td>1.9488</td>
<td>0.1182</td>
<td>1.0335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) $\phi_r^* = -0.384$</td>
<td>1.8433</td>
<td>0.1302</td>
<td>0.9868</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(B) Welf criterion &quot;B&quot; (i.e., $\zeta = 1 - \beta$)</th>
<th>Savers</th>
<th>Borrowers</th>
<th>Social</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i) $\phi_r = 0.000$</td>
<td>2.5483</td>
<td>0.0773</td>
<td>0.7180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) $\phi_r^* = -0.520$</td>
<td>1.6497</td>
<td>0.1268</td>
<td>0.5217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iii) $\phi_r^* = -0.581$</td>
<td>1.5784</td>
<td>0.1379</td>
<td>0.5114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Second-order approximation to the welfare gains associated to the CBDC interest rate rules and the corresponding optimized policy parameter for each of the two proposed welfare criteria. Welfare gains are expressed in percentage permanent consumption. Policy parameter values marked with an asterisk correspond to those for which social welfare is maximized under the corresponding welfare weighting criterion.
Figure 1: Stock market reactions to CBDC news by euro area banks (percentage points)

Notes: The figure reports the results of the estimation of model (1). Each horizontal segment reports the cumulated abnormal returns up to the latest key event, relative to the level on 1 October 2020. The solid line reports the average across all banks in the sample. The dashed and dotted lines report the average within two groups of banks, those with deposit ratio above or below the median, respectively. The two grey vertical lines indicate the publication of the ECB report on a digital euro on 2 October 2020 and the interview on 9 February 2021.

Figure 2: Change in loan volumes to firms associated with reactions of bank stock prices (percentages of volumes in October 2020)

Notes: The figure reports the results of the estimation of model (3) with the specification of Table 3 (column 3). The solid line reports, for each monthly horizon from October 2020 indicated on the horizontal axis, the impact of 1 pp decrease in (cumulated) abnormal returns in October 2020. Shaded areas represent confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered at the bank level.
Figure 3: Transmission and steady state effects of CBDC issuance

Notes: The figure reports the percentage changes in the steady state level of key selected aggregates arising when the economy moves from the no CBDC scenario to alternative CBDC scenarios under which CBDC supply in equilibrium is assumed to be equal to 25%, 45% and 64% of quarterly real GDP, respectively.

Variables are expressed in percentage deviations from the steady state with the exceptions of CBDC, the inflation rate and the lending policy rate, which are shown as absolute deviations from the steady state. These two rates have been annualized and are expressed in percentage points. The solid line refers to the baseline (no CBDC) scenario. The starred, dotted, and diamond lines make reference to alternative scenarios under which CBDC supply in equilibrium is equal to 25%, 45% and 64% of quarterly real GDP, respectively.

Figure 4: Transmission and cyclical effects. Impulse-responses to a positive CBDC supply shock

Notes: Variables are expressed in percentage deviations from the steady state with the exceptions of CBDC, the inflation rate and the lending policy rate, which are shown as absolute deviations from the steady state. These two rates have been annualized and are expressed in percentage points. The solid line refers to the baseline (no CBDC) scenario. The starred, dotted, and diamond lines make reference to alternative scenarios under which CBDC supply in equilibrium is equal to 25%, 45% and 64% of quarterly real GDP, respectively.
Figure 5: Welfare effects of CBDC quantity rules (welfare effects of ceteris paribus changes in $\phi_Y$)

Notes: Second-order approximation to the unconditional welfare of savers and borrowers as well as to the unconditional social welfare under welfare criteria “A” and “B” as a function of CBDC policy parameter $\phi_Y$. The starred line, the dotted line, and the diamond line relate to CBDC quantity rules (i), (ii) and (iii), respectively.

Figure 6: Welfare effects of CBDC quantity rule (iii) (welfare effects of ceteris paribus changes in $\phi_Y - \phi_X$)

Notes: Second-order approximation to the unconditional welfare of savers and borrowers as well as to the unconditional social welfare under welfare criteria “A” and “B” as a function of CBDC policy parameters $\phi_Y$ and $\phi_X$ under CBDC quantity rule (iii).
Notes: Second-order approximation to the unconditional welfare of savers and borrowers as well as to the unconditional social welfare under welfare criteria “A” and “B” as a function of CBDC policy parameter $\phi_r$. The star, the dotted line, and the diamond line refer to CBDC interest rate rules (i), (ii) and (iii), respectively.

Figure 7: Welfare effects of CBDC interest rate rules (welfare effects of ceteris paribus changes in $\phi_r$)

Notes: For CBDC quantity rules of type (i), (ii) and (iii) and interest rate rules within the class (ii) and (iii), the figure reports the percentage change in the second-order approximation to the stochastic mean of liquidity services (panel A), the stochastic mean of quarterly real GDP (panel B), and the stochastic standard deviation of bank lending (panel C) arising when the economy moves from the no CBDC scenario to alternative CBDC scenarios under which the quantity of CBDC in equilibrium is assumed to be equal to 25%, 45% and 64% of quarterly real GDP, respectively.

