

Discussion of “Deadly Embrace: Sovereign and Financial Balance Sheets Doom Loops” by E. Farhi and J. Tirole


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The views expressed are not necessarily those of the ECB or the Eurosystem.

Bank exposures to domestic govt debt



The average domestic government debt to total assets ratios for banks in three GIIPS countries (Italy, Portugal, and Spain) and in 14 non-GIIPS countries. Source: Horváth, Huizinga, and Ioannidou, 2015, "Determinants and valuation effects of the home bias in European banks' sovereign debt portfolios", WP

Model ingredients

- Risk-taking by banks due to the possibility of bail-outs (investment in risky domestic govt debt); strategic complementarities
- Modelling domestic bank supervision:
 - assumed to be imperfect (holdings of domestic bonds not measurable on continuous basis)
 - can decide to be lenient (even more imperfect than imperfect)
- Government / supervisor lacks commitment
- Multiple sovereign bonds: home bias, re-nationalization of debt
- Key is the determination of domestic government bond prices; foreign creditors are marginal investors

Main mechanisms

- Doom loop bw domestic banks and the sovereign:
 - govt has incentives to bail out banks, more so the more they invest in domestic debt
 - hence, banks have incentives to invest in risky domestic govt debt
 - when bail out happens, weakens both sovereign and bank balance sheets
- “Double-decker” bail-out:
 - when fiscal prospects bleak, foreign creditors may want to forgive some debt (if on the wrong side of the Laffer curve)
 - in turn, govt allows banks to load up on domestic debt, and risk needing a bail-out, to extract larger concessions from foreigners
- Explanation for why domestic supervision may be lenient
 - if investors anticipate supervisory lenience, govt bond prices adjust, optimal for the govt to commit ex ante to be a tough supervisor ex post
 - but once the debt is issued, temptation to be lenient: a time-inconsistency problem

Take-aways

- Strategic complementarities (collective moral hazard) different from Farhi and Tirole (2012):
 - work through GE effect on sovereign debt prices and occurrence of default, rather than through how many banks are in trouble to warrant bail-out
- Lenient domestic supervision due to debt forgiveness by foreign investors
- Supranational supervisor can help:
 - weakens the temptation for lenience (puts more weight on foreign investors or is better able to commit)
 - internalizes positive externalities created by tough domestic supervision
- Who holds govt debt matters!
- Model is fully fleshed out; a number of interesting extensions considered
 - so my comments will be mostly about interpretation / applications

Govt incentives

- Govt bail-outs are undesirable in the model:
 - ban on bail-outs (Dodd-Frank Act)
 - (supranational) fiscal rules (caps on spending) to tie the hands of the government
- Consider the role of debt maturity: long-term debt (benchmark model) versus short-term debt that needs to be refinanced
 - short-term debt as a disciplining device (Calomiris and Kahn, 1991; Diamond and Rajan, 2001)
 - short maturity can substitute for lack of commitment but entails a cost in terms of fiscal hedging
- What determines the supply of safe / risky government debt? What are the consequences of sovereign risk in financially integrated economies?
 - sovereign bonds of one member state held by banks in other member states; sovereign problems can become contagious
 - safety of the government debt a public good whose provision may be inefficient (Bolton and Jeanne, 2011)

Bank incentives

- In the model, banks can hold safe liquid assets to finance future liquidity needs but they don't want to because of bail-outs / supervisory lenience
 - supervision is imperfect as bank balance sheets are opaque
- If supervision imperfect and bail-outs possible, how to discipline bankers (and reduce taxpayers' exposure)?
- If worried about the doom loop due to ex post public bail-outs...
 - set-up a private bail-out fund financed by banks ex ante using safe assets
- If worried about opaque / inadequate liquid asset holdings by banks...
 - cash reserves with the central bank make bank liquidity observable and verifiable
 - cash holdings can reduce bank risk-taking incentives (Calomiris, Heider and Hoerova, 2014)

Role of the central bank?

- The model does not feature a central bank (CB)
 - CB provides liquidity to banks
 - one reason for banks to hold govt debt is that it can be used as collateral at the CB
- Changes in govt debt exposures and central bank policies:

	change in home exposure (billion) of GIIPS	change in GIIPS exposure (billion) of euro area non-GIIPS
March '10 - Dec. '10	31	-50
Dec. '10 - Sept. '11	-2	-40
Sept. '11 - Dec. '11	-15	-20
Dec. '11 - June '12 (post LTRO)	55	-14
June '11 - Dec. '12 (post OMT)	12	4
Dec. '12 - June '13	51	8

Acharya, Pierret and Steffen, 2015, "Do central bank interventions limit the market discipline from short-term debt?," WP

Banking union discussion

- The paper provides rationales for Supranational supervision
 - supranational supervisor helps with the commitment problem
- National versus supranational supervision:
 - supranational supervisor may have better incentives but domestic supervisor may have informational advantage (local knowledge; lower monitoring costs)
 - potential tradeoff; room for joint supervision (Colliard, 2014)
- Supranational guarantees to depositors to deal with doom loops:
 - bank balance sheet concerns trigger runs, deepen funding problems and increase bail-out needs
 - likelihood of sovereign default increases, depressing govt bond prices etc.
- Supranational resolution:
 - common backstop for a resolution fund to avoid doom loops

In conclusion

- A rich framework to think about bank-sovereign doom loops and the design of supervisory architecture
- Quality of domestic supervision can have externalities on other countries
 - here: tougher supervision has positive externalities
 - if tougher domestic supervision means banks take on more risk abroad (empirically documented in Ongena, Popov and Udell, 2013), externalities can go the other way
 - points at the importance of international coordination
- In a monetary union, which policies are most effective in preventing / attenuating the sovereign-bank loops? How do they interact?
 - bank regulation
 - banking union
 - fiscal rules
 - central bank policies