




Hungarian financial crisis simulation exercises - central banking perspective

(MNB assessment)

Dr. Tamás Kálmán
Magyar Nemzeti Bank

High level conference on “Simulating financial instability”
12-13 July 2007, Frankfurt

In case of a local crisis ...



BUT there is only **ONE crisis** to be solved!

For an optimal solution
cooperation is not a need, it is a must!



Hungarian crisis simulation exercises

1st Hungarian exercise: October 2005

- Between MNB and HFSA; MoF as an observer
- With the aim to test cooperation and coordination procedures:
 - i. smooth information-sharing
 - ii. exchanging views on systemic assessment
 - iii. coordinating policy responses (including public communication)

2nd Hungarian exercise: February 2007 – a step forward

- Testing cooperation with the active participation of the MoF
- In addition, to test:
 - i. state intervention in fast-moving crisis
 - ii. market sector solutions– bank consortium
 - iii. the main enhancements ascribed to the 1st exercise (MoU for crisis management between MNB and HFSA, communication strategy)



Design of scenarios

High shock-absorbing capacity of Hungarian banks
(stress tests)



Substantial/unrealistic modification of real banking data
both in terms of liquidity and capital position
&
Most negative reactions of stakeholders

Should a scenario be realistic?



Detected pressure points (1)

Information-sharing



- Need for the harmonisation of extraordinary data requirements between HFSA and MNB – the banks' ability to provide them
- No defined roles of authorities regarding external communication with parent companies and other market participants
- Uncertainty about the availability of documents and commitments from the owners at short notice

Detected pressure points (2)

Systemic assessment



- Lack of common analytical methodology
 - No efficient/structured discussions on underlying factors
 - Authorities tend to act presuming each others' feasible reactions and steps
- No coordinating authority: the central bank's potential role
 - Overall picture of the potential impacts on the financial system
 - Systemic assessment is fundamental for its decisions on intervention
- Timing of MoF involvement: information at earlier stages to help timely decision-making


Detected pressure points (3)

Coordination of policy responses



- Flexibility should be ensured with regard to the policy tools
 - Main principles – discretionary power
 - Different policy responses may be required as the crisis develops - systemic assessment can change quickly
- Communication strategy should be developed
 - Predefined panels
 - Cautious communication
 - Potential conflicts between the communication and the financial stability area
- MoU on crisis management among authorities
 - Clear definition of tasks and responsibilities
 - Information-sharing and coordination processes

Outlook: CEC5 countries



Data source: BSC

Main cross-border banking groups in the region



	CZ	HU	PL	SI	SK
Erste	Red	Red	White	White	Red
Raiffeisen	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Red
KBC	Red	Red	Yellow	White	White
Unicredit	Red	Yellow	Red	Yellow	Red
Société Gen.	Red	White	Yellow	Red	Yellow
Intensa	White	Red	White	White	Red

Red: Market share is at least 7,5% of banking system total assets

Yellow: Market share is below 7,5%

White: No presence

Data source: BSC

The need for regional cooperation

- A potentially emerged crisis situation in the CEC5 region would probably have cross-border implications



- For timely/efficient crisis management, **regional arrangements are not a need, they are a must!**
- Potential regional arrangements to enhance cross border communication:
 - i. Organisation of regional exercises
 - ii. Set-up of networks for crisis management
 - iii. Organisation of workshops