Figure 8: Liquidity services, bank disintermediation and stabilization effects

Notes: For CBDC quantity rules of type (i), (ii) and (iii) and interest rate rules within the class (ii) and (iii), the figure reports the percentage change in the second-order approximation to the stochastic mean of liquidity services (panel A), the stochastic mean of quarterly real GDP (panel B), and the stochastic standard deviation of bank lending (panel C) arising when the economy moves from the no CBDC scenario to alternative CBDC scenarios under which the quantity of CBDC in equilibrium is assumed to be equal to 25%, 45% and 64% of quarterly real GDP, respectively.
Notes: For each of the six considered specifications of the CBDC policy rule and for welfare weighting criteria “A” and “B”, panel A reports the annualized nominal CBDC interest rate and the CBDC-to-real GDP ratio associated to each welfare-maximizing CBDC policy rule. For the same optimal policy rules, panel B displays the steady state impact on bank valuations and aggregate bank loans to firms. Bank valuations in the model are proxied by the recursive value of the representative bank (i.e., the objective function of banks’ optimization problem).

Notes: Given the CBDC policy rule within the class of quantity rules (ii) that maximizes social welfare under welfare criterion “B”, panel A reports the steady state impact of issuing CBDC on the size of the central bank’s balance sheet for different values of the reserves requirement parameter, $\theta_R$, whereas panel B displays the steady state impact of introducing a CBDC on aggregate bank loans to firms for different values of central banks’ collateral requirement parameter, $\theta_L$. 

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**Figure 9: Steady state effects of CBDC policy rules**

A. Steady state CBDC interest rate - quantity vectors

B. Steady state changes to bank valuations & NFC loans

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**Figure 10: Steady state effects of related policies under optimal CBDC quantity rule (ii)**

A. Impact of reserve requirements on the size of the central bank balance sheet

B. Impact of central bank collateral requirements (NFC loans) on lending to firms

Notes: Given the CBDC policy rule within the class of quantity rules (ii) that maximizes social welfare under welfare criterion “B”, panel A reports the steady state impact of issuing CBDC on the size of the central bank’s balance sheet for different values of the reserves requirement parameter, $\theta_R$, whereas panel B displays the steady state impact of introducing a CBDC on aggregate bank loans to firms for different values of central banks’ collateral requirement parameter, $\theta_L$. 

---
Notes: Variables are expressed in percentage deviations from the steady state with the exception of the lending policy rate, which is shown as absolute deviations from the steady state and expressed in percentage points. Social welfare has been maximized under welfare criterion “B”. The solid line refers to the baseline (no CBDC) scenario. The starred line corresponds to interest rate rule (i). The dotted line relates to the CBDC optimal policy rule within the class of interest rate rules (ii). The diamond line makes reference to the CBDC interest rate rule of type (iii) that maximizes social welfare.

Notes: Second-order approximation to the unconditional welfare of savers and borrowers as well as to the unconditional social welfare under welfare criteria “A” and “B” for CBDC quantity rule (i) as a function of policy parameter $\phi_Y$, for alternative values of the deposits preference parameter $\omega_d$. The starred line refers to the baseline calibration whereas the dotted and dashed lines relate to alternative parameterization scenarios.
Figure 13: Robustness Checks: $\eta_z$ (welfare effects of ceteris paribus changes in $\phi_Y$)

Notes: Second-order approximation to the unconditional welfare of savers and borrowers as well as to the unconditional social welfare under welfare criteria “A” and “B” for CBDC quantity rule (i) as a function of policy parameter $\phi_Y$, for alternative values of the elasticity of substitution across forms of money, $\eta_z$. The starred line refers to the baseline calibration whereas the dotted and dashed lines relate to alternative parameterization scenarios.

Figure 14: Robustness Checks: $\psi_m$ (welfare effects of ceteris paribus changes in $\phi_Y$)

Notes: Second-order approximation to the unconditional welfare of savers and borrowers as well as to the unconditional social welfare under welfare criteria “A” and “B” for CBDC quantity rule (i) as a function of policy parameter $\phi_Y$, for alternative values of the cash storage cost parameter, $\psi_m$. The starred line refers to the baseline calibration whereas the dotted and dashed lines relate to alternative parameterization scenarios.
Figure 15: Robustness Checks: $\theta_b$ (welfare effects of ceteris paribus changes in $\phi_Y$)

Notes: Second-order approximation to the unconditional welfare of savers and borrowers as well as to the unconditional social welfare under welfare criteria “A” and “B” for CBDC quantity rule (i) as a function of policy parameter $\phi_Y$, for alternative values of the central bank’s collateral requirement parameter for government bonds, $\theta_b$. The starred line refers to the baseline calibration whereas the dotted and dashed lines relate to alternative parameterization scenarios.

