

# THE IMPACT OF BORROWER-BASED MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICIES ON FINANCIAL STABILITY, INEQUALITY, AND HOUSING STOCK

WITH A HIGH-RESOLUTION, DATA-DRIVEN MODEL

#### **MOTIVATION**



#### **Policy challenges**

- Preventing the emergence of excessive financial risks in the economy
- In the context of the housing market:
  - Inhibiting the build up of vulnerable loan portfolios
  - Restraining the volatility of the prices on the housing market
- BUT: Finding an optimal trade-off between stability and the costs of the regulation

#### **Contributions**


- 1) Multiple objectives beyond the "stability-economic growth trade-off":
  - Social, welfare and inequality consequences
  - Housing stock quality, housing standards, energy efficiency

