The Unequal Gains from Product Innovations:
Evidence from the US Retail Sector*

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Abstract

This paper shows theoretically and empirically that, in the context of economic growth and rising income inequality, product innovations disproportionately benefit high-income households due to the supply response to market size effects. Using detailed barcode-level scanner data in the US retail sector from 2004 to 2015, higher-income households are found to systematically experience a larger increase in product variety and a lower inflation rate for continuing products. Annual retail inflation was 0.65 percentage points lower for households earning above $100,000 a year, relative to households making less than $30,000 a year. This finding can be quantitatively explained by the supply response to market size effects: (A) the relative demand for products consumed by high-income households increased because of growth and rising inequality; (B) in response, firms introduced more new products catering to such households; (C) as a result, the prices of continuing products in these market segments were lowered due to increased competitive pressure. Changes in demand plausibly exogenous to supply factors — from shifts in the national income and age distributions over time — are used to provide causal evidence that increasing relative demand leads to more new products and lower inflation for continuing products, implying that the long-term supply curve is downward-sloping. Based on this channel, a model is developed and predicts a secular trend of lower inflation for higher-income households, which is tested and validated using Consumer Price Index and Consumer Expenditure Survey data on the full consumption basket going back to 1953.

JEL codes: E31, I31, I32, O30, O31, O33

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"The capitalist achievement does not typically consist in providing more silk stockings for queens but in bringing them within the reach of factory girls in return for steadily decreasing amounts of effort... The capitalist process, not by coincidence but by virtue of its mechanism, progressively raises the standard of life of the masses."

Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*

1 Introduction

Who benefits from product innovations? Various studies have investigated how skill-biased technical change affects the relative price of skills in the labor market and results in higher income inequality (e.g. Griliches (1969), Katz and Murphy (1992), Acemoglu (1998), Aghion (2002), and Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003)). Much less attention has been paid to how price changes in the product market and the introduction of new products may differentially affect households across the income distribution. Product innovations may affect purchasing-power inequality by increasing the variety and quality of goods available in specific consumer segments, as well as by driving down the price of existing products in these segments due to increased competitive pressure. This paper investigates this question theoretically and empirically. The theory predicts that, in the context of economic growth and rising income inequality, the endogenous entry dynamics of new products (driven by changes in market size) tend to increase product variety and to reduce the prices of existing products in product categories consumed by high-income households. Several empirical tests, primarily using barcode-level scanner data in the US retail sector in recent years, support this theory. These dynamics have important implications for the price indexation of government programs that provide support for low- and middle-income families.

The first part of the paper establishes that, in the US retail sector from 2004 to 2015, higher-income households experienced a faster increase in product variety and lower inflation (in line with Ar gentle and Lee, 2016). The magnitude of these effects is large: over the sample period, the average annual inflation rate was 0.65 percentage points lower for households making more than $100,000 a year, compared with households making less than $30,000. The results are very stable for a wide variety of price indices and hold before, during and after the Great Recession, both across and within product categories. The scanner data used for this analysis, provided by The Nielsen Company, is representative of a large subset of the retail sector, accounting for approximately 40% of household expenditures on goods and 15% of total household expenditures.

1 The retail sector is ideal to conduct this investigation because it accounts for a sizable share of US GDP, rich scanner data on consumption patterns across income groups is available, and the notion of product (barcode) is well-defined and consistent over time. Additional analysis is conducted using price data on the full consumption basket.
2 The relationship between my results and the findings of Ar gentle and Lee (2016) is discussed below.
3 Income-group-specific price indices are built using detailed barcode-level scanner data recording consumption patterns across income groups, price changes for all products available in consecutive years (inflation) and changes in product variety (product entry and exit). As discussed in Section 3, increasing product variety is valuable on its own, but empirically most of the welfare difference between households across the income distribution is captured by price changes in the basket of products that are available across years. The annual inflation difference of 65 basis points in retail is large relative to the average inflation rate (1.9% in CPI data) and to the increase in income inequality in this range of the income distribution (93 basis point per year in the Census public-use microdata, comparing households making more than $100,000 a year to those earning below $30,000, in 2004 dollars).
The results in the first part of the paper have implications for the measurement of inflation inequality by statistical agencies, as well as for government transfers that are indexed on the food CPI, such as the Food Stamp and Child Nutrition Programs. Using decomposition methods, a large share of the inflation difference between income groups is found to occur across the quality ladder within detailed product categories, which cannot be accurately measured using data on income groups’ spending patterns aggregated at a level similar to what the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and other statistical agencies currently use.\footnote{In other words, collecting product-level data on spending patterns across income groups is key to accurately measure the divergence between nominal income inequality and purchasing-power inequality.} Regarding indexation, between 2004 and 2015, food CPI indexation implied an increase in nominal food stamp benefits of 23.19%. In contrast, indexation on my preferred non-homothetic food price index implies a 31.44% increase, because food-stamp eligible households experienced higher inflation rates.

The second part of the paper examines whether the equilibrium response of supply to faster growth of demand from high-income consumers explains the patterns of differential inflation and increase in product variety across the income distribution in the retail sector. It is well-documented that in recent decades the share of national income accruing to high-income consumers has steadily increased, both because more and more households enter high-income brackets as the economy grows and because of rising income inequality (e.g. Piketty and Saez (2003), Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008), and Kopczuk, Saez and Song (2010)). Intuitively, firms can respond to changes in relative market size by skewing product introductions toward market segments that are growing faster. This process can lead to a decrease in the price of existing products in the fast-growing market segments because increased competitive pressure from new products pushes markups down. A variety of patterns in the data support this theory: product categories that grow faster feature a greater increase in product variety, lower inflation, and disproportionately cater to higher-income households.

To test the causal claim that increases in demand lead to an increase in product variety and a fall in inflation, shifts in the national age and income distributions between 2004 and 2015 are used. The age-by-income spending profiles of products are estimated in the base period to build predictors of demand in future periods that vary only due to changes in the age and income distributions, rather than due to changes in spending patterns that are endogenous to supply factors.\footnote{Identification requires that socio-demographic groups that grow faster should not source their consumption from parts of the product space where innovation or inflation systematically differs due to unobserved supply factors. For instance, considering households in their thirties, the numbers of low-income and high-income households grew faster than the number of middle-income households during the sample. 30-year-olds are the main market for baby diapers and higher-income groups tend to purchase higher-quality diapers. Therefore, changes in the income distribution increased demand for both low-end and high-end diapers, relative to middle-range diapers. This identifying variation for demand shocks across the quality ladder within baby diapers appears unlikely to be correlated with supply shocks, which would need to vary non-monotonically across quality ladder for baby diapers. Section 4.2.1 provides a formal derivation and a complete discussion of the identification conditions in this research design. This identification strategy effectively relies on a “Bartik shock”: for a general review of Bartik research designs, see Bartik (1991), Blanchard and Katz (1992), Goldsmith-Pinkham, Sorkin and Swift (2006), and Borusyak and Jaravel (2017).} This research design is similar in spirit to Acemoglu and Linn (2004) and Dellavigna and Pollet (2007).\footnote{These papers studied the impact of demographic shifts on the entry of new drugs and on industry returns, respectively.} The estimated effects are large: a 1 percentage point increase in the annualized growth of predicted demand leads to a 2.73 percentage point increase in the share of spending on new products and a 0.43 percentage point decline in inflation.\footnote{I also introduce a research design exploiting variation in food stamp policy across US states between 2000 and 2007 to trace out the causal impact of changes in \textit{per capita spending} on product innovations and inflation. States changed eligibility...} This finding implies that the
long-term supply curve is downward-sloping, which rules out a broad class of supply models and provides support for others. B Moreover, this result shows that the equilibrium response of firms alters the cost-benefit analysis of any policy that affects relative market size, such as the Food Stamp program: transfers are more effective in general equilibrium than in partial equilibrium because they induce lower prices for the recipients through the supply response.

Using the point estimates for the effect of demand on supply, historical changes in the US income distribution are found to imply substantial inflation inequality through the supply response to market size effects. Shifts in the income distribution over time generate changes in demand across the product space, to which the point estimates from the causal research design are applied, in order to predict the rates of product innovations and inflation across the product space. The predicted patterns closely approximate the actual relationship between consumer income, products innovation and inflation across product categories. This channel is found to account for 83% of retail inflation inequality.

The third part of the paper develops a micro-founded general equilibrium model consistent with the various aspects of the data and featuring a secular trend of faster-increasing product variety and lower inflation for higher-income households. Using translog preferences nested in CES preferences, the model flexibly accommodates non-homotheticities with an arbitrary number of consumer groups and sectors, endogenous product variety, and endogenous markups. This unified framework brings together the various results of the paper by providing a tractable non-homothetic price index (part 1) and comparative statics for the study of the market size channel (part 2). Due to non-homotheticities and the supply response to market size effects induced by long-run trends of growth and rising inequality, the model predicts a secular pattern of decreasing price index for higher-income households relative to lower-income households. This prediction is tested and validated using Consumer Priced Index (CPI) and Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) data on the full consumption basket going back to 1953. The price index from the model is used to show that, from 2004 to 2015, inflation inequality in the retail sector alone led to a large increase in purchasing-power inequality between the top and bottom income quintiles, equal to 0.22 percentage points per year, about one fourth of the effect of increasing income inequality.

Quantity, price and innovation dynamics in the food industry in recent years illustrate particularly well requirements, which had a large impact on the food-stamp take-up rate (Ganong and Liebman, 2016) and generated variation in market size for products with local brand capital (Bromberg, Dube and Gentzkow, 2012). The point estimates obtained following this identification strategy are consistent with those obtained with the first research design, based on changes in the national age and income distributions over time. In principle, changes in market size induced by changes in the number of consumers (as in the first research design) or by changes in per capita spending (as in the food-stamp design) could have different effects on the equilibrium. This evidence is used to discipline the model.

Three broad classes of models can generate the prediction that in general equilibrium the price index in a sector falls when demand increases: endogenous growth macro models with scale effects [e.g. Romer (1990) and Aghion and Howitt (1992)], trade models with free entry and endogenous markups through variable-elasticity-of-substitution preferences [e.g. Melitz, 2003, and Zhelebidko et al., 2012], and industrial organization models with free entry and endogenous markups through strategic interactions between firms [e.g. Sutton, 1991, and Berry and Reiss, 2006]. Appendix E.1 discusses the relationship between these models and mine.

Other channels may affect retail inflation inequality as well – for instance trade, changes among retailers like the rise of Walmart, or supply expansions that are exogenous to demand. These other channels should either be small individually or should offset each other such that collectively they account for less than 20% of retail inflation inequality. Appendix D.7 presents results about trade with China. For the impact of Walmart on consumer welfare, see Hausman and Leibtag (2007), Jia (2008) and Holmes (2011), among others.

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the core ideas developed in this paper. Organic food sales have grown at an average annualized rate of 11.2% between 2004 and 2015, compared with 2.8% for total food sales, in the context of increasing demand from higher-income households. The price premium for organic products shrunk significantly: for instance, organic spinach cost 60% more than nonorganic spinach in 2004, compared with only 7% more today (Appendix Figure A1). Low inflation for organic products brought down the food CPI, implying that it reduced the rate of increase in food stamps through indexation, although most food-stamp recipients do not purchase organic products. Bell, Alvarez, Weber and Shelman (2015) show how innovations and increased competition led to the fall in organic food prices.

This paper contributes primarily to the literature on innovation and inequality, as well as to the literature on inflation inequality.

Literature on innovation and inequality. A vast literature has studied skilled-biased factor-augmenting technical change (see Violante (2008) for a survey). Studies have alternatively emphasized that skilled labor is more complementary to equipment capital than unskilled labor (Goldin and Katz (1998) and Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull and Violante (2000)), that skilled workers better adapt to technical change (Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997) and Galor and Moav (2000)), that changes in technology induce skill-biased organizational shifts (Garicano and Rossi (2004)), or that a higher proportion of skilled workers in the labor force endogenously leads to skill-biased technological change due to market size effects (Acemoglu (1998, 2002, 2007)). In contrast, this paper investigates the distributional effects of innovations in the product market, that is to say considering sector-augmenting (or product-augmenting) technical change, rather than factor-augmenting technical change.

Only a few papers have examined how demand-side forces determine the direction of innovation across sectors. Acemoglu, Aghion, Bursztyn and Hemous (2012), Boppart and Weiss (2013) and Comin, Lashkari and Mestieri (2016) study this question primarily theoretically and Acemoglu and Linn (2004) provide estimates of the effect of changes in market size on the entry of new drugs. Relative to this literature, the contribution of this paper is to show theoretically and empirically the implications of endogenous innovations across sectors for inequality. The theory shows that the endogenous entry of new products induced by market size effects across product categories is biased towards the rich in a period of growth and rising income inequality. The empirical analysis documents that these effects are quantitatively large, estimating

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10 For more details, see the USDA ERS reports on organic consumer studies and on organic production, as well as Baird’s Health, Nutrition and Fitness Report.

11 Handbury et al. (2015) show that higher-income households have stronger preferences for organic food products, hence they disproportionately benefit from the falling price premium for these products. The implied welfare difference between higher- and lower-income households can be accurately captured only with detailed micro data: the divergence in price dynamics occurs between organic and nonorganic spinach/granola/coffee/carrot/milk/etc., i.e. within detailed product categories, rather than across broader categories like fruit versus vegetables. This example illustrates the importance of aggregation bias.

12 Due to growing market demand, farmers undertook investments to obtain organic label certifications; certified organic pasture, rangeland, cropland and livestock have been expanding at double-digit rates since 2004. To reduce cost, organic producers harnessed innovative techniques like integrated pest management and relied on innovations to product formulations. More recently, conventional consumer packaged goods companies, such as Hormel, Kellog, General Mills, and PepsiCo, entered the organic market and created venture capital funds to invest in startups of organic products. The increase in competition led to lower prices and reduced profitability for early entrants like Hain Celestial, which had been outperforming the stock market for several years.
the response of the price index to changes in market size in addition to entry and exit dynamics.\(^{13}\)

The existing literature examining the impact of innovation on inequality from a product market perspective has emphasized the notion of “product cycle”, the idea that innovation is driven by economies of scale and allows for a trickle-down process bringing to the mass market the new products that were initially enjoyed by a select few at the top of the income distribution (e.g. Schumpeter (1942), Vernon (1966), and Matsuyama (2002)). This paper shows the importance of a different force: increasing product variety driven by increasing market size, which lowers the price index of higher-income households when market size grows faster for premium products. Two recent papers also call into question the pervasive nature of the trickle-down logic. Eizenberg (2014) shows that the rapid innovations in CPUs mostly benefited the 20% least price-sensitive consumers, and Faber and Fally (2017) find that more productive firms endogenously sort into catering to the tastes of wealthier households, giving rise to asymmetric effects on household price indices.

**Literature on inflation inequality.** In a closely related paper, Argenite and Lee (2016) construct income-group-specific price indices from 2004 to 2010 using Nielsen scanner data and report that annual inflation for the highest income quartile was on average 0.59 percentage points lower than for the lowest income quartile. They interpret this inflation difference as being driven by the Great Recession.\(^{14}\) Appendix C.8 shows that the data supports my interpretation of retail inflation inequality as a long-term trend, instead of a business-cycle phenomenon. The key difference between Argenite and Lee (2016) and this paper is the mechanism: Appendix C.8 shows that the channel they suggest (product quality substitution), although theoretically plausible, in practice explains little of the effect.

An extensive empirical literature has investigated the inflation experiences of different household groups. Most existing research has concluded that there is little variation in inflation across population groups, with the exception of the elderly in the US (e.g. Ambler and Stewart (1994), Garner, Johnson and Kokoski (1996) and Hobijn and Lagakos (2003) for the US, and Murphy and Garvey (2004) and Chiru (2005) for other countries). Using income-group-specific spending shares from CEX data matched to item-specific CPI inflation series, McGranahan and Paulson (2005) report that from 1982 to 2004 average inflation was 0.14 percentage points smaller for the top income quartile, relative to the bottom income quartile, and they interpret this difference to be small.\(^{15}\) In the context of this literature, this paper makes two contributions. First, the importance of aggregation bias is shown: aggregating the scanner data to a level similar to what is available from the CEX yields an inflation difference similar to McGranahan and Paulson (2005), over

\(^{13}\)Borrowing the language of Acemoglu (2007) and adapting it to sector-augmenting technical change, this paper formalizes and tests both the “weak bias” and “strong bias” hypotheses for technical change across sectors, namely: when demand for a sector becomes relatively more abundant, does product entry endogenously increase in this sector (weak bias)? And is this effect sufficiently strong such that the observed relative supply curves for goods are downward-sloping (strong bias)? See Appendix E.2 for a complete discussion.

\(^{14}\)Argente and Lee (2016) write: “we find substantial differences across income groups that arise during the Great Recession” (abstract); “[Figure 1] shows that the indices for all income groups track each other closely but drastically vary during the Great Recession” (page 16).

\(^{15}\)They highlight that the 0.14 percentage point inflation difference is “just less than 5% of average urban inflation” (page 27) and “conclude that inflation is principally an aggregate shock and that the CPI-U does a reasonable job of measuring the inflation experience of the demographic groups that we investigate” (abstract). However, from the perspective of accurately measuring changes in purchasing-power inequality across income group, an annual inflation difference of 0.14 percent points that is sustained for twenty years does not seem negligible.
four times smaller than the full effect (see Section 3.6). Second, following their methodology, the income-
group-specific inflation series are extended from 1953 to 2015 to confirm that inflation inequality is a secular
trend.

households experienced lower inflation than high-income households. Although the dataset they used can
no longer be obtained from The Nielsen Company, similar Nielsen scanner data was obtained from the U.S.
Department of Agriculture between 1998 and 2005. In this data, product variety increased faster and inflation
was lower in product categories catering to higher income groups (see Appendix C.8), in line with the results
reported in the main text from 2004 to 2015. Appendix C.8 also reports that in the dataset of McGranahan
and Paulson (2005) inflation was lower for higher-income households from 1994 to 2005.

Some studies have looked at the variability in the inflation experiences of different households. Michael
(1979), Hobijn and Lagakos (2003) and Kaplan and Schuhlofer-Wohl (2016) have found that there is substanc-
tial variation across households and that most variation occurs within rather than across groups.16 Following
Polak (1980), this paper focuses on group price indices.17

Layout. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data; Section 3
describes the patterns of increasing product variety and inflation in retail across income groups; Section 4
establishes that increases in demand cause an increase in product variety and lower inflation for continuing
products — in such a way that lower inflation in retail for higher-income households is explained by the
supply response to changes in the income distribution; Section 5 presents the model, the evidence from the
CPI and CEX data on the secular trend of lower inflation for higher-income households, and the implications
for inequality. A number of theoretical results, estimation details and robustness checks are reported in
appendices.

2 Data Sources and Summary Statistics

This section discusses how product-level scanner data in the retail sector is uniquely suited to accomplish the
two main goals of the paper. On the measurement front, this data is ideal to compute income-group-specific
inflation rates as well as changes in product variety across the income distribution because the spending
patterns of a large panel of consumers are observed at the product level. On the mechanism front, the
strength of this data is that the notion of product (barcode) is well defined and one can thus measure
whether firms respond to changes in relative market size by skewing product introductions toward market

16 Although Kaplan and Schuhlofer-Wohl (2016) focus on characterizing the dispersion in inflation rates across households,
they also report that between 2004 and 2013 lower-income households experienced much higher inflation, with a difference in
average inflation rates of nearly 1 percentage point between the highest- and lowest-income households. They use a restricted
sample covering a quarter of all spending, which likely explains why they find a much larger inflation difference than I do.
17 Note that this paper builds on a vast literature about the measurement of inflation, using scanner data or other data sources.
For homothetic price indices, see Sato (1976), Varia (1976), Feenstra (1992), Pakes (2003), Broda and Weinstein (2006, 2010),
and Erickson and Pakes (2011), among others. For non-homothetic price indices, see Moretti (2013), Diamond (2015), Handbury
(2015), and Comin, Lashkari and Mestieri (2015), among others. For the early literature using scanner data, see in particular
Aguilar and Husted (2007). This paper's findings about inflation inequality also speak to the measurement of consumption
inequality (Krueger and Perri (2006), Aguilar and Bils (2015)).
Table 1: Distribution of Spending across Nielsen Expenditure Categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Product Groups</th>
<th>Expenditure Share</th>
<th>Barcode Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alcoholic Beverages</td>
<td>beer, liquor, wine, butter and margarine, cheese, sour cream</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dairy</td>
<td>toppings, dough products, eggs, milk, pudding, snacks, spreads, yeast, yogurt</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dairy</td>
<td>baby food, baking mixes, baking supplies, bread and baked goods, breakfast food</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dairy</td>
<td>and candy, syrup, flour, carbonated beverages, cereal, coffee, condiments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dry Grocery</td>
<td>gravies, sauces, cookies, crackers, desserts, gelatinas, etc.</td>
<td>39.9%</td>
<td>29.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dairy</td>
<td>syrup, flour, canned fruit, dried fruit, gum, jams, jellies, non-carbonated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dairy</td>
<td>soft drinks, soup, spices, seasoning, sugar, sweeteners, molasses, tea, canned</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dairy</td>
<td>vegetables, etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fresh Produce</td>
<td>fresh produce</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frozen Food</td>
<td>frozen baked goods, frozen breakfast foods, frozen deserts, fruits and topping,</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frozen Food</td>
<td>ice, ice cream, frozen drinks, frozen pizza and snacks, frozen prepared food,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Merchandise</td>
<td>frozen seafood and poultry, frozen vegetables, automotive, batteries and</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beauty Aids</td>
<td>flashlight, books and magazines, canning, freezing supplies, cookware,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beauty Aids</td>
<td>electronics, records, tapes, gardening, glassware, tableware, party needs,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beauty Aids</td>
<td>tools, hosiery, socks, household supplies, appliances, insecticides, pesticides,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beauty Aids</td>
<td>kitchen gadgets, light bulbs, etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and Beauty Aids</td>
<td>medications, men's toiletries, oral hygiene, sanitary protection, shaving needs,</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beauty Aid</td>
<td>skin care, vitamins</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and Beauty Aids</td>
<td>charcoal, logs, accessories, detergents, disposable diapers, fresheners and</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beauty Aids</td>
<td>deodorizers, household cleaners, laundry supplies, paper products, personal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beauty Aids</td>
<td>soap and bath additives, pet care, tobacco, wrapping materials and bags</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the various departments and product groups in the Nielsen Homescan Consumer Panel dataset, from 2004 to 2015. A detailed description of the data source is provided in Sections 2.1.1 and A.1.4. Appendix Table A1 reports additional summary statistics.

2.1 Data Sources

2.1.1 Scanner Data

The analysis is primarily based on the Nielsen Homescan Consumer Panel and Nielsen Retail Scanner datasets, which have been widely used in the literature (Einav, Leibtag and Nevo, 2008). This data tracks consumption from 2004 to 2015 at the product level in department stores, grocery stores, drug stores, convenience stores and
other similar retail outlets across the US. The data are representative of about 40% of household expenditures on goods and 15% of total household expenditures. Appendix A presents a detailed description of the data sources.

Three features of the data are particularly useful. First, product-level data is available on both prices and quantities. Quantity data is rare at the product level (for instance, the BLS does not collect such data), but it is crucial for quality adjustment in price indices.\textsuperscript{18} Second, the Homescan Consumer panel has information on household characteristics such as income, age, education, size, occupation, marital status and zip code. It is therefore possible to directly map products to consumer characteristics. Third, the dataset offers a good measure of product innovations, defined as the introduction of new barcodes, or Universal Product Classification (UPC) codes. It is rare for a meaningful quality change to occur without resulting in a change of UPC\textsuperscript{19} and, conversely, for a UPC change to occur without being associated with a quality change that might cause consumers to pay a different price.\textsuperscript{20} Similarly, discontinued UPCs can be identified.\textsuperscript{21}

Nielsen provides a detailed product hierarchy, based on where products are sold in stores. About 3 million products (identified by their barcode, or UPC code) are classified into 10 broad departments (dry grocery, general merchandise, health and beauty care, alcoholic beverages, deli, etc.), 125 more detailed product groups (grooming aids, soup, beer, pet care, kitchen gadgets, etc.) and 1,075 very detailed product modules (ricotta cheese, pet litter liners, bathroom scale, tomato puree, women’s hair coloring, etc.). When ranking product modules by mean consumer income\textsuperscript{22}, in line with intuition the top five product modules are scotch, natural cheese, gin, fondue sauce and cookware, while the bottom five are tobacco, canned meat, taco filling, insecticide and frozen fruit drinks.

Finally, the data can be disaggregated at the level of 76 local markets, described in Appendix A. According to Nielsen, the dataset is still representative within each of the 76 markets. The data cannot reliably be disaggregated further (e.g. at the county or zip code level).

\subsubsection*{2.1.2 Additional Datasets: Manufacturer Identifiers, Markups and CPI/CEX Data}

A number of datasets in addition to the Nielsen scanner data are used in the analysis. Appendix A describes them in greater detail. First, to measure manufacturer entry and competition, manufacturer identifiers from

\textsuperscript{18}Intuitively, observing shifts in quantities makes it possible to directly measure substitution patterns (and thus address substitution bias, which is a core concern of the CPI produced by BLS) and to infer the quality of products given their price, their market share, and the demand system. See Section 3 for a complete discussion.

\textsuperscript{19}First, retailers rely on UPCs for inventory management: if distinct products, offering a different experience to consumers, have the same barcode, then inventory management becomes very difficult. As a result, GS1, the international organization in charge of attributing UPC codes, requires manufacturers to purchase a new barcode following any quality change of a product. Second, I observe a large set of attributes of UPCs in the Nielsen data, e.g. flavor, container description, organic label, scent, etc. I find that this set of characteristics remains constant over time within a UPC.

\textsuperscript{20}Allowing for changing UPC codes for the same product, offering the same experience to consumers, would hamper inventory management by making it difficult for retailers to re-order out-of-stock items. Accordingly, GS1 forbids manufacturers to change UPC codes when there is no quality change. Second, I show in Section 3 that over 50% of new UPCs (weighted by spending) in any given year correspond to entry of a manufacturer that was previously not active in this part of the product space.

\textsuperscript{21}Note that these measures of product turnover include any change in products, including those driven by changes in the size of products, their flavor, or other characteristics that can be secondary for the consumer. Nielsen provides identifiers that allows tracking barcodes that are new because of marginal changes, e.g. a change in packaging: all of the results presented in the paper are similar when excluding these products from the definition of “new” products.

\textsuperscript{22}For product module \( l \), mean consumer income is defined as \( I_l = \sum_n s_n I_n \), where \( I_n \) is the income of household \( n \) and \( s_n \) their share of total spending in \( l \).
GS1, the company in charge of allocating bar codes in the US, were matched to the UPC codes in the Nielsen data, reaching a match rate of 95%. The typical product group is characterized by a few large manufacturers and a competitive fringe of manufacturers with very low market shares. The model developed in Section 5 is consistent with these patterns.

Some of the predictions of the model are tested using data on retailer markups in 250 grocery stores, operated by a single retail chain, between January 2004 and June 2007 in 19 U.S. states. To examine whether lower inflation for higher-income households is a secular trend, the various expenditure categories of the CEX were matched to 48 item-specific CPI data series going back to 1953 (see Appendix Section A.1.3).

2.2 Summary Statistics

Table 1 shows the distribution of spending across the main expenditure categories available in the Nielsen scanner data. Although most of aggregate spending is devoted to food products, a wide variety of product groups are included in the dataset. By examining heterogeneous patterns across these detailed product categories, one can distinguish between various theories that could explain why high-income households experienced a lower inflation rate than low-income households.

The product groups listed in Table 1 may not strike the reader as particularly innovative. Indeed, although some consumer electronics are included, most of the spending is devoted to product categories that are not known for groundbreaking technology innovations in recent decades. However, these product categories are characterized by a relatively high rate of increase in product variety, as further documented in Section 3. The data is therefore ideal to study one particular manifestation of innovation, increasing product variety, and how it benefits households across the income distribution. Appendix A presents more details on the data, with a comparison of aggregate spending share in the Nielsen scanner data, the Consumer Price Index for all urban consumers and the Consumer Expenditure Survey.

3 Measuring Quality-Adjusted Inflation Across Income Groups

This section estimates quality-adjusted inflation rates across the income distribution, taking into account the welfare gains from increasing product variety. Inequality is found to be magnified: annual quality-adjusted inflation is on average 65 basis points lower for households who make above $100,000 a year, relative to households earning below $30,000. A large share of the inflation difference between income groups occurs within detailed product categories, which cannot be captured when using existing survey data on spending shares from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

3.1 Nonhomothetic Preferences, Product Variety and Inequality

This paper studies how the mapping between nominal income and inequality changes over time, at various points of the income distribution, using a money metric. The compensating variation gives the amount of nominal income that one would need to take away from the consumer at the “new” equilibrium to make
them indifferent between this new equilibrium (with the new mapping) and the “old” one (with the initial mapping). This approach provides a characterization of changes in purchasing-power inequality. Given the demand system, it is possible to infer the quality of products based on their price and equilibrium market share, and to measure the gains from increasing product variety based on the share of spending on new products. The rest of this section discusses the procedure in detail and shows that the results are robust across price indices, indicating that structural assumptions about the demand system do not drive the results.

The term “inflation” is used to describe the findings because it is an intuitive notion, but the results are invariant to the unit of account. This paper documents changes in the relative prices of goods that cater to high- and low-income households. These relative price changes would be unaffected by shifts in the overall level of inflation; therefore nominal indeterminacy plays no role in the findings.

3.2 Overview of Methodology and Review of Basic Price Indices

The goal is to compute the cost of achieving a certain level of utility in one year relative to the previous year. Such price indices are known as “exact price indices.” The analysis must take into account price changes for continuing products, changes in product variety, as well as the optimizing behavior of consumers who may substitute from one good to another. By definition, this exercise requires taking a stance on a utility function. The role of the utility function is twofold: quantifying the impact on utility of price changes for the goods that exist across periods, but also translating the patterns of product creation and destruction into a welfare metric. To understand what parts of the result are driven by structural assumptions on the utility function, it is useful to split this analysis into two parts, first considering price changes on products that exist across periods and second considering changes in product variety.

First, inflation for the set of products available in two consecutive years, accounting for about 90% of overall spending, is considered. The quality of a given product is assumed to be constant over time and data is available on market shares of each product; therefore it is straightforward to compute a price index reflecting product quality and consumers’ substitution behavior. Intuitively, the price change for each product is observed and one only needs to decide how to weigh the various products. The exact price index offers a principled way of doing so. The structural assumption on the utility function plays a minor role for the final result, as can be seen by computing standard price indices that do not have an interpretation in terms of utility but can serve as bounds by allowing for an extreme form of substitution (like the Paasche price index, which offers a lower bound on inflation) or making any substitution impossible (like the Laspeyres price index, which offers an upper bound on inflation). To show that the quantitative results on continuing products do not depend on the way substitution effects are handled, results for the following price indices are reported:

\[ P_t^q = \frac{\sum_i q_i p_{it}}{\sum_i q_{it}} \]
\[ P_t^s = \frac{\sum_i s_i p_{it}}{\sum_i s_{it}} \]

23 The assumption that quality is constant at the UPC level was justified in Section 2, with a description of institutional details (rules to grant new barcodes set by GS1 and inventory management system used by retailers) and empirical exercises (showing that the set of available characteristics such as flavor, label and scent, are stable within UPC codes).

24 i indexes barcodes, t time, q quantities, p prices, and s spending shares. See Appendix B for a discussion of chaining.
Laspeyres Index: $P_L \equiv \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_t^i q_0^i}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_0^i q_0^i} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_t^i}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_0^i}$

Paasche Index: $P_P \equiv \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_t^i q_t^i}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_0^i q_t^i} = \left( \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \left( \frac{p_t^i}{p_0^i} \right)^{-1} s_t^i}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} s_t^i} \right)^{-1}$

Marshall–Edgeworth Index: $P_{ME} \equiv \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_t^i (q_t^i + q_0^i)}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_0^i (q_t^i + q_0^i)}$

Walsh Index: $P_W \equiv \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_t^i \sqrt{q_t^i q_0^i}}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_0^i \sqrt{q_t^i q_0^i}}$

Fisher Index: $P_F \equiv \sqrt{P_L P_P}$

Geometric Laspeyres Index: $P^G_L \equiv \prod_{i=1}^{n} \left( \frac{p_t^i}{p_0^i} \right)^{s_t^i} = \exp \left( \sum_{i=1}^{n} s_0^i \cdot \log \left( \frac{p_t^i}{p_0^i} \right) \right)$

Geometric Paasche Index: $P^G_P \equiv \prod_{i=1}^{n} \left( \frac{p_t^i}{p_0^i} \right)^{s_t^i} = \exp \left( \sum_{i=1}^{n} s_t^i \cdot \log \left( \frac{p_t^i}{p_0^i} \right) \right)$

Tornqvist Index: $P_T \equiv \prod_{i=1}^{n} \left( \frac{p_t^i}{p_0^i} \right)^{\frac{s_t^i + s_0^i}{2}} = \exp \left( \sum_{i=1}^{n} s_0^i + s_t^i \cdot \log \left( \frac{p_t^i}{p_0^i} \right) \right)$

Second, standard techniques in the literature are used to provide an adjustment to the price index depending on the rate of increase in product variety. By definition, for new and discontinued products price changes across years are not available. Intuitively, given that consumers have a taste for variety, an increase in the range of available products should lead to a decrease in the price index. Translating the increase in product variety into welfare gains requires structural assumptions. Two standard frameworks are used: nested CES utility (presented in the next subsection) and nested translog utility (presented in Appendices B.3 and C.5). In both of them, higher-income groups are found to benefit more from the dynamics of product creation and destruction. Because the estimated elasticities of substitution of products within modules are large, the gains from increasing product variety turn out to be largely reflected in price changes for existing products (this is shown formally in the next subsection). The patterns of product creation and destruction matter through competition effects in general equilibrium, such that their welfare effect is almost entirely taken into account in price changes for products existing across periods.