Figure 16: Impulse-responses to a positive CBDC preference shock under different haircuts on gov. bonds

Notes: Variables are expressed in percentage deviations from the steady state with the exception of the lending policy rate, which is shown as absolute deviations from the steady state and expressed in percentage points. Social welfare has been maximized under welfare criterion “B” and for interest rate rule (iii). The starred line refers to the baseline calibration whereas the dotted and diamond lines relate to alternative parameterization scenarios.
## A List of Digital Euro Events

Table A.1: List of digital euro events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type of event</th>
<th>Subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29-Jul-21</td>
<td>INTERVIEW</td>
<td>Luis de Guindos: Interview with Handelsblatt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29-Jul-21</td>
<td>INTERVIEW</td>
<td>Fabio Panetta: Interview with Corriere della Sera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-Jul-21</td>
<td>PRESS RELEASE</td>
<td>Eurosystem launches digital euro project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-Jul-21</td>
<td>THE ECB BLOG</td>
<td>Fabio Panetta: Preparing for the euro's digital future</td>
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<tr>
<td>20-Jun-21</td>
<td>INTERVIEW</td>
<td>Fabio Panetta: Interview with Financial Times</td>
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<td>26-May-21</td>
<td>INTERVIEW</td>
<td>Fabio Panetta: Interview with Nikkei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03-May-21</td>
<td>INTERVIEW</td>
<td>Luis de Guindos: Interview with La Repubblica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-Apr-21</td>
<td>SPEECH</td>
<td>Fabio Panetta: A digital euro to meet the expectations of Europeans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-Apr-21</td>
<td>PRESS RELEASE</td>
<td>ESB publishes the results of the public consultation on a digital euro</td>
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<td>09-Apr-21</td>
<td>INTERVIEW</td>
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<td>08-Apr-21</td>
<td>SPEECH</td>
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<td>25-Feb-21</td>
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<td>Fabio Panetta: Evolution or revolution? The impact of a digital euro on the financial system</td>
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<td>30-Nov-20</td>
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<td>Fabio Panetta: From the payments revolution to the reinvention of money</td>
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<td>12-Oct-20</td>
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<td>Fabio Panetta: A digital euro for the digital era</td>
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<tr>
<td>05-Oct-20</td>
<td>VOXEU COLUMN</td>
<td>Ulrich Bindseil &amp; Fabio Panetta: CBDC remuneration in a world with low or negative nominal interest rates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02-Oct-20</td>
<td>PRESS RELEASE</td>
<td>ECB intensifies its work on a digital euro</td>
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<td>02-Oct-20</td>
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<td>Fabio Panetta: We must be prepared to issue a digital euro</td>
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<td>23-Sep-20</td>
<td>INTERVIEW</td>
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<tr>
<td>10-Sep-20</td>
<td>SPEECH</td>
<td>Christine Lagarde: Payments in a digital world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07-Jul-20</td>
<td>SPEECH</td>
<td>Fabio Panetta: Unleashing the euro’s untapped potential at global level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-May-20</td>
<td>SPEECH</td>
<td>Yves Mersch: An ECB digital currency - a flight of fancy?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08-Jan-20</td>
<td>INTERVIEW</td>
<td>Christine Lagarde: Interview with &quot;Challenges&quot; magazine</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## B Data and Sources

This appendix presents the full data set employed to calibrate the model in section 3.2.

**Gross Domestic Product**: Gross domestic product at market prices, Euro area 19 (fixed composition), Domestic (home or reference area), Total economy, Euro, Current prices, Non trans-
formed data, Calendar and seasonally adjusted data. Source: ESA2010 National accounts, Main aggregates, Eurostat.

**GDP Deflator:** Gross domestic product at market prices, Euro area 19 (fixed composition), Domestic (home or reference area), Total economy, Index, Deflator (index), Non transformed data, Calendar and seasonally adjusted data. Source: ESA2010 National accounts, Main aggregates, Eurostat.

**Private Consumption:** Private final consumption, Individual consumption expenditure, Euro area 19 (fixed composition), World (all entities, including reference area, including IO), Households and non profit institutions serving households (NPISH), Euro, Current prices, Non transformed data, Calendar and seasonally adjusted data. Source: ESA2010 National accounts, Main aggregates, Eurostat.

**Public Consumption:** Government final consumption, Final consumption expenditure, Euro area 19 (fixed composition), World (all entities, including reference area, including IO), General government, Euro, Current prices, Non transformed data, Calendar and seasonally adjusted data. Source: ESA2010 National accounts, Main aggregates, Eurostat.

**Gross fixed capital formation:** Gross fixed capital formation, Euro area 19 (fixed composition), World (all entities, including reference area, including IO), Total economy, Fixed assets by type of asset (gross), Euro, Current prices, Non transformed data, Calendar and seasonally adjusted data.

**Bank Deposits (Counterpart: MFIs):** Deposit liabilities vis-a-vis euro area MFI reported by MFI excluding ESCB in the euro area (stock), Euro area (changing composition), Outstanding amounts at the end of the period (stocks), MFIs excluding ESCB reporting sector, Deposit liabilities, Total maturity, Euro, Euro area (changing composition) counterpart, Monetary financial institutions (MFIs) sector, denominated in Euro, data Neither seasonally nor working day adjusted. Source: MFI Balance Sheet Items (BSI Statistics), European Central Bank.

**Bank Deposits (Counterpart: Non-MFIs):** Deposit liabilities vis-a-vis euro area non-MFI reported by MFI excluding ESCB in the euro area (stock), Euro area (changing composition), Outstanding amounts at the end of the period (stocks), MFIs excluding ESCB reporting sector - Deposit liabilities, Total maturity, Euro - Euro area (changing composition) counterpart, Non-MFIs sector, denominated in Euro, data Neither seasonally nor working day adjusted. Source: MFI Balance Sheet Items (BSI Statistics), European Central Bank.

