The Euro and the Theory (and Practice) of Monetary Unions
by
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DISCUSSANT
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Barry’s two grim conclusions

1. Twenty years from the establishment of the EMU, the EZ is still further from an OCA than the US is
   “shocks are still asymmetric”

2. The euro had some efficiency effects but led to large capital flows from the North to the South and loss of competitiveness
   “the perils of financial integration”
My discussion

Two facts

1. Big effect of the euro has been nominal convergence and not much change in business cycle synchronization pre-crisis
   • ex post risk sharing mechanisms in the euro area not that different than in the US (evidence on labor mobility, automatic stabilizers) in normal times

2. Things went wrong when EMU faced LARGE shocks – post crisis
   • Financial frictions leading to asymmetries
   • Pro-cyclicality fiscal policy
   • Drop of confidence in the euro leading to balkanization of financial markets
   • ....
POINT 1: nominal and real asymmetries

\[ E(\Delta y_t^i - \Delta y_t^{ea})^2, \quad i = DE, FR, IT, SP, ... \]
Point 2: real correlation across countries did not change in the euro pre-crisis sample
EMU and the blue countries
1970-1999
Add 6 years: 1970-2005 - average euro area
Add 6 years: 1970-2005 – blue countries
Add 6 years: 1970-2005 – red countries
Formal exercise 1

• Suppose you were in 1999 and you knew the future EA GDP.
• Could have you anticipated single countries’ GDP on the basis of the past correlation and the knowledge of EA aggregate GDP?

• Answer: YES but uncertainty is large in red countries!
GROWTH RATES – focus on pre-crisis sample
-- Huge uncertainty in red countries (not the PIIGS!)
-- Conditional and unconditional forecasts not significantly different
LEVELS

Before the big crisis all inside the bands except for Greece.
Formal exercise 2

• Do the same exercise but start conditional forecast in 2008
• Could have you anticipated observed heterogeneity in 2009-2017?
• Answer: NOT REALLY!
POINT 3: The crisis is different
Levels of GDP per capita
1970-2007 sample

NOW YOU SEE SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES!!

- Germany
- Italy
- Greece
- Ireland but less persistent

- LARGER UNCERTAINTY
- ALL BELOW UNCONDITIONAL FORECAST
Point 4: We did significantly worse than the US in the aggregate

*Conditioning on pre-crisis correlations and observed US GDP*

![Graph showing US GDP per capita over time, with lines for unconditional forecast, expected conditionally, and actual GDP per capita.](graph.png)
Why are big shocks different?

Recession with financial crisis – large symmetric shocks with asymmetric effect / everywhere

In the euro area compounded by:

- Poor crisis management capacity
- Pro-cyclical fiscal policy
Fiscal space: this time was different
Comparisons of three recessions in the EA
What does it say about optimal currency areas?

Not sure OCA is very useful as a model of the euro area crisis

- It does not take into account the role of monetary policy credibility (nominal convergence)
- Does not deal with countries growing at different rates (catch-up dynamics)
- Does not deal with financial disruption
Conclusions

- It might be .... that the euro area is dysfunctional .... but for reasons which were not anticipated by the OCA literature

- To function will need to strengthen the euro area governance

- And I agree with Barry ... a lot is about finance!
Thank you!