3.3 An Exact Price Index for Nested CES with New Products

The preferred estimation approach in this paper follows a well-established literature in trade and macroeconomics and computes quality-adjusted inflation using a nested-CES utility function. The key insight is that this utility function yields a simple expression for the price index, which can be written only in terms of prices and market shares even when goods are constantly being replaced.

The estimation framework builds on Feenstra (1994) and Broda and Weinstein (2006, 2010). The analysis is conducted separately for three representative agents, one for households making less than $30,000 a year, one for households making between $30,000 and $100,000 a year, and one for households making above $100,000. Preference parameters in the estimation framework are hence a flexible function of the income level, which allows for nonhomotheticities.
The remainder of this subsection shows how to derive and estimate the price index for any representative agent. A nested CES utility function is assumed. Product groups are indexed by $g$ and $G$ is the set of all product groups. $\sigma = \rho / (\rho - 1)$ is the elasticity of substitution between product groups.\(^{25}\)  
The upper level utility function is:  
$$U = \left( \sum_{g \in G} C_{gt}^\rho \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}}$$

Composite consumption within a product group is given by:  
$$C_{gt} = \left( \sum_{m \in M_g} (c_{mgt})^{\rho_g} \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho_g}}$$

where $\sigma_g = \rho_g / (\rho_g - 1)$ is the elasticity of substitution between product modules within product group $g$.  
$$c_{mgt} = \left( \sum_{u \in U_{mgt}} (d_{umgt} c_{umgt})^{\rho_m} \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho_m}}$$

where $c_{umgt}$ is the quantity of UPC $u$ consumed in product module $m$ and product group $g$ in period $t$. $\sigma_m = \rho_m / (\rho_m - 1)$ is the elasticity of substitution between UPCs within product module $m$. $d_{umgt}$ is unobserved and reflects the quality of the UPC.

The minimum unit cost function of the subutility function at the product module level is:  
$$P_{mgt} = \left( \sum_{u \in U_{mgt}} \left( \frac{p_{umgt}}{d_{umgt}} \right)^{\sigma_m} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma_m}}$$

The minimum cost function at the product group level is:  
$$P_{gt} = \left( \sum_{m \in M_g} (P_{mgt})^{\sigma_s} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma_s}}$$

And the overall price index is given by:  
$$P_t = \left( \sum_{g \in G} (P_{gt})^\sigma \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}$$

Consumer optimization also yields:  
$$s_{umgt} = \left( \frac{p_{umgt}}{d_{umgt}} \right)^{1-\sigma_m}$$

i.e. the quality adjusted price can be backed out as follows:  
$$\ln \left( \frac{p_{umgt}}{d_{umgt}} \right) = \frac{\ln(s_{umgt})}{1-\sigma_m} + \ln(P_{mgt})$$

\(^{25}\)In the empirical analysis presented below, product groups are themselves nested within departments.
The key insight for estimation is that the share of consumption of UPC $u$ depends directly on the quality-adjusted price. The price index can be written only in terms of prices and market shares even when goods are constantly being replaced.

Under the assumption that product quality is constant over time ($d_{umg} = d_{umgt-1}$) and ignoring the introduction of new products, the exact price index of the CES utility function for product module $m$ within product group $g$ is as in Sato (1976) and Vartia (1976):

$$P_{mg}(p_{mg}, p_{mgt-1}, x_{mg}, x_{mgt-1}, I_{mg}) = \Pi_{u \in I_{mg}} \left( \frac{p_{umg}}{p_{umgt-1}} \right)^{w_{umg}} \quad (1)$$

$$w_{umg} = \frac{(s_{umg} - s_{umgt-1})/(\ln(s_{umg}) - \ln(s_{umgt-1}))}{\sum_{c \in I_{mg}} (s_{umg} - s_{umgt-1})/(\ln(s_{umg}) - \ln(s_{umgt-1}))} \quad ; \quad s_{umg} = \frac{p_{umg}x_{umg}}{\sum_{u \in I_{mg}} p_{umg}x_{umg}}$$

where $I_{mg} = I_{mgt} \cap I_{mgt-1}$ is the set of varieties consumed in both periods $t$ and $t - 1$. $x_{mg}$ and $x_{mgt-1}$ are the cost-minimizing quantity vectors of products within module $m$ in each of the two periods. A remarkable feature is that the price index does not depend on the unknown quality parameters $d_{umg}$. One only need to compute the geometric mean of the individual variety price changes, where the weights are ideal log-change weights $w_{umg}$. These weights are computed using spending shares in the two periods and are always bounded between the shares of spending in the $t$ and $t - 1$.

With introduction of new varieties and exit of some old varieties, as shown in Feenstra (1994) the exact price index for product module $m$ within product group $g$ is given by:

$$\pi_{mg}(p_{mg}, p_{mgt-1}, x_{mg}, x_{mgt-1}, I_{mg}) = P_{mg}(p_{mg}, p_{mgt-1}, x_{mg}, x_{mgt-1}, I_{mg}) \cdot \left( \frac{\lambda_{mg}}{\lambda_{mgt-1}} \right)^{\frac{1}{s_{mg}}} \quad (2)$$

$$\lambda_{mg} = \frac{\sum_{u \in I_{mg}} p_{umg}x_{umg}}{\sum_{u \in I_{mg}} p_{umg}x_{umg}} \quad ; \quad \lambda_{mgt-1} = \frac{\sum_{u \in I_{mg}} p_{umgt-1}x_{umgt-1}}{\sum_{u \in I_{mgt-1}} p_{umgt-1}x_{umgt-1}}$$

This result states that the exact price index with variety change is equal to the “conventional” price index multiplied by an additional term, which captures the role of new and disappearing varieties. The higher the expenditure share of new varieties, the lower is $\lambda_{mg}$ and the smaller is the exact price index relative to the conventional price index. An intuitive way to rewrite this ratio is as follows:

$$\frac{\lambda_{mg}}{\lambda_{mgt-1}} = \frac{1 + \text{Growth Rate of Spending on Overlapping Products}_{gmt}}{1 + \text{Growth Rate of Total Spending}_{gmt}}$$

which clearly shows that a net increase in product variety (weighted by spending) drives the price index down. The price index also depends on the module-specific elasticity of substitution between varieties $\sigma_m$. As $\sigma_m$ grows, the additional term converges to one and the bias goes to zero. Intuitively, when existing varieties are close substitutes to new or disappearing varieties, a law of one price applies and price changes in the set of existing products perfectly reflect price changes for exiting and new varieties.

In principle, the result presented in equation (2) can be used to compute price indices adjusted for increasing product variety over any time horizon. However, two factors make some time horizons more sensible than others in practice. First, it is useful to define periods in years to prevent seasonal factors from driving product turnover. UPCs will be considered destroyed only if they were not purchased at any time during a year-long period. Second, one needs to decide how many years should separate the two periods. While this choice is inherently arbitrary, this paper presents the main results based on one-year intervals, considering other intervals in robustness checks.
Figure 1: Inflation for Continued Products across Income Groups

Panel A: Nested CES Exact Price Index

Panel B: Stability of Inflation Difference across Price Indices

Panel C: Nested-CES Exact Price Index across Age-Income Groups

Notes: Panels A to C report the average inflation rate for various household groups from 2004 to 2015. In any given year, the sample includes all barcodes observed in the current and previous year. The price indices are described in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. Appendix Tables C4, C5, C6, C7 and C15 show the robustness of these results.
To compute the price index shown by equation (2), a high-dimensional set of elasticities of substitution $\{\sigma_m\}$ must be estimated. Estimation is conducted separately for each income group to allow for non-homotheticities. The main challenge for estimation is that demand and supply parameters must be obtained using only information on prices and quantities. The insight of Feenstra (1994) is that although one cannot identify supply and demand, the data conveys information about the joint distribution of supply and demand parameters: the constant elasticity assumption is essentially sufficient for identification. Due to space constraints, the derivation of the estimation equations and identification conditions is presented in Appendix B.2.

3.4 Inflation across Income Groups for Products Available in Consecutive Years

Panel A of Figure 1 shows the average inflation between 2004 and 2015 on the set of continued products (defined as products that are available in consecutive years) for households across the income distribution. Inflation is computed using the exact price index for the nested CES utility function described in the previous subsection (without the adjustment for new and disappearing products, which is examined later in this section and does not affect the results much). The inflation rate is 0.65 pp lower for households making more than $100,000 a year, relative to households making less than $30,000.

As shown in Panel B of Figure 1, similar results are obtained when considering any of the price indices introduced in Subsection 3.2. In addition, this panel reports the inflation difference when re-defining products as UPCs available in the same store, or as UPCs available in the same local market (see Appendix A.1.4 for a map of local markets). The results with this new definition of products are very similar. Overall, across all price indices and product definitions, the inflation rate is always between 0.56pp and 0.72pp lower for households making more than $100,000 a year, relative to households making less than $30,000. Panel C of Figure 1 shows that these results are robust when considering other income groups and when repeating the analysis within age groups. For each age group, inflation is systematically lower for higher-income households.

3.5 Changes in Product Variety across Income Groups

Do welfare effects from increasing or decreasing product varieties also differ across income groups? The rate of increase in product variety is found to be faster in product modules catering to higher-income households. Panel A of Figure 2 shows this effect in an intuitive way by using the share of spending on new products (defined as barcodes which did not exist in the previous year) as a measure of the flow of successful product innovations. For every $10,000 increase in the mean income of the consumers buying from a product module, the share of spending on new products in this product module goes up by 3 percentage points, a large change equal to approximately a third of the average share of spending on new products. Plotting the data in this way, through the lens of the product space rather than by directly looking at the consumption baskets of consumers of different income levels, has the key advantage that the “product cycle” will not mechanically generate differences across income groups. In other words, the fact that new products may first
be purchased by higher-income consumers will not generate an increasing relationship between income and share of spending on new products, given that we are looking at patterns across product modules while the product cycle operates within product modules.

Figure 2: Welfare Gains from Changes in Product Variety across Income Groups

Panel A: New Products Benefit Higher-Income Households More

Panel B: Difference in Welfare Gains across Specifications

Notes: Panel A shows the relationship across product modules between the share of spending on new products (defined in any given year as barcodes that did not exist in the previous year) and the mean (spending-weighted) consumer income. Panel B shows the difference in inflation rates experienced by households earning above $100,000 (high income) and below $30,000 (low income), using the exact price index with new products derived in Section 3.3. The sample extends from 2004 to 2015.

The patterns of product destruction are found to be relatively homogeneous across product modules, implying that the share of spending on new products is a good proxy for the increase in product variety. Panel A of Appendix Figure C6 shows this by plotting the total increase in barcodes across product modules: the rate of increase in the total number of varieties goes up by one percentage point with a $10,000 dollar increase in the income of the representative consumer. Moreover, Panel B of Appendix Figure C6 plots the welfare-relevant metric that captures the benefits of increasing product variety in the nested CES demand

Notes
system introduced earlier. Similar results hold for other measures of “new products” - new UPCs relative to two, three or four years ago, as well as new brands and new manufacturers, as shown in Appendix Figure C7.

Panel B of Figure 2 brings together the patterns of increasing product variety and inflation for continued products. The results are shown for various specifications. The bar at the top of the figure uses the formula in equation (2). According to the nested-CES price index with income-group-specific elasticities of substitution, between 2004 and 2015, on average, annual quality-adjusted inflation was 78 basis point lower for households earning above $100,000 a year, relative to households earning below $30,000 a year. Changes in product variety benefited higher-income households more and contributed another 13 basis points to the inflation difference for continued products of 65 basis points. The distribution of within-module elasticities of substitution and the ratios $\frac{\lambda_{mgt}}{\lambda_{mgt-1}}$ are reported in Appendix Table C8. The elasticities are relatively high, with a median of 5.5, and are slightly smaller for high-income households. The high values of the estimated elasticities imply that the “product variety” adjustment is relatively small: most of the welfare effects are captured by the inflation difference on goods that exist across consecutive years.

The first five bars from the top on Panel B of Figure 2 show the sensitivity of the quantitative results to various values of the elasticities of substitution, based on the estimates obtained by other papers in the literature. A small elasticity of 2.09, as in Handbury (2013), implies a large differential welfare gains to the benefit of high-income households. But a high elasticity of 11.5, as in Broda and Weinstein (2010), implies a small effect. In the marketing literature, elasticities in the retail sector are found to be between 4 and 7 (Dube et al. (2005), Montgomery and Rossi (1999)), which implies modest differential welfare gains from new products.

The last two bars on Panel B of Figure 2 use other specifications to address the two main limitations of the nested-CES demand system. First, as pointed out by Hausman (2003), CES assumes infinite reservation prices and may overestimate the amount of infra-marginal consumer surplus created by increasing product variety. Hausman (2003) introduced a lower-bound on consumer surplus: using this bound still yields the result that higher-income households benefit more from changes in product variety, although the effect becomes smaller. Second, CES assumes that the elasticity of utility to increasing product variety is constant, while it may in fact be the case that the product space gets crowded out as new varieties get introduced.

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27 The magnitude of these elasticities is consistent with markups in the retail sector, which are between 30% and 40% in the Census of Retail Trade.

28 Indeed, from the derivation in subsection 3.2, quality adjusted inflation is given by $\pi_{mg} \equiv P_{mg} \cdot \left( \frac{\lambda_{mgt}}{\lambda_{mgt-1}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma_m}} \to P_{mg}$ as $\sigma_m \to \infty$. Intuitively, a law of one price applies as the elasticity of substitution increases.

29 In general, the estimated elasticities of substitution tend to be smaller in papers using the Hausman-type IV approach (e.g., Hausman & Leibtag (2007), Handbury (2013)) and larger in empirical work using the Feenstra (1994) approach for estimation (e.g., Broda & Weinstein (2010), Hottman et al. (2014), and this paper).

30 The technique introduced by Hausman (2003) is a conservative way to value new products, using the slope of the demand curve at the observed prices and quantities. Using a linear demand curve to estimate infra-marginal consumer surplus will provide a lower bound for the true infra-marginal consumer surplus as long as the true demand curve is convex to the origin. See Appendix C.5 for a complete discussion.

31 For instance, the introduction of the hundredth variety of craft beer may generate less consumer surplus than the introduction of the tenth variety did. Put another way, consumers may start perceiving products in a category as more substitutable as their number increases.
system such as translog allow for such crowding-out effects but do not alter the result that higher-income consumers benefit relatively more from changes in product variety, although the results become substantially lower than under CES.\textsuperscript{32}

Although the exact values differ, the qualitative finding is the same across specifications: new products benefit higher-income households more and the inflation difference for continued products can serve as a lower bound for the full welfare difference between high- and low-income households. Due to the high elasticities of substitution within product modules, the patterns of increase in product variety do not matter much for the measurement of quality-adjusted inflation: they have a small direct effect on the price index. However, increasing product variety may be a fundamental mechanism explaining why the price index rises more slowly for higher-income households, because new products compete with existing products and can thus have an indirect effect on the price index. Section 4 supports this hypothesis.

3.6 Decompositions
3.6.1 Results
Inflation difference across income groups reflect the combined effects of both price and quantity changes, as well as baseline differences in spending patterns across income groups. For instance, it could be that high-income households spend more on fresh produce and that inflation tends to be lower in this broad item category. Alternatively, it could be the case that high-income households experience different inflation rates compared with low-income households on the same barcodes, for instance because they shop at different stores or have different propensities to use coupons. Accordingly, the inflation difference between high income and low-income households can be decomposed into a “between” component and a “within” component. The “between” component corresponds to the inflation difference that would prevail if households differed only in terms of their expenditure shares across items categories and experienced the same inflation rate within each item category. The “within” component corresponds to the inflation difference that would prevail if households differed only in terms of the inflation rate they experience within an item category and had the same expenditure shares across categories. Formally, for any grouping of products $G$, the inflation difference between high- and low-income households can be decomposed as follows:\textsuperscript{33}

$$\pi^R - \pi^P = \sum_G s^R_G \pi^R_G - \sum_G s^P_G \pi^P_G = \left( \sum_G s^R_G \pi^R_G - \sum_G s^P_G \pi^P_G \right) + \sum_G \overline{\pi}_G (\pi^R_G - \pi^P_G)$$

with $s^i_G$ denoting the share of spending of income group $i$ on product grouping $G$ and $\pi^i_G$ the inflation experienced by income group $i$ in product grouping $G$. $\pi_G$ and $\overline{\pi}_G$ denote the average inflation rate and the average spending shares for product grouping $G$, respectively. Table 2 carries out this decomposition for the inflation difference between households making more than $100,000$ a year and households making less than $30,000$ a year.

\textsuperscript{32}The translog price index comes out of the model developed Section 5, where translog preferences are nested in CES preferences.

\textsuperscript{33}Diewert (1975) shows the validity of this decomposition for a large number of price indices.
Table 2: Decompositions of Differences between High- and Low-Income Households

Panel A: Inflation for Continued Products

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aggregation Level</th>
<th>Inflation Difference (Broad to Narrow)</th>
<th>% of Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Product Group</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Product Module</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>42.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPC</td>
<td>0.476</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPC-Local Market</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPC-Store</td>
<td>0.607</td>
<td>92.1</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Panel B: Share of Spending on New Products

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aggregation Level</th>
<th>Difference in Share of Spending (Broad to Narrow) on New Products (% of Actual)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>Product Group</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Product Module</td>
<td>39.2</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Panel A shows the decomposition of the inflation difference for continued products between households making above $100,000 (high income) and below $30,000 (low income) from 2004 to 2015. In any given year, the sample includes all barcodes observed in the current and previous year. Each row reports the “between” component in equation (3) for a given level of aggregation (described in Section 2.1.1). Panel B shows the decomposition of the difference in spending shares on new products between high- and low-income households, from 2004 to 2015. The sample includes all barcodes and each row reports the “between” component in equation (4) for the relevant level of aggregation.

Panel A of Table 2 reports the results of the decomposition at the following levels of aggregation: department, product group, product module, UPC, UPC in a given local market, and UPC in a given store. Inflation is directly observed at the product level for the last three categories, and the definitions of inflation for categories at levels of aggregation above the UPC are given in subsection 3.2. Perhaps not surprisingly, less than 10% of the difference in the inflation rates experienced by high- and low-income households is due to differences in spending across broad departments. More surprisingly, less than 25% of the inflation difference results from different spending patterns across the 125 detailed product groups, and less than 45% of the difference stems from spending patterns across the 1,075 very disaggregated product modules. More than 70% of the inflation difference occurs between UPCs. This is a large share of the overall difference in inflation rates, but a substantial fraction of the difference still occurs within UPCs. To assess the mechanism at play, the decomposition exercise is carried out at the level of UPCs in a given local market, which brings the share of the “between” component close to 80%, as well as at the level of UPCs in a given store, which brings the share of the “between” component to 92%.34

34 Note that the “within UPC” component of the inflation difference between high- and low-income households is difficult to interpret from a welfare perspective, because households can exert search effort - thus incurring a utility cost - to get a better price for a given UPC. Moreover, the Nielsen data is less reliable to document variation in prices paid by different income groups.
Taken together, these results show that most of the difference in inflation rates between high- and low-income households occurs across UPCs, and that some of the effect results from differential price dynamics for the same UPC across stores. Appendix Section C.1 shows that the quality ladder plays a key role in the decomposition. Close to the entirety of the inflation difference between income groups across UPCs occurs at the level of “product modules by price decile” cells, used as proxies for the quality ladder.\textsuperscript{35}

In a way analogous to the exercise conducted for inflation, the difference in the share of spending on new products between high- and low-income consumers can be decomposed at various levels of aggregation. Formally, for any grouping of products $G$, the decomposition is as follows:

$$N^R - N^P = \sum_G s^R_G N^R_G - \sum_G s^P_G N^P_G = \left( \sum_G s^R_G N_G - \sum_G s^P_G N_G \right) + \sum_G \bar{N}_G (N^R_G - N^P_G)$$

with $s^i_G$ the share of spending of income group $i$ on product grouping $G$ and $N^i_G$ the share of spending on new products for income group $i$ in product grouping $G$. $N_G$ and $\bar{N}_G$ denote the average share of spending on new products and the average spending shares for product grouping $G$, respectively. Panel B of Table 2 shows that the difference between the shares of spending on new products between high- and low-income consumers largely occurs within product modules. This pattern is very similar to the inflation decomposition shown in Panel A and provides preliminary evidence that there is a tight connection between the patterns of inflation and product innovations.

### 3.6.2 Measurement Implications for Statistical Agencies

Table 2 indicates that product-level data is needed to capture the magnitude of the difference in inflation rates between households at different points of the income distribution. It is not sufficient to simply reweigh price series based on income-specific spending shares across item categories, even when the level of aggregation is as detailed as product modules. Yet this is precisely the approach one must follow when working with the data from BLS and other statistical agencies. More specifically, the BLS collects prices on 305 different item categories, known as “entry-level items” (ELI). Most of these item categories are very coarse. 230 of them are actually in the retail sector, where the level of disaggregation is much higher than in other sectors. These price series can be reweighted using income-specific expenditure shares from the BLS’s consumption survey, the CEX, but the level of aggregation is too high to capture the bulk of the difference between high and low income consumers.

Aggregation bias explains why the degree of inflation inequality documented in this paper is much larger than in papers in the existing literature that used CPI and CEX data, such as McGranahan and Paulson

\[\text{for the same UPC. Indeed, Nielsen often automatically enters the price of the UPC based on the store the panelist reported for their shopping trip. Because most of the inflation difference exists across UPCs, and because the within-UPC patterns have ambiguous welfare implications and are less precisely measured, the analysis focuses on the between-UPC patterns in the remainder of the paper.}\]

\[\text{35 Various goods illustrate these inflation patterns across the quality ladder: average inflation was 2.4% for organic milk versus 3% for nonorganic milk; 2% for organic olive oil versus 2.3% for nonorganic olive oil; 1.5% for branded pain remedies versus 2.5% for generic pain remedies; and 2.3% for branded antiseptics versus 3.7% for generic antiseptics.}\]
Appendix Section C.2 shows that the degree of inflation inequality found in their dataset is very similar to what is obtained in the Nielsen data with the “between product group” methodology. As shown in Appendix Section C.1, a large share of the inflation difference across income groups could be captured by segmenting each of the product modules by price deciles: the confidential micro data collected by statistical agencies like the BLS could be used to replicate this approach, in the retail sector as well as in other sectors.\textsuperscript{36}

3.7 Robustness Checks

Appendix C presents a series of robustness checks. First, Appendix Section C.3 shows the robustness of the difference between the inflation rates of high- and low-income households. Table C3 shows that it exists before, during and after the Great Recession and that it is not driven by any single department. Tables C4 and C5 describe the level of inflation for various cuts of the income distribution, various price indices and various periods. Figure C2 summarizes this information and shows that the difference in inflation rates is very robust: higher-income households consistently experienced a lower inflation rate. Figure C3 shows that the patterns are similar when considering eighteen detailed income groups. Additionally, when products are re-defined as barcodes available in a given local market (Table C6) or barcodes available in a given store (Table C7), the results continue to hold.

Second, Appendix Section C.4 documents that the results are not driven by the product cycle, the notion that a given product may be first purchased by the rich and only later by the poor. In particular, it is found that the average income of consumers does not decline as a barcode ages and that much of the differential inflation and innovation patterns arise across product modules, between which there is no product cycle (see Appendix C.4 for a complete discussion and additional tests).

Third, Appendix Section C.5 documents the robustness of the result that new products benefit higher-income consumers more. The results are similar when defining a new product as a barcode from a new manufacturer, which did not exist at all in previous years or was active in a different part of the product space. Additional results on the Hausman (2003) and translog specifications used in Panel B of Figure 2 are reported.

Fourth, Appendix Section C.6 shows that the results on inflation across income groups are similar when using price information from the Nielsen Retail Scanner dataset, a point-of-sale dataset which addresses the concern that prices may be mismeasured in the Homescan Consumer Panel.

Finally, Appendix Section C.7 reports additional robustness checks. The results are not sensitive to selection effects induced by the exit of certain products, to the fashion cycle, to patterns of price convergence within barcodes across income groups, to the use of quarterly data, to alternative measures of household income, to differential sample noise across income groups, nor to base drift.

\textsuperscript{36}One would then need to infer the spending shares of various income groups along price deciles, which could be done for instance by estimating “quality Engel curves” as in Bils and Klenow (2001).
4 The Equilibrium Response of Supply to Changes in Demand

This section documents that the supply response to market size effects induced by shifts in the income distribution is a quantitatively important reason why higher-income households experienced a faster increase in product variety and lower inflation from 2004 to 2015. During the sample period, demand for premium products increased relative to demand for entry-level products, because of both growth and rising inequality. In response, suppliers directed their product innovation efforts towards premium market segments, which in turn led to increased competitive pressure and lower inflation for products in these market segments. First, a series of correlations in line with this hypothesis are presented. Second, the causal impact of a demand shock on product innovations and price dynamics is estimated. These point estimates are then applied to changes in demand induced by shifts in the income distribution: the implied patterns for product innovations and inflation are very close to the patterns actually observed, accounting for 83% of retail inflation inequality. Finally, additional evidence on the nature of the supply response is presented, which helps discipline the model developed in the final part of the paper.

4.1 Descriptive Evidence

A variety of patterns in the data are in line with the notion that supply responds to changes in demand and that this process primarily benefits higher-income households. First, Panel A of Figure 3 documents that product modules that grow faster are characterized by a faster-increase in product variety and by lower inflation for continued products, and that product modules catering to higher-income households have grown faster during the sample period.37

Second, Panel B of Figure 3 shows that the patterns of product introductions and low inflation for continued products go hand in hand, both across and within product modules. Within product modules, the quality ladder plays an important role. As reported in this panel, there is more product entry and lower inflation for products that belong to higher price deciles. The price deciles are computed within each module based on the average (spending-weighted) unit price of the products that are available in consecutive years. This approach provides a way to segment the product space even within product modules, the highest level of disaggregation provided by Nielsen. Prices in both start and end period are used to classify the UPC across price deciles, so that the classification is not subject to mean reversion. Prices are adjusted for the weight of the item in order to provide a more accurate measure of the unit price. Appendix Figure D1 provides a robustness check using information on the brand of each UPC. In that figure, the deciles are not based on the price of the UPC itself, but rather on pricing behavior at the brand level over the entire dataset. The results are identical to Panel B of Figure 3, which confirms that mean reversion is not driving the results.

37 Quantity growth across product modules is computed using module-specific CES quantity indices.
Figure 3: Descriptive Evidence

Panel A: Quantity Growth, New Products, Inflation and Household Income across Modules

(a) Quantity Growth and New Products

(b) Quantity Growth and Inflation

(c) Quantity Growth and Household Income

Panel B: New Products and Inflation Within and Across Modules

(d) New Products within Modules

(e) Inflation within Modules

(f) New Products and Inflation across Modules

Notes: Figures (a), (b), (c) and (f) report the best-fit lines of OLS regressions across 1,075 product modules, as well as binned scatter plots (each dot represents 5% of the data). Figure (a) shows the relationship between changes in product variety (measured by the Feenstra (1994) ratio, derived in Section 3.3) and the growth rate of quantities (using the exact quantity index for the nested CES demand system of Section 3.3). Figure (b) shows the relationship between the inflation rate for continued products (defined in each year as all barcodes observed in the current and previous year) and the growth rate of quantities. Figure (c) shows the relationship between the growth rate of quantities and mean (spending-weighted) consumer income. Figure (f) shows the relationship between the inflation rate for continued products and the share of spending on new products. Figures (d) and (e) present the best-fit lines from OLS regressions at the level of 10,750 product modules by price deciles, with product module fixed effects (the price deciles are built as described in Section 4.1). These figures also report the mean for each (within-module) decile. All regressions are weighted by spending.

Panel B of Figure 3 documents a strong negative correlation between inflation and the share of spending on new products across product modules. Appendix Section D.1 uses decomposition techniques to estimate the extent to which the difference in inflation rates between high- and low-income households results from the fact that high-income consumers tend to devote a higher share of their spending to product categories where the rate of product innovations is higher (i.e. moving to the right along the x-axis in Figure 3 (f)), or from the fact that high-income households tend to spend more on product categories with a lower share of inflation, holding the rate of product innovations constant (i.e. moving down the y-axis in Figure 3 (f)). Table D1 shows that for the various levels of aggregation, around half of the inflation difference between high- and low-income households is explained by differences in patterns of product innovations.

Additional patterns in support of the theory are reported in Appendix Section D.2. First, Appendix Table D2 isolates the contribution of supply factors by showing that the strong correlation between shares of spending on new products and mean consumer income across product modules is unaffected by the inclusion of
household fixed effects. This result rejects the hypothesis that the share of spending on new products is higher in product modules catering to higher-income households simply because new products diffuse faster due to a composition effect in demand.\textsuperscript{38} Second, Appendix Table D3 conducts a decomposition establishing that the inflation difference between high- and low-income households is driven by differences across manufacturers, rather than across retailers or stores. Indeed, most of the inflation difference occurs because high- and low-income households purchase different barcodes within the same store, rather than because they purchase from different stores or retailers in different areas. Third, Appendix Figure D2 indicates that competition, as measured by Herfindahl indices, increases over time in higher-quality tiers segments of the market, relative to lower-quality tiers. This evidence supports the prediction that increases in market size in higher-quality tiers spur entry and increasing competition. Finally, Appendix Figure D3 investigates inflation patterns across states. In all states, inflation was lower for households earning above $100,000 a year, relative to low-income households making below $30,000 a year. The inflation difference between high- and low-income households was larger in states with a faster increase in inequality, which is consistent with the notion of an endogenous supply response to changes in relative market size.\textsuperscript{39}

The relationships described so far are only correlations and should not be interpreted as causal. But they provide transparent evidence on the pervasive nature of the relationship between product innovations and inflation, on its link to changes in market size, and on its relevance for understanding purchasing-power inequality.

4.2 Causal Evidence

The equilibrium relationships between product innovations, price changes and quantities across product modules documented in Section 4.1 do not identify the causal effect of demand, because of reverse causality (better products will have larger markets: causality might run from supply to demand) and omitted variable bias (there might be unobserved heterogeneity in the difficulty of innovating across modules, which could happen to coincide with spending patterns across income groups). To address this issue, changes in market size at the national level driven by changes in the US age and income distributions are used in a Bartik-style research design.\textsuperscript{40}

4.2.1 Research Design

This section describes the research design, possible threats to identification and how to address them.

Consider two periods, $N$ socio-demographic household groups denoted by $n$ and $L$ product categories denoted by $l$. Between the two periods, each household group is characterized by the growth rate of the

\textsuperscript{38}Higher-income consumers might have a higher taste for novelty and purchase new products wherever they are introduced in the product space, while the rate of product introduction may be similar across product modules. The inclusion of household fixed effects directly addresses such composition effects.

\textsuperscript{39}Changes in inequality at the state level induce changes in relative market size only for retailers with strong local brand capital (Bronnenberg et al., 2012). See Appendix D2 for a complete discussion.

\textsuperscript{40}In robustness checks, variation in market size both over time and across states within the US is used. The primary specification uses national changes because most products in the database are priced nationally.
number of households in this group, denoted \( g_n \), and by growth rates in per-capita spending across the product space, denoted \( \tilde{g}_{nl} \). The share of total spending in product category \( l \) accounted for by household group \( n \) in the initial period is denoted \( s_{nl} \).

For an outcome variable \( Y_l \) (e.g. spending on new products and inflation for continued products), the relationship of interest is:

\[
Y_l = \alpha + \beta X_l + \eta_l
\]

where \( X_l = \sum_n s_{nl}(\tilde{g}_{nl} + g_n) \) is the overall growth of demand (total spending) in product category \( l \).

The first empirical challenge is reverse causality. Changes in supply that improve products and lower prices in a given part of the product space will endogenously lead to an increase in spending per capita \( \tilde{g}_{nl} \) in that part of the product space. To address this concern, the research design uses the component of growth of total spending resulting only from changes in the number of households \( g_n \):

\[
Y_l = \alpha + \beta Z_l + \epsilon_l
\]

where \( Z_l = \sum_n s_{nl}g_n \) is the growth of demand in product category \( l \) implied by changes in the number of households in each group.