**Bank Capital and Reserves:** Capital and reserves reported by MFI excluding ESCB in the euro area (stock), Euro area (changing composition), Outstanding amounts at the end of the period (stocks), MFIs excluding ESCB reporting sector - Capital and reserves, All currencies combined, World not allocated (geographically) counterpart, Unspecified counterpart sector sector, denominated in Euro, data Neither seasonally nor working day adjusted. Source: MFI Balance
Bank Loans to Households: Loans vis-a-vis euro area households reported by MFI excluding ESCB in the euro area (stock), Euro area (changing composition), Outstanding amounts at the end of the period (stocks), MFIs excluding ESCB reporting sector, Loans, Total maturity, All currencies combined, Euro area (changing composition) counterpart, Households and non-profit institutions serving households (S.14 and S.15) sector, denominated in Euro, data Neither seasonally nor working day adjusted. Source: MFI Balance Sheet Items (BSI Statistics), European Central Bank.

Bank Loans to NFCs: Loans vis-a-vis euro area NFC reported by MFI excluding ESCB in the euro area (stock), Euro area (changing composition), Outstanding amounts at the end of the period (stocks), MFIs excluding ESCB reporting sector - Loans, Total maturity, All currencies combined - Euro area (changing composition) counterpart, Non-Financial corporations (S.11) sector, denominated in Euro, data Neither seasonally nor working day adjusted. Source: MFI Balance Sheet Items (BSI Statistics), European Central Bank.

Bank Holdings of Government Debt: Holdings of debt securities issued by euro area General Government reported by MFI excluding ESCB in the euro area (stock), Euro area (changing composition), Outstanding amounts at the end of the period (stocks), MFIs excluding ESCB reporting sector, Debt securities held, Total maturity, All currencies combined, Euro area (changing composition) counterpart, General Government sector, denominated in Euro, data Neither seasonally nor working day adjusted. Source: MFI Balance Sheet Items (BSI Statistics), European Central Bank.

Reserves: Liabilities to euro area credit institutions related to MPOs denominated in euro - Eurosystem, Euro area (changing composition), Eurosystem reporting sector, Liabilities to euro area credit institutions related to MPOs denominated in euro, Euro, Euro area (changing composition) counterpart. Source: Internal Liquidity Management (ILM Statistics), European Central Bank.


Deposit Interest Rate: Bank interest rates, overnight deposits from households - euro area, Euro area (changing composition), Annualised agreed rate (AAR) / Narrowly defined effective rate (NDER), Credit and other institutions (MFI except MMFs and central banks) reporting sector, Overnight deposits, Total original maturity, New business coverage, Households and non-profit institutions serving households (S.14 and S.15) sector, denominated in Euro. Source: MFI Interest Rate Statistics (MIR Statistics), European Central Bank.
NFC Loans Interest Rate: Bank interest rates, loans to corporations with an original maturity of up to one year (outstanding amounts) - euro area, Euro area (changing composition), Annualised agreed rate (AAR) / Narrowly defined effective rate (NDER), Credit and other institutions (MFI except MMFs and central banks) reporting sector, Loans, Up to 1 year original maturity, Outstanding amount business coverage, Non-Financial corporations (S.11) sector, denominated in Euro. Source: MFI Interest Rate Statistics (MIR Statistics), European Central Bank.

Deposit Facility Rate: ECB Deposit facility, date of changes (raw data), Level. Euro area (changing composition), Key interest rate, ECB Deposit facility, date of changes (raw data), Level, Euro, provided by ECB. Source: Financial market data (MF Statistics), European Central Bank.

Lending Facility Rate: ECB Marginal lending facility - date of changes (raw data) - Level. Euro area (changing composition), Key interest rate, ECB Marginal lending facility, date of changes (raw data), Level, Euro, provided by ECB. Source: Financial market data (MF Statistics), European Central Bank.

C Equations of the Model

This section presents the full set of equilibrium equations of the DSGE model.

C.1 Patient Households

Patient households seek to maximize their objective function subject to the following budget constraint:

\[
\begin{align*}
    c_{p,t} + q_t(h_{p,t} - h_{p,t-1}) + m_t + f(m_t) + cbdc_t + d_t + b_{p,t} + \omega_T T_t \\
    = \frac{m_{t-1}}{\pi_t} + R_{cbdc,t-1} \frac{cbdc_{t-1}}{\pi_t} + R_{d,t-1} \frac{d_{t-1}}{\pi_t} + R_{g,t-1} \frac{b_{p,t-1}}{\pi_t} + w_t n_{p,t} + \Omega_t, \quad (C.1)
\end{align*}
\]

Their choice variables are \(c_{p,t}, h_{p,t}, d_t, m_t, cbdc_t, b_{p,t}\) and \(n_{p,t}\). The optimality conditions of the problem read

\[
\lambda_{t}^{p} = \left[ c_{p,t} - \frac{n_{p,t}^{1+\phi}}{(1+\phi)} \right]^{-\sigma_h}, \quad (C.2)
\]

\[
q_t \lambda_{t}^{p} = \frac{j_{p,t}}{h_{p,t}} + \beta_{p} E_{t} (q_{t+1} \lambda_{t+1}^{p}), \quad (C.3)
\]
\[
\lambda_l^p = \beta_p E_t \left( \lambda_{l+1}^p R_{d,t}/\pi_{t+1} \right) + \frac{\chi_{s,t} \omega_d}{z_t} \left( \frac{z_t}{d_t} \right)^{1/\eta_{s,t}}, \tag{C.4}
\]

\[
\lambda_l^p = \beta_p E_t \left( \lambda_{l+1}^p R_{e,t}/\pi_{t+1} \right) + \frac{\chi_{s,t} r_t}{z_t} \left( \frac{z_t}{e_t} \right)^{1/\eta_{s,t}}, \tag{C.5}
\]

\[
\lambda_l^p (1 + f_m) = \beta_p E_t \left( \lambda_{l+1}^p /\pi_{t+1} \right) + \frac{\chi_{s,t} z_t}{z_t} \left( \frac{z_t}{m_t} \right)^{1/\eta_{s,t}}, \tag{C.6}
\]

\[
\lambda_l^p = \beta_p E_t \left( \lambda_{l+1}^p R_{g,t}/\pi_{t+1} \right), \tag{C.7}
\]

\[
w_t = n_{p,t}, \tag{C.8}
\]

where \(\lambda_l^p\) is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint of the representative patient household.

### C.2 Impatient Households

The representative impatient household chooses the trajectories of consumption \(c_{i,t}\), property housing \(h_{i,t}\), hours worked \(n_{i,t}\), and demand for loans \(l_{i,t}\) that maximizes its objective function subject to a budget constraint and a borrowing limit:

\[
c_{i,t} + q_t (h_{i,t} - h_{i,t-1}) + R_{i,t-1} l_{i,t-1} / \pi_t + (1 - \omega_T) T_t = l_{i,t} + w_t n_{i,t}, \tag{C.9}
\]

\[
l_{i,t} \leq m_{H,t} E_t \left( \frac{q_{t+1}}{R_{i,t}} h_{i,t} \pi_{t+1} \right). \tag{C.10}
\]

The resulting optimality conditions are

\[
\lambda_l^i = \left[ c_{i,t} - \frac{n_{i,t}^{1+\phi}}{(1+\phi)} \right]^{-\sigma_h}, \tag{C.11}
\]

\[
\lambda_l^i \left[ q_t - E_t \left( m_{H,t} q_{t+1} / R_{i,t} \pi_{t+1} \right) \right] = \frac{j_{i,t}}{h_{i,t}} + \beta_i E_t \left[ q_{t+1} \lambda_l^i (1 - m_{H,t}) \right], \tag{C.12}
\]

\[
w_t = n_{i,t}^\phi, \tag{C.13}
\]

where \(\lambda_l^i\) is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint of the representative impatient household.
C.3 Banks

Banks maximize their objective function subject to a balance sheet identity, a cash flow restriction, a capital adequacy constraint, a liquidity (reserves) requirement and a central banks’ collateral requirement

\[ L_{i,t} + L_{e,t} + b_{b,t} + \tilde{R}_{b,t} = e_t + D_t + f_t, \quad (C.14) \]

\[ \Omega_{b,t} + e_t - (1 - \delta) \frac{\epsilon_{t-1}}{\pi_t} \]
\[ = \left( r_{i,t-1} L_{i,t-1} + r_{e,t} L_{e,t-1} + r_{g,t-1} b_{b,t-1} + r_{\tilde{R},t-1} \tilde{R}_{b,t-1} - r_{d,t-1} D_{t-1} - r_{f,t-1} f_{t-1} \right), \quad (C.15) \]

\[ D_t + f_t \leq \gamma_i L_{i,t} + \gamma_e L_{e,t} + \gamma_b b_{b,t} + \gamma_{\tilde{R}} \tilde{R}_{b,t}, \quad (C.16) \]

\[ \theta_{R,t} D_t \leq \tilde{R}_{b,t}, \quad (C.17) \]

\[ f_t \leq \theta_{b,t} E_t \left( \frac{b_{b,t}}{\tilde{R}_{f,t} \pi_{t+1}} \right). \quad (C.18) \]

The law of motion for bank equity reads

\[ e_t = J_{b,t} - \Omega_{b,t} + (1 - \delta) \epsilon_{t-1}/\pi_t. \quad (C.19) \]

Their choice variables are \( \Omega_{b,t}, L_{i,t}, L_{e,t}, b_{b,t}, \tilde{R}_{b,t}, D_t \) and \( f_t \). The resulting optimality conditions read

\[ \frac{1}{\Omega_{b,t}} + \mu_{e,t} \gamma_e = E_t \left[ \Lambda_{t,t+1} (r_{e,t+1} + 1 - \delta^e) / \pi_{t+1} \right], \quad (C.20) \]

\[ \frac{1}{\Omega_{b,t}} + \mu_{e,t} \gamma_i = E_t \left[ \Lambda_{t,t+1} (r_{i,t+1} + 1 - \delta^i) / \pi_{t+1} \right], \quad (C.21) \]

\[ \frac{1}{\Omega_{b,t}} + \mu_{R,t} + \mu_{e,t} = E_t \left[ \Lambda_{t,t+1} (r_{\tilde{R},t} + 1 - \delta^{t}) / \pi_{t+1} \right], \quad (C.22) \]
\[
\frac{1}{\Omega_{b,t}^2} + \mu_{f,t} \theta_{f,t} E_t \left( \frac{\pi_{t+1}}{R_{f,t}^2} \right) + \mu_e = E_t \left[ \Lambda_{t,t+1} \frac{(r_{g,t} + 1 - \delta_e)}{\pi_{t+1}} \right], \tag{C.23}
\]