Thus, spending profiles across the product space are kept constant and the variation in predicted demand comes entirely from changes in age-income group size over time. Variations in market size driven by US socio-demographic changes are likely to be exogenous to other, for example scientific, determinants of product innovations. The strategy of using time-invariant spending profiles \( (s_{nl}) \) and changes in the size of households groups \( (g_n) \) to address reverse causality follows Acemoglu and Linn (2004) and Dellavigna and Pollet (2007). It can also be viewed as a Bartik research design (Bartik, 1991, Blanchard and Katz, 1992, Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2016).

Specification (5) is implemented by building 108 age-income groups and segmenting the product space by product modules by price deciles. Appendix D.3.1 describes how the size of each of these groups varies over the course of the sample, using data from the Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey and taking 2000 to 2004 as the base period and 2011 to 2015 as the end period.\(^{41}\) In general, older groups grow faster, as the baby boomers enter retirement, and more affluent groups grow faster, in the context of growth and increasing inequality. Moreover, there is substantial variation in growth rates within age groups and within income groups.\(^{42}\) Appendix Figures D5 and D6 and Appendix Table D5 document these trends in detail.

\(^{41}\)Nine household income groups (<10k, 10k-20k, 20k-30k, 30k-40k, 40k-50k, 50k-60k, 60k-70k, 70k-100k, >100k, in 2004 dollars) and twelve household age groups (each spanning five years: 20-25, 25-30, ..., 70-75, >75) are considered. Household age is defined as the average age of the household head and their spouse. The patterns are similar when considering 30 coarser groups and when using the Census public-use micro data (IPUMS). Long-differences are used because innovation and entry decisions should respond to long-run changes in demand.

\(^{42}\)For instance, considering households in their thirties, there are relatively more high-income and low-income households over time, relative to a shrinking middle class. In contrast, for households in their sixties, growth rates are monotonically increasing in household income.
The product space is segmented into 10,750 product-module-by-price-decile cells, because new products and inflation dynamics vary widely even within product modules, as documented in Section 3 and Appendix C. Panel A of Figure 4 shows that income groups are segmented across the quality ladder within product modules, while Panel B shows that some products have strong age profiles, like baby diapers. The age-income spending profiles for each product module by price decile are built using data at the beginning of the sample, from 2004 to 2006.

Given these time-invariant age-income spending profiles, changes in market size implied by shifts in the age and income distributions over time are computed. The resulting patterns of predicted spending growth across the product space are shown on Panel C of Figure 4. The implied changes in market size are smoothly distributed around an annualized growth rate of around 1%, with substantial variation in growth rates. The standard deviation of annualized growth rates is 0.5%, as indicated in Appendix Table D6.

In sum, changes in the US age and income distributions over the course of the sample generate substantial variation in demand across the product space. Intuitively, some products have strong age profiles (e.g. diapers), some have strong income profiles (e.g. organic products) and some have distinct age-by-income profiles (e.g. craft beer and high-end wine). Identification requires that changes in the age and income distributions should have a direct effect on the equilibrium through demand only, and should not directly affect supply. 43

Figure 4: Changes in Market Size Implied by Changes in the Age-Income Distribution, 2004 to 2015

(a) Spending Across Quality Ladder by Income  (b) Spending on Baby Diapers by Age  (c) Annualized Predicted Growth of Spending Across the Product Space

Notes: Panel A shows the fraction of spending of households earning above $100,000 a year (“high income”) and below $30,000 (“low income”) across product modules by price deciles, built as in Section 4.1. Panel B shows the fraction of total spending on diapers accounted for by households across the age distribution. Panel C reports a histogram of the demand growth predictor built in Section 4.2.1 across 10,750 product modules by price deciles. The sample extends from 2004 to 2015.

The second empirical challenge is statistical power. The identification strategy described above requires using spending profiles estimated in the base period. If the spending patterns of the various age-income groups are not stable across the product space, then the research design will have no power. This can be checked directly by testing whether per capita spending at the beginning of the sample, from 2004 to 2006,

43 Heterogeneity in the treatment effect by age is studied below as a test of this assumption, given that older household groups are likely to be more marginally attached to the labor force and innovation activities. Furthermore, another research design is introduced in Appendix Section D.6, based on food stamp policy changes across states, which by construction is immune to direct supply effects.
is a good predictor of per capita spending at the end of the sample, from 2013 to 2015.

This regression is implemented using the spending patterns across 10,750 product modules by price deciles for the 108 age-income. The results are reported in Panel A of Figure 5 and in column 1 of Table 3. Initial spending patterns are strong predictors of future spending patterns: the point estimate is close to one, is precisely estimated, and the $R^2$ is above 0.6.

The third empirical challenge is omitted variable bias due to the endogeneity of initial expenditure shares. The OLS estimator for $\beta$ in specification (5) can be written as:

$$\hat{\beta} = \beta + \frac{1}{N} \sum_n (g_n \cdot (\sum_l w_{nl} \epsilon_l))$$

where $s_n = \frac{1}{L} \sum_l s_{nl}$ measures the importance of household group $n$ in an average product category, and $w_{nl} = \frac{N}{L} (s_{nl} - s_n)$ is increasing in the share of spending of $n$ in $l$ relative to the full sample. A formal derivation is provided in Appendix Section D.3.2.

Consistency requires the numerator $\frac{1}{N} \sum_n (g_n \cdot (\sum_l w_{nl} \epsilon_l))$ to go to zero. Intuitively, this means that there should be no systematic relationship across socio-demographic groups between the growth rate ($g_n$) and the weighted-average of the error term $\epsilon_l$ across the product space ($\sum_l w_{nl} \epsilon_l$) characterizing this group. For instance, consistency fails if groups that grow faster disproportionately source their consumption from parts of the product space where innovation is intrinsically easier.

Given the observed patterns of growth across age and income groups, without the introduction of more controls the condition for consistency shown in (6) seems unlikely to be met. For instance, higher-income groups tend to grow faster (Appendix Figure D5) and they source their consumption from higher-quality segments of the market (Panel A of Figure 4). It may be intrinsically easier to innovate and push prices down in high-quality segments of the market, where products are more differentiated and consumers are willing to pay for novelty. Similarly, older household groups grow faster and they may spend disproportionately more on product categories where innovation is low and inflation is high because, having defined their tastes earlier in life, these households are less less likely to adopt new products.

To address these possible sources of omitted variable bias, age group fixed effects and income group fixed effects are introduced, so that the coefficient $\beta$ is identified from residual variation of household group growth across the joint age-by-income distribution. The specification is:

$$Y_l = \alpha + \beta Z_l + \sum_a \lambda_a s_{al} + \sum_i \lambda_i s_{il} + \tilde{\epsilon}_l$$  \hfill (7)

where $s_{al}$ ($s_{il}$) is the share of total spending in $l$ accounted for by households in age group $a$ (in income group $i$) in the initial period. The OLS estimator for $\beta$ in specification (7) becomes:

$$\hat{\beta} = \beta + \frac{1}{N} \sum_n (\tilde{g}_n \cdot (\sum_l w_{nl} \tilde{\epsilon}_l))$$

$$\frac{1}{L} \sum_l (\sum_n (s_{nl} - s_n) \tilde{g}_n)^2$$  \hfill (8)

44 In addition, the denominator should not go to zero. This technical condition is satisfied as long as there is sufficient concentration of spending across household groups in a typical product category, which holds in the data. See Appendix D.3.2 for a complete discussion.
where $\bar{g}_n$ is the growth rate of the number of households in group $n$ after residualizing growth rates by age fixed effects and income fixed effects (Appendix D.3.2 provides the proof). In words, the research design identifies demand shocks from changes in the joint age-by-income distribution, rather than by exploiting broader changes affecting the entire age and income distributions (because the latter are more likely to be correlated with determinants of supply). Much of the overall variation in growth rates across groups occurs within age and income groups, as shown in Appendix Figure D6, which ensures that statistical power is retained even after the inclusion of controls.\footnote{Residualizing by age group fixed effects and income group fixed effects, the standard deviation of annualized growth rates across household groups becomes 1.25%, which is 56% of the raw standard deviation.}

A simple example illustrates the nature of the variation used in the research design: baby diapers. Consistent with the “polarization” of the US labor market and the shrinking US middle class (Autor and Dorn, 2013), over the course of the sample the numbers of 30-year-old households in both high- and low-income brackets grew faster than the number of 30-year-old middle-income households. The various panels of Appendix Figure D5 show that 30-year-old low-income households grew faster than both the average 30-year-old household and the average low-income household. Consequently, specification (7) attributes a positive demand shock to product categories primarily consumed by 30-year-old low-income households, such as low-quality baby diapers (conditional on age and income controls). Likewise, a positive demand shock is given to product categories mostly consumed by 30-year-old high-income households, such as high-quality baby diapers, while a negative demand shock is attributed to product categories primarily consumed by 30-year-old middle-income households, such as mid-range baby diapers. This identifying variation for demand shocks within the baby diaper category appears unlikely to be correlated with determinants of supply: supply shocks would need to vary non-monotonically along the quality ladder for baby diapers.

Finally, to address the concern that some omitted variable bias may survive even conditional on age and income controls, a falsification test is implemented using the lagged growth rates of the various age-income groups, computed between 1988 and 1999.\footnote{As another robustness check, Appendix Section D.6 reports results using variation in market size induced by changes in food stamp policy across states.} Appendix Figure D7 shows that lagged and contemporaneous growth rates are very weakly correlated. Lagged growth rates can be used to implement a falsification test as follows: if the demand predictor in specification (7) spuriously captures properties of expenditure shares, using lagged growth rates should not affect the point estimates much; but if the effect comes from changes in market size, specifications using lagged growth rates should lose significance.

4.2.2 Results

The strength of the relationship between market size growth, product innovations and inflation are best seen graphically using binned scatter plots. Panels B and C of Figure 5 show that the predicted increase in market size (based on the changes in the age and income distributions) is positively correlated with the introduction of new products and negatively correlated with inflation. The relationships are strong and lend clear support to the hypothesis that supply endogenously responds to changes in market size.
Figure 5: Causal Effects of Changes in Market Size

Panel A: Stability of Per-Capita Spending of Age-Income Groups across the Product Space

Panel B: Increasing Market Size Leads to Product Entry

Panel C: Increasing Market Size Leads to Lower Inflation for Continued Products

Notes: Panel A reports the relationship between per capita spending across product modules by price deciles for the 108 age-income groups described in Section 4.2.1. Panel B and C report OLS best-fit lines and binned scatter plots across 10,750 product modules by price deciles. Each dot represents 5% of the data. Panel B shows the relationship between the demand growth predictor built in Section 4.2.1 and the share of spending on new products, while Panel C reports the relationship between the demand growth predictor and the nested CES inflation rate for continued products. Regression results are reported in Panel A of Table 3. The sample extends from 2004 to 2015.
Table 3: Causal Effects of Changes in Market Size

Panel A: Main Results

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per-Capita Spending in 2004-2006 ($)</th>
<th>Share of Spending on New Products (pp)</th>
<th>Continued Products Inflation Rate (pp)</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>0.9114*** (0.03014)</td>
<td>2.7358*** (0.4887)</td>
<td>-0.4349*** (0.1195)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Predicted Increase in Spending, Annualized (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age and Income Controls</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Yes</th>
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<tr>
<td>Product Module Fixed Effects</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.54</td>
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<td>Number of Observations</td>
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<td>Number of Clusters</td>
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</table>

Panel B: Falsification Tests Using Lagged Predictor of Spending

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lagged Predictor of Increase in Spending, Annualized (%)</th>
<th>Share of Spending on New Products (pp)</th>
<th>Continued Products Inflation Rate (pp)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.8254 (0.9949)</td>
<td>0.1802 (0.2284)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Age and Income Controls | Yes |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Product Module Fixed Effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>10,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Clusters</td>
<td>1,075</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel C: Heterogeneity in Effect of Increasing Demand

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annualized Predicted Increase in Spending × Average Consumer Age</th>
<th>Share of Spending on New Products (pp)</th>
<th>Continued Products Inflation Rate (pp)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.06834 (0.19047)</td>
<td>0.004813 (0.03571)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annualized Predicted Increase in Spending × Average Consumer Income</th>
<th>Share of Spending on New Products (pp)</th>
<th>Continued Products Inflation Rate (pp)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.02806 (0.2043)</td>
<td>-0.002725 (0.02794)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Age and Income Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Product Module Fixed Effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>10,750</td>
<td>10,750</td>
<td>10,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Clusters</td>
<td>1,075</td>
<td>1,075</td>
<td>1,075</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Panels A to C report the results of regressions at the level of product modules by price deciles. The cells and the independent variable are built as described in Section 4.2.1. The inflation rate for continued products is the nested CES price index, computed based on barcodes that are available across consecutive years. The specification in the first column of Panel A is described in Section 4.2.1. The specifications in columns 2 and 3 of Panel A and in Panel B are given by equation (7), with product module fixed effects. In Panel C, the interacted regressors are standardized by their standard deviation and are demeaned, so that the regression coefficient on the treatment effect is similar to Panel A. The specifications for Panel C are described in Section 4.2.2. The sample extends from 2004 to 2015. In all panels, standard errors are clustered by product modules and regressions are weighted by log spending. *$p < 0.1$, **$p < 0.05$, ***$p < 0.01$. 
Table 3 shows that the relationships between predicted market size growth, product innovations and inflation are large and significant at the 1% level, clustering standard errors by product module. The interpretation of the magnitudes is as follows: a one percentage point increase in the annualized growth of predicted demand causes a 2.73 percentage point increase in the annual share of spending on new products and a 0.43 percentage point decline in the annual inflation rate on goods that are available across years.

Panels B and C of Table 3 document additional results. Panel B runs a falsification test using lagged growth rates of age-income groups. There is no significant relationship between the placebo predicted change in market size and entry of new products or inflation. Appendix Figure D7 reports the corresponding binned scatter plots. Panel C documents heterogeneity in the treatment effect. There is no significant heterogeneity in the effect of changes in demand on supply depending on the age of consumers: the results are not driven by young consumers, for whom direct supply effects are more likely to exist. This finding alleviates the concern that the relationship between predicted demand, innovation and inflation could be spuriously driven by a differential increase in supply across the product space. The second row of Panel C documents that there is no heterogeneity in the effect of demand across the income profile of product categories. This result justifies using the average treatment effect for all income groups in the prediction exercise carried out in Section 4.3.

A variety of robustness checks are reported in Appendix D.3.3. Panel A of Appendix Table D7 shows that increasing demand leads to more exit, but that the entry effects are stronger, such that on net product variety increases when demand increases. This panel also confirms that the relationship between predicted and actual growth of total spending is significant at the 5% level. Panel B shows that the effect of demand on supply does not vary much with the degree of competition across the product space, measured with the Herfindahl index. Panel C shows that the results are similar without spending weights.

---

47 Given the inclusion of fixed, the amount of residual variation used for estimation (shown on the x-axis of the binned scatter plots) is much smaller than the raw variation shown in Figure 4. It can be checked that there is residual variation in the growth rate locally across the range of raw growth rates shown in Figure 4, i.e. identification does not come from a specific part of the growth rate distribution. Regarding inference, it should be noted that idiosyncratic shocks at the level of household age-income groups will induce a correlation in error terms across the cells of the product space, because of the spending patterns of the various groups across the product space. Clustering standard errors by product module may therefore not be sufficient to obtain consistent standard errors. Borusyak and Jaravel (2017) show that a quasi-MLE estimator can be used to take account this more complex correlation structure. Using this estimator for the specifications reported in Table 3, the standard errors increase only slightly and the point estimates remain significant at the 1% level. These results are available upon request.

48 The magnitude of these effects is consistent with the competition channel: Appendix E.3.8 calibrates the strength of these effects using the model derived in Section 5 and shows that the various point estimates are in line with the notion that increasing demand leads to an increase in product variety and lower prices on continued products through the response of markups.

49 The interacted regressors of interest are (spending-weighted) average consumer age and average consumer income across product modules by price deciles indexed by l. Average consumer age is defined as \(A_l \equiv \sum_n s_{nl} A_n\) and average consumer income as \(I_l \equiv \sum_n s_{nl} I_n\), where \(A_n\) is the age of household group \(n\) and \(I_n\) their income. The heterogeneity specifications are similar to equation (7), but including an interaction between the predictor of demand and the interacted regressor of interest. The interacted regressors are standardized by their standard deviation and are demeaned.

50 Likewise, the point estimates are similar when repeating the analysis in a subsample of product categories whose average consumer age is above 55.

51 The point estimate in the first column of Appendix Table D7 is very close to 1, i.e. the predictor is unbiased. Unbiased prediction wasn’t necessarily expected, because the measure of actual total spending growth takes into account both price and quantity effects, while the predicted increase in spending is based on the assumption that spending per capita is fixed.
4.3 Implications of Shifts in the Income Distribution for Inflation Inequality

Do historical shifts in the income distribution imply substantial inflation inequality through the equilibrium response of supply? Over the course of the sample, and more broadly over recent decades, demand from high-income consumers has been increasing faster than demand from low-income consumers for two reasons. First, because of economic growth, more and more consumers have become high-income earners over time. Second, because of rising income inequality, the purchasing power of consumers at the top of the income distribution has been increasing faster than that of consumers at the bottom. These trends in the US income distribution have been widely documented (e.g. Piketty and Saez (2003), Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008), and Kopczuk, Saez and Song (2010)). Table 3 indicates that the long-term supply curve is downward-sloping. The point estimates from columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 are used to compute the implied effect on product entry and inflation of historical shifts in the income distribution, measured in the Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey. Changes in the income distribution are found to explain 83% of the observed retail inflation inequality.

To conduct this analysis, it is important to non-parametrically allow for a continuum of tastes across income groups, so that local density changes at a certain point of the income distribution may imply market size effects affecting consumers located in other parts of the income distribution (through common tastes). This is done in three steps. First, historical changes in the US income distribution are used to get changes in demand across detailed cells of the product space. 18 household income groups are considered, denoted by $i$, which are available in the Nielsen data from 2006 to 2009. Considering product-module-by-price-decile cells indexed by $l$, changes in demand induced by changes in the income distribution are built as follows:

$$d_l = \sum_n s_{nl} \cdot (1 + g_n)$$

where $s_{nl}$ is the share of total spending in $l$ accounted for by income group $n$ in 2006-2009 and $g_n$ is the growth rate of the number of households in group $n$ between 1986 and 2006. $d_l$ capture changes in demand induced by historical changes in the income distribution.

Second, the relevant point estimates from Table 3 are used to infer the patterns of product innovations and inflation induced by changes in the income distribution through market size effects. The predicted values are computed as follows:\(^{54}\)

$$\text{Predicted Share of Spending on New Products}_l = 2.73 \cdot d_l \quad (9)$$

$$\text{Predicted Continued Product Inflation Rate}_l = -0.43 \cdot d_l \quad (10)$$

---

\(^{52}\)This period is the only period in which Nielsen provides distinct bins of the income distribution above an income of $100,000.

\(^{53}\)Results are reported using secular changes in the income distribution, assuming that suppliers respond to long-term trends. Panels A and B of Appendix Figure D8 document the patterns of growth across income groups; the growth of the number of households in a group is monotonically increasing in the income of that group. The results are similar when using changes in the size of the various income groups over the course of the Nielsen sample (2004-2015) instead of the longer-term trend, as shown in Panel C of Appendix Figure D8.

\(^{54}\)This approach requires that the response of supply to changes in demand should be similar regardless of the income profile of the product category, which Panel C of Table 3 lends support to.
The final step is to compare the actual and predicted relationships between mean consumer income, spending on new products and inflation for continued products across the product space. Mean consumer income in product module by price decile \( l \) is defined as 
\[
I_l = \sum_n s_n I_n, \quad \text{with } I_n \text{ the income level of household group } n. 
\]
The actual and predicted values for spending on new products and inflation for continued products are regressed on \( I_l \) and a comparison is drawn between the actual and predicted OLS best-fit lines to gauge whether a substantial fraction of actual inflation inequality is induced by changes in the income distribution through market size effects and the endogenous supply response.$^55$

Figure 6: Inflation Inequality Implied by Changes in the Income Distribution

Panel A: Consumer Income and Spending on New Products, Actual vs. Predicted

Panel B: Consumer Income and Inflation for Continued Products, Actual vs. Predicted

Notes: Panel A shows the relationship between actual and predicted spending on new products and mean consumer income across product modules by price deciles. Panel B shows the relationship between actual and predicted nested CES inflation rates for continued products and mean consumer income across product modules by price deciles. The predictors are built using equations (9) and (10). The actual data is shown in blue, with the OLS best-fit line and one hundred data points each capturing 1% of the data. All specifications include log spending weights and product module fixed effects. Regression results and robustness checks are reported in Appendix Table D8. The sample extends from 2004 to 2015.

Figure 6 shows that the actual and predicted relationships between mean consumer income, spending on new products and inflation for continued products are closely aligned.$^56$ The predicted slopes are about

$^55$ The specifications are of the form \( Y_l = \beta I_l + \lambda_m + \epsilon_l \), where \( Y_l \) is in turn the actual share of spending on new products, the predicted share of spending on new product from equation (9), the actual nested CES inflation rate for continued products, and the predicted nested CES inflation rate for continued products from equation (10). \( \lambda_m \) denotes product module fixed effects.

$^56$ The predicted patterns for new products and inflation for continued products are almost perfectly linear. This is not
83% of the actual slopes, as reported in Appendix Table D8. This table shows that the results are similar regardless of the inclusion of product module fixed effects in the regression, indicating that the predictor is potent both across and within product modules. Overall, the results show that changes in the household income distribution explain a large fraction of inflation inequality across household income groups, through the endogenous response of supply.\textsuperscript{57}

4.4 Additional Evidence

To discipline the model developed in the final part of the paper, a series of additional results is presented. First, supply is found to respond to changes in market size, rather than to the level of market size. Second, markups are found to fall faster in parts of the product space catering to higher-income households. Third, a similar supply response is documented for changes in per capita spending at the bottom of the income distribution, induced by changes in food stamp policy. Fourth, other channels that may affect inflation inequality, such as international trade, are found to be quantitatively less important than the supply dynamics previously documented.

Changes in market size vs. level of market size. To test whether the supply response is driven by changes in market size, rather than the level of market size, a research design similar to the national age-income group research design, but exploiting cross-state variation, is used. The level of spending in a state is predicted based on the initial age and income distribution in that state and the age-income spending per capita profiles estimated using data in other states (thus addressing the identification concern that cheaper products typically attract more spending). Changes in spending are predicted using the observed change in the size of the various age-income groups in each state.

The results, reported in Panel A Table 4, show that the fall in inflation is entirely predicted by the increase in spending, rather than by the initial level of spending. Appendix Table D9 presents similar results with OLS regressions at the national level. These results are consistent with models in which an increase in market size only has a temporary effect on supply. In other words, changes in market size are the relevant predictors of the supply response, not the level of market size.

The role of markups. As mentioned in Section 2, retailer price $p_{it}$ and wholesale cost $c_{it}$ are observed from 2004 to 2007 for a subset of products. The retailer's gross margin $m_{it}$ is defined by: $p_{it} = m_{it} + c_{it}$. Do prices rise more slowly for high-income consumers because retailer margins decline more quickly or because wholesale costs rise more slowly? To answer this question, first note that a first-order Taylor expansion yields a convenient additive expression for the log price change: $\Delta \log(p_{it}) \approx \Delta \log(c_{it}) + \Delta \frac{m_{it}}{c_{it}}$. Next, with

---

\textsuperscript{57}Figure 1 depicts a convex pattern of inflation across income groups, which contrasts with the linear relationship between mean consumer income and inflation across the product shown in Figure 6. The contrast is due to the nature of non-homotheticities in the retail sector: above some income level, households tend to converge to similar consumption baskets because they all purchase high-quality items, and therefore have the same inflation rate. Appendix Figure D9 confirms this intuition by plotting a dissimilarity index characterizing consumption patterns across the income distribution.
\(I_i\) denoting mean consumer income in the module of product \(i\) and with \(\lambda_{st}\) denoting module-store-year fixed effects, the following specifications are estimated across product modules:  
\[
\Delta t \log(p_{it}) = \beta I_i + \lambda_{st} + \epsilon_{it}; \\
\Delta t \log(c_{it}) = \tilde{\beta} I_i + \tilde{\lambda}_{st} + \tilde{\epsilon}_{it}; \\
\Delta t \frac{m_{it}}{c_{it}} = \bar{\beta} I_i + \bar{\lambda}_{st} + \bar{\epsilon}_{it}.
\]

Note that \(\beta \approx \tilde{\beta} + \bar{\beta}\), which provides a convenient decomposition of inflation inequality \((\beta)\) into wholesale cost effects \((\tilde{\beta})\) and retailer margin effects \((\bar{\beta})\).  

The fixed effects absorb rent and labor costs, addressing the concern that the retailer gross margin \(m_{it}\) may fall due to changes in rent and labor cost. Empirically, inclusion of these fixed effects does not affect the results, which suggests that the relationship is driven by changes in markups over wholesale cost rather than differential changes in rents and labor costs across the product space.

Panel B of Table 4 shows that differential changes in retailer margins account for about half of the differential inflation between high- and low-income households, while differential changes in wholesale costs account for the other half. The result that about half of inflation inequality is explained by changes in retailer margins can be thought of as a lower bound on the total share of changes in markups in inflation inequality, because wholesalers, and in turn manufacturers, themselves have a markup. Appendix Figure D10 depicts changes in retailer margins and wholesale cost graphically. These relationships are robust across years and when using other specifications, changing the sets of fixed effect and weights. These results provide support for a model featuring variable markups.

**Food stamp research design.** Appendix Section D.6 introduces a research design based on food-stamp policy changes across US states. Between 2001 and 2007, the take-up rate for food stamps substantially increased in some states due to a series of policy changes that made it easier for eligible individuals to enroll in the program. This policy variation generates variation in purchasing power for food products at the bottom of the income distribution.

This identification strategy is a useful complement to the previous analysis based on changes in the number of consumers across the product space at the national level over time. First, it is useful to examine whether variation in demand coming from changes in per capita spending generates similar effects to variation in demand coming from changes in the number of consumers. Second, this research design has a number of advantages from the point of view of identification: there is clearly no direct supply effect, the market size change occurs at the bottom of the distribution (thus breaking the usual collinearity between level of income and rate of growth in income), and the time frame and the location of the market size change are known. Third, these findings are of direct policy relevance. A large effect is found, which can be summarized as follows: a 1 percentage point increase in spending per capita lowers the inflation rate by about 10 basis points.

**Alternative mechanisms.** Appendix Section D.7 studies two mechanisms that may disproportionately benefit the poor: the product cycle and international trade. These channels are found to be quantitatively less important than the endogenous supply dynamics documented previously. A series of other possible

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As can be checked from the regression table, the margins are sufficiently small for the Taylor expansion to be almost exact, which in turn implies that the relationship between the regression coefficients is almost exact.
mechanisms are investigated — aggregate shocks, online retail, innovation dynamics independent of changes in market size, and household search behavior. The evidence indicates that these channels are not the drivers of the patterns found in the data.

Table 4: Additional Evidence on the Supply Response to Changes in Demand

Panel A: Lower Inflation is Caused by Increases in Market Size

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inflation Rate for Continued Products (pp)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Predicted Increase in Spending, 2000-2004 to 2011-2015 (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predicted Level of Spending in 20040-2004 (Log)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department Fixed Effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spending Weights</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel B: Changes in Wholesale Costs vs. Changes in Retailer Margins

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Log Price Change</th>
<th>Log Wholesale Cost Change</th>
<th>Retailer Margin Change (pp)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean Income of Consumer in Product Module ($10,000)</td>
<td>-0.777*** (0.188)</td>
<td>-0.341*** (0.103)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Store-Year Fixed Effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spending Weights</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>6,002,235</td>
<td>6,002,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Clusters</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>628</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Panel A reports the result of regressions at the level of product modules by US states, following the methodology described in Section 4.4, in the full sample extending from 2004 to 2013. Panel B reports the results of barcode-level regressions, using information on wholesale cost and retail margin variables available in a subsample of the data, from 2004 to 2007, described in Appendix Section A.1.2. For both panel, the sample is restricted to continued products, defined as barcodes that are available across consecutive years. In both panels, standard errors are clustered by product modules. *p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

5 Model and Implications

This section presents a model bringing together the empirical results from the previous sections. On the demand side, the model flexibly accounts for non-homotheticities and generates tractable exact price indices across the income distribution. On the supply side, it features a downward-sloping long-term supply curve through both the endogenous introduction of new products and endogenous markups. Using CEX and CPI data, support is found for the key prediction of the model that lower-inflation for higher-income households is a long-term trend in retail and in other sectors. Taking into account inflation inequality in retail alone between 2004 and 2015, the rate of increase in purchasing-power inequality between the bottom and top income quintiles is 25% faster than when only considering changes in nominal income. This section concludes with a discussion of the implications of the findings for policy and for our understanding of innovation dynamics.
5.1 Model

A model is developed to show that market size effects from economic growth and rising income inequality induce biased innovations and inflation inequality to the benefit of higher-income groups. This section describes the setting, solves for the equilibrium and the comparative statics, and relate the results to the empirical evidence and other models in the literature.\textsuperscript{59}

**Non-homothetic CES aggregator across sectors.** Consider an arbitrary number of household types differing in their productivity level \( l^i \), \( i \in I \). The numbers of households of each type in each period \( t \) is denoted \( L^i_t \). These agents consume and produce in \( K \) different sectors of the economy. The number of products available in each sector is endogenous and denoted \( N_k \). In period \( t \), households maximize aggregate consumption \( C^t_i \) using a non-homothetic CES aggregator of sectoral consumptions \( \{ C^t_{ik} \}_{k=1}^K \):

\[
C^t_i = \left( \sum_{k=1}^K \tilde{\Omega}^t_{ik} \left( C^t_{ik} \right)^{\frac{\gamma_{ik}}{\gamma_{ik}-1}} \right)^{\frac{\gamma_{ik}-1}{\gamma_{ik}}}
\]

where the income-group-specific elasticity of substitution \( \sigma_i \) and income-group-specific sectoral weights \( \tilde{\Omega}_{ik} \) capture non-homotheticities. Appendix E.3 provides a micro-foundation for the \( \tilde{\Omega}_{ik} \) weights in terms of total consumption \( C^t_i \).\textsuperscript{60}

**Translog preferences within sectors.** Each sectoral consumption \( k \) is itself a consumption aggregator. Within a sector \( k \), all households have the same translog preferences. Let \( \tilde{N}_k \) be the total number of products (or, alternatively, firms)\textsuperscript{61} conceivably available in sector \( k \) and treat this number as fixed. Dropping the \( k \) and \( t \) subscripts for convenience and denoting by \( p_n \) the price of product \( n \), within each sector the translog expenditure function is defined as:\textsuperscript{62}

\[
\ln(E) = \ln(U) + \alpha_0 + \sum_{n=1}^{\tilde{N}} \alpha_n \ln(p_n) + \sum_{n=1}^{\tilde{N}} \frac{1}{2} \sum_{m=1}^{\tilde{N}} \gamma_{nm} \ln(p_n) \ln(p_m) \text{ with } \gamma_{nm} = \gamma_{mn} \forall m,n
\]

**Labor supply and budget constraint.** Labor is supplied inelastically. Households of type \( i \) are endowed with \( l^i \) effective units of labor.\textsuperscript{63} The wage for one effective unit of labor is the numeraire. Each

\textsuperscript{59}A number of simplifying assumptions are made for tractability but are all relaxed in Appendix E.3: 1. firms in each sector are homogeneous, i.e. have the same marginal and fixed costs of production; 2. agents maximize current-period consumption (hand-to-mouth); 3. consumer preferences are non-homothetic across sectors [i.e. different agents place different weights on the various sectors, depending on their income levels] but are homothetic within sectors [i.e. at the lowest level of aggregation, all agents have the same spending patterns]; 4. all agents enter the production function in a similar way across sectors, which implies that there is no feedback effect of shifting demand on wages across agent types; 5. all agents pay the same price for each bundle (within sectors). A closed economy is considered, because exposure to trade is very low for most of the goods considered in the empirical analysis. The median import penetration rate and the median export ratio across product modules are both about half a percentage point.

\textsuperscript{60}Intuitively, each sector \( k \) is characterized by an income elasticity parameter \( \epsilon_k \). As aggregate consumption \( C^t_i \) increases, the weight given to the consumption of good \( k \) varies at a rate controlled by the parameter \( \epsilon_k \). This generalization of the standard (homothetic) CES aggregator follows Comin, Lashkari and Mestieri (2016).

\textsuperscript{61}In my model presentation below and in the discussion of results, there is a one-to-one identification between a producer, a product, and a firm. The results are robust to the introduction of multi-product firms, as shown in Appendix E.3.30.