\[
\frac{1}{\Omega_{b,t}^2} + \mu_{e,t} + \mu_{R,t} \theta_{R,t} = E_t \left[ \Lambda_{t,t+1} \frac{(r_{d,t} + 1 - \delta_e)}{\pi_{t+1}} \right], \tag{C.24}
\]

\[
\frac{1}{\Omega_{b,t}^2} + \mu_{e,t} + \mu_{f,t} = E_t \left[ \Lambda_{t,t+1} \frac{(r_{f,t} + 1 - \delta_e)}{\pi_{t+1}} \right], \tag{C.25}
\]

where \(\mu_{e,t}, \mu_{R,t}\), and \(\mu_{f,t}\) are the multipliers on the capital adequacy constraint, the reserve requirement, and the central bank’s collateral constraint, respectively.

### C.4 Entrepreneurial Managers

Entrepreneurs seek to maximize their objective function subject to subject to a budget constraint and the corresponding borrowing limit:

\[
\Omega_{e,t} + R_{e,t} \frac{l_{e,t-1}}{\pi_t} + q_{k,t} \left[ k_{e,t} - (1 - \delta_t^k) k_{e,t-1} \right] + q_t (h_{e,t} - h_{e,t-1}) = r_{h,t} h_{e,t-1} + r_{k,t} u_t k_{e,t-1} + l_{e,t} + J_{er,t}, \tag{C.26}
\]

\[
l_{e,t} \leq m_{K,t} E_t \left[ \frac{q_{k,t+1}}{R_{e,t+1}} (1 - \delta_{t+1}^k) k_{e,t} \pi_{t+1} \right], \tag{C.27}
\]

where

\[
\delta_t^k (u_t) = \delta_0^k + \delta_1^k (u_t - 1) + \frac{\delta_2^k}{2} (u_t - 1)^2. \tag{C.28}
\]

Their choice variables are \(\Omega_{e,t}, l_{e,t}, k_{e,t}, h_{e,t}\) and \(u_t\). The following optimality condition can be derived from the first order conditions of the problem

\[
\Omega_{e,t}^{-\frac{1}{2}} q_t = \Lambda_{t,t+1} E_t \left[ \Omega_{e,t+1}^{-\frac{1}{2}} (q_{t+1} + r_{h,t+1}) \right], \tag{C.29}
\]

\[
\Omega_{e,t}^{-\frac{1}{2}} \left\{ q_{k,t} - m_{K,t} E_t \left[ \frac{q_{k,t+1}}{R_{e,t+1}} (1 - \delta_{t+1}^k) \pi_{t+1} \right] \right\} = \Lambda_{t,t+1} E_t \left\{ \Omega_{e,t+1}^{-\frac{1}{2}} [q_{k,t+1} (1 - \delta_t^k - m_{K,t}) + u_{t+1} r_{k,t+1}] \right\}, \tag{C.30}
\]
\[
\delta_1^k + \delta_2^k (u_t - 1) = r_{k,t}.
\]  
(C.31)

### C.5 Entrepreneurial Retailers

There is a continuum of entrepreneurial retailers (also referred to as intermediate non-housing good producers). Each intermediate good producer \( j \) operates the following Cobb-Douglas production function:

\[
Y_t(j) = A_t [u_t(j) k_{e,t-1}(j)]^\alpha h_{e,t-1}(j)^\nu N_t(j)^{(1 - \alpha - \nu)},
\]  
(C.32)

Intermediate good producers solve a two-stage problem. In the first stage, they choose the trajectories of \( k_{e,t-1}(j), h_{e,t-1}(j) \) and \( N_t(j) \) that minimize total real costs, \( r_{k,t} k_{e,t-1}(j) + r_{h,t} h_{e,t-1}(j) + w_t N_t(j) \):

\[
\frac{w_t}{r_{k,t}} = \frac{(1 - \alpha - \nu) u_t k_{e,t-1}}{\alpha N_t},
\]  
(C.33)

\[
\frac{r_{h,t}}{r_{k,t}} = \frac{\nu u_t k_{e,t-1}}{\alpha h_{e,t-1}},
\]  
(C.34)

\[
m_{ct} = \frac{(w_t)^{(1 - \alpha - \nu)} (r_{k,t})^\alpha (r_{h,t})^\nu}{A_t (1 - \alpha - \nu)^{(1 - \alpha - \nu)} \alpha^{\alpha \nu}}.
\]  
(C.35)

The firms that can change prices in period \( t \) set them to satisfy:

\[
g_1^t = \lambda_t^p m_{ct} Y_t + \beta_p \theta E_t \left( \frac{\pi_t^\chi}{\pi_{t+1}^\chi} \right)^{-\varepsilon} \frac{g_{t+1}^1}{g_t^2},
\]  
(C.36)

\[
g_2^t = \lambda_t^p \pi_t^* Y_t + \beta_p \theta E_t \left( \frac{\pi_t^\chi}{\pi_{t+1}^\chi} \right)^{1-\varepsilon} \left( \frac{\pi_t^*}{\pi_{t+1}^*} \right) \frac{g_{t+1}^2}{g_t^1},
\]  
(C.37)

\[
\varepsilon g_t^1 = (\varepsilon - 1) g_t^2.
\]  
(C.38)