\textsuperscript{62}See Diewert (1974) and Feenstra (2003). The restrictions \( \sum_{n=1}^{\tilde{N}} \alpha_n = 1 \) and \( \sum_{m=1}^{\tilde{N}} \gamma_{nm} = 0 \) ensure that the expenditure function is homogeneous of degree one. Following the literature, I impose that all goods enter the expenditure function symmetrically: \( \alpha_n = \frac{1}{\tilde{N}} \) and \( \gamma_{nm} = \frac{-\epsilon_{N-1}}{\tilde{N}} \) for \( m \neq n \), with \( n, m = 1, \ldots, \tilde{N} \).

\textsuperscript{63}One could allow wealthier agents to have a comparative advantage in working for firms producing goods with higher income elasticities, which would create additional feedback effects. However, Leonardi (2015) shows that these effects are small.
household type is subject to the period budget constraint, with $c_{inkt}$ denoting consumption of variety $n$ in
sector $k$ by household $i$ at time $t$:

$$\sum_{k=1}^{K} \sum_{n=1}^{N_k} c_{inkt} \cdot p_{nt} = l^i$$

**Monopolistic competition between homogeneous firms within sectors.** Within each sector $k$, symmetric firms compete monopolistically. Given symmetry, firm subscripts $n$ are dropped in what follows. The quantity produced by a single firm is given by $q_k = Z_k l_k$, where $l_k$ is labor demand for production and $Z_k$ is a productivity factor specific to sector $k$. Moreover, all firms pay a sunk entry cost of $f_k$ effective units of labor, i.e. the required amount of labor for entry per firm is $\frac{f_k}{Z_k}$. Given this cost structure (see Appendix E.2.2 for a flexible cost structure) and the residual demand curve $p_k(q_k)$ implied by households’ preferences, firms maximize profits:

$$\max_{q_k} \pi_k(q_k) = p_k(q_k) \cdot q_k - \frac{q_k}{Z_k} \cdot \frac{f_k}{Z_k}$$

**Labor demand.** The total amount of labor required by all firms in sector $k$ is $L_k = N_k \cdot \left( \frac{q_k + f_k}{Z_k} \right)$.

**Free entry.** Firms enter sector $k$ until profits are brought to zero: $\pi_k = 0$.

**Proposition 1.** In period $t$, across sectors $k$ and income groups $i$, the equilibrium is characterized by:

- Number of varieties $\forall k$: $N_{kt}^* = \frac{(\gamma_k - 1) + \sqrt{(1 - \gamma_k)^2 + 4\gamma_k (\sum_i L_i^t \cdot l^t \cdot s_{ikt}) Z_k}}{2\gamma_k}$ (11)
- Demand elasticity $\forall k$: $\epsilon_{kt}^* = 1 + (N_{kt}^* - 1) \cdot \gamma_k$ (12)
- Markup $\forall k$: $M_{kt}^* = \frac{1}{(N_{kt}^* - 1) \cdot \gamma_k}$ (13)
- Price of varieties $\forall k$: $p_{kt}^* = (1 + M_{kt}) \cdot \frac{1}{Z_k}$ (14)
- Sectoral price index $\forall k$: $ln(P_{kt}^*) = \alpha_{kt} + \frac{1}{2} \frac{1 - N_{kt}^*}{\gamma_k N_{kt}^*} + \frac{1 + (N_{kt}^* - 1) \cdot \gamma_k}{(N_{kt}^* - 1) \cdot \gamma_k} \frac{1}{Z_k}$ (15)
- Sectoral spending share $\forall (i,k)$: $s_{ikt}^* = \frac{\Omega_{ikt} (P_{kt}^*)^{1-\sigma}}{\sum_{k=1}^{K} \Omega_{ikt} (P_{kt}^*)^{1-\sigma}}$ (16)
- Aggregate price index $\forall i$: $P_t^i = \left[ \sum_{k=1}^{K} \frac{\Omega_{ikt} (P_{kt}^*)^{1-\sigma}}{\Omega_{ikt} (P_{kt}^*)^{1-\sigma}} \right]^{1/(1-\sigma)}$ (17)

The full proof is given in Appendix E.3.

The expressions for the various equilibrium objects and the implied comparative statics with respect to market size in Proposition 1 are intuitive. Equation (11) shows that the equilibrium number of varieties in sector $k$ is increasing in market size (total spending) in that sector, which is given by the term $\left( \sum_i L_i^t \cdot l^t \cdot s_{ikt} \right)$. Market size is higher if there are more consumers (increased $L_i^t$), if their purchasing power is higher (increased $l^t$) and if their spending share in sector $k$ is higher (increased $s_{ikt}$). The elasticity of demand in a sector is increasing in the number of varieties in this sector, as indicated by (12): as the number of varieties increases,
consumers perceive them as less and less differentiated. This elasticity is the key feature of preferences which determines firms’ optimal markups in equilibrium. The markup on any given variety is decreasing in the price elasticity of demand, hence in the total number of varieties available in that sector, as shown in (13). The equilibrium price of varieties is given by the optimal markup over marginal cost in (14).

The comparative statics of the number of varieties and the price of varieties with respect to changes in market size are in line with the results in Table 3. Increasing market size causes the introduction of more products and, through increased competitive pressure and decreasing markups, lower inflation. Moreover, Appendix Section E.3.8 shows that the elasticity of the price of continuing products to changes in product variety implied by the model is closely aligned with the data.

The model delivers a tractable non-homothetic price index. Equation (15) shows that the sectoral price index goes down, i.e. welfare goes up, as the equilibrium number of varieties increases because of two forces. First, consumers love variety, which is captured by the term \( \frac{1 - N_k^*}{\gamma_k N_k^*} \); note that this term decreases at a decreasing rate as \( N_k^* \) increases, because the product space gets filled and there are decreasing returns to increasing product variety. Second, an increasing number of varieties leads to lower markups, which is reflected by the term \( \frac{1 + (N_k^* - 1) - \gamma_k}{(N_k^* - 1) - \gamma_k} \). Sectoral spending shares are determined by (16) and, in turn, (17) gives the price index for each income group.

**Proposition 2.** Represent changes in the income distribution between periods \( t-1 \) and \( t \) using a set \( \{g_{it}\}_{i=1}^I \) of growth rates in the number of households with income (productivity) \( l^i \), such that \( L_i^t = (1+g_{it})L_i^{t-1} \).

For each income group \( i \), with \( k \) denoting sectors, define the welfare-relevant market size effect implied by changes in the income distribution as:

\[
\tilde{g}_{it} = \sum_{k=1}^{K} s_{ik(t-1)} \cdot \left( \sum_{j=1}^{I} \tilde{s}_{kj(t-1)} \cdot g_{jt} \right)
\]

with \( s_{ik(t-1)} \) as defined in (16) and \( \tilde{s}_{kj(t-1)} \) denoting the share of income group \( j \) in total spending in \( k \) at \( t-1 \). Then, changes in prices indices \( \pi_{it} = \log(\mathbb{P}_t^i) - \log(\mathbb{P}_{t-1}^i) \) across the income distribution satisfy:

\[
\tilde{g}_{it} > \tilde{g}_{mt} \iff \pi_{it} < \pi_{mt}
\]

The full proof is given in Appendix E.3.7.
Intuitively, Proposition 2 indicates that if a household’s preferences are skewed toward parts of the product space that grow faster, then their price index falls relative to that of other households. As the market size becomes relatively larger, the price index decreases because of both increasing product variety (equation (11)) and decreasing markups (equation (14)). Households who source their consumption from parts of the product space that grow faster, due in particular to changes in the income distribution, benefit disproportionately from this process and face a lower inflation rate, in line with the patterns displayed in Figure 6.

Three lessons follow from Proposition 2. First, changes in the price index at a given point of the income distribution are determined by market size effects that take into account changes in the entire income distribution. For instance, to the extent that they share similar preferences, households in the middle class can benefit from increased spending from the upper middle class. Second, changes in the price index over time are determined by changes in market size rather than by the level of market size. Intuitively, when market size in a given part of the product space grows, it is profitable for firms to enter this part of the product space because the returns to paying the fixed cost of entry are higher in a larger market. However, markups endogenously decrease as more firms enter and competition intensifies, such that the process of entry eventually stops. In other words, product innovations and low inflation are features of growing markets, not of large markets, consistent with the evidence in Table 4. Finally, given that households taste diverge gradually across the income distribution (Appendix Figure D9), the market size effects implied by growth and rising inequality disproportionately benefit higher-income households. Given that the US economy is characterized by long-term trends of growth and rising top income shares, the model predicts a long-term trend of lower inflation for higher-income households.

Robustness. Although upward-sloping supply curves are a typical feature of standard price theory, a variety of models can generate the key prediction that in general equilibrium the quality-adjusted price goes down when demand increases. There are three broad classes of such models: endogenous growth macro models with scale effects (e.g. Romer, 1990, Aghion and Howitt, 1992, and Acemoglu and Linn, 2004), trade models with free entry and endogenous markups through variable-elasticity-of-substitution preferences (e.g. Melitz, 2003, and Zhelobodko et al., 2012), and industrial organization models with free entry and endogenous markups through strategic interactions between firms (e.g. Sutton, 1991, and Berry and Reiss, 2006). The model presented above has the advantage of being particularly tractable, consistent with all features of the data presented in Sections 3 and 4 (in contrast, existing models make counterfactual predictions, discussed in Appendix E.1) and robust to several extensions presented in Appendix E.3.10 (multi-product firms, heterogeneous productivity across firms, non-homotheticities within sectors, feedback effects of shifting demand on the relative income of the various household types, endogenous savings, and additional nests in the utility function).

\(^{67}\) Appendix Figure E3 illustrates that market size effects induced by equally-shared growth of income across the income distribution benefit higher-income households more. On the one hand, the upper tail of the income distribution becomes thicker, which encourages more entry for luxury products. On the other hand, there are fewer and fewer households at the bottom of the income distribution, which discourages entry for necessities and thus increases the effective level of poverty for those households who are in the lower tail of the income distribution.
5.2 Long-Term Inflation Inequality across Income Groups

To test the prediction from Proposition 2 that long-run changes in the income distribution should induce a long-term trend of lower-inflation for higher-income households, BLS and CEX data are used in two steps. First, CPI price series on 48 CEX expenditure categories are collected going back to 1953. These categories cover the full basket of consumer goods and services and are described in Appendix A.1.3. They are matched by hand across the CPI and CEX surveys. Second, price indices are built for the consumption baskets of households in the top and bottom quintiles of the income distribution, using expenditure shares fixed at 1980-1985 levels (which are observed in the CEX data).

The data thus obtain covers the full basket of consumption — in particular, housing, auto purchases and medical care are included. The advantage of this dataset is its broad coverage, as well as the fact that it goes much further back in time than the Nielsen data. This of course comes at a price: the data series are relatively aggregated, therefore it is more difficult to capture the segmentation of consumption across income groups, and quality adjustments are difficult to carry in many of the product categories.

To probe the external validity of the core findings of the paper, the CPI and CEX data are used to ask two questions. First, is inflation lower for the consumption basket of households in the top income quintile, relative to the bottom income quintile, over a long horizon? Second, does the difference increase after the 1970s, in the broader context of increasing inequality? The answer to both questions is yes.

Figure 7: Full-Basket Inflation Inequality across Income Groups in the Long Run

![Graph showing the relative price index for baskets of bottom versus top income quintiles from 1950 to 2015.](image)

**Notes:** This figure reports the relative price index of households in the bottom income quintile relative to households in the top income quintile from 1953 to 2015. The relative price index is normalized to one in 1953. Income-group-specific price indices are built using CPI and CEX data as described in Section 5.2.

The price series provided by BLS are meant to adjust for quality changes over time. No further adjustment is made.
was expected: the relatively broad level of aggregation of product categories biases the inflation difference towards 0, as Panel A of Table 2 showed. These results are not driven by any single broad product category and are robust to considering other base years for the spending shares, as well as education groups (Appendix Figure F1).

Finally, Appendix Figure F2 presents complementary evidence showing that technical change disproportionately benefited high-income households over a long time horizon. Despite aggregation bias, a clear pattern emerges: the number of granted patents and TFP growth have been substantially higher in sectors of manufacturing targeting high-income households.69

5.3 Implications

Inequality. The exact price index from the model derived in equation (17) is used to compute the implication of inflation inequality in the retail sector for purchasing-power inequality between the bottom and top quintiles of the income distribution. It is assumed that households’ preferences feature a Cobb-Douglas aggregator across retail and non-retail goods. The match of the Nielsen to the CEX data reported in Appendix 2 indicates that the Nielsen data captures 18% of spending for households in the bottom quintile of the income distribution, and 12% of spending for households in the top quintile. The overall increase in nominal income inequality between 2004 and 2015 is computed from the Census public-use microdata (IPUMS). Nominal income increased 0.93 percentage points faster per year in the top income quintile, relative to the bottom income quintile. The impact of inflation inequality in retail on purchasing-power inequality between these two groups is computed using the following formula:

$$\Delta Purchasing\ Power\ Inequality = \left( \Delta \log(Y^{Q1}) - \Delta \log(Y^{Q5}) \right) - \left( \alpha^{Q1} \Delta \log(P^{Q1}) - \alpha^{Q5} \Delta \log(P^{Q5}) \right)$$

where $P^{Q}$ denotes the price index in retail, $\bar{P}^{Q}$ the price index outside retail, $Y^{Q}$ income and $\alpha^{Q}$ the retail expenditure share for income quintile $Q$. From 2004 to 2015, inflation inequality in the retail sector had a large impact on purchasing-power inequality between the top and bottom income quintiles, equal to about one fourth of the impact of increasing income inequality. Figure 7 suggests that inflation patterns beyond retail may increase inflation inequality even further.70

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69 This analysis follows Boppart and Weiss (2013).
70 Assuming that there was no inflation inequality beyond retail, purchasing-power inequality increased 23.7% faster than nominal-income inequality. This number is a lower bound according to Figure 7, which suggests that inflation is likely to be lower for higher-income households outside retail as well. Using local house price indices, the analysis in Moretti (2013) shows that inflation in the housing sector is larger for college workers relative to high-school dropouts, but finds no difference across income groups. Diamond (2015) shows that once changes in amenities are taken into account, housing inflation is higher for lower-income groups. The CEX analysis presented in Section 5.2 relies on a common price index for the housing sector for all households and ignores these within-housing differences, which is an example of aggregation bias. According to Diamond (2015), the estimates in Figure 7 are conservative. In Appendix F.3, using the demand system and changes in expenditure patterns in the CEX over time, a lower bound of 0.65 percentage point for the overall level of inflation inequality between the top and bottom income quintiles is derived. Although striking, this lower-bound result must be approached with caution because it remains subject to aggregation bias, one of the major findings of Section 3, which pleads for additional work with suitable microdata in other sectors of the economy.
In sum, the two main lessons of this paper regarding inequality are that purchasing-power inequality is increasing faster than commonly thought, at least in the retail sector but probably also beyond, and that changes in nominal income inequality have an amplification effect, because of the response of supply to changes in relative market size. But two caveats should be kept in mind. First, a more unequal income distribution may have other effects on the equilibrium dynamics of innovation that are not captured in this paper. For instance, because the early adopters are typically high-income households, it could be the case that a more unequal income distribution allows for the introduction of more new technologies that eventually “trickledown” to the rest of the income distribution and benefit everyone (e.g. as in Matsuyama, 2002). This paper does not speak to this general equilibrium effect. Second, much of the debate about inequality in the US has revolved around the income share of the top 1%, and the results in this paper do no speak to this part of the income distribution, where quality-adjusted consumption is very difficult to measure.71

Policy. The various findings in this paper have two implications for public policy. First, accurately measuring quality-adjusted inflation across income groups is important. Inflation differences were found to be large across income groups in the retail sector (Figure 1) and are likely to persist beyond retail (Figure 7). Several government transfers are indexed to food-at-home CPI (e.g. food stamps); many others are indexed on the full-basket CPI (e.g. Social Security), as are income poverty thresholds and tax brackets.72 Between 2004 and 2015, according to the food price index for households who were eligible for food stamps, the nominal increase in food stamp benefits required to preserve purchasing power was 31.44%, instead of the 23.19% actual increase implied by indexation on the overall food CPI.73 To appropriately account for income-group-specific inflation rates, it appears essential for BLS to improve on its ability to measure income-group-specific spending patterns, so that rigorous measurement of quality-adjusted inflation across income groups becomes possible in all sectors of the economy (as opposed to only in those sectors for which barcode scanner data happens to be available). A first step could be to record information on income in the Telephone Point of Purchase Survey (TPOPS) administered by BLS. The existing micro-data available to researchers and staff at BLS already makes it possible to measure price changes at different points of the quality (price) distribution within detailed product categories. Combining this information with simple estimates of quality Engel curves within categories (as in Bils and Klenow, 2001) may be sufficient to capture the bulk of the inflation difference across income groups.74

The second lesson for public policy is that taking into account the supply response to market size changes induced by policy is key for cost-benefit analysis. Food stamps, the EITC, UI and DI insurance, the minimum

71 Indeed, the consumption of very high-income households is not well covered in scanner data and, in general, tends to be much more idiosyncratic (e.g. luxury products and services that are highly customized and make quality adjustments very difficult, such as luxury cruises).

72 Following Orshansky (1962), poverty is measured according to an “absolute” scale in the US, which makes the adjustments for non-homothetic price indices even more important than in countries using relative measures of poverty, like most European countries.

73 The estimate for food-stamp eligible households was obtained from a Laspeyres price index on food products within the Nielsen data, considering only households whose income satisfies the eligibility requirements for food stamps.

74 Indeed, Table C1 showed that inflation inequality largely results from inflation difference across the quality distribution, at least in retail.
wage, Social Security transfers, the possible introduction of a universal basic income, and so on — these policies will all affect the relative market size of different groups of agents, which will induce a targeted response of supply, with price effects which will determine the equilibrium real effects of the policy change. In Section 4 and Appendix D.6, such effects were found to be large in retail and to make food stamp policy more potent than usually thought, because it induces a supply response that lowers the equilibrium price for the recipients. Estimating the equilibrium incidence of other policies would be fruitful.

**Innovation.** The various results of the paper show the importance of increasing product variety, and how it differs across income groups. In retail, product innovations are typically simple “customizations”, such as a new flavor or a new size, as opposed to radically new products that usher in a new technological era — like smart phones, electric cars, etc. But these simple product innovations do change people’s lives by providing more variety and lower prices for everyday purchases, which account for an important share of total spending. This paper has shown that the dynamics of product variety are largely governed by changes in market size, and for that reason they disproportionately benefit high-income households. This stands in contrast with the “product cycle” view, according to which innovation tends to benefit everyone equally. The product cycle does characterize some parts of the product space relatively well, e.g. consumer electronics, but in many large sectors of the economy the logic of increasing product variety may be the dominant force at play — this paper has shown that it is the case for retail, and a similar logic might apply in other sectors, as suggested by the evidence presented in Section 5.2 using CPI and CEX data.

6 Conclusion

This paper has investigated theoretically and empirically the endogenous response of product innovations and prices on continued products to changes in market size. In a period of growth and rising inequality, these dynamics were found to magnify purchasing-power inequality. In the retail sector between 2004 and 2015, the price index of high-income households rose substantially more slowly than that of low-income households. Using a Bartik-style research design to estimate the response of supply to changes in demand, most of this inflation inequality can be quantitatively explained by the supply response to changes in demand across the product space. In line with the theory, a secular trend of lower-inflation for higher-income households is found in CPI and CEX data on the full consumption basket of American households going back to 1953.

This paper raises a number of questions for future research. First, a similar analysis could be carried out with suitable micro data in sectors of the economy beyond retail and in countries other than the United States. Second, more work is needed to characterize the impact of a range of policies on inflation and product variety across the income distribution, which could significantly alter their cost-benefit analysis (e.g. minimum wage laws, sales tax changes, or transfer programs like the EITC). Finally, from a theoretical perspective, it would be fruitful to build on Mirrlees (1971) and adjust optimal redistributive taxation formulas to take into account the endogenous response of supply to changes in market size induced by redistribution.
References


Hausman, Jerry, “Sources of bias and solutions to bias in the consumer price index,” the Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2003, 17 (1), 23–44.


Appendix

A Data Appendix

A.1 Data Sources

A.1.1 Manufacturer Identifier Data

In order to measure manufacturer entry and competition, I use data from GS1, the company in charge of allocating bar codes in the US, on the universe of barcodes and manufacturers. I match the barcodes observed in the Nielsen data to manufacturers using the first few digits of the bar code - the match rate is close to 95%. Since the cutoff size for a manufacturer to appear in this dataset is to make a sale rather than an arbitrary number of workers, I can observe the full distribution of manufacturers in each product group. There are about 500 manufacturers on average in each product group, with 90 percent of the product groups having more than 200 manufacturers. The median number of products supplied by a manufacturer is 5 and the average is 14.

Consistent with the findings reported by Hottman et al. (2016), while on average half of all output in a product group is produced by just five manufacturers, around 98 percent of manufacturers have market shares below 2 percent. Thus, the typical product group is characterized by a few large manufacturers and a competitive fringe of manufacturers with very low market shares. Another important feature of the data is that even the largest manufacturers are not close to being monopolists: the largest manufacturer in a product group on average has a market share of 22 percent. The model presented in Section 5 is consistent with these patterns.

A.1.2 Retailer Markup Data

To test specific predictions of the model in Section 5, I use data on retailer markups. I have access to weekly product-level data between January 2004 and June 2007 in 19 U.S. states, for 250 grocery stores operated by a single retail chain. This dataset contains information for 125,048 unique products (UPCs), mostly in the food and beverages categories, housekeeping supplies, books and magazines, and personal care products. Most of the stores are located in the western and eastern corridors, in the Chicago area, Colorado and Texas. For every store in every week, data is available on the price, the wholesale cost and the marginal cost of each product. I infer the markups of the retailer based on the price and wholesale cost. Note that I do not measure other costs like labor, rent and utilities. In the analysis carried out in Section 4, store-year fixed effects are used to absorb these costs. The dataset also reports “adjusted gross profits” per unit for each product, defined as the net price minus the sum of wholesale costs and transportation costs plus net rebates from the manufacturer - I use this adjustment in robustness checks.

In addition, I can measure wholesale prices from 2006 to 2011 using data from National Promotion Reports’ PRICE-TRAK database. These data contain wholesale price changes and deal offers by UPC in 48 markets during this period, along with associated product attributes such as item and pack sizes. The data
are sourced from one major wholesaler in each market, which is representative due to the provisions of the Robinson-Patman (Anti-Price Discrimination) Act. I compute retail margins by matching wholesale prices with retail prices by UPC, item size, and year.

A.1.3 BLS Consumer Price Index and Consumer Expenditure Survey Data

In order to provide suggestive evidence about the external validity of the findings obtained with the Nielsen data, I rely on additional data and find that the results are likely to extend to earlier periods and to other product groups. Specifically, I use the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) to compute the full consumption baskets of various income and education groups. In order to price the items in these consumption baskets, I manually match the various CEX product categories to 48 item-specific Consumer Price Index (CPI) data series. These price series extend back to 1953 and I thus obtain estimates of income-group-specific inflation rates for the full consumption basket over a long time horizon. The results are reported in Section 5 and support the idea that the findings obtained in the Nielsen sample apply more broadly.

The product categories are matched by hand and are as follows: cereals, bakery, beef, pork, other meat, poultry, fish, egg, dairy, fresh fruit, fresh vegetables, sugar, fat and oils, other food, beverages, food away from home, beer at home, whiskey at home, wine at home, spirits at home, alcohol away from home, shelter, rent, fuel, utilities, electricity, oil, water, furniture, men’s apparel, boys’ apparel, girls’ apparel, infants’ apparel, footwear, other apparel, new vehicles, used vehicles, motor fuel, vehicle maintenance, vehicle insurance, public transportation, medical care products, medical care services, tobacco, personal care products, personal care services.

A.1.4 More on Nielsen Scanner Data

Description of Homescan Consumer Panel Data: I primarily rely on the Home Scanner Database collected by AC Nielsen and made available through the Kilts Center at The University of Chicago Booth School of Business. AC Nielsen collects these data using hand-held scanner devices that households use at home after their shopping in order to scan each individual transaction they have made. Faber and Fally (2015) report that on average each semester covers $105 million worth of retail sales across 58,000 individual, across more than 500,000 barcodes belonging to 180,000 brands.

Description of Retail Scanner Data: The Retail Scanner Data consist of weekly price and quantity information for more than one hundred retail chains across all US markets between January 2006 and December 2013. The database includes about 45,000 individual stores. The stores in the database vary in terms of the channel they represent: e.g. food, drug, mass merchandising, liquor, or convenience stores. Faber and Fally (2015) report that on average each semester covers $110 billion worth of retail sales across 25,000 individual stores, across more than 700,000 barcodes belonging to 170,000 brands.

The strength of the home scanner database is the detailed level of budget share information that it

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75These results are based on relatively aggregated data and are therefore much cruder than those obtained with the Nielsen microdata. But the consistency of the results across samples is striking.
provides alongside household characteristics. Its relative weakness in the comparison to the store-level retail scanner data is that the home scanner samples households and, therefore, has higher sampling error at the product level. Relative to the home scanner data, the store-level retail scanner data records more than one thousand times the retail sales in each semester. I primarily rely on the home scanner data in the paper, but I present robustness checks based on the retail scanner data.

**Examples.** The food industry has undergone a revolution in the past fifteen years, with the rise of organic and natural food products, which illustrates the price and quantity dynamics discussed in the paper particularly well. As shown in Figure A1, organic products constitute an increasing share of the market and their price relative to nonorganic food products has been steadily decreasing. For a detailed study of the sector, the US Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service report.

Another particularly good example illustrating the forces discussed in the paper is the market for snacks. In recent years, meat snacks have grown tremendously - for instance premium beef jerky, with sustained double-digit growth for over five years nationwide. Premium beef jerky is a high-protein, low-fat and low-calorie snack - a practical and healthy snack that particularly appeals to young and high-income households. The branding of premium beef jerky is fundamentally different from that of traditional jerky - favorite of truckers and staple of gas-station checkouts - and so is its production process. In particular, many of the varieties of premium beef jerky are fully organic - for instance, beef jerky made from 100% grass-fed cattle from networks of small family farms. The so-called “jerky renaissance” is largely driven by demand. It is answering the demand of high-income consumers concerned with healthy living and eager to support a sustainable, more humane agriculture. And it is taking place in a broader context of increased demand for snacks - a Nielsen survey found that one in ten Americans say they eat snacks instead of meals - and for proteins - according to the NPD group, more than half of Americans say they want more protein in their diet. The competition for the premium beef jerky market has intensified in recent years, with an ever-increasing number of small, local players but also with the entry of established companies through acquisitions. For instance, Krave, one of the early players in premium jerky who led the market in the late 2000s, was acquired in 2015 by Hershey’s, the largest chocolate manufacturer in North America. Accordingly, premium beef jerky prices have fallen and varieties have increased. Similar - although less spectacular - dynamics are visible in other segments of the snack industry, like hummus and protein bars, but not so in segments catering to lower-income consumers, like chips, bars and nuts.

Another case in point is craft beer - the number of microbreweries in the United States went from about 30 in the early 1990s to 300 in the early 2000 to more than 3,000 today, and the relative price of craft beers relative to entry-level beers has plummeted.\[76\]

\[76\] Source: https://www.brewersassociation.org.
Figure A1: The Rise of Organic Food Products

Panel A: Quantities

Organics’ share of total product sales are rising


Panel B: Relative Prices

Organic price premiums for only a few of the products studied have fallen over 2004-10

Local Markets: Both the home scanner and retail scanner data can be disaggregated into 76 local markets, which are shown on the map below.

Figure A2: Map of the 76 Local Markets Tracked in the Nielsen Data

A.2 Summary Statistics

Table A1 compares aggregate spending share in the Nielsen scanner data with the Consumer Price Index for all urban consumers (CPI-U) and the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). As expected, the Nielsen products are not representative of the full consumption basket. Accordingly, in order to probe the external validity of the findings based on the Nielsen data, I extend the analysis using CPI and CEX data in Section 5. Figure A3 reports the spending shares of the top and bottom income quintiles across CEX item categories. Using a Laspeyres price index, inflation in the Nielsen data closely approximates the Food CPI, as shown in Figure A4.
Table A1: Comparing Spending in Nielsen Basket and Full Consumption Basket

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spending Category</th>
<th>Expenditure Shares (%)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CPI-U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food and beverages</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food at home</td>
<td>13.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cereals and bakery products</td>
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<td>Cereal products</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakery products</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meats, poultry, fish, and eggs</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meats, poultry, and fish</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eggs</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dairy and related products</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruits and vegetables</td>
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<td>Nonalcoholic beverages, beverage materials</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other food at home</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sugar and sweets</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fats and oils</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other foods</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Food away from home</td>
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<td>Housing</td>
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<td>Household furnishings and operations</td>
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<td>Furniture and bedding</td>
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<td>Appliances</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other household equipment and furnishings</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Tools, hardware, outdoor equipment, supplies</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housekeeping supplies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Household operations</td>
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<td>Video and audio</td>
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<td>Other recreational services</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreational reading materials</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education and communication</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others goods and services</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco and smoking products</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal care</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure A3: Expenditures Shares of Top and Bottom Income Quintiles (2012 CEX data)

Notes: This figure reports expenditure shares across expenditure categories for households in the top income quintile (high income) and in the bottom income quintile (low income). The data is from the 2012 CEX survey.
Figure A4: Comparison of Food CPI Inflation with Inflation on Food Products in Nielsen Data

Notes: The Food CPI series is obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The Nielsen food inflation rates is built using a Laspeyres price index in the sample of goods from the following departments: dry grocery, frozen food, dairy, deli, packaged meat, and fresh produce.
B Price Index Appendix

B.1 Chaining

An important consideration is whether or not to chain the price index. In a chain index, each link consists of an index in which each period is compared with the preceding one, the weight and price reference being moved forward each period. A chain index is therefore path dependent: it depends on the prices and quantities in all the intervening periods between the first and last period in the index series. When there is a gradual economic transition from the first to the last period, chaining is advantageous because it smooths trends in relative prices and quantities and tends to reduce the index number spread between the various price indices listed above.

But if there are fluctuations in the prices and quantities in the intervening periods, chaining may not only increase the index number spread but also distort the measure of the overall change between the first and last periods. For example, suppose all the prices in the last period return to their initial levels in period 0, which implies that they must have fluctuated in between. A chain Laspeyres index will not return to 100: it will tend to be greater than 100. If the cycle is repeated with all the prices periodically returning to their original levels, a chain Laspeyres index will tend to drift further and further above 100 even though there may be no long-term upward trend in the prices. Chaining is therefore not advised when the price fluctuates.

Accordingly, I present robustness checks with and without chaining the indices.

B.2 Estimation Equations for (Nested) CES Exact Price Index

Given the formula reported in the main text, we only need to estimate the module-specific elasticities. We do this by first modeling the supply and demand conditions for each good within a module.

The demand equation comes from the following transformation, which exploits the panel nature of the data:

\[
\ln(s_{umgt}) - \ln(s_{umg(t-1)}) = \Delta \ln(s_{umgt}) \\
= (1 - \sigma_m) [\ln(p_{umgt}) - \ln(p_{umg(t-1)})] + \lambda_{mt}
\]

where the second line uses (1) and the fact that quality/taste is assumed to be constant over time. The fixed effect corresponds to the change in the price index of the module. In practice, there will be an estimation error, which for instance could come from yearly change in taste (which would affect the \(d\) parameters). So we can write the demand curve as:

\[
\Delta \ln(s_{umgt}) = (1 - \sigma_m) \Delta \ln(p_{umgt}) + \lambda_{mt} + \epsilon_{umgt}
\]
Then, we assume an isoelastic supply curve (with $\alpha > 0$ assumed to be the same for all UPCs within a module):

\[
\ln(c_{umgt}) = \alpha \ln(p_{umgt}) + \chi_{mg} \\
\ln(s_{umgt}) = \alpha \ln(p_{umgt}) - \ln(E_{mg}) + \chi_{mg}
\]

Differencing over time:

\[
\ln(s_{umgt}) - \ln(s_{umg(t-1)}) = \alpha \left[ \ln(p_{umgt}) - \ln(p_{umg(t-1)}) \right] + \ln(E_{mg}) - \ln(E_{mg(t-1)})
\]

so

\[
\Delta \ln(p_{umgt}) = \frac{1}{\alpha} \Delta \ln(s_{umgt}) - \frac{1}{\alpha} \Delta \ln(E_{mg}) = \frac{1}{\alpha} \Delta \ln(s_{umgt}) + \psi_{mg}
\]

The fixed effect corresponds to the change in total expenditures in the module (which is observed). In practice there will be estimation errors, e.g. due to assembly line shocks, so we write:

\[
\Delta \ln(p_{umgt}) = \frac{1}{\alpha} \Delta \ln(s_{umgt}) + \psi_{mg} + \delta_{umgt}
\]

We now want to eliminate the fixed effects in the demand and supply equations. We take a difference relative to the UPC $k$ with the largest market share:

\[
\Delta^k \ln(s_{umgt}) = (1 - \sigma_m) \Delta^k \ln(p_{umgt}) + \epsilon^k_{umgt}
\]

\[
\Delta^k \ln(p_{umgt}) = \frac{1}{\alpha} \Delta^k \ln(s_{umgt}) + \delta^k_{umgt}
\]

with $\Delta^k X = \Delta X_{umgt} - \Delta X_{kmgt}$, $\epsilon^k_{umgt} = \epsilon_{umgt} - \epsilon_{kmgt}$ and $\delta^k_{umgt} = \delta_{umgt} - \delta_{kmgt}$.