The price level and price dispersion \( v_t \), respectively, evolve according to:

\[
1 = \theta \left( \frac{\pi_{t-1}^\chi}{\pi_t^\chi} \right)^{1-\varepsilon} + (1 - \theta) \pi_t^{*1-\varepsilon},
\]  
(C.39)

and

\[
v_t = \theta \left( \frac{\pi_{t-1}^\chi}{\pi_t^\chi} \right)^{-\varepsilon} v_{t-1} + (1 - \theta) \pi_t^{*-\varepsilon}.
\]  
(C.40)
Profits from each intermediate good producer $j$ are transferred to entrepreneurial managers:

$$J_{er,t}(j) = Y_t(j) - [r_{k,t}k_{e,t-1}(j) + r_{h,t}h_{e,t-1}(j) + w_tN_t(j)]. \quad (C.41)$$

### C.6 Capital Goods Producers

Capital-good-producing firms seek to maximize their objective function with respect to net investment in physical capital, $I_t$. The resulting optimal condition is

$$1 = q_{k,t} \left[ 1 - \frac{\psi_I}{2} \left( \frac{I_t}{I_{t-1}} - 1 \right)^2 - \psi_I \left( \frac{I_t}{I_{t-1}} - 1 \right) \frac{I_t}{I_{t-1}} \right]$$

$$+ E_t \left[ \Lambda_{t,t+1}q_{k,t+1} \psi_I \left( \frac{I_{t+1}}{I_t} - 1 \right) \left( \frac{I_{t+1}}{I_t} \right)^2 \right]. \quad (C.42)$$

The law of motion for physical capital reads

$$K_t = (1 - \delta^k_t)K_{t-1} + I_t \left[ 1 - \frac{\psi_I}{2} \left( \frac{I_t}{I_{t-1}} - 1 \right)^2 \right]. \quad (C.43)$$

### C.7 Government

Tax revenues are collected from households in a lump-sum fashion and determined according to a fiscal rule

$$T_t = \phi_p b_{p,t-1} + \phi_y b_{y,t-1}. \quad (C.44)$$

Government spending is assumed to be equal to a constant fraction of steady state real output

$$G_t = \phi Y^{ss}. \quad (C.45)$$

Supply of short-term government bonds is endogenously determined by the following intertemporal budget constraint

$$R_{g,t-1} B_{g,t-1} + G_t = T_t + B_{g,t} + \Omega_{cb,t}. \quad (C.46)$$

### C.8 Central Bank

The central bank sets the lending facility rate $r_{f,t}$ according to a Taylor-type policy rule:
\[ r_{f,t} = \rho_f r_{f,t-1} + (1 - \rho_r) \left( r_{f,t}^{ss} + \alpha_{\pi} \tilde{\pi}_t + \alpha_Y \tilde{y}_t \right) + e_{r_f,t}. \]  

(C.47)

A constant corridor of width $\alpha > 0$ is assumed to be maintained between the lending facility rate and the deposit facility rate,

\[ r_{\tilde{R},t} = r_{f,t} - \alpha. \]  

(C.48)

According to the balance sheet of the central bank:

\[ F_t = \tilde{R}_t + M_t + CBDC_t. \]  

(C.49)

Central bank’s profits evolve as

\[ \Omega_{cb,t} = \tilde{R}_t + M_t + CBDC_t + R_{f,t-1} \frac{F_{t-1}}{\pi_t} - R_{\tilde{R},t-1} \frac{F_{t-1}}{\pi_t} - \frac{M_{t-1}}{\pi_t} - \frac{R_{cbdc,t-1} CBDC_{t-1}}{\pi_t} - F_t. \]  

(C.50)

In the baseline scenario, CBDC supply is set according to the following policy rule:

\[ CBDC_t = \phi_Y Y^{ss}. \]  

(C.51)

### C.9 Aggregation and Market Clearing

Market clearing is implied by the Walras’ law, by aggregating all the budget constraints. The aggregate resource constraint of the economy represents the equilibrium condition for the final goods market:

\[ \Delta_t = C_t + q_{k,t} I_t + G_t + \delta e_{t-1} + f(m_t). \]  

(C.52)

Similarly, in equilibrium labor demand equals total labor supply,

\[ N_t = n_{p,t} + n_{i,t}. \]  

(C.53)

The stock of physical capital produced by capital goods producers must equal the demand for this good coming from households

\[ K_t = k_{e,t}. \]  

(C.54)

The stock of real estate must equal the demand coming from households and entrepreneurs
\[ \mathcal{H} = h_{p,t} + h_{i,t} + h_{e,t}. \] (C.55)

Similarly, in equilibrium demand for loans of households and entrepreneurs equals bank credit supply

\[ l_{i,t} + l_{e,t} = L_t. \] (C.56)

In equilibrium, the supply of government bonds equals the demand for this asset coming from patient households and banks

\[ b_{p,t} + b_{h,t} = B_{g,t}. \] (C.57)

Bank’s reserves are a liability of the central bank

\[ \tilde{R}_{b,t} = \tilde{R}_t. \] (C.58)

CBDC issued by the central bank equals demand for that means of payment

\[ CBDC_t = cbc_t. \] (C.59)

Cash issued by the central bank equals demand for that monetary instrument

\[ M_t = m_t. \] (C.60)

The stock of bank deposits held by households must be equal to banks’ deposit funding

\[ d_t = D_t. \] (C.61)

In equilibrium, banks’ demand for central bank funding equals central bank’s supply of funding to banks

\[ f_t = F_t. \] (C.62)

C.10 Shocks

The following zero-mean, AR(1) shocks are present in the baseline calibration model: \( \varepsilon_{h,t}, \varepsilon_{z,t}, \varepsilon_{h,t}, \varepsilon_{mh,t}, \varepsilon_{mk,t}, A_t, \varepsilon_{\theta, h,t}, \theta_{b,t} \). These shocks follow the processes given by:

\[ \log \varepsilon_{h,t} = \rho_h \log \varepsilon_{h,t-1} + \varepsilon_{h,t}, \quad \varepsilon_{h,t} \sim N(0, \sigma_h), \] (C.63)
\[
\log \varepsilon_{z,t} = \rho_z \log \varepsilon_{z,t-1} + e_{z,t}, \quad e_{z,t} \sim N(0, \sigma_z),
\]  
(C.64)

\[
\log \varepsilon_{\eta,t} = \rho_z \log \varepsilon_{\eta,t-1} + e_{\eta,t}, \quad e_{\eta,t} \sim N(0, \sigma_{\eta}),
\]  
(C.65)

\[
\log \varepsilon_{mh,t} = \rho_{mh} \log \varepsilon_{mh,t-1} + e_{mh,t}, \quad e_{mh,t} \sim N(0, \sigma_{mh}),
\]  
(C.66)

\[
\log \varepsilon_{mk,t} = \rho_{mk} \log \varepsilon_{mk,t-1} + e_{mk,t}, \quad e_{mk,t} \sim N(0, \sigma_{mk}),
\]  
(C.67)

\[
\log A_t = \rho_A \log A_{t-1} + e_{A,t}, \quad e_{A,t} \sim N(0, \sigma_A),
\]  
(C.68)

\[
\log \varepsilon_{\theta_R,t} = \rho_{\theta_R} \log \varepsilon_{\theta_R,t-1} + e_{\theta_R,t}, \quad e_{\theta_R,t} \sim N(0, \sigma_{\theta_R}).
\]  
(C.69)

\[
\log \varepsilon_{\theta_b,t} = \rho_{\theta_b} \log \varepsilon_{\theta_b,t-1} + e_{\theta_b,t}, \quad e_{\theta_b,t} \sim N(0, \sigma_{\theta_b}).
\]  
(C.70)

In addition to the above defined shocks, the model also allows for zero-mean, AR(1), CBDC preference and supply shocks, \( \vartheta_t \) and \( \varepsilon_{cbdc,t} \), under CBDC policy scenarios:

\[
\log \vartheta_t = \rho_{\vartheta} \log \vartheta_{t-1} + e_{\vartheta,t}, \quad e_{\vartheta,t} \sim N(0, \sigma_{\vartheta}),
\]  
(C.71)

\[
\log \varepsilon_{cbdc,t} = \rho_{cbdc} \log \varepsilon_{cbdc,t-1} + e_{cbdc,t}, \quad e_{cbdc,t} \sim N(0, \sigma_{cbdc}).
\]  
(C.72)

### D Complementary Figures to Section 4.2
Figure D.1: Mean and volatility effects of CBDC quantity rules (welfare effects of ceteris paribus changes in $\phi_Y$)

Notes: Second-order approximation to the stochastic mean and standard deviation of key selected aggregates as a function of CBDC policy parameter $\phi_Y$. The starred line, the dotted line, and the dashed line relate to CBDC quantity rules (i), (ii) and (iii), respectively.

Figure D.2: Mean and volatility effects of CBDC interest rate rules (welfare effects of ceteris paribus changes in $\phi_r$)

Notes: Second-order approximation to the stochastic mean and standard deviation of key selected aggregates as a function of CBDC policy parameter $\phi_r$. The star, the dotted line, and the dashed line relate to CBDC interest rate rules (i), (ii) and (iii), respectively.
Figure D.3: Welfare effects of CBDC quantity rules by types of shocks (shutting down shocks)

Notes: Second-order approximation to the unconditional welfare of savers and borrowers as well as to the unconditional social welfare under welfare criteria “A” and “B” as a function of CBDC policy parameter $\phi_Y$ under quantity rule of type (ii). Each of the 9 lines informs about the welfare effects of ceteris paribus changes in $\phi_Y$ when only one of the nine types of shocks that are considered under the baseline calibration hits this model economy.

Fig D.4: Impulse-responses to a negative technology shock

Notes: Variables are expressed in percentage deviations from the steady state. Social welfare has been maximized under welfare criterion “B”. The solid line refers to the baseline (no CBDC) scenario. The starred line corresponds to interest rate rule (i). The dotted line relates to the CBDC optimal policy rule within the class of interest rate rules (iii). The diamond line makes reference to the CBDC quantity rule of type (iii) that maximizes social welfare.
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