Now we can set up the moment condition, based on the assumption that the UPC-specific demand and supply shocks are uncorrelated over time, i.e. $E_t[\epsilon^k_{umgt} \delta^k_{umgt}] = 0$.

\[
v_{umgt} = \epsilon^k_{umgt} \times \delta^k_{umgt}
\]

\[
G(\beta_m) = E_t(v_{umgt}(\beta_m)) = 0 \; \forall u, m \; \text{and} \; g
\]

This can be written as:

\[
v_{umgt}(\beta_m) = \epsilon^k_{umgt} \times \delta^k_{umgt}
\]

\[
= (\Delta^k \ln(s_{umgt}) - (1 - \sigma_m) \Delta^k \ln(p_{umgt})) \times \left( \Delta^k \ln(p_{umgt}) - \frac{1}{\alpha} \Delta^k \ln(s_{umgt}) \right) \\
= (\sigma_m - 1) (\Delta^k \ln(p_{umgt}))^2 - \frac{1}{\alpha} (\Delta^k \ln(s_{umgt}))^2 + \frac{\alpha + (1 - \sigma_m)}{\alpha (\sigma_m - 1)} \Delta^k \ln(s_{umgt}) \Delta^k \ln(p_{umgt})
\]

The moment condition $E_t[v_{umgt}(\beta_m)] = 0$ means:

\[
E_t \left[ (\Delta^k \ln(p_{umgt}))^2 \right] = \frac{1}{\alpha (\sigma_m - 1)} E_t \left[ (\Delta^k \ln(s_{umgt}))^2 \right] - \frac{\alpha + (1 - \sigma_m)}{\alpha (\sigma_m - 1)} E_t \left[ \Delta^k \ln(s_{umgt}) \Delta^k \ln(p_{umgt}) \right] \; \forall u, m \; \text{and} \; g
\]
Rewriting $\alpha \equiv \frac{1 + \omega_m}{\omega_m}$ yields:

$$E_t \left[ (\Delta^k \ln(p_{umgt}))^2 \right] = \frac{\omega_m}{(1 + \omega_m)(\sigma_m - 1)} E_t \left[ (\Delta^k \ln(s_{umgt}))^2 \right] - \frac{1 - \omega_m(\sigma_m - 2)}{(1 + \omega_m)(\sigma_m - 1)} E_t \left[ \Delta^k \ln(s_{umgt}) \Delta^k \ln(p_{umgt}) \right]$$

The parameters $\omega_m$ and $\sigma_m$ are estimated under the restriction that $\omega_m > 0$ and $\sigma_m > 1$. To do this, $\theta_1$ and $\theta_2$ are first estimated by weighted least squares, as in Feenstra (1994). Then I go back to the primitive parameters. If this produces imaginary estimates or estimates of the wrong sign, a grid search is performed for the objective function for values of $\sigma_m \in [1.05, 131.5]$ at intervals that are 5 percent apart.

Given estimates for $\sigma_m$, the price index formula given in equation (2) can be implemented. An example of how equation (2) captures the impact of different types of creation and destruction is given in Broda and Weinstein (2010): “Let’s consider the case of a new type of sunscreen that replaces an earlier type. If the new sunscreen is just a repackaging of last year’s sunscreen without a noticeably different quality or price, then, ceteris paribus, the new sunscreen will have a market share equal to that of the old sunscreen. If this is true, then the share of common goods will be unchanged and our measured quality bias from the replacement of the old model would be zero. If, instead, the new sunscreen is priced identically but is of a higher quality than the old model, then, ceteris paribus, its market share will rise. This result comes directly from the optimizing behavior of the consumer, because the new sunscreen will have a lower price per unit quality than the old sunscreen. If this is the case, the higher share of the new good relative to the old good implies that there is a “quality bias” in the conventional price index that only considers products existing across periods.”

### B.3 Estimation Equations for Translog Exact Price Index

This section derives estimation equation for the translog price index. The translog price index is used as a robustness check for the results with the CES price index presented in Section 3. As shown in Panel B of Figure 2 in the main text, the results are very similar to CES. Moreover, the translog price index comes out of the model developed Section 5, where translog preferences are nested in CES preferences. The derivations below show how to estimate the translog elasticity parameter of the lower nest of the preference structure from Section 5. Since the logic of the derivation of the estimation equations for translog is similar to what was was done for CES in Appendix Section B.2, only the main steps are reported here.

The derivation of the estimation equations borrows from Feenstra and Weinstein (2016), who derive similar equations at the firm level (rather than at the variety level). As shown in Feenstra and Weinstein (2016), with a changing set of varieties, at time $t$ the rate of inflation in the translog price index for product module $m$ is given by:

$$\tilde{\pi}_m = \tilde{P}_m \cdot \exp \left( \frac{\tilde{\lambda}_{mt} - \tilde{\lambda}_{mt-1}}{\gamma_m} \right) \cdot \exp \left( -\frac{\left( \sum_i s_{it}^2 - \sum_i s_{i(t-1)}^2 \right)}{2\gamma_m} \right)$$

where $\tilde{P}_m$ is the Tornqvist price index introduced in Section 3.2, $\tilde{\lambda}_{mt}$ is the share of spending at time $t$ on products that did not exist at time $t - 1$, $\tilde{\lambda}_{mt-1}$ is the share of spending at time $t - 1$ on products that no
longer exist at time $t$, $s_{it}$ denotes the spending share on $i$ at time $t$. Intuitively, the second term means that inflation declines when product variety increases, and the third term means that inflation increases when the Herfindahl index of expenditure shares decreases. These terms reflect the fact that the translog demand system features love-of-variety (term 2), but at a declining rate (term 3). As more products get introduced, the product space becomes more crowded and consumers benefit less from an additional variety (see Section 5 for a discussion of these effects and their implications for markups).

The key object to estimate is $\gamma_m$, which govern the degree of substitutability between products within product module $m$. If $\gamma_m$ takes a very large value, i.e. if products are very substitutable, then inflation is correctly by the Tornqvist price index on continued products: $\bar{\pi}_m \to P_m$ as $\gamma_m \to \infty$. The intuition is similar to the CES case: when products are highly substitutable, a law of one price applies.

To estimate $\gamma_m$, it is important to take into account that prices are endogenous, as in a conventional supply and demand system. For the CES case, Feenstra (1994) showed how this endogeneity could be overcome by specifying the supply equation and assuming that the demand and supply errors are uncorrelated. Identification of the model parameters from this moment condition depended on having heteroskedasticity in second-moments of the data, so this is an example of “identification through heteroskedasticity,” as discussed more generally by Rigobon (2003). A similar logic applies to the translog case.

The key equations for estimation are as follows. On the supply side, we have the pricing equation:

$$\ln(p_{it}) = \omega_{i0} + \omega \ln(s_{it}) + \omega \ln(E_t) + \ln(1 + \frac{s_{it}N_t}{\gamma(N_t - 1)}) + \delta_{it} \quad (21)$$

where $\delta_{it}$ is an idiosyncratic supply shock. The demand side is characterized by the equation:

$$s_{it} = \alpha_{it} + \alpha_t - \gamma (\ln(p_{it}) - \ln(p_t))$$

Next, model $\alpha_{it}$ as a barcode fixed effect plus an idiosyncratic error term: $\alpha_{it} = \alpha_i + \epsilon_{it}$. The demand curve becomes:

$$s_{it} = \alpha_i + \alpha_t - \gamma (\ln(p_{it}) - \ln(p_t)) + \epsilon_{it} \quad (22)$$

Equations (21) and (22) can now be transformed to yield the estimation equation. We difference with respect to product $k$ and with respect to time, thereby eliminating the terms $\alpha_i + \alpha_t$ and the overall average prices $\ln(p_t)$. Denoting $X_t - X_{t-1}$ by $\Delta X$, we obtain:

$$\frac{\Delta s_{it} - \Delta s_{kt}}{\gamma} = \frac{\Delta \ln(p_{it}) - \Delta \ln(p_{kt})}{1 + \omega} (\Delta \ln(s_{it}) - \Delta \ln(s_{kt})) - \frac{1}{1 + \omega} \left( \Delta \ln(1 + \frac{s_{it}N_t}{\gamma(N_t - 1)}) - \Delta \ln(1 + \frac{s_{kt}N_t}{\gamma(N_t - 1)}) \right)$$

Multiplying these equations together yields:

$$Y_i = \frac{\omega}{1 + \omega} X_{1i} + \frac{\omega}{\gamma(1 + \omega)} X_{2i} - \frac{1}{\gamma} X_{3i} + \frac{1}{1 + \omega} Z_{1i}(\gamma) + \frac{1}{\gamma(1 + \omega)} Z_{2i}(\gamma) + \bar{u}_i \quad (23)$$
where the over-bar indicates averaging variables over time and:

\[ Y_{it} = (\Delta \ln(p_{it}) - \Delta \ln(p_{kt}))^2 \]
\[ X_{1it} = (\Delta \ln(s_{it}) - \Delta \ln(s_{kt})) \cdot (\Delta \ln(p_{it}) - \Delta \ln(p_{kt})) \]
\[ X_{2it} = (\Delta \ln(s_{it}) - \Delta \ln(s_{kt})) \cdot (\Delta s_{it} - \Delta s_{kt}) \]
\[ X_{3it} = (\Delta \ln(p_{it}) - \Delta \ln(p_{kt})) \cdot (\Delta s_{it} - \Delta s_{kt}) \]
\[ Z_{1it} = \left( \Delta \ln(1 + \frac{s_{it}N_t}{\gamma(N_t - 1)}) - \Delta \ln(1 + \frac{s_{kt}N_t}{\gamma(N_t - 1)}) \right) \cdot (\Delta \ln(p_{it}) - \Delta \ln(p_{kt})) \]
\[ Z_{2it} = \left( \Delta \ln(1 + \frac{s_{it}N_t}{\gamma(N_t - 1)}) - \Delta \ln(1 + \frac{s_{kt}N_t}{\gamma(N_t - 1)}) \right) \cdot (\Delta s_{it} - \Delta s_{kt}) \]
\[ u_{it} = \frac{(\Delta \epsilon_{it} - \Delta \epsilon_{kt}) (\Delta s_{it} - \Delta s_{kt})}{\gamma(1 + \omega)} \]

Under the assumption that the contemporaneous (differenced) demand and supply shocks are uncorrelated, \( \bar{u}_i \to 0 \) as \( T \to \infty \) and equation (23) can be used to estimate \( \gamma \) by nonlinear least squares. I do so using grid search and imposing \( \gamma > 0.5 \), given that the results are sensitive to small values of \( \gamma \). The results are presented in Appendix Table C9 and Panel B of Figure 2 in the main text.
C Additional Analysis on Quality-Adjusted Inflation across Income Groups

C.1 Decomposition of Inflation Difference across UPC codes

Does the quality ladder within product modules play an important role for inflation inequality? Price deciles are computed within each product module based on the average (spending-weighted) unit price of the products that are available in consecutive years. This approach provides a way to segment the product space even within product modules, the highest level of disaggregation provided by Nielsen. Prices are adjusted for the weight of the item in order to provide a more accurate measure of the unit price.

Table C1 shows that differences in the spending patterns of high- and low-income households across price deciles within product modules explain more than 85% of the inflation difference between high- and low-income households that exists across UPCs. In other words, the decomposition shows that the inflation difference between high- and low-income households can be accounted for almost entirely by the fact that inflation is lower for higher-quality products (with higher unit prices), which primarily cater to higher-income consumers. Similar patterns exist when decomposing the share of spending on new products.

Table C1: Decomposition of the Inflation Difference Between High- and Low-Income Households Relative to Across-UPC Benchmark

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aggregation Level (Broad to Narrow)</th>
<th>Inflation Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department</td>
<td>0.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Product Group</td>
<td>0.143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Product Module</td>
<td>0.282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Product Module*Price Decile</td>
<td>0.408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPC</td>
<td>0.476</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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C.2 Aggregation Bias

McGranahan and Paulson (2005) compute income-specific inflation rates based on between-ELI inflation differences and income-specific CEX spending patterns. Figure C1 and Table C2 report the levels of inflation inequality measured in this data, in the period that overlaps with the Nielsen sample as well as in the pre-period. The numbers are consistent with what is obtained in the Nielsen data using the “between product group” methodology (Table 2 in the main text).

Figure C1: Inflation Inequality between 2004 and 2013, Following McGranahan and Paulson (2005)

Table C2: Average Inflation Difference between Bottom and Top Income Quartiles, Following McGranahan and Paulson (2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average Annual Inflation difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983-1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### C.3 Inflation on Continued Products

Table C3: Robustness of the Difference in Inflation for Continued Products between Income Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample Restriction</th>
<th>Average Annual Inflation Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Years ≤ 2007 only</td>
<td>0.532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years ≥ 2011 only</td>
<td>0.559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excluding Health and beauty care</td>
<td>0.689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excluding Dry grocery</td>
<td>0.738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excluding Frozen food</td>
<td>0.690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excluding Dairy</td>
<td>0.649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excluding Deli</td>
<td>0.657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excluding Packaged meat</td>
<td>0.654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excluding Fresh produce</td>
<td>0.655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excluding Non-food grocery</td>
<td>0.534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excluding Alcohol</td>
<td>0.638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excluding General merchandise</td>
<td>0.631</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table reports the inflation difference for continued products between households making above $100,000 (high income) and below $30,000 (low income) across subsamples. In any given year, barcodes that are not observed in both the current and previous year are excluded. Appendix Tables C4 to C14 report additional robustness checks.
### Table C4: Average Annual Inflation Rates Across Three Income Groups

#### Panel A: Full Sample (Percentage Points)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income $&lt;$ $30k</th>
<th>Income $\in [30k-100k]$</th>
<th>Income $&gt;$ $100k$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geometric Laspeyres</td>
<td>1.212 (Arithmetic Avg.) 1.204 (Geometric Avg.)</td>
<td>0.912 (Arithmetic Avg.) 0.951 (Geometric Avg.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truncated Geometric Laspeyres</td>
<td>1.544 (Arithmetic Avg.) 1.536 (Geometric Avg.)</td>
<td>1.137 (Arithmetic Avg.) 1.157 (Geometric Avg.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paasche</td>
<td>1.580 (Arithmetic Avg.) 1.571 (Geometric Avg.)</td>
<td>0.985 (Arithmetic Avg.) 1.010 (Geometric Avg.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truncated Paasche</td>
<td>1.719 (Arithmetic Avg.) 1.710 (Geometric Avg.)</td>
<td>1.182 (Arithmetic Avg.) 1.194 (Geometric Avg.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tornqvist</td>
<td>1.938 (Arithmetic Avg.) 1.929 (Geometric Avg.)</td>
<td>1.426 (Arithmetic Avg.) 1.418 (Geometric Avg.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisher</td>
<td>1.983 (Arithmetic Avg.) 1.974 (Geometric Avg.)</td>
<td>1.425 (Arithmetic Avg.) 1.418 (Geometric Avg.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall-Edgeworth</td>
<td>1.992 (Arithmetic Avg.) 1.984 (Geometric Avg.)</td>
<td>1.440 (Arithmetic Avg.) 1.433 (Geometric Avg.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CES Ideal</td>
<td>2.041 (Arithmetic Avg.) 2.032 (Geometric Avg.)</td>
<td>1.529 (Arithmetic Avg.) 1.552 (Geometric Avg.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truncated CES Ideal</td>
<td>2.063 (Arithmetic Avg.) 2.054 (Geometric Avg.)</td>
<td>1.541 (Arithmetic Avg.) 1.534 (Geometric Avg.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walsh</td>
<td>2.076 (Arithmetic Avg.) 2.065 (Geometric Avg.)</td>
<td>1.571 (Arithmetic Avg.) 1.563 (Geometric Avg.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truncated Laspeyres</td>
<td>2.257 (Arithmetic Avg.) 2.502 (Geometric Avg.)</td>
<td>1.724 (Arithmetic Avg.) 1.910 (Geometric Avg.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laspeyres</td>
<td>2.387 (Arithmetic Avg.) 2.379 (Geometric Avg.)</td>
<td>1.867 (Arithmetic Avg.) 1.860 (Geometric Avg.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truncated Geometric Paasche</td>
<td>2.433 (Arithmetic Avg.) 2.424 (Geometric Avg.)</td>
<td>1.742 (Arithmetic Avg.) 1.734 (Geometric Avg.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geometric Paasche</td>
<td>2.669 (Arithmetic Avg.) 2.660 (Geometric Avg.)</td>
<td>1.942 (Arithmetic Avg.) 1.934 (Geometric Avg.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Panel B: All Years but Great Recession (Percentage Points, Arithmetic Average)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income $&lt;$ $30k</th>
<th>Income $\in [30k-100k]$</th>
<th>Income $&gt;$ $100k$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geometric Laspeyres</td>
<td>0.870 (Arithmetic Avg.) 0.642 (Geometric Avg.)</td>
<td>0.318 (Arithmetic Avg.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truncated Geometric Laspeyres</td>
<td>1.179 (Arithmetic Avg.) 0.876 (Geometric Avg.)</td>
<td>0.627 (Arithmetic Avg.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paasche</td>
<td>1.246 (Arithmetic Avg.) 0.732 (Geometric Avg.)</td>
<td>0.768 (Arithmetic Avg.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truncated Paasche</td>
<td>1.380 (Arithmetic Avg.) 0.928 (Geometric Avg.)</td>
<td>0.919 (Arithmetic Avg.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tornqvist</td>
<td>1.586 (Arithmetic Avg.) 1.144 (Geometric Avg.)</td>
<td>1.085 (Arithmetic Avg.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisher</td>
<td>1.625 (Arithmetic Avg.) 1.161 (Geometric Avg.)</td>
<td>1.111 (Arithmetic Avg.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall-Edgeworth</td>
<td>1.633 (Arithmetic Avg.) 1.176 (Geometric Avg.)</td>
<td>1.116 (Arithmetic Avg.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CES Ideal</td>
<td>1.674 (Arithmetic Avg.) 1.254 (Geometric Avg.)</td>
<td>1.169 (Arithmetic Avg.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truncated CES Ideal</td>
<td>1.695 (Arithmetic Avg.) 1.268 (Geometric Avg.)</td>
<td>1.192 (Arithmetic Avg.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walsh</td>
<td>1.707 (Arithmetic Avg.) 1.297 (Geometric Avg.)</td>
<td>1.204 (Arithmetic Avg.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truncated Laspeyres</td>
<td>1.891 (Arithmetic Avg.) 1.448 (Geometric Avg.)</td>
<td>1.316 (Arithmetic Avg.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laspeyres</td>
<td>2.006 (Arithmetic Avg.) 1.592 (Geometric Avg.)</td>
<td>1.455 (Arithmetic Avg.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truncated Geometric Paasche</td>
<td>2.071 (Arithmetic Avg.) 1.467 (Geometric Avg.)</td>
<td>1.623 (Arithmetic Avg.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geometric Paasche</td>
<td>2.308 (Arithmetic Avg.) 1.648 (Geometric Avg.)</td>
<td>1.858 (Arithmetic Avg.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table C4: Average Annual Inflation Rates Across Three Income Groups (Continued)

Panel C: Years Prior to Great Recession (Percentage Points, Arithmetic Average)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income &lt; $30k</th>
<th>Income ∈ [$30k-$100k]</th>
<th>Income &gt; $100k</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geometric Laspeyres</td>
<td>1.210</td>
<td>0.808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truncated Geometric Laspeyres</td>
<td>1.545</td>
<td>1.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paasche</td>
<td>1.521</td>
<td>0.906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truncated Paasche</td>
<td>1.670</td>
<td>1.186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tornqvist</td>
<td>1.854</td>
<td>1.303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisher</td>
<td>1.884</td>
<td>1.281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall-Edgeworth</td>
<td>1.892</td>
<td>1.294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CES Ideal</td>
<td>1.966</td>
<td>1.452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truncated CES Ideal</td>
<td>2.019</td>
<td>1.493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walsh</td>
<td>2.001</td>
<td>1.501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truncated Laspeyres</td>
<td>2.249</td>
<td>1.658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laspeyres</td>
<td>2.249</td>
<td>1.658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truncated Geometric Paasche</td>
<td>2.317</td>
<td>1.688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geometric Paasche</td>
<td>2.502</td>
<td>1.802</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel D: Years After Great Recession (Percentage Points, Arithmetic Average)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income &lt; $30k</th>
<th>Income ∈ [$30k-$100k]</th>
<th>Income &gt; $100k</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geometric Laspeyres</td>
<td>0.615</td>
<td>0.519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truncated Geometric Laspeyres</td>
<td>0.905</td>
<td>0.738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paasche</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>0.601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truncated Paasche</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>0.735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tornqvist</td>
<td>1.386</td>
<td>1.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisher</td>
<td>1.430</td>
<td>1.070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall-Edgeworth</td>
<td>1.439</td>
<td>1.088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CES Ideal</td>
<td>1.456</td>
<td>1.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truncated CES Ideal</td>
<td>1.452</td>
<td>1.099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walsh</td>
<td>1.485</td>
<td>1.143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truncated Laspeyres</td>
<td>1.675</td>
<td>1.321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laspeyres</td>
<td>1.823</td>
<td>1.542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truncated Geometric Paasche</td>
<td>1.886</td>
<td>1.301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geometric Paasche</td>
<td>2.162</td>
<td>1.532</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table C4: Average Annual Inflation Rates Across Three Income Groups (Continued)

Panel E: During the Great Recession (Percentage Points, Arithmetic Average)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Income &lt; $30k</th>
<th>Income ∈ [$30k-$100k]</th>
<th>Income &gt; $100k</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geometric Laspeyres</td>
<td>2.408</td>
<td>1.857</td>
<td>1.411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truncated Geometric Laspeyres</td>
<td>2.821</td>
<td>2.049</td>
<td>1.685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paasche</td>
<td>2.751</td>
<td>1.872</td>
<td>1.657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truncated Paasche</td>
<td>2.903</td>
<td>2.069</td>
<td>1.811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tornqvist</td>
<td>3.168</td>
<td>2.413</td>
<td>2.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisher</td>
<td>3.235</td>
<td>2.351</td>
<td>2.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall-Edgeworth</td>
<td>3.249</td>
<td>2.364</td>
<td>2.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CES Ideal</td>
<td>3.323</td>
<td>2.492</td>
<td>2.147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truncated CES Ideal</td>
<td>3.352</td>
<td>2.498</td>
<td>2.186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walsh</td>
<td>3.369</td>
<td>2.531</td>
<td>2.189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truncated Laspeyres</td>
<td>3.721</td>
<td>2.831</td>
<td>2.506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laspeyres</td>
<td>3.721</td>
<td>2.831</td>
<td>2.506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truncated Geometric Paasche</td>
<td>3.700</td>
<td>2.705</td>
<td>2.518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geometric Paasche</td>
<td>3.933</td>
<td>2.973</td>
<td>2.666</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table C5: Average Annual Inflation Rates Across Four Income Groups

Panel A: Full Sample (Percentage Points)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income &lt; $25k</th>
<th>Income ∈ [$25k-$50k]</th>
<th>Income ∈ [$50k-$100k]</th>
<th>Income &gt; $100k</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geometric Laspeyres</td>
<td>1.236</td>
<td>1.029</td>
<td>0.785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truncated Geometric Laspeyres</td>
<td>1.561</td>
<td>1.293</td>
<td>1.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paasche</td>
<td>1.647</td>
<td>1.249</td>
<td>0.962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truncated Paasche</td>
<td>1.766</td>
<td>1.414</td>
<td>1.132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tornqvist</td>
<td>2.000</td>
<td>1.668</td>
<td>1.365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisher</td>
<td>2.045</td>
<td>1.687</td>
<td>1.377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall-Edgeworth</td>
<td>2.052</td>
<td>1.698</td>
<td>1.396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CES Ideal</td>
<td>2.086</td>
<td>1.763</td>
<td>1.462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truncated CES Ideal</td>
<td>2.106</td>
<td>1.778</td>
<td>1.474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walsh</td>
<td>2.116</td>
<td>1.800</td>
<td>1.501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truncated Laspeyres</td>
<td>2.293</td>
<td>1.984</td>
<td>1.657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laspeyres</td>
<td>2.445</td>
<td>2.126</td>
<td>1.795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truncated Geometric Paasche</td>
<td>2.527</td>
<td>2.090</td>
<td>1.738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geometric Paasche</td>
<td>2.769</td>
<td>2.311</td>
<td>1.949</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel B: All Years but Great Recession (Percentage Points, Arithmetic Average)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income &lt; $25k</th>
<th>Income ∈ [$25k-$50k]</th>
<th>Income ∈ [$50k-$100k]</th>
<th>Income &gt; $100k</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geometric Laspeyres</td>
<td>0.843</td>
<td>0.729</td>
<td>0.529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truncated Geometric Laspeyres</td>
<td>1.164</td>
<td>1.007</td>
<td>0.769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paasche</td>
<td>1.289</td>
<td>0.964</td>
<td>0.723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truncated Paasche</td>
<td>1.405</td>
<td>1.148</td>
<td>0.885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tornqvist</td>
<td>1.613</td>
<td>1.374</td>
<td>1.097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisher</td>
<td>1.660</td>
<td>1.392</td>
<td>1.127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall-Edgeworth</td>
<td>1.666</td>
<td>1.403</td>
<td>1.148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CES Ideal</td>
<td>1.692</td>
<td>1.469</td>
<td>1.201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truncated CES Ideal</td>
<td>1.713</td>
<td>1.489</td>
<td>1.211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walsh</td>
<td>1.722</td>
<td>1.504</td>
<td>1.241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truncated Laspeyres</td>
<td>1.895</td>
<td>1.683</td>
<td>1.394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laspeyres</td>
<td>2.033</td>
<td>1.823</td>
<td>1.533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truncated Geometric Paasche</td>
<td>2.143</td>
<td>1.805</td>
<td>1.474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geometric Paasche</td>
<td>2.388</td>
<td>2.024</td>
<td>1.669</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table C6: Average Annual Inflation Rates across the Income Groups at UPC*Geography Level (Full Sample, Percentage Points, Arithmetic Average)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income range</th>
<th>Paasche</th>
<th>CES Ideal</th>
<th>Laspeyres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Income &lt; $30k</td>
<td>2.065</td>
<td>2.434</td>
<td>2.789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income ∈ [$30k-$100k]</td>
<td>1.401</td>
<td>1.902</td>
<td>2.365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income &gt; $100k</td>
<td>1.341</td>
<td>1.722</td>
<td>2.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table C7: Average Annual Inflation Rates across the Income Groups at UPC*Store Level
(Full Sample, Percentage Points, Arithmetic Average)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Range</th>
<th>Paasche</th>
<th>CES Ideal</th>
<th>Laspeyres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Income &lt; $30k</td>
<td>2.239</td>
<td>2.471</td>
<td>2.710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income ∈ [30k-$100k]</td>
<td>2.002</td>
<td>2.248</td>
<td>2.471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income &gt; $100k</td>
<td>1.692</td>
<td>1.901</td>
<td>2.072</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C.4 The Product Cycle

One may worry that the patterns about inflation and new products are driven by the “product cycle” - namely, products start in the market with a very high price, and at that point are only purchased by high-income households, and then converge to their long-run, stable price, at which point they start being purchased by lower-income households. This concern is addressed in several ways.

First, recall that about 40% of the patterns of differential inflation and product innovations across income groups occur between product modules, as reported in Panels A and B of Table 2.\textsuperscript{77} For instance, the rich spend relatively more on scotch than on tobacco and there is a faster increase in product variety in scotch. Since these are different product modules, using different technologies, these patterns are not about the product cycle. If the product cycle was driving the results, then the measured differences in inflation and product innovations should not be visible between product modules.

Second, a direct test for the product cycle was implemented, computing the average income of the consumers buying a given barcode over the lifecycle of this barcode (using spending weights). The average income of consumers is found not to decline as the barcode ages: Figure C4 reports a precisely estimated zero. Therefore it is not the case that a new barcode is first purchased by the rich and only later by the poor.

Figure C4: Looking for the Product Cycle

\textsuperscript{77} These patterns across product modules are illustrated graphically on Panel A of Figure 2 for new products and on Panel F of Figure 3 for inflation on continued products.
Third, if the product cycle is the driving force in the data, it predicts a negative relationship between the rate of churn of products in a module and inflation on continued products in this module. On the other hand, the theory developed in this paper predicts that there should be a negative relationship between the rate of increase in product variety in a module and inflation on continued products. Figure C5 reports that there is no significant relationship between churn and inflation, but that there is a strong negative relationship between increasing product variety and inflation across product modules. One would not expect such patterns if the product cycle were the driving force given that the product cycle is about churn, not about increasing product variety.

Figure C5: The Relationship between Churn, Increasing Product Variety, and Inflation for Continued Products

Panel A: Churn and Inflation for Continued Products across Product Modules

Panel B: Increasing Product Variety and Inflation for Continued Products across Product Modules

The only type of product cycle that could be left given these patterns is a product cycle that would occur across barcodes within a given product module (rather than within barcodes). But the inflation patterns implied by such product cycle are precisely what is captured by the CES price index introduced by Feenstra (1994). In the income-group-specific CES price index, the adjustment term for new products is computed

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separately for each income group, based on the basket of goods consumed by each income group in the previous year. Therefore, even in that case, the estimates of the inflation difference between income groups would not be biased.

Finally, the measurement of inflation for continued products across income groups was repeated by considering only products in the middle of their lifecycle. In any given year, the sample was restricted to products that had been in the market for at least two years and that would remain in the market for at least two more years. The inflation patterns obtained with this approach are similar to those reported in the main text. These results are available upon request.

C.5 Welfare Effects from Increasing Product Variety across Income Groups

Figure C6 shows that the patterns of increasing product variety across product modules are similar when measured by using the growth of the total count of UPC codes or the “Feenstra ratio”

\[
\frac{\lambda_{gmt}}{\lambda_{gmt-1}} = \frac{1 + \text{Growth Rate of Spending on Overlapping Products}_{gmt}}{1 + \text{Growth Rate of Total Spending}_{gmt}}
\]

which is the welfare-relevant metric in equation (2).

Figure C6: Increasing Product Variety across Income Groups

Panel A: Annual Growth in Total UPC Count across the Product Space

Panel B: Feenstra Ratio across the Product Space
Figure C7 shows that manufacturer entry occurs disproportionately in parts of the product space catering to higher-income households. The introduction of new products in product modules by price deciles in which a manufacturer was previously never active explains over 50% of the patterns of increasing product variety across income groups. This directly addresses the concern that the patterns of increasing product variety would be directly due to spurious “relabeling” of UPC codes.

Figure C7: Manufacturer Entry Benefits Higher-Income Consumers More

Panel A: Manufacturer Entry

Panel B: Manufacturer Entry in a New Product Module - Price Decile

Table C8 shows the distribution of “Feenstra ratios” $\frac{\lambda_{mgt}}{\lambda_{mgt-1}}$ and of the elasticities of substitution in 1,075 product modules for households making above $100,000 a year (“high income”) and households making less than $30,000 (“low income”). A back-of-the-envelope calculation, based on the formula in equation (2) and using the mean Feenstra ratios and the mean elasticity, yields a difference in welfare gain between high- and
low-income households in line with the results in Figure 2:

\[ \Delta \pi = \frac{1}{6.2 - 1} \left( (1 - 0.9515) - (1 - 0.9448) \right) = 12.88\text{bp} \]

Table C8: Within-module CES Elasticities of Substitution and Feenstra Ratios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>p25</th>
<th>p50</th>
<th>p75</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feenstra Ratios</td>
<td>High-Income</td>
<td>0.9448</td>
<td>0.9092</td>
<td>0.9666</td>
<td>0.9913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low-Income</td>
<td>0.9515</td>
<td>0.9229</td>
<td>0.9666</td>
<td>0.9942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CES Elasticities</td>
<td>High-Income</td>
<td>6.2680</td>
<td>3.9873</td>
<td>5.5027</td>
<td>7.5624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low-Income</td>
<td>6.3272</td>
<td>4.0974</td>
<td>5.7874</td>
<td>7.5196</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table C9 shows the distribution of translog elasticities of substitution across product modules for households making above $100,000 a year (“high income”) and households making less than $30,000 (“low income”). Panel B of Figure 2 in the main text shows that under the translog demand system, inflation patterns on continued products contribute to a 62 basis point lower rate of (annual) inflation for high-income households, relative to low-income households, and the dynamics of entry and exit contribute another 2 basis points. Intuitively, because elasticities of substitution are high, price changes on continued products capture most of the differential welfare effects.

Table C9: Within-module Elasticities of Substitution for Translog Demand System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>p25</th>
<th>p50</th>
<th>p75</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Translog Semi-Elasticities</td>
<td>High-Income</td>
<td>54.93</td>
<td>0.9902</td>
<td>3.6522</td>
<td>150.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low-Income</td>
<td>61.43</td>
<td>1.0231</td>
<td>4.6534</td>
<td>150.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel B of Figure 2 in the main text also reports the results when valuing new products using the “lower bound” formula of Hausman (2003), using the nested CES elasticity. The technique introduced by Hausman (2003) is a conservative way to value new products, using the slope of the demand curve at the observed prices and quantities: the use of a linear demand curve to estimate infra-marginal consumer surplus will provide a lower bound for the true infra-marginal consumer surplus (unless the true demand curve is concave to the origin, which is theoretically possible but is not expected for most products). The compensating variation under the linear demand curve is easily calculated as

\[ \hat{\pi}_{Hausman}^{m} = \frac{0.5 \times (\hat{\lambda}_{mt} - \hat{\lambda}_{mt-1})}{\sigma_m} \]

where \( \hat{\lambda}_{mt} \) is the share of spending at time \( t \) on products that did not exist at time \( t - 1 \), and \( \hat{\lambda}_{mt-1} \) is the share of spending at time \( t - 1 \) on products that no longer exist at time \( t \). The results show that high-income households benefit more from new products, but the magnitude of the effect is relatively small (3 basis points per year) due to high elasticities of substitution.

\(^{78}\text{This formula uses the approximation } \log(1 + x) \approx x \text{ for small } x.\)
C.6 Inflation Across Income Groups Using the Retail Scanner Dataset

A potential concern is that the price data in the Nielsen Homescan Consumer Panel is mismeasured. To address this issue, the analysis is conducted using price data from the Nielsen Retail Scanner dataset, where prices are recorded at the point of purchase. The patterns of inflation on continued products across income groups are found to be similar when the price information is obtained from the Retail Scanner dataset instead of the Homescan Consumer Panel dataset.

The barcodes present in both datasets were merged in order to compute price indices across income groups using the price information from the Retail Scanner dataset and the (income-group-specific) spending information from the Homescan Consumer Panel dataset. The results are as follows: from 2006 to 2014, on average inflation was 47.57 basis points smaller for households making more than $100,000 a year, relative to households earning below $30,000 a year. This effect is consistent with the result obtained based on the Homescan Consumer Panel dataset alone, when income-group-specific inflation dynamics within UPC are ignored (47.6 basis points, reported in the last row of Table C1). Indeed, using the Retail Scanner data restricts the analysis to be carried across-UPCs, since for a given UPC prices are no longer allowed to vary across income groups.

Figure C8 and Table C10 show that (spending-weighted) average unit prices are very closely aligned in the Retail Scanner and Homescan Consumer Panel datasets. The data extends from 2006 to 2014, prices are winsorized at the 1% level and standard errors are clustered by product modules. This analysis confirms that the patterns of inflation across income groups reported in the main text of the paper do not depend on the choice of the dataset.

Figure C8: Relationship between Average Unit Prices in Retail Scanner and Consumer Panel Datasets (2006-2014)
Table C10: Average Unit Prices in Retail Scanner and Consumer Panel Datasets (2006-2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average Unit Price Consumer Panel Data</th>
<th>0.9672***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003626)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.9149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N$</td>
<td>3,117,983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Clusters</td>
<td>1,019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C.7 Additional robustness checks

Selection effects. A potential concern is that the inflation patterns for continued products across income groups could result from selection effects. For instance, it could be the case that low-income households overwhelmingly consume goods whose characteristics are rendered obsolete by the entry of new products. In such a case, a relatively higher share of the goods consumed by the poor would be exiting the market in any given year - the price changes for these goods are not observed, but if they were they would be negative because these products face tougher competition. Pakes and Erickson (2011) discuss such selection effects. Appendix Tables C11 to C13 show that such selection effects are in fact not at play in the data.

Table C11: Products that Are About to Exit Have a Lower Inflation Rate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsample</th>
<th>Laspeyres Inflation Rate</th>
<th>Median Laspeyres Inflation Rate (Across Product Modules)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Continued</td>
<td>2.03%</td>
<td>2.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About to Exit</td>
<td>-1.33%</td>
<td>-0.52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justed Entered</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table C12: Products that Are About to Exit have a Higher Price Level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsample</th>
<th>Average Price Level</th>
<th>Median Price Level (Across Product Modules)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Continued</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>2.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About to Exit</td>
<td>3.95</td>
<td>2.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justed Entered</td>
<td>4.91</td>
<td>3.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table C13: Share of Spending on New and Discontinued Products across Income Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household Income</th>
<th>Share of Spending on Products...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>About to Exit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; $100,000</td>
<td>3.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$30,000 – $100,000</td>
<td>2.71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt; $30,000</td>
<td>2.59%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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The fashion cycle. A potential concern is that the inflation patterns may be driven by a phenomenon analogous to the “fashion cycle” - the fact that products exhibit seasonality patterns and that the price of older products falls disproportionately. For instance, because of the fashion cycle measured inflation is negative in the apparel industry - yet productivity gains for apparel are small and it would be incorrect to infer large welfare gains from the observed price patterns.\(^{79}\) Conceptually, the fashion cycle means that the assumption that the quality of a barcode is fixed over time fails - if newness is a key feature of the utility derived from a product, the observed price of this product will fall over time but this may not reflect any change in the quality-adjusted price. The concern that high-income households are more affected by the fashion cycle is addressed in two ways. First, the fashion cycle is about churn of products and not about a net increase in the number of available varieties. But Figure C5 shows that the inflation patterns are driven by increasing product variety, not by churn. Second, the results hold even with product categories where the fashion cycle is unlikely to exist, such as food products.

Price convergence. Another potential worry is that the observed inflation difference between high- and low-income households could be driven by the fact that high-income households might initially pay a higher price for the same UPCs than low-income households, and the price would then converge to the same level for all households in future periods. The last three rows of Table 2 reject the hypothesis by showing that the “within-UPC” share of the total inflation difference is modest. A more direct way of showing that this mechanism is not the driving force is to run a regression of the unit price of the UPC on a UPC fixed effect and an indicator for whether the household is high income (restricting attention to products purchased by both income groups). Appendix Table C14 reports the results of such a regression and shows that, in any given year, households making more than $100,000 a year tend to pay about 2.9% more for the same UPC, compared with households making less than $30,000 a year. This result is consistent with the findings of Pisano and Stella (2015). The magnitude of this effect is negligible compared with the 0.65pp difference in inflation rates, which over the course of a few years leads to a much bigger welfare difference between high- and low-income households than the difference in price levels in any given year.\(^{80}\) Appendix Figure C9 provides complementary evidence by showing that the distribution of average unit prices paid by high- and low-income households is very similar, restricting attention to the set of products purchased by both income groups.

\(^{79}\)The Bureau of Labor Statistics addresses this by making hedonic adjustments and by ignoring sale prices.

\(^{80}\)Note that focusing on inflation allows one to take into account changes in product variety and consumer substitution across products over time, as well as to characterize how these patterns differ across the income distribution. The static analysis of the levels of prices paid for the same barcodes by individuals across the income distribution does not speak to these dynamic considerations, which are first order in the data.
Table C14: Differences in Price Level Paid for Same UPC by High- and Low-Income Households ($)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average Unit Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High-Income Household</td>
<td>0.0664***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00118)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.2825***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00061)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPC*Year Fixed Effect</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.9954</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure C9: Distribution of Average Unit Prices Paid Across Income Groups, with Spending Weights

Quarterly data. Appendix Table C15 shows that the results for inflation inequality are very similar when repeating the analysis at a quarterly frequency.

Table C15: Average Annual Inflation Rates across the Income Groups at Quarterly Level (Full Sample, Percentage Points, Arithmetic Average)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income &lt; $30k</th>
<th>Income ∈ [$30k-$100k]</th>
<th>Income &gt; $100k</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paasche</td>
<td>-1.161</td>
<td>-2.268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CES Ideal</td>
<td>1.911</td>
<td>1.107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laspeyres</td>
<td>5.429</td>
<td>5.042</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Alternative measures of household income. The analysis was repeated with three alternative measures of household income: reported income divided by household size; total retail expenditures per capita within a household; and whether the head of household is a college graduate. The results are similar and are available upon request.

Sampling variability. To ensure that the results are not driven by differing degrees of sampling variability across income groups, a random subsample of the data with an equal number of households in each
of the income bins was built, following Handbury (2013). The results are similar are available upon request.

**Base drift.** Similar results are obtain when using unchained price indices instead of chained indices. The results are available upon request.

### C.8 Related Literature

Argente and Lee (2016) write “In this paper, we calculate income-specific price indices and show that high-income households experienced lower inflation in their cost of living than low-income households during the Great Recession. We argue that high-income households were able to cope with the recession by adjusting their shopping behavior unlike low-income households” (page 1). They report that annual inflation for the highest income quartile was on average 0.59 percentage points lower than for the lowest income quartile between 2004 and 2010. They interpret this inflation difference as being driven by the Great Recession on the basis of their Figure 1: “[Figure 1] shows that the indices for all income groups track each other closely but drastically vary during the Great Recession” (page 16).

Figure C10 shows that the inflation difference between high- and low-income households in fact existed before, during and after the Great Recession and was approximately constant over the business cycle. Figure C11 reproduces the graph of Argente and Lee (2016) for completeness.

The key difference between Argente and Lee (2016) and this paper is the mechanism. They summarize their product quality substitution mechanism as follows: “The recent literature shows that households’ shopping behavior changed during the Great Recession. Households changed the quality of the items they bought [...] Because households have different margins within which to adjust their shopping behavior, they face heterogeneous inflation rates” (page 1). Although this channel is theoretically plausible, it can be checked that in practice it explains little of inflation inequality. Panel C of Figure 1 in the main text shows that inflation inequality remains quantitatively very similar when using price indices that do not allow for any substitution patterns, such as the Laspeyres and Paasche indices. By definition, such indices rule out the shopping behavior adjustment margin hypothesized by Argente and Lee (2016). The Laspeyres and Paasche price indices do not allow consumers to substitute across barcodes, let alone across the quality ladder.

---

81 According to the NBER’s methodology, the Great Recession started December 2007 and ended in June 2009.
82 A possible explanation for their interpretation is that they plotted the price indices of high- and low-income households in a cumulative fashion, and in such a graph the inflation difference between them mechanically increases over time and thus seems to open up during the Great Recession.
Figure C10: Inflation Inequality Over Time

![Graph showing inflation inequality over time with markers for household income below $30,000 and above $100,000.]

Figure C11: Argent and Lee (2016)

Figure 1: Exact Price Index by Income Group

![Graph showing exact price index by income group with lines for less than 25k, 25k to 50k, 50k to 100k, and over 100k.

Note: This graph plots the exact price index for each income group from the first quarter of 2004 to the last quarter of 2010. The shaded areas indicate periods designated as recessions by the NBER.

Notes: This figure reports Figure 1 in Argent and Lee (2016).

Broda and Romalis (2009) report that between 1994 and 2005 low-income households experienced lower inflation than high-income households. The dataset they used can no longer be obtained from The Nielsen Company.\textsuperscript{83} However, the US Department of Agriculture provided a similar Nielsen scanner data covering the period from 1998 to 2004. This dataset is known as the Fresh Foods Panel and consists of approximately

\textsuperscript{83}They use two extracts of the complete Nielsen Homescan database. The first extract has price and quantity data for every UPC purchased by a sample of 41,500 households for every quarter in 1994, and 55,000 households every quarter between 1999 and 2003. In addition, they have household-level information on every UPC purchase for a sample of 3,500 households in the last quarter of 2003, together with detailed household characteristics. The second extract they use includes detailed information on the food purchases and demographic characteristics of a large subsample of households included in the Homescan database between 1998 and 2005. In this extract, they have household-level data on every purchase in all food modules.
8,000 households. Panel A of Table C16 shows that during this period in this sample, inflation was lower and the increase in product variety was larger in product modules catering to higher-income households (the independent variable is the same measure as in the main text for mean consumer income across modules between 2004 and 2006). In addition, Panel B of Table C16 reports that inflation was lower and the increase in product variety was larger in higher price deciles within a product module (price deciles are computed as described in Section 4.1 of the main text). These results are in line with the findings reported in the main text from 2004 to 2015.

Furthermore, using the data from McGranahan and Paulson (2005), Figure C12 shows that inflation was lower for higher-income households between 1994 and 2005. The average annual inflation rate was 0.23 percentage points lower for households in the top income quartile, relative to households in the bottom income quartile.

Table C16: Relationship between Consumer Income, Product Innovations and Inflation across the Product Space, 1998-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel A: Across Product Modules</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CES Inflation (%)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Consumer Income in 2004-2006 ($)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.1311)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Modules</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel B: Across the Quality Ladder within Product Modules</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CES Inflation (%)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit Price Decile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.0105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Product Module F.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Modules</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

84 Households in the Fresh Foods Panel record their UPC labeled items as well as non-UPC labeled items, or random weight items, such as fresh fruits and vegetables, bakery goods produced at the store, and meats cut and packaged at the store. Non-UPC labeled items are excluded from my analysis.
Figure C12: Inflation Inequality from 1994 to 2005, Following McGranahan and Paulson (2005)

Notes: This figure uses the data from McGranahan and Paulson (2005).

Two other recent papers are related to the findings in this paper. Pisano and Stella (2015) document that lower-income households pay lower prices than higher-income households for the same products, primarily because they shop more at discount stores. In contrast, this paper focuses on changes in income-specific price indices over time and use the demand system to provide a measure of quality-adjusted inflation. Faber and Fally (2017) explore the implications of firm heterogeneity for household price indices across the income distribution. They find that larger, more productive firms endogenously sort into catering to the taste of wealthier households, and that this gives rise to asymmetric effects on household price indices in their structural model. In contrast, this paper provide direct evidence of differences in inflation rates across income groups and, in Section 4, shows that they are driven by a distinct explanatory mechanism, the supply response to market size effects.
D Additional Analysis on the Equilibrium Response of Supply to Changes in Demand

D.1 Share of Inflation Difference Explained by Spending on New Products

A decomposition exercise shows that the negative correlation between inflation and the share of spending on new products across product modules (reported in Panel B of Figure 3) is strong enough to explain a large fraction of the inflation patterns across income groups documented in Section 3.\textsuperscript{85} For any product grouping \( G \), the inflation difference between income groups can be decomposed according to (3), with \( s_m^i \) denoting the share of spending of income group \( i \) on \( G \) and \( \pi_G \) the average inflation rate in \( G \). The “between” component can be decomposed further to examine how much of the inflation difference across categories is explained (predicted) by differences in shares of spending on new products across categories.

\[
\sum_G s_R^G \pi_G - \sum_G s_P^G \pi_G = (\hat{\pi}_R^G - \hat{\pi}_P^G) + R \tag{24}
\]

with

\[
\hat{\pi}_R^G - \hat{\pi}_P^G = \sum_G \left( \hat{\beta} X_G \cdot (s_R^G - s_P^G) \right)
\]

\[
R = \sum_G (\hat{\epsilon}_G \cdot (s_R^G - s_P^G))
\]

\[
\pi_G = \hat{\beta} X_G + \hat{\epsilon}_G
\]

where \( X_G \) is share of spending on new products in \( G \). \( \hat{\beta} \) is the OLS estimate of \( \beta \) and \( \hat{\epsilon}_G \) the estimated residual. Table D1 shows that for the various levels of aggregation, around half of the inflation difference between high- and low-income households is explained by differences in patterns of product innovations.\textsuperscript{86}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aggregation Level</th>
<th>Share of Inflation Difference Explained by Spending on New Products (% of Actual)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department</td>
<td>40.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Product Group</td>
<td>58.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Product Module</td>
<td>51.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table reports the share of the inflation difference for continued products between households making above \$100,000 (high income) and below \$30,000 (low income), between 2004 and 2015, that can be explained by spending on new products according to the methodology in equation (24). Each row reports the results from the analysis at various levels of aggregation (10 departments, 125 product groups, 1,075 product modules). In any given year, the inflation rate for continued products is computed using all barcodes observed in the current and previous year.

\textsuperscript{85}This exercise is similar in spirit to the reweighting technique introduced in DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996).

\textsuperscript{86}Note that any measurement error (e.g. UPC relabeling that does not reflect a true product innovation) will bias this estimate downward, therefore these estimates can be viewed as a lower bound.
D.2 Additional Descriptive Evidence

**Inflation across brand price deciles.** Figure D1 shows inflation patterns across UPCs ranked by the average (leave-one-out) price per ounce of UPCs of the same brand in the same product module available during the sample period. The deciles are not based on the price of the UPC itself and the results are identical to Panel B of Figure 3, which confirms that mean reversion is not driving these patterns.

![Figure D1: Inflation across Brand Price Deciles, within Product Modules](image)

The role of supply effects. Do the product variety patterns across income groups come from supply or demand? As shown on Figure 2, the share of spending on new products increases with mean consumer income across product modules. It could be the case that more new products are introduced in product modules catering to high-income consumers because of supply effects, which may be exogenous (e.g. it may be inherently easier to introduce new products at the high-end of the product space) or endogenous (e.g. if innovators and suppliers decide to specifically target higher-income consumers). Alternatively, it could be the case that higher-income consumers have a higher taste for novelty and purchase new products wherever they are introduced in the product space. In other words, the share of spending on new products may be higher in product modules catering to higher-income households simply because new products diffuse faster due to a basic composition effect in demand (while the rate of product introduction may be similar across modules).

To isolate the contribution of supply, the ideal regression would compare the same household moving across the product space. Such a regression can be directly run in the Nielsen data, at the household $H \times$ product module $M$ level with household fixed effects:

$$Share Spending New Products_{HM} = \alpha + \beta Product Module Income Rank_M + \alpha_H + \epsilon_{HM}$$

where $\alpha_H$ is a household fixed effect and $Product Module Income Rank_M$ is the rank of the product.
module by income of the representative consumer in the product module (computed using 2004-2006 data).
The results are reported in Table D2, with standard errors clustered at the household level. As in the previous
graphs, I find a strong positive relationship between the share of spending on new products and the mean
income of the consumer in the product module - the point estimate is almost identical to the specification
without household fixed effect shown in Figure 2. This analysis confirms that supply plays a role in this
process, because household fixed effects ensure that the relationship is not driven by a composition effect
across modules (i.e. different propensities of consumers to buy new products wherever they show up in the
product space). I also present specifications with interaction terms for whether the household is “high-income”
(income above $100,000) or “low-income” (income below $30,000). The magnitude of the interaction effects
is small, around 10% of the effect for middle-income households.

Table D2: New Products Target Higher-Income Consumers

| SHARE SPENDING NEW PRODUCTS | SHARE SPENDING NEW PRODUCTS
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( ProductModuleIncomeRank_M )</td>
<td>2.79***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( (ProductModuleIncomeRank_M \times HighIncome_H) )</td>
<td>-0.24***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( (ProductModuleIncomeRank_M \times LowIncome_H) )</td>
<td>0.11*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Household Fixed Effects**

Yes  Yes

| Standard errors clustered by product modules. |

**Retailers vs. Manufacturers Decomposition.** In order to establish whether the supply effects
documented above are driven by retailers or manufacturers, I carry out an additional decomposition of the
inflation difference between high- and low-income households. For this exercise I use the Laspeyres price
index, which can be written as follows:

\[
P_L^i = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{p_t^i}{p_0^i} \cdot s_{local\ market}^i \cdot s_{store}^i \cdot s_{upc}^i
\]

where \( i \) indexes the income group, \( s_{local\ market}^i \) the share of spending in a given local market (MSA), \( s_{store}^i \) the share of spending in a given store within a local market, and \( s_{upc}^i \) the share of spending on a given UPC within a store. In other words, the difference in inflation rates between high- and low-income households across UPCs could come from the fact that these consumers shop in different local markets or different stores or buy different UPCs within stores.

Table D3 presents the results. The third row shows that differences in spending patterns across local
markets (MSAs) explain only about 3% of the inflation difference across UPCs between high- and low-income
households. The second row gives an upper bound for the contribution of store-specific price dynamics, which
account for at most about 40% of the total difference. It is an upper bound because in several stores I only
observe spending from either the low- or high-income, therefore I cannot separately identify the contribution of UPC dynamics within stores. Overall, these results show that at least 60% of the inflation difference comes from UPC effects within stores, suggesting that manufacturer-level dynamics are a key channel.

Table D3: Isolating the Contribution of Stores and Local Markets to the Overall Inflation Difference between High- and Low-Income Households

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Price Change</th>
<th>Local Market Shares</th>
<th>Store Shares</th>
<th>UPC Shares</th>
<th>Inflation Difference (% of Benchmark)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Counterfactual</td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterfactual</td>
<td>Counterfactual</td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>Counterfactual</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterfactual</td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>Counterfactual</td>
<td>Counterfactual</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Evidence on Herfindahl Indices Across the Quality Ladder.** Herfindahl indices vary substantially across the product space. Table D4 presents the distribution of Herfindahl indices across product modules by price deciles. The level of observation is a year by product module by price decile. Statistics are weighted by log spending and show wide dispersion in Herfindahl indices.

Figure D2 shows that Herfindahl indices across the product space, in levels and changes, are systematically related to the quality ladder. Panel A shows that, from a static perspective, on average competition tends to be lower in higher-quality tiers of the market, where quality is proxied for by prices deciles within modules as in Section 4.1. Panel B indicates that over time competition increases in higher-quality tiers, relative to lower-quality tiers. The magnitude of these differential changes in competition across the quality ladder is large. Over a period of ten years, on average the Herfindahl indices of the top and bottom deciles within a product module converge by 0.061 points, which is equal to 27% of the standard deviation of Herfindahl indices across the product space. This evidence supports the prediction of the model in Section 5 that increases in market size in higher-quality tiers spur entry and increasing competition.

Table D4: Summary Statistics on Herfindahl Indices Across Product Modules by Price Deciles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>p25</th>
<th>p50</th>
<th>p75</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Herfindahl Index</td>
<td>0.3091</td>
<td>0.2282</td>
<td>0.1382</td>
<td>0.2410</td>
<td>0.4112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Figure D2: Herfindahl Indices in Levels and Changes across the Quality Ladder

Panel A: Levels

Panel B: Changes

Coeff. 0.006673*** (s.e. 0.0007618).

Coeff. -0.0006114 (s.e. 0.0001). Mean Herfindahl index = 0.3091
Evidence from Variation in the Rate of Growth of Inequality Across US States. Using Census public use microdata between 2004-2006 and 2012-2014, I measure the change in the total income accruing to households who earned more than 100k and less than 30k in each state. Inequality has increased in all 50 states but the rate of increase varied across states. The increase in inequality was fastest in California, Texas and New York and slowest in West Virginia, New Mexico and North Dakota. I aggregate the Nielsen data at the state level to examine how variation in the rate of inequality growth relates to patterns of inflation. In all states, inflation was lower for high-income households earning above $100,000 a year, relative to low-income households making below $30,000 a year. But this difference in inflation rates was relatively larger in states with a faster increase in inequality. Figure D3 shows this result.

Figure D3: The Inflation Difference Between High- and Low-Income Increases as Inequality Increases Faster
Evidence on Product Destruction and Net Product Creation Across the Quality Ladder. Panel A of Figure D4 shows that there is relatively more exit of products at the top of the quality ladder. This differential exit effect is smaller than the differential entry patterns documented in Figure 3. As a result, product variety increases faster in higher-quality tiers of the market. Panel B of Figure D4 quantifies the differential increase in product variety across the quality by plotting the “Feenstra ratio”, derived using a nested CES demand system in Section 3.3.

Figure D4: Product Destruction and Net Product Creation Across the Quality Ladder

Panel A: Spending on Discontinued Product

Panel B: Feenstra Ratio
D.3 Causal Evidence

D.3.1 Source of variation

Figure D5: Changes in Age-by-Income Distributions, 2011-2015 relative to 2000-2004

(a) For 20-year-olds

(b) For 30-year-olds

(c) For 40-year-olds

(d) For 50-year-olds

(e) For 60-year-olds

(f) For 70-year-olds
Table D5: Distribution of Changes in Number of Households across Age-Income Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Annualized Change (%)</th>
<th>2011-2015 relative to 2000-2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean</strong></td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SD</strong></td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Min</strong></td>
<td>-2.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Max</strong></td>
<td>7.56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>108</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>p10</strong></td>
<td>-1.62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>p25</strong></td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>p50</strong></td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>p75</strong></td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>p90</strong></td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure D6: Changes in Number of Households by Age-Income Groups, 2011-2015 relative to 2000-2004

(a) Variation Within and Across Age Groups

(b) Variation Within and Across Income Groups

Table D6: Distribution of Predicted Growth Across the Product Space

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Annualized Change (%)</th>
<th>2011-2015 relative to 2000-2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean</strong></td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SD</strong></td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Min</strong></td>
<td>-1.94</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Max</strong></td>
<td>5.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>10,394</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>p10</strong></td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>p25</strong></td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>p50</strong></td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>p75</strong></td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>p90</strong></td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D.3.2 Identification and Consistency of OLS Estimator

The discussion and derivations in this section closely follow Borusyak and Jaravel (2017).\(^{87}\)

**Assumptions on data generating process.** Assume that $\epsilon_l = f(s_{l1}, ..., s_{lN}) + \eta_l$ where $f(\cdot) \in [-B, B]$ for some $0 < B < \infty$.\(^{88}\) Consider a sequence of statistical models. In each of them, $g_n$, $s_{ln}$ and $\eta_l$ are drawn for all groups indexed by $n$ and parts of the product space indexed by $l$ --- these random variables are assumed to be jointly independent.

\(^{87}\)For more details on identification in Bartik research designs, see Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2016).

\(^{88}\) $f(\cdot)$ is a random function. This notation illustrates that identification can be preserved even when the error term is correlated with expenditure shares.
**Consistency of estimator.** Denote the average $Z_i$ across the product space as:

$$
\bar{Z} = \frac{1}{L} \sum_l Z_l = \frac{1}{L} \sum_l \sum_n s_{ln} g_n = \sum_n g_n \frac{1}{L} \sum_l s_{ln} = \sum_n \bar{s}_n g_n
$$

where $\bar{s}_n = \frac{1}{L} \sum_l s_{ln}$ measures the importance of household group $n$ in an average product category. The OLS estimator for $\beta$ is:

$$
\hat{\beta} = \frac{\frac{1}{L} \sum_l \left[ \frac{Z_l - \bar{Z}}{\sum_n (s_{ln} - \bar{s}_n) g_n} \right] \cdot Y_l}{\frac{1}{L} \sum_l \left[ \sum_n (s_{ln} - \bar{s}_n) g_n \right]^2} = \beta + \frac{1}{L} \left[ \sum_l \left( \frac{\sum_n (s_{ln} - \bar{s}_n) g_n}{\sum_n (s_{ln} - \bar{s}_n) g_n} \right) \epsilon_l \right]
$$

Conditions under which the second term goes to 0 as $N$ and $L$ go to infinity are provided below.

First, the denominator should not go to zero. It could go to zero if there were many household groups and very dispersed household shares in each product category. Sufficient concentration of spending across household groups in a typical product category is required. For instance, a group of high-income household might account for most of the demand in a product category like scotch. This holds, for instance, when $s_{ln} = \frac{X_{ln}}{\sum_X X_{lm}}$ with $X_{ln}$ following a Pareto distribution, or when each product category is perfectly specialized in catering to one household group, $s_{ln} = 1 \ [n = n_l]$.

Second, to derive the conditions under which the numerator goes to 0, flip the order of the summation for the $f(\cdot)$ component of the error term, so that it is possible to make an asymptotic statement in household group space $N$. The expression for the numerator becomes:

$$
Num = \frac{1}{N} \sum_n g_n \cdot \left[ \frac{1}{L} \sum_l N(s_{ln} - \bar{s}_n) f(s_{ln}) \right] + \frac{1}{L} \sum_l \left( Z_l - \bar{Z} \right) \eta_l
$$

The first term in this expression averages over household group objects, $g_n \cdot \sum_l \frac{N}{L} (s_{ln} - \bar{s}_n) f(s_{ln})$. A loose intuition is that for the numerator to go to 0, there should be no systematic relationship between the growth rate of a household group $g_n$ and the cross-product category covariance between the spending share of this group (relative to the full sample) and the error term (induced by household group composition). For instance, it should not be the case that household groups that grow faster have higher spending shares in product categories with a larger error term (due to anything related to changing household share composition across product categories). This intuition is imperfect, however, because the relevant size of the household group in the expression above is $N s_{ln}$, which may explode without further assumptions. Regularity conditions on $\{s_{ln}\}$ ensure this does not happen.\(^{89}\)

**Controls.** In some cases, it may be the case that the assumption that $g_n$ is randomly assigned holds only conditional on some controls. For instance, each household group $n$ is characterized by a variable $x_n$ taking

---

\(^{89}\) For instance, one can consider a special case where each product category $l$ is fully specialized in catering to one household group $n_l$, i.e. $s_{ln} = 1 \ [n = n_l]$. The standard $\sqrt{N}$ convergence rate is achieved when all household groups are approximately of the same size—that is, $\exists a \in (1, \infty)$ such that $\bar{s}_n < a/N$ for all $n$. 94
values $a \in [1, 2, \ldots, A]$. $x_n$ is not independent from the spending shares $s_{nl}$, which are themselves correlated with the error term $\epsilon_l$. Consider the following model:

$$g_n = \bar{g}_n + \sum_a \mu_n \cdot 1(x_n = a)$$

where $\mu_n$ is a growth fixed effect common to all household groups for which $x_n = a$ and $\bar{g}_n$ is the residual variation in growth rate (assumed to be independent of $x_n$). So $\sum_n s_{nl} g_n = \sum_n s_{nl} \bar{g}_n + \sum_n s_{nl} (\sum_a \mu_n \cdot 1(x_n = a))$.

Note that $\sum_n s_{nl} (\sum_a \mu_n \cdot 1(x_n = a)) = \sum_a \mu_n \left( \sum_n s_{nl} \cdot 1(x_n = a) \right)$, where $s_{al}$ denotes the share of spending accounted for by sectors with $x_n = a$ in product category $l$.

Consider the following regression:

$$Y_l = \alpha + \beta \left( \sum_n s_{nl} \bar{g}_n \right) + \beta \left( \sum_a \mu_n s_{al} \right) + \epsilon_l$$

$$= \alpha + \beta \left( \sum_n s_{nl} \bar{g}_n \right) + \left( \sum_a \mu_n \bar{s}_{al} \right) + \epsilon_l$$

Equation (11) is an OLS regression with parameters $\beta$ and $\bar{\mu}_a$. Compared with the baseline model, this specification adds controls for the weighted distribution of variable $x_n$ in location $l$, where the weights are local spending shares. Intuitively, one starts with a fixed effects regression in sector space $N$, and when moving to the location space $L$ one obtains a linear estimator in the spending shares accruing to sectors with characteristics indexed by $a$.

A consistent estimator of $\beta$ is given by running the equation above using $g_n$ instead of $\bar{g}_n$:

$$Y_l = \alpha + \beta \left( \sum_n s_{nl} g_n \right) + \left( \sum_a \mu_n \bar{s}_{al} \right) + \epsilon_l$$

Intuitively, $\beta$ is identified from the residual variation in $g_n$, after flexibly controlling for $x_n$ with fixed effects. Formally, using the residual regression formula, the OLS estimator for $\beta$ in (29) is given by:

$$\hat{\beta} = \frac{\frac{1}{n} \sum_l \left[ \left( \sum_n (s_{ln} - \bar{s}_n) \bar{g}_n \right) \cdot (Y_l - \hat{Y}_l) \right]}{\frac{1}{n} \sum_l \left[ \sum_n (s_{ln} - \bar{s}_n) \bar{g}_n \right]^2} = \beta + \frac{1}{\frac{1}{n} \sum_l \left[ \sum_n (s_{ln} - \bar{s}_n) \bar{g}_n \right]^2} \left[ \frac{1}{\frac{1}{n} \sum_l \left[ \sum_n (s_{ln} - \bar{s}_n) \bar{g}_n \right]} \epsilon_l \right]$$

where $\hat{Z}_l$ and $\hat{Y}_l$ are the best linear predictors of $Z_l$ and $Y_l$, respectively, conditional on a constant and $\{s_{al}\}_{a=1}^A$. The second equality follows from the fact that $Y_l - \hat{Y}_l = \beta (\sum_n (s_{ln} - \bar{s}_n) \bar{g}_n)$. This estimator of $\beta$ with controls is consistent under conditions similar to those derived above, except that the conditions are now in terms of $\bar{g}_n$ instead of $g_n$.

D.3.3 Robustness
Figure D7: Falsification Tests

Panel A: Relationship between Actual and “Placebo” Growth Rates

Panel B: Falsification Test for New Products

Panel C: Placebo Test for Inflation for Continued Products
Table D7: Robustness Checks on Effects of Changes in Market Size

Panel A: Additional Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predicted Increase in Spending, Annualized (%)</th>
<th>Actual Spending Growth (%)</th>
<th>Share of Spending on Discontinued Products (pp)</th>
<th>Feenstra Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.031**</td>
<td>1.3963***</td>
<td>-0.00858***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age and Income Controls</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Product Module Fixed Effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>10,705</td>
<td>10,705</td>
<td>10,705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Clusters</td>
<td>1,075</td>
<td>1,075</td>
<td>1,075</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel B: Interaction By Herfindahl Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annualized Predicted Increase in Spending on New Products (pp) $\times$ Herfindahl Index</th>
<th>Share of Spending on New Products (pp)</th>
<th>Continued Products Inflation Rate (pp)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-0.5434***</td>
<td>(0.1941)</td>
<td>(0.045003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age, Income and Herfindahl Controls</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Product Module Fixed Effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>10,705</td>
<td>10,705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Clusters</td>
<td>1,075</td>
<td>1,075</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel C: Robustness without Spending Weights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predicted Increase in Spending, Annualized (%)</th>
<th>Share of Spending on New Products (pp)</th>
<th>Continued Products Inflation Rate (pp)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.4450***</td>
<td>(0.5027)</td>
<td>(0.1171)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age and Income Controls</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Product Module Fixed Effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>10,705</td>
<td>10,705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Clusters</td>
<td>1,075</td>
<td>1,075</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
D.4 The Supply Response to Market Size Effects Implied by Changes in the Income Distribution

Figure D8: Growth of Number of Households across the Income Distribution


Panel B: Raw Growth Rates of Number of Households Across the Income Distribution (1986-2006)


Notes: The data source is the Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey. Panel A shows smoothed patterns of growth in the number of households across the income distribution, using a quartic polynomial with parameters estimated by OLS.
Table D8: Actual and Predicted Relationship between Mean Consumer Income, New Products and Inflation for Continued Products across Product Modules by Price Deciles

### Panel A: With Product Module Fixed Effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Share of Spending on New Products (pp)</th>
<th>Continued Products Inflation Rate (pp)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Predicted</td>
<td>Actual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Consumer Income</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(per $10,000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.0340</strong>*</td>
<td><strong>1.2364</strong>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.00846)</td>
<td>(0.1235)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.15938***</td>
<td>-0.19128***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.000682)</td>
<td>(0.028869)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of Slopes (Predicted/Actual)</td>
<td>83.63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Product Module Fixed Effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R</strong>&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>10,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Clusters</td>
<td>1,075</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Panel B: Without Product Module Fixed Effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Share of Spending on New Products (pp)</th>
<th>Continued Products Inflation Rate (pp)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Predicted</td>
<td>Actual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Consumer Income</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(per $10,000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1.0100</strong>*</td>
<td><strong>0.9650</strong>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.00714)</td>
<td>(0.1306)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.16153***</td>
<td>-0.23138***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.001298)</td>
<td>(0.0306006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of Slopes (Predicted/Actual)</td>
<td>104.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Product Module Fixed Effects</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R</strong>&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>10,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Clusters</td>
<td>1,075</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### D.4.1 Dissimilarity Index

Figure D9: Dissimilarity Index
D.5  Additional Evidence

D.5.1  Change vs. Level of Market Size

Table D9: Do Product Innovations Follow Market Size or Changes in Market Size?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Share of Spending on New Products</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Change in Market Size</td>
<td>3.107***    1.901**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.139)</td>
<td>(0.926)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged Market Size</td>
<td>1.399       0.577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.439)</td>
<td>(1.269)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Product Group Fixed Effects</td>
<td>No          Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weights</td>
<td>Yes         Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D.5.2  Changes in Markups

Figure D10: Changes in Wholesale Costs vs. Changes in Retailer Margins

D.6  Food Stamp Research Design

Using changes in food stamp policy across US states between 2000 and 2007, I estimate the causal effect of an increase in the level of spending per capita in a certain part of the product space on the introduction of new products and the rate of inflation (holding the number of consumers constant). I find a substantial effect.

D.6.1  Research Design

I rely on a novel research design based on changes in food stamp policy across US states between 2000 and 2007, which generates variation in per capita spending on food from low-income consumers. Between 2001 and 2007, the take-up rate for food stamps dramatically increased due to a series of policy changes that made
it easier for eligible individuals to enroll in the program. Ganong and Liebman (2016) document these trends, reproduced in Figure D11. They also document that the increase in take-up rate substantially varied across states, because different states adopted a different policy mix. This policy variation generates variation in purchasing power for food products at the bottom of the income distribution and is plausibly exogenous to price dynamics. This addresses the endogeneity problem that better products get larger market shares and allows me to estimate the causal effect of an increase in per capita spending in a certain part of the product space on the inflation rate.

Figure D11: Changes in SNAP Take-up Rate and Total Enrollment over Time

![Figure D11](source: Ganong and Liebman (2015))

This identification strategy is a useful complement to the previous analysis based on changes in the number of consumers across the product space at the national level over time. First, it is interesting to examine whether variation in demand coming from changes in per capita spending generates similar effects to variation in demand coming from changes in the number of consumers. Second, the SNAP-based research design has a number of advantages from the point of view of identification: there is clearly no direct supply effect, the market size change occurs at the bottom of the distribution (thus breaking the usual collinearity between level of income and rate of growth in income), and the time frame and the location of the market size change are known very precisely. Third, these findings are of direct policy relevance (for a study of the short-run incidence effect of food stamp policy, see Hastings and Washington, 2010).

Thus, the research design is based on variation in changes in take-up rates across US states. I compare the difference between the inflation rates experienced by SNAP eligible and ineligible households between

---

90 For instance some states stopped requiring fingerprints from food stamp recipients, which facilitated the application process. Other states amended their vehicle policies, for instance excluding the value of all vehicles when determining eligibility for the program.
2004 and 2007 across states, running the following specification:

$$\pi_{s}^{E} - \pi_{s}^{I} = \alpha + \beta \Delta_{t}^{SNAP} + \lambda X_{s} + \epsilon_{s}$$

Variation in the SNAP take-up rate induces variation in market size for manufacturers with local brand capital. Many UPCs are partly non-tradable because of the strength of local brand preferences (Bronnenberg, Dube and Gentzkow, 2012). The strength of local brand preferences varies across product groups. This provides an opportunity for a falsification test of the research design: inflation should respond to local changes in market size only in product groups for which brand preferences tend to be “local.”

I set up a random effect model to identify in a data-driven way which product groups have strong brand preferences. Intuitively, local preferences must be strong for product groups in which I observe a lot of variation in the ranking of brands by market shares across different states. On the other hand, local preferences must be weak in product groups where the market shares of brands are very similar across states. The random effect model provides a way to conduct this comparison systematically and to handle noise efficiently. Formally, for each product group I write the market share of brand $b$ in state $s$ at time $t$ as the sum of a “national preference” component $\lambda_{b}$, a “local preference” component $\mu_{bs}$ and a shock $\epsilon_{bst}$. I then estimate the signal standard deviation of the “national preference” component, denoted $\hat{\sigma}_{\lambda}^{2}$, and the signal standard deviation of the “local preference” component $\hat{\sigma}_{\mu}^{2}$:

$$s_{bst} = \lambda_{b} + \mu_{bs} + \epsilon_{bst}$$

$$\hat{\sigma}_{\lambda}^{2} = \text{Var}(s_{bst} - \bar{s}_{bs})$$

$$\hat{\sigma}_{\mu}^{2} = \text{cov}(s_{bs}, \bar{s}_{bs+1})$$

$$\hat{\sigma}_{\mu}^{2} = \text{Var}(s_{bst}) - \hat{\sigma}_{\lambda}^{2} - \hat{\sigma}_{\epsilon}^{2}$$

Finally, I rank product groups according to the quantity $R = \frac{\hat{\sigma}_{\mu}^{2}}{\hat{\sigma}_{\lambda}^{2}}$. The product groups above median $R$ are those where local preferences matter relatively more. The results I obtain from this procedure are very intuitive: sanitary protection, canning supplies, detergent, flour and deodorant are the five product groups for which local preferences are the weakest, while liquor, wine, beer, apparel and fresh meat are the five product groups with the strongest local preference component. I conduct the regression analysis across subsamples to check that the effect is driven by product group with a strong local brand component.

**D.6.2 Results**

I find a large effect, which can be summarized as follows: a 1 percentage point increase in spending per capita lowers the inflation rate by about 10 basis points. Consistent with my preferred model, the magnitude of this effect is similar to that of the effect of a change in the number of consumers documented in the previous subsection.

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91 This approach is similar to the model used in the teacher value-added literature, for instance in Kane and Staiger (2008).
Table D10: Results from Food Stamp Research Design

Panel A: Main Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Difference in Continued Products Inflation Rate (pp)</th>
<th>Actual Spending Growth for SNAP Eligible (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Change in Take-up Rate (pp), 2001-2007</td>
<td>0.2226*** 0.0770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weights</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard errors clustered by 50 states</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel B: Robustness

| Change in Take-up Rate (pp), 2001-2007 | -0.0242*** (0.00791) | -0.0195*** (0.00654) | -0.0151** (0.00776) |

| 2001 Take-up Rate | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Unemployment | Yes | Yes |
| Population | Yes |
| Employment growth | Yes |
| Total Labor Force | Yes |

Standard errors clustered by 50 states

Panel C: Local vs. National Brand Preferences

| Change in Take-up Rate (pp), 2001-2007 | -0.00828** (0.00308) | -0.01687*** (0.00523) | -0.000597 (0.00560) |

| All product groups | X     |
| Top 50% by “local” preferences | X     |
| Bottom 50% by “local” preferences | X     |

Standard errors clustered by 50 states

Panel D: Food vs. Non-Food Products

| Change in Take-up Rate (pp), 2001-2007 | -0.0187** (0.00808) | -0.0115 (0.0203) | -0.0255*** (0.0110) | -0.0124 (0.0078) |

| Food product groups | X | X | X |
| Non-food product groups | X |
| Top 50% by “local” preferences | X |
| Bottom 50% by “local” preferences | X |

Standard errors clustered by 50 states

Table D10 shows these results in detail. Panel A summarizes the main results. A 10 percentage point increase in the take-up rate across states (which was the mean increase during this period) leads to a 2.2% increase in spending from SNAP-eligible households, and to a 24.2 basis point fall in inflation for these households, relative to SNAP-ineligible households. Panel B shows the robustness of this finding to the
inclusion of a series of controls, alleviating concerns about omitted variable biases.\footnote{I have conducted a number of other falsification tests, not reported in this version of the draft but available upon request. In particular, I have compared inflation patterns for households in other parts of the income distribution (e.g. $30k - $100k) and found that they were not correlated with the increase in SNAP take-up rate.}

Panel C repeats the analysis at the level of product groups and shows that the effect is driven by product groups with strong local brand preferences, consistent with the hypothesized mechanism. Finally, Panel D tests whether the effect is stronger for food products, which one would expect if recipients do not treat food stamps as fungible income.\footnote{On the fungibility of money and spending choices, see Shapiro and Hastings (2013).} Indeed, the effect is significant only in food categories, and within that set of products it is driven by the product categories with stronger local preferences (note that the point estimates for non-food products are not significant but are not precisely estimated zeroes).

**D.6.3 Calibration: Changes in Spending per Capita across Income Groups**

I calibrate the magnitude of the per capita spending channel by using the observed change over time in the average income of households making above $100,000 and below $30,000. Between 2004 and 2015, the average income of high-income households grew 0.93 percentage point faster than that of low-income households. By taking the ratio of the point estimates in Panel A of Table D10, I obtain that a 1 percentage point increase in spending per capita leads to a $\frac{24.2}{7.226} = 10.9$ basis point fall in inflation. Therefore, the annual inflation difference caused by rising inequality is equal to 0.93 × 10.9 = 10.1 basis points, which represents $\frac{10.1}{40.8} = 24.7\%$ of the benchmark inflation difference and $\frac{10.1}{66.0} = 15.3\%$ of the overall inflation difference.

Rising income inequality therefore has a sizable amplification effect on real inequality: the amplification factor is about one tenth. However, over the course of the sample this channel played a quantitatively less important role in lowering inflation for the high-income relative to the low-income compared with the “number of consumers” channel studied in the main text.

**D.7 Alternative Mechanisms**

I investigate various alternative explanations for the evidence. I first study in depth two mechanisms that may disproportionately benefit the poor: the product cycle and international trade. I show that although these mechanisms appear to indeed play a role and benefit the poor relatively more, they are quantitatively less important than other channels that disproportionately benefit the high-income. I then study a series of other possible mechanisms and find that they can’t be the primary drivers of the patterns found in the data.

**The product cycle.** I find that the difference in quality-adjusted inflation for the high- and low-income households is lower in product modules in which the “product cycle” is faster. Intuitively, if there is a high rate of product churn (a fast “product cycle”), then it is less easy for manufacturers to customize products and introduce new varieties, which will rapidly become outdated. Consumer electronics are a good example illustrating this idea: in that sector, the difference in quality adjusted inflation between low- and high-income households is close to 20 basis points, a third of the sample average. More broadly, I find that across product modules, a one standard deviation increase in the rate of “product churn” (measured as the sum of the
share of spending on new products and the share of spending on products about to exit) is correlated with a 9.18 basis point decline ($t = 1.98$) in the difference in quality-adjusted inflation between low- and high-income households. These results provide partial support for the view that the product cycle tends to benefit “everyone” — but the dynamics of increasing product variety appear to matter more quantitatively.

**International trade.** Does trade with China disproportionately benefit the poor? This intuition is widespread and I do find support for it in the data, but this channel is not sufficient to outweigh the other forces at play that benefit the high-income relatively more. Matching HS6 code import data to Nielsen category by hand, I find that inequality in quality-adjusted inflation is lower in product modules with higher import penetration from China. Across product modules, a 10 percentage point increase in import penetration rank is correlated with a 6.23 basis point decline ($t = 2.03$) in the difference in quality-adjusted inflation between low- and high-income. In product modules above the median of import penetration, the difference in quality-adjusted inflation between low- and high-income households is around 30 basis points, one half of the sample average. In other words, competitive dynamics from international trade tend to benefit the poor relatively more, but this effect does not outweigh the domestic competitive dynamics, which tend to disproportionately benefit the high-income.

**Aggregate shocks.** First, the various decompositions reported in Section 3 show that the results are not driven by broad shocks that would be specific to certain areas (Table D3) or to certain departments, product groups or product modules (Tables C3 and 2).

**Online retail.** The rise of online retail could have differentially benefited high- and low-income households. For instance, if higher-income households are more technology savvy, they might be more likely to use online platforms to search for products, which would increase their price elasticity and result in lower equilibrium markups. However, the inflation difference across product categories is not related to heterogeneity in exposure to online retail - in particular, it persists in categories that were very little affected by online retail during this period, such as food (Table C3).

**Innovation dynamics independent of changes in market size.** An alternative view of the innovation patterns is that product innovation may always be skewed towards the higher-income consumers, regardless of the underlying patterns of growing inequality. In other words, the patterns documented in Section 3 may be a steady state. By introducing flexible controls for the income distribution of consumers and for the quality distribution (price deciles) within a product module, Panel B of Appendix Table D7 shows that the estimated response of product innovations to market size is not confounded by static patterns related to income or quality. Moreover, I have not found empirical support for the predictions of a simple class of models that generate a steady-state difference in the inflation rates experienced by high- and low-income households - in these models, the equilibrium price elasticity of higher-income consumers should always be lower.\(^{94}\)

\(^{94}\) Intuitively, if high-income consumers are less price elastic and if the cost of increasing product variety is linear, in equilibrium we will observe a high flow of new products targeting higher income consumers. The equilibrium mechanism is that the high-end products have higher margins (because the high-income consumers are less price elastic) but have a shorter lifecycle (because they get displaced by other high-end product innovations).
Household search behavior. Another possible channel for the results is that high-income consumers could have become more price elastic because their search behavior has changed. Such a channel would manifest itself primarily through within-UPC inflation difference between high- and low-income households, which Table 2 shows is not the case.
E Theory Appendix

E.1 Predictions from Competing Models

A variety of models can generate the key prediction that in general equilibrium the quality-adjusted price goes down when demand increases. There are three broad classes of such models: endogenous growth macro models with scale effects (e.g. Romer, 1990, Aghion and Howitt, 1992, and Acemoglu and Linn, 2004), trade models with free entry and endogenous markups through variable-elasticity-of-substitution preferences (e.g. Melitz, 2003, and Zhelobodko et al., 2012), and industrial organization models with free entry and endogenous markups through strategic interactions between firms (e.g. Sutton, 1991, and Berry and Reiss, 2006). Intuitively, in all of these models, when demand rises product variety increases through entry\textsuperscript{95}, and the price of continuing products decreases either because of a decrease in marginal cost\textsuperscript{96} or because of a fall in markups.\textsuperscript{97}

Although their key prediction is similar, these models differ in important ways. First, it is important to establish whether quality-adjusted inflation is driven by the level of market size or by changes in market size. In most macro models, a permanent change in market size will have a permanent effect on the rate of economic growth: the returns from innovation are larger in bigger markets because the cost of innovation (assumed to be linear) can be spread out over more consumers, and therefore the level of innovation is always higher in bigger markets. Semi-endogenous growth models with decreasing returns to scale in the R&D production function (Jones, 1995) and models with endogenous markups and free entry offer a competing view, according to which an increase in market size will only have a temporary effect on the level of innovation. In other words, changes in market size are the relevant predictors of innovation, not the level of market size. Intuitively, endogenous changes in markups or the increased cost of innovation prevent scale effects from permanently raising the level of innovation. In Section 4.3.4, I conduct a direct test to distinguish between these competing views and I find support for the idea that changes in market size matter, rather than the level of market size.

Second, as previously mentioned, in some models the fall in inflation on continuing products results from a fall in markups, while in others it results from a fall in marginal cost. Using data on retailer markups, Section 4.4 provides suggestive evidence that the effect comes from changes in markups.

Finally, “demand” is not a well-defined primitive object in any of these models. Rather, changes in demand in a given market could result from either a change in the number of consumers or from a change in

\textsuperscript{95}Recent work in the trade tradition models entry of products within multi-product firms, e.g. Mayer, Melitz and Ottaviano (2016).

\textsuperscript{96}In models in the macro tradition, the fall in marginal cost can either be exogenous or endogenous to the firm’s decisions. Exogenous falls in marginal costs stem from increasing returns to scale (e.g. Matsuyama, 2002). In models with endogenous investment in marginal cost, the returns to marginal cost improvements increase with market size (e.g. Acemoglu and Linn, 2004).

\textsuperscript{97}In models in the trade tradition, markups fall because consumers move along their demand curves to a point with a higher price elasticity; while in models in the industrial organization tradition, markups fall because a larger market can sustain more firms and an increase in the number of firms reduces markups through strategic interactions.
spending per capita, respectively denoted \( L \) and \( E \) in the model introduced above. Depending on the model, variation in the number of consumers and variation in per capita spending could have different effects on the equilibrium.\(^{98}\) Empirically, I find that these effects are in fact very similar.

In light of the results of the various tests reported in the remainder of this section, I develop my preferred model by relying on translog preferences with flexible preference parameters across income groups. In contrast with the other models mentioned above, my preferred model yields predictions in line with all aspects of the data: changes in market size drive the effect (rather than the level), falling markups are key, and changes in demand coming from changes in the number of consumers or from changes in per capita spending lead to the same endogenous supply response.

E.2 Intuitions

E.2.1 Reduced-Form Approach

Figure E1: Does the Price Fall When Demand Rises?

Because of nonhomothetic preferences and the endogenous price changes induced by changes in relative demand, changes in nominal inequality may overstate or understate changes in purchasing-power inequality. Consider Figure E1. When relative demand goes up, if the short-run supply curve is upward-sloping as in standard price theory, then the equilibrium price should go up. However, supply may endogenously shift out due to the response of firms to market size effects. The price increase will at least be mitigated. As illustrated

\(^{98}\) For instance, in Zhelobodko et al. (2012) changes in spending per capita will only result in an impact on the equilibrium number of varieties, while the price of continuing products will be unaffected. In contrast, changes in the number of consumers will also lead to a fall in the price of continuing products.
in Figure E1, the new equilibrium price could even be lower than the initial equilibrium price. This “price overshooting” is found to be relevant empirically in Section 4. In other words, the observed long-term supply curve is downward-sloping.\footnote{The “observed” long-term supply curve is defined as the nexus of equilibrium points traced out by shifts in the demand curve. The concept of “observed” supply curve is useful in the context of monopolistic competition, where firms are not price takers and where the usual notion of “supply curve” is therefore not well defined.}

To investigate whether changes in nominal inequality overstate or understate changes in real inequality, the following concepts are useful:

- **Weak equilibrium (relative) bias** ("directed technical change"): when demand for a good becomes relatively more abundant, supply (technology, innovation, entrepreneurship, etc.) becomes endogenously biased towards this factor.

- **Strong equilibrium (relative) bias**: the relative supply curves for goods are downward-sloping.

Consider demand \( H \) for a high-quality good and demand \( L \) for a low-quality good. Endogenous technology \( A \) is a function of relative demand \( \frac{H}{L} \). The equilibrium relative price is

\[
\frac{p_H}{p_L} = f \left( \frac{H}{L}, A \left( \frac{H}{L} \right) \right)
\]

There is weak equilibrium bias if:

\[
\frac{\partial f}{\partial A} \frac{\partial A}{\partial H} < 0
\]

There is strong equilibrium bias if:

\[
\frac{\partial f}{\partial H} + \frac{\partial f}{\partial A} \frac{\partial A}{\partial H} < 0
\]

where one could have \( \frac{\partial f}{\partial H} > 0 \), as in standard price theory.

The equations above and Figure E1 provide an intuitive reduced-form way of thinking about the effect of shifts in demand on the equilibrium price.

### E.2.2 A Simple Microfoundation

Figure E1 provides an intuitive reduced-form way of thinking about the effect of shifts in demand on the equilibrium price. I now turn to providing a microfoundation for this effect, focusing on microfounded models of monopolistic competition with free entry.\footnote{This broad class of models is appealing for two reasons: the assumption of monopolistic competition is reasonable in retail, and these models nest the standard model of directed technical change (Acemoglu, 2002).} The intuition for the effect of changes in market size on supply in monopolistic competition models is as follows: an increase in market size leads to more product entry, which puts downward pressure on the prices of existing products (pecuniary externality). Therefore, in such models innovation occurs entirely through product entry - there is no “process innovation” reducing the marginal cost of the existing products, whose price dynamics are determined by changes in markups.

Within the class of monopolistic competition models with free entry of products, only some models are consistent with the “price overshooting” case illustrated in Figure E1. In particular, the CES model of Acemoglu (2002) does not allow for the possibility that the price goes down when demand goes up (see...
Appendix A for a detailed derivation). On the other hand, Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) is consistent with the strong equilibrium bias (see Appendix A for a derivation). In the rest of this section, I characterize the conditions under which “price overshooting” is possible using the general monopolistic competition model of Zhelobodko, Kokovin, Parenting and Thisse (2012). The key insight is that, in general equilibrium, the curvature of the utility function and variable markups drive the sign and magnitude of the response of the equilibrium price to changes in market size.

$L$ consumers with additively separable preferences over varieties solve:

$$\max_{x_i \geq 0} U = \int_0^N u(x_i) di \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \int_0^N p_i x_i di = E$$

Consumer maximization yields

$$p_i(x_i) = \frac{u'(x_i)}{\lambda}$$

$$\lambda = \frac{\int_0^N x_i u'(x_i) di}{E}$$

Total quantity demanded is $q_i = Lx_i$. The monopolist takes the residual demand curve as given and solves:

$$\max \pi(q_i) = R(q_i) - C(q_i) \equiv \frac{u'(q_i/L)}{\lambda} q_i - V(q_i) - F$$

with $V(.)$ the variable cost function and $F$ the fixed cost. The optimal markup of the producer is therefore given by:

$$M^* = -\frac{x_i \cdot u''(x_i)}{u'(x_i)}$$

At the free entry equilibrium, $\pi(q_i^*) = 0$ and a mass $N^*$ of firms satisfies labor market clearing$^{101}$:

$$N^* = \frac{L \cdot E}{C(q_i^*)}$$

Therefore, the model delivers the following comparative statics:

$$\frac{dN^*}{dL} > 0 \quad \frac{dx_i^*}{dL} < 0 \quad \frac{dM_i^*}{dL} \lesssim 0$$

The optimal markup is given by the inverse of the price elasticity of demand. The result is very general and holds regardless of the shape of the cost function $V(.)$. It shows why the equilibrium response of prices to changes in market size crucially depends on the curvature of the utility function. The intuition for the comparative statics is as follows. When market size increases, new products enter the market. As a result, consumers start spreading out their expenditures across more products, due to taste for variety. Consequently, consumption per capita $x_i$ for the existing products goes down, which induces a responses of the optimal markup $M^*$. The equilibrium markup may increase, decrease or stay unchanged, depending on the properties of demand. Figure E2 shows this effect in log-log space. The blue curve corresponds to CES

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$^{101}$ A similar model can be solved by assuming that the sector is small relative to the total economy, which allows for ignoring some GE effects. See Mayer, Melitz and Ottaviano (2016).

$^{102}$ The inverse of the price elasticity of demand is equal to the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Given our assumption of separable utility, it is also equal to the inverse of the elasticity of substitution between varieties.
demand, as in Acemoglu (2002). Movements along the curve do not matter; the elasticity is constant. On the other hand, the red curve shows that when consumption per capita decreases (moving to the left along the curve), the price elasticity of demand goes up, i.e. the optimal markup goes down. Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) corresponds to this case. Conversely, as shown with the green curve, if the price elasticity of demand is increasing, the equilibrium price should go up in response to an increase in market size.

The market size comparative statics in the case of decreasing elasticity of substitution are in line with the stylized facts documented earlier: through market size effects and endogenous product entry, there should be a strong negative correlation between inflation and the share of spending on new products both across and within product modules. The main prediction of the model is of course that growing demand causes more product innovations and lower inflation. An additional prediction is that the inflation patterns on continuing products are driven by differences in changes in markups.\footnote{Note that this speaks to an active debate in the trade literature about the source of the gains from trade and the role of variable markups and variable elasticity of substitution preferences. See in particular DeLoecker, Goldberg, Pavcnik and Khandelwal (2012), Feenstra and Weinstein (2016), and Mayer, Melitz and Ottaviano (2016).} I test and find support for these predictions in the rest of this section.

Figure E2: The Equilibrium Response of Price to Changes in Market Size Depends on the Price Elasticity of Demand

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure_e2.png}
\caption{The Equilibrium Response of Price to Changes in Market Size Depends on the Price Elasticity of Demand}
\end{figure}

\section*{E.3 General Equilibrium Model}

\subsection*{E.3.1 Goals}

The purpose of this model is to offer a unified framework for the estimation of inflation across income groups and the estimation of the response of supply to market size effects. In other words, the model features A. well-defined non-homothetic preferences giving rise to tractable income-group specific prices indices; B.
closed-form solutions showing the general equilibrium response of supply to shifts in demand across the product space, in terms of endogenous product variety and endogenous markups.

Thus, this model provides a microfoundation for the measurement of inflation across income groups carried out in Section 3, as well as for the regression specifications and comparative statics used in Section 4 to characterize the response of supply to market size effects.\textsuperscript{104}

E.3.2 Setting and Main Assumptions

I consider a general equilibrium model with two types of agents differing in their productivity levels, denoted $H$ for high productivity and $L$ for low productivity. The numbers of agents of each type are denoted $L^i$, with $i = H, L$. These agents consume and produce in $K$ different sectors in the economy. The number of products available in each sector is endogenous and denoted $N_k$.\textsuperscript{105}

In order to obtain tractable closed-form solutions, the following simplifying assumptions are made:

1. The model is static;

2. Firms in each sector are homogeneous, i.e. have the same marginal cost of production;

3. Consumer preferences are non-homothetic across sectors (i.e. different agents place different weights on the various sectors, depending on their income levels) but are homothetic within sectors (i.e. at the lowest level of aggregation, all agents have the same spending patterns);

4. High- and low-productivity agents enter the production function in a similar way across sectors, which implies that there is no feedback effect of shifting demand on wages across agent types.

5. High- and low-productivity agents pay the same price for each barcode (within sectors).

Each of these assumptions are relaxed in turn in extensions presented later in this appendix.

E.3.3 Consumers

**Non-homothetic CES aggregator across sectors.** Consumers of each type, indexed by $i = H, L$, maximize aggregate consumption $C_i$. As in Comin et al. (2016), $C_i$ combines sector goods $\{C_{ik}\}_{k=1}^K$ according to the implicitly defined function:

\[
\sum_{k=1}^{K} \Omega_k^i \left( \frac{C_i^{\sigma} - C_{ik}^{\sigma}}{\sigma} \right)^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}} = 1 \tag{E1}
\]

where $\sigma$ is the elasticity of substitution and $\Omega_k$’s are constant weights for the various sectors. Each sectoral good $k$ is itself a consumption aggregator, described below, and is characterized by an income elasticity parameter $\epsilon_k$. This is a generalization of the standard (homothetic) CES aggregator, which corresponds to

\textsuperscript{104}The model can also be used to clarify the identification assumptions and the potential threats to identification discussed in Section 4.

\textsuperscript{105}In my model, product entry and firm entry are analogous, therefore $N^K$ can be thought of as the equilibrium number of firms or the equilibrium number of sectors.
the special case for which $\epsilon_k = 1$ for all sectors. Intuitively, as aggregate consumption $C_i$ increases, the weight given to the consumption of good $k$ varies at a rate controlled by the parameter $\epsilon_k$. As a result, household $i$‘s demand for sectoral good $k$ features a constant elasticity in terms of aggregate consumption $C_i$, which is in turn determined by household income.\textsuperscript{106}

Note that, with only two household types, we can re-write the non-homothetic CES aggregator above as two income-group-specific standard (homothetic) CES aggregator, with income-group-specific sectoral weights $\tilde{\Omega}_{ik} = \Omega_k C_i^{\sigma_k - 1}$. In other words, each household maximizes aggregate consumption $C_i$ defined as:

$$\frac{1}{K} \sum_{k=1}^{K} \frac{1}{\Omega_k^{1/\sigma_k}} C_i^{\sigma_k} C_{ik}^{1-\sigma_k} = 1 \text{ i.e. } C_i = \left( \frac{1}{\sum_{k=1}^{K} \Omega_k^{1/\sigma_k} C_{ik}^{\sigma_k}} \right)^{1/\sigma_k} \text{ for } i = H, L$$

The standard CES results then apply for each household type.\textsuperscript{107} The optimal allocation of expenditures across sectors is characterized by

$$C_{ik} = \tilde{\Omega}_{ik} \left( \frac{P_k}{\tilde{P}_i} \right)^{-\sigma} C_i$$

where $P_k$ is the sectoral price index and $\tilde{P}_i$ is the aggregate price index for a household of type $i$:

$$\tilde{P}_i \equiv \frac{E_i}{C_i} = \left[ \frac{1}{K} \sum_{k=1}^{K} \tilde{\Omega}_{ik} P_k^{1-\sigma} \right]^{1/\sigma}$$

using the level of expenditures $E_i = \sum_{k=1}^{K} P_k C_{ik}$ and the expression for $C_{ik}$ above.

Therefore, expenditure shares for each income group across sectors are given by:

$$s_{ik} = \frac{P_k \cdot C_{ik}}{E_i} = \frac{P_k \cdot \tilde{\Omega}_{ik} \left( \frac{P_k}{\tilde{P}_i} \right)^{-\sigma} C_i}{C_i \cdot \tilde{P}_i} = \tilde{\Omega}_{ik} \left( \frac{P_k}{\tilde{P}_i} \right)^{1-\sigma} = \frac{\tilde{\Omega}_{ik} P_k^{1-\sigma}}{\sum_{k=1}^{K} \tilde{\Omega}_{ik} P_k^{1-\sigma}} \quad \text{(E3)}$$

**Translog preferences within sectors.** Within a sector, consumers have the same translog preferences. Let $\tilde{N}_k$ be the total number of varieties (or firms) conceivably available in sector $k$ and treat this number as fixed. Dropping the $k$ subscripts for convenience and denoting by $p_n$ the price of variety (or firm) $n$, within each sector the translog expenditure function is defined as:\textsuperscript{108}

$$\ln(E) = \ln(U) + \sum_{n=1}^{\tilde{N}} \alpha_n \ln(p_n) + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{n=1}^{\tilde{N}} \sum_{m=1}^{\tilde{N}} \gamma_{nm} \ln(p_n) \ln(p_m)$$

with $\gamma_{nm} = \gamma_{mn} \forall m, n$. The restrictions $\sum_{n=1}^{\tilde{N}} \alpha_n = 1$ and $\sum_{n=1}^{\tilde{N}} \gamma_{nm} = 0$ ensure that the expenditure function is homogeneous of degree one. Following the literature, I impose that all goods enter “symmetrically” into the expenditure function, i.e. $\alpha_n = \frac{1}{\tilde{N}}$, $\gamma_{nm} = \frac{-\gamma_{(n-1)/\tilde{N}}}{\tilde{N}}$ and $\gamma_{nm} = \frac{-\gamma_{m/\tilde{N}}}{\tilde{N}}$ for $m \neq n$, with $n, m = 1, ..., \tilde{N}$. In

\textsuperscript{106}Useful properties of this utility function include the fact that the elasticity of relative demand for two different goods with respect to aggregate consumption is constant: $\frac{\partial \ln(C_i/C_j)}{\partial \ln(P_k)} = \epsilon_i - \epsilon_j$; and the fact that the elasticity of substitution between goods of different sectors is uniquely defined and constant: $\frac{\partial \ln(C_i/C_j)}{\partial \ln(P_k/P_L)} = \sigma$. See Comin et al. (2016) for more details.

\textsuperscript{107}In the estimation carried out in Section 3, $\tilde{\Omega}_{ik}$ can be recovered directly from price and quantity data. The estimation framework also allows for elasticities of substitution $\sigma$ to vary across income groups.

\textsuperscript{108}See Dievert (1974) and Feenstra (2003).
the presence of unavailable goods, the expenditure function becomes complicated, involving their reservation prices. However, in the symmetric case defined above, Feenstra (2003) shows that the expenditure function can be simplified considerably, so that the reservation prices no longer appear explicitly. Specifically, imposing the symmetry restrictions and \( \gamma > 0 \) and assuming that only the goods \( n = 1, \ldots, N \) are available, Feenstra (2003) shows that the expenditure function can be written in a way such that reservation prices no longer appear:

\[
\ln(E) = \ln(U) + a_0 + \sum_{n=1}^{N} a_n \ln(p_n) + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{n=1}^{N} \sum_{m=1}^{N} b_{nm} \ln(p_n) \ln(p_m)
\]

where \( a_n = \frac{1}{N} \), \( b_{nn} = -\frac{\gamma(N-1)}{N} \) and \( b_{nm} = \frac{\gamma}{N} \) for \( m \neq n \), with \( n, m = 1, \ldots, N \), and \( a_0 = a_0 + \frac{1}{2} \frac{\tilde{N}-N}{\gamma N} \).

The second term appearing in \( a_0 \) reflects the welfare gains of increasing the number of available products - it shows that these gains are smaller and smaller as \( N \) approaches \( \tilde{N} \), a key feature of translog (i.e. there are decreasing returns to increasing product variety, in contrast with the CES case).

By Shephard’s lemma, the spending share on each variety \( n \) is given by:

\[
s_n = \frac{1}{N} + \gamma \left( \frac{\ln(p)}{\ln(p_n)} - \ln(p_n) \right)
\]

with \( \ln(p) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{m=1}^{N} \ln(p_m) \). Thus, a 1% increase in the price of a product, holding the overall mean price fixed, lowers its expenditure share by \( \gamma \) percentage points.

Therefore, the elasticity of demand for each product \( n \) is given by:

\[
\epsilon_n = 1 - \frac{d \ln(s_n)}{d \ln(p_n)} = 1 + \frac{(N-1) \cdot \gamma}{N \cdot s_n}
\]

i.e. the elasticity of demand is decreasing in expenditure share, therefore it is increasing in price. The elasticity of demand is the key feature of preferences which determines firms’ optimal markups in equilibrium.

**Labor supply.** Labor is supplied inelastically. High-productivity households are endowed with \( l^H \) effective units of labor, as against \( l^L \) effective units of labor for low-productivity households. The wage for one effective unit of labor is the numeraire.

**Budget constraint.** Each household type is subject to the budget constraint:

\[
\sum_{k=1}^{K} \sum_{n=1}^{N_i} c_{nk} \cdot p_{nk} = l^i \quad \forall i
\]

**Two-stage budgeting.** In addition to the budget constraint, equations (E1), (E3), (E4) and (E5) above completely characterize the demand side of the model. I have shown how the non-homothetic CES-aggregator can be re-written as separate income-group-specific homothetic CES aggregators across sectors. The translog utility functions within sectors are also homothetic, which makes it possible to rely on two-stage budgeting: households first allocate their expenditures across sectors according to (E3), and then within sector according to (E4). Their equilibrium demand elasticity is given by (E5) and is the key equilibrium object that governs optimal markups.


**E.3.4 Producers**

**Homogeneous firms/varieties within sectors.** Within each sector $k$, symmetric firms (or, alternatively, varieties) enter until profits are brought to zero. To obtain tractable closed-form solutions, the cost structure is assumed be to homogeneous across firms within a sector: firms have the same marginal cost, produce varieties of the same quality, and incur the same entry cost. Therefore, firm/variety subscripts $n$ can be dropped in what follows.

**Labor demand.** All firms/varieties produce using the same production function. The quantity produced by a single firm/variety is given by $q_k = Z_k l_k$, where $l_k$ is labor demand for production and $Z_k$ is a productivity factor specific to sector $k$. Moreover, all firms pay the same sunk “entry cost” equal to $f_k$ effective units of labor. The required amount of labor for entry per firm is therefore $f_k/Z_k$. Thus, the total amount of labor required by all firms in sector $k$ is:

$$L_k = N_k \cdot \left(\frac{q_k}{Z_k} + \frac{f_k}{Z_k}\right)$$

**Optimal markups.** Firms are monopolistically competitive. Therefore, the same formula as described in Section 4 applies. In each sector $k$, firms charge an optimal markup equal to $1/\epsilon_k - 1$. Using the fact that $s_{nk} = 1/N_k$ by symmetry, from E5 we have that the optimal markup for product $n$ in sector $k$ is given by:

$$\mu_{nk} - 1 = \mu_k - 1 = \frac{1}{\epsilon_k - 1} = \frac{1}{(N_k - 1) \cdot \gamma_k}$$

(E7)

In contrast with the CES case, the optimal markup is decreasing in the number of products.

**Free entry.** Firms enter sector $k$ until profits are brought to zero via decreasing markups. Using the fact that the wage is the numeraire, this can be written as:

$$\pi_k = (\mu_k - 1) \frac{q_k}{Z_k} - \frac{f_k}{Z_k} = 0 \quad \forall k$$

(E8)

where $q_k$ is the total quantity produced by the firm in market $k$ in equilibrium.

**E.3.5 Equilibrium (Proof of Proposition 1)**

The equilibrium objects are as follows:\(^{109}\)

1. Equilibrium consumption levels for each variety $n$ and each household type $i$ in each sector $k$; by symmetry, $c_{ink} = c_k$

2. Equilibrium production levels for each variety $n$ in each sector $k$; by symmetry, $q_{nk} = q_k$

3. Equilibrium prices for each variety $n$ in each sector $k$; by symmetry, $p_{nk} = p_k$

\(^{109}\)Note that the derivations can readily be extended to an arbitrary number of income groups.
4. Equilibrium number of varieties $N_k$ in each sector $k$

5. Optimal markup for each variety $n$ in each sector $k$; by symmetry, $\mu_{nk} = \mu_k$

6. Total labor demand $L_k$ for each sector $k$

The equilibrium conditions are as follows:

1. Optimal allocation of spending across sectors: equation (E3)

2. $L^L$ budget constraints for the low-income and $L^H$ budget constraints for the high-income: equation (E6)

3. Optimal markups in each sector $k$: equation (E7)

4. Zero-profit condition in each sector $k$: equation (E8)

5. Equilibrium of supply and demand for each variety $n$ in each sector $k$; by symmetry:

$$q_k = L^H \cdot c^H_k + L^L \cdot c^L_k$$

6. Equilibrium of supply and demand for labor:

$$\sum_k \frac{N_k}{Z_k} \left( L^H \cdot c^H_k + L^L \cdot c^L_k + f_k \right) = \frac{\theta^H \cdot L^H + \theta^L \cdot L^L}{\text{total endowment of effective labor units}}$$

Intuitively, in equilibrium households maximize their utility subject to their budget constraint (conditions 1 and 2), no existing firm can increase its profit by changing its output (condition 3), no firm can enter any sector and make positive profits (condition 4), the product market clears (condition 5), and the labor market clears (condition 6).

We can now solve the model. From E8 and the equilibrium of supply and demand for each variety,

$$(\mu_k - 1) \left( L^H \cdot c^H_k + L^L \cdot c^L_k \right) = f_k \quad \forall k$$

where $\mu_k = \frac{1}{(N_k - 1) \gamma_k}$ by E7. Using the equilibrium spending shares across sectors from E3 and symmetry within sector, the equilibrium spending on each variety within each sector $k$ is given by:

$$e_k \equiv p_k \cdot \left( L^H \cdot c^H_k + L^L \cdot c^L_k \right) = L^H \cdot \frac{\theta^H \cdot s_{Hk}}{N_k} + L^L \cdot \frac{\theta^L \cdot s_{Lk}}{N_k} \quad \forall k$$

The optimal price is the optimal markup over the marginal cost, i.e. $p_k = \mu_k \frac{1}{Z_k} = \frac{1+(N_k-1)\gamma_k}{(N_k-1)\gamma_k} \frac{1}{Z_k} \quad \forall k$.

Plugging this back in E8, we can write:

$$\left( \frac{\mu_k - 1}{p_k} \right) \frac{ e_k }{ p_k } = f_k$$

$$\frac{1}{(N_k - 1) \cdot \gamma_k} \frac{ \theta^H \cdot s_{Hk} + \theta^L \cdot s_{Lk} }{N_k} \frac{ 1 + (N_k - 1) \cdot \gamma_k }{ (N_k - 1) \cdot \gamma_k } = f_k$$
\[
\frac{(L^H \cdot I^H \cdot s_{Hk} + L^L \cdot I^L \cdot s_{Lk}) \cdot Z_k}{N_k(1 + (N_k - 1) \cdot \gamma_k)} = f_k
\]

\[
\gamma_k N_k^2 + (1 - \gamma_k)N_k - \left(\frac{(L^H \cdot I^H \cdot s_{Hk} + L^L \cdot I^L \cdot s_{Lk}) \cdot Z_k}{f_k}\right) = 0
\]

(E9)

Therefore, in equilibrium:

\[
N_k^* = \frac{(\gamma_k - 1) + \sqrt{(1 - \gamma_k)^2 + 4\gamma_k(\frac{(L^H \cdot I^H \cdot s_{Hk} + L^L \cdot I^L \cdot s_{Lk}) \cdot Z_k}{f_k})}}{2\gamma_k}
\]

(E10)

This also gives us the equilibrium price of each variety, given that the optimal markup over marginal cost is entirely determined by the equilibrium number of varieties:

\[
p_k^* = 1 + \frac{(N_k^* - 1) \cdot \gamma_k}{Z_k}
\]

(E11)

Following Feenstra (2003) and using symmetry of all varieties, the aggregate price index within each sector is given by:

\[
\ln(P_k^*) = \alpha_{0k} + \frac{1 - N_k^*}{2\gamma_k N_k^*} + \frac{1 + (N_k^* - 1) \cdot \gamma_k}{(N_k^* - 1) \cdot \gamma_k} \cdot \frac{1}{Z_k}
\]

(E12)

Note that welfare goes up (i.e. \(P_k^*\) goes down) as the equilibrium number of varieties \(N_k^*\) increases because of two forces. First, consumers love variety, which is captured by the term \(\frac{1 - N_k^*}{2\gamma_k N_k^*}\) (note that this term decreases at a decreasing rate as \(N_k^*\) increases, because the product space gets filled and there are decreasing returns to increasing product variety). Second, an increasing number of varieties leads to lower markups, which is reflected by the term \(\frac{1 + (N_k^* - 1) \cdot \gamma_k}{(N_k^* - 1) \cdot \gamma_k} \cdot \frac{1}{Z_k}\).

It can be checked that the equilibrium solution above satisfies the labor market clearing condition:

\[
\sum_k \frac{N_k}{Z_k} (L^H \cdot c_{k}^H + L^L \cdot c_{k}^L + f_k) = \sum_k \frac{N_k}{Z_k} \left( \frac{f_k}{(\mu_k - 1)} + f_k \right)
\]

\[
= \sum_k \frac{N_k \cdot f_k}{Z_k} \gamma_k N_k - \gamma_k + 1
\]

\[
= \sum_k \left( \frac{f_k}{Z_k} \gamma_k N_k^2 - \frac{f_k}{Z_k} (1 - \gamma_k)N_k \right)
\]

\[
= \sum_k (L^H \cdot I^H \cdot s_{Hk} + L^L \cdot I^L \cdot s_{Lk})
\]

\[
= L^H \cdot I^H + L^L \cdot I^L
\]

where the first line follows from E8 and the fourth line follows from E9. This completes the derivation of the equilibrium.110

---

110 Technically, the conditions derived above are only necessary conditions. To show that there are also sufficient conditions for existence and unicity of the equilibrium, we only need to show that \(N_k^*\) is uniquely determined. \(s_{ik}\) is monotonically increasing in \(N_k^*\), which establishes existence.
E.3.6 Comparative Statics

The model delivered simple closed-form solutions for the equilibrium number of varieties, the price of each variety, the sectoral price index, and the (non-homothetic) aggregate price index for each household type. The regression specifications in Section 4 examine the equilibrium response of the sectoral price index (where a sector is defined as a product module by price decile) and the total number of varieties to changes in the number of consumers and per capita spending. This can be shown directly in the model by taking comparative statics with respect to $L^i$, the number of consumers of type $i$, and $l^i$, nominal spending per capita for consumers of type $i$.

Equation (E10) shows that changes in the number of consumers ($L^i$) and in spending per capita ($l^i$) have the same effect on the equilibrium, consistent with the result found in Section 4. From equations (E10), (E11), (E12) and (E2), the comparative statics of interest are:

$$\frac{dN^*_k}{dL^i} = \frac{dN^*_k}{dl^i} > 0 \forall k, i$$
$$\frac{dp^*_k}{dL^i} = \frac{dp^*_k}{dl^i} < 0 \forall k, i$$
$$\frac{dP^*_k}{dL^i} = \frac{dP^*_k}{dl^i} < 0 \forall k, i$$
$$\frac{dP^*_i}{dL^i} = \frac{dP^*_i}{dl^i} < 0 \forall i$$

Thus, when either the number of consumers of a certain type or spending per capita from consumers of that type increase, the total number of varieties increase, the price of each variety decreases, the sectoral price index decreases, and the aggregate price index decreases. The observed supply curve is downward-sloping, in line with the regression results and the intuition presented in Section 4.111

E.3.7 Proof of Proposition 2

Consider two periods, $t-1$ and $t$. Represent the change in the income distribution between these two periods by a set $\{g_i\}_{i=1}^I$ of growth rates in the number of households with income (productivity) $l^i$, i.e. such that $L^i_t = (1 + g_t) L^i_{t-1}$. For each income group $i$, define the welfare-relevant market size effect implied by changes in the income distribution as:

$$\bar{g}_{it} = \sum_{k=1}^K s_{ik(t-1)} \cdot \left( \sum_{j=1}^I s_{kj(t-1)} \cdot g_{jt} \right)$$

where $s_{kj(t-1)}$ denotes the share of $j$ in total spending in $k$ at $t - 1$.

111Note that we could also include transfers in the model, for instance to speak directly to the specifications used for the SNAP research design in Section 4. With transfers, the budget constraint becomes:

$$\sum_{k=1}^K \sum_{n=1}^N c_{ink} \cdot p_{nk} = l^i + T^i$$

where $T^i$ denotes government transfers, such that $L^H \cdot T^H + L^L \cdot T^L = 0$. It follows immediately that changes in $T^i$ have exactly the same effects on the equilibrium as changes in $l^i$: the comparative statics are identical.
By (E2), changes in the price index across the income distribution are given by:

\[ \pi^i_t \equiv \log(\bar{P}^i_t) - \log(\bar{P}^i_{t-1}) \]
\[ = \frac{1}{1-\sigma} \log \left( \sum_{k=1}^{K} \tilde{\Omega}_{ik} P^1_{kt}^{1-\sigma} \right) - \frac{1}{1-\sigma} \log \left( \sum_{k=1}^{K} \tilde{\Omega}_{ik} P^1_{k(t-1)}^{1-\sigma} \right) \]
\[ = \frac{1}{1-\sigma} \log \left( \frac{\sum_{k=1}^{K} \tilde{\Omega}_{ik} P^1_{kt}^{1-\sigma}}{\sum_{k=1}^{K} \tilde{\Omega}_{ik} P^1_{k(t-1)}^{1-\sigma}} \right) \]
\[ = \frac{1}{1-\sigma} \log \left( \frac{\sum_{k=1}^{K} \tilde{\Omega}_{ik} P^1_{kt}^{1-\sigma} \left( \frac{P_{kt}}{P_{k(t-1)}} \right)^{1-\sigma}}{\sum_{k=1}^{K} \tilde{\Omega}_{ik} P^1_{k(t-1)}^{1-\sigma}} \right) \]  

(E13)

The fall in the price index is larger for households who were spending more on parts of the product space where the sector price index declined faster, i.e. \( \frac{P_{kt}}{P_{k(t-1)}} \) is low.

Next, let’s show that the fall in \( \frac{P_{kt}}{P_{k(t-1)}} \) is governed by the term \( \sum_{j=1}^{l} g_{jt} \cdot s_{jk(t-1)} \). Note that if the spending shares do not change much across periods, i.e. \( s_{jk(t-1)} \approx s_{jk} \), then \( \sum_{j=1}^{l} g_{jt} \cdot s_{jk(t-1)} \) gives the percentage change in spending in sector \( k \) between \( t-1 \) and \( t \) (since total spending at \( t-1 \) is given by \( L^H \cdot l^H \cdot s_{Hk} + L^L \cdot l^L \cdot s_{Lk} \), or \( \sum L^i \cdot l^i \cdot s_{ikt} \) with more than two groups). From (E10), (E11) and (E12), we know that the equilibrium sectoral price index is entirely determined by spending, i.e. we can write:

\[ P_{k(t-1)} = f_k \left( \sum_{i} L^i \cdot l^i \cdot s_{ikt} \right) \]
\[ P_{kt} = f_k \left( \sum_{i} (1 + g_{it}) \cdot L^i \cdot l^i \cdot s_{ikt} \right) \]

Log-linearizing,

\[ \frac{P_{kt}}{P_{k(t-1)}} - 1 \approx \epsilon_k \cdot \left( \sum_{j=1}^{l} g_{jt} \cdot s_{kj(t-1)} \right) \]

where \( \epsilon_k \) is the (semi-)elasticity of the sectoral price index to a change in market size, which in general depends on \( \gamma_k, N_{k(t-1)}, Z_k, f_k \) and initial demand \( \sum L^i \cdot l^i \cdot s_{ikt} \). Assume that this elasticity is negative and similar across sectors: \( \epsilon_k = \epsilon < 0 \forall k \), in line with the evidence in Sections 4 and D.6. Intuitively, this assumptions means that supply responds in a similar way to proportional changes in market size across the product space. Therefore,

\[ \left( \frac{P_{kt}}{P_{k(t-1)}} \right)^{1-\sigma_i} \approx \left( 1 + \epsilon \cdot \left( \sum_{j=1}^{l} g_{jt} \cdot s_{kj(t-1)} \right) \right)^{1-\sigma_i} \]
\[ \approx 1 + (1 - \sigma_i) \cdot \epsilon \cdot \left( \sum_{j=1}^{l} g_{jt} \cdot s_{kj(t-1)} \right) \] 

(E14)
where the second line follow from a first-order Taylor expansion. Equation (E14) shows that sectoral price indices fall disproportionately in parts of the product space that grow faster.

Next, to simplify the analysis and in line with the results in Table C8, assume that \( \sigma_i = \sigma_m = \sigma \). Then,

\[
\tilde{g}_{it} > \tilde{g}_{mt} \iff \sum_{k=1}^{K} s_{ik(t-1)} \cdot \left( \sum_{j=1}^{I} g_{jt} \cdot s_{kj(t-1)} \right) > \sum_{k=1}^{K} s_{mk(t-1)} \cdot \left( \sum_{j=1}^{I} g_{jt} \cdot s_{kj(t-1)} \right)
\]

\[
\iff 1 + (1 - \sigma) \cdot \sum_{k=1}^{K} s_{ik(t-1)} \cdot \left( \sum_{j=1}^{I} g_{jt} \cdot s_{kj(t-1)} \right) < 1 + (1 - \sigma) \cdot \sum_{k=1}^{K} s_{mk(t-1)} \cdot \left( \sum_{j=1}^{I} g_{jt} \cdot s_{kj(t-1)} \right)
\]

\[
\iff \sum_{k=1}^{K} s_{ik(t-1)} \cdot \left( \frac{P_{kt}}{P_{k(t-1)}} \right)^{1-\sigma} < \sum_{k=1}^{K} s_{mk(t-1)} \cdot \left( \frac{P_{kt}}{P_{k(t-1)}} \right)^{1-\sigma}
\]

\[
\iff \frac{1}{1 - \sigma} \log \left( \sum_{k=1}^{K} s_{ik(t-1)} \cdot \left( \frac{P_{kt}}{P_{k(t-1)}} \right)^{1-\sigma} \right) < \frac{1}{1 - \sigma} \log \left( \sum_{k=1}^{K} s_{mk(t-1)} \cdot \left( \frac{P_{kt}}{P_{k(t-1)}} \right)^{1-\sigma} \right)
\]

\[
\iff \pi_{it} < \pi_{mt}
\]

where the fourth line follows from (E14) and the sixth line follows from (E13). This completes the proof of Proposition 2.

### E.3.8 Implied elasticity of the price of continuing products to changes in product variety

Given E10 and E11, the elasticity of inflation on continued products to product introductions is:

\[
\eta = \frac{d p_k^*}{d N_k^*} N_k^* = -\frac{N_k}{N_k - 1} \cdot \frac{1}{1 + (N_k - 1) \cdot \gamma_k}
\]

Hence, for large \( N_k \),

\[
\eta \to \frac{1}{1 + \mu_k}
\]

where \( \mu_k \) is the markup.

According to the Census Annual Retail Trade Survey, retail markups are about 35%. In the empirical analysis reported in Tables 3 and D7, I find that a 1 percentage point increase in demand leads to a 2.7 percentage point increase in spending on new products, a 1.4 percentage point increase in product exit, and a 40 basis point decline in inflation on continued products. The implied elasticity of the price of continued products to product introductions is \( \frac{0.40}{1.4} \approx 0.30 \). By comparison, the implied elasticity from the model and using the retail markup from the Census Annual Retail Trade Survey is \( \frac{1}{1 + \mu} = 0.27 \).

\[\text{112This assumption can be relaxed. We only need the two elasticities to not be "too different", namely they must satisfy:}\]

\[
\frac{\log \left( \sum_{k=1}^{K} s_{ik(t-1)} \cdot \left( 1 + (1 - \sigma_i) \cdot \epsilon \sum_{j=1}^{I} g_j \cdot s_{kj(t-1)} \right) \right)}{\log \left( \sum_{k=1}^{K} s_{mk(t-1)} \cdot \left( 1 + (1 - \sigma_m) \cdot \epsilon \sum_{j=1}^{I} g_j \cdot s_{kj(t-1)} \right) \right)} < \frac{1 - \sigma_i}{1 - \sigma_m} < \frac{\sum_{k=1}^{K} s_{mk(t-1)} \cdot \left( \sum_{j=1}^{I} g_j \cdot s_{kj(t-1)} \right)}{\sum_{k=1}^{K} s_{ik(t-1)} \cdot \left( \sum_{j=1}^{I} g_j \cdot s_{kj(t-1)} \right)}
\]
E.3.9 Market Size Effects Implied by Growth

Figure E3: Market Size Effects Implied by Growth

E.3.10 Extensions

In this section, I present a number of extensions of the model. I first show the results when the lower nest in the demand system is CES instead of translog. I then relax the main simplifying assumptions of the model, introducing 1. dynamics, 2. heterogeneous firms, 3. non-homotheticities within sectors, 4. feedback effects of shifting demand on the relative income of the various consumer types.

Model with CES preferences in lower nest

When preferences within a sector are CES (instead of translog), consumer’s demand elasticity becomes independent of the number of varieties and is denoted $\theta_k > 1$ for each sector $k$. Accordingly, firms’ optimal markup is given by:

$$\mu_k - 1 = \frac{1}{\theta - 1}$$

The equilibrium is then characterized by:

$$N_k^* = \frac{(L^H \cdot l^H \cdot s_{Hk} + L^L \cdot l^L \cdot s_{Lk}) \cdot Z_k}{\theta_k \cdot f_k}$$

$$p_k^* = \frac{1}{\theta - 1} \frac{1}{Z_k}$$

$$P_k^* = N_k^* p_k^*$$
The comparative statics of interest are:

\[
\frac{dN^*_k}{dL^i} = \frac{dN^*_i}{dL^i} > 0 \quad \forall k, i
\]

\[
\frac{dp^*_k}{dL^i} = \frac{dp^*_i}{dL^i} = 0 \quad \forall k, i
\]

\[
\frac{dP^*_k}{dL^i} = \frac{dP^*_i}{dL^i} < 0 \quad \forall k, i
\]

\[
\frac{dP^*_i}{dL^i} = \frac{dP^*_i}{dL^i} < 0 \quad \forall i
\]

Thus, because of constant markups, CES delivers the prediction that inflation on continuing varieties should not respond to changes in the number of consumers or spending per capita. All welfare effects are through changes in the number of varieties, which is not in line with the results presented in Section 4.

**Endogenous savings**

To relax the restriction that the model is static, see Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2012).

**Heterogeneous firms**

To relax the assumption of homogeneous firms, see Rodriguez-Lopez (2010).

**Non-homotheticities within sector**

To relax the assumption that consumers have similar preferences (and, in particular, similar elasticities) within sector, see Hottman, Redding and Weinstein (2016).

**Multi-product firms**

To introduce multi-product firms in the model, see Mayer, Melitz and Ottaviano (2015) and Hottman, Redding and Weinstein (2016).

**Feedback effects of shifting demand on the relative income of the various consumer types**

To introduce feedback effects, assume that the two types of labor are not perfectly substitutable and that the production function is: 

\[
q_k(\omega) = (Z_k^H t_k^H(\omega))^{\alpha} (Z_k^L t_k^L(\omega))^{1-\alpha},
\]

where \(\omega\) denotes a variety. The derivations with this production function are available upon request.
F  External Validity Appendix

This appendix presents additional proofs and empirical evidence speaking to the “external validity” (i.e. beyond retail) of the findings presented in the main text.

F.1 Long-Run Inflation Inequality across Education Groups

Figure F1: Full-Basket Inflation Inequality across Education Groups in the Long Run

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Price Index of High-School Dropouts relative to College Graduates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This figure reports the relative price index of high-school dropouts relative to college graduates over time. The relative price index is normalized to one in 1953. Education-group-specific price indices are built using CPI and CEX data as described in Section 5.2.

F.2 Relative TFP Growth and Patents for High- and Low-Income Households over a Long Time Horizon

In this section, I follow Boppart and Weiss (2013) to provide evidence that technical change has disproportionately benefited high-income households over the long run by using TFP data from the NBER-CES database and patent data from the USPTO, in conjunction with expenditure patterns on goods across income groups.

I proceed in three steps, following the approach of Boppart and Weiss (2013), who report similar results across education groups for TFP. First, I convert Consumer Expenditure Survey UCCs to national account PCEs, which yields a dataset with income-group-specific expenditure shares across about 230 product categories. Second, I use the I-O tables to convert the final commodities into industry value-added. Finally, I link the different industries to the NBER-CES database for TFP and to USPTO technology classes for patents.

The results are shown in Figure F2. A clear pattern emerges: over more than five decades, TFP and patents have been biased in favor of the high-income. Figure F3 shows the figure of Boppart and Weiss (2013) for completeness.
Figure F2: Relative TFP Growth and Patents for High- and Low-Income Households over a Long Time Horizon

**Panel A: Relative TFP**

**Panel B: Relative Granted Patents**
F.3 A Lower Bound for the Full Basket Inflation Difference between High- and Low-Income Households: Structural Extrapolation from Nielsen Data.

Assume that for each income group $i = Rich, Poor$, households’ utility function is CES with $\sigma^{Poor} \geq \sigma^{Rich} > 1$ over an aggregator for Nielsen goods, denoted $N_i$, and an aggregator for outside goods, denoted $O_i$. In other words, Nielsen goods are assumed to be on average substitutes for goods outside of the Nielsen sample (e.g. food-at-home is in $N_i$ and food-away-from-home is in $O_i$) and the elasticity of substitution is assumed to be weakly larger for low-income households (intuitively, as their income increases households become less price elastic).

Using CEX data and matching the Nielsen spending categories to CEX categories by hand, I find that during the 2000s, the share of spending on Nielsen product groups for high-income households declined at a rate 0.086 basis points faster than for low-income households ($t = 1.99$). This means that high-income households where substituting away from Nielsen goods relative to low-income households, in spite of the lower inflation they were enjoying for this set of goods. Under the assumption that $\sigma^{Poor} \geq \sigma^{Rich} > 1$, this implies that the relative price of the high-income consumption basket was declining even faster for outside goods, relative to the low-income consumption basket.

Formally, for each income group utility is given by:

$$U_i = \left[ a_i (N_i)^{\frac{\sigma^{i}-1}{\sigma^{i}}} + (1-a_i) (O_i)^{\frac{\sigma^{i}-1}{\sigma^{i}}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma^{i}-1}}$$

with $N$ goods covered by Nielsen and $O$ the outside good. For each income group $i$, utility maximization yields the familiar formulas for the spending shares $S^i_N$ and $S^i_O$, sectoral price index $P^i_N$ and $P^i_O$, and overall
price index $\Pi^i$. Then,

$$\Delta S_{N}^{\text{Rich}} < \Delta S_{N}^{\text{Poor}} \implies (\Delta \Pi^{\text{Poor}} - \Delta \Pi^{\text{Rich}}) > \left( \frac{\Delta P_{N}^{\text{Poor}} - \Delta P_{N}^{\text{Rich}}}{\Pi} \right)_{=66bp}$$

In ongoing work, I study the robustness of these results by making adjustment to spending patterns that account for income-group-specific reporting biases in the CEX of the kind documented by Aguiar and Bils (2015). I also repeat the exercise by keeping the income distribution fixed over time within each income group, in order to ensure that the differential evolution of spending shares is not driven by non-homotheticity patterns. Thus, based on the inflation patterns in Nielsen data, basic spending shares from the CEX and economic theory, I show how one can interpret the 66 basis point inflation difference found in the Nielsen data as a lower bound for the full consumption basket inflation difference between high- and low-income households, during the relevant sample period.

**Proof.** The utility function is CES over Nielsen goods and other goods, with $\sigma^i > 1$ and $i$ indexing household type.

$$U_i = \left[ a_i \left( N_i \right)^{\frac{\sigma^i - 1}{\sigma^i}} + (1 - a_i) \left( O_i \right)^{\frac{\sigma^i - 1}{\sigma^i}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma^i}}$$

For each income group, the share of spending on each good is given by:

$$S_{N}^i = a_i^{\sigma^i} \left( \frac{P_{N}^{i}}{\Pi} \right)^{1-\sigma^i}$$

$$S_{O}^i = (1 - a_i)^{\sigma^i} \left( \frac{P_{O}^{i}}{\Pi} \right)^{1-\sigma^i}$$

where $\Pi^i$ is the income-group-specific aggregate price index corresponding to the cost of a unit of utility:

$$\Pi^i = \left( a_i^{\sigma^i} \left( P_{N}^{i} \right)^{1-\sigma^i} + (1 - a_i)^{\sigma^i} \left( P_{O}^{i} \right)^{1-\sigma^i} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma^i}}$$

Therefore,

$$\Delta \log(S_{N}^i) = (1 - \sigma^i) \left( \Delta \log(P_{N}^i) - \Delta \log(\Pi^i) \right)$$

i.e. income group $i$ substitutes toward good $N$ if and only if the rate of inflation is smaller for good $N$ relative to the full consumption basket (and the degree of substitution is higher if $\sigma^i$ is higher). Thus,

$$\Delta \log(S_{N}^{\text{Rich}}) < \Delta \log(S_{N}^{\text{Poor}})$$

$$\iff (1 - \sigma^{\text{Rich}}) \left( \Delta \log(P_{N}^{\text{Rich}}) - \Delta \log(\Pi^{\text{Rich}}) \right) < (1 - \sigma^{\text{Poor}}) \left( \Delta \log(P_{N}^{\text{Poor}}) - \Delta \log(\Pi^{\text{Poor}}) \right)$$

$$\iff \frac{(1 - \sigma^{\text{Rich}})}{(1 - \sigma^{\text{Poor}})} \left( \Delta \log(P_{N}^{\text{Rich}}) - \Delta \log(\Pi^{\text{Rich}}) \right) > \left( \Delta \log(P_{N}^{\text{Poor}}) - \Delta \log(\Pi^{\text{Poor}}) \right)$$

Assuming $\sigma^{\text{Poor}} \geq \sigma^{\text{Rich}} > 1$, we have $\frac{(1-\sigma^{\text{Rich}})}{(1-\sigma^{\text{Poor}})} < 1$, hence:

$$\implies \Delta \log(\Pi^{\text{Poor}}) - \Delta \log(\Pi^{\text{Rich}}) > \left( \frac{\Delta P_{N}^{\text{Poor}} - \Delta P_{N}^{\text{Rich}}}{\Pi} \right)_{=66bp}$$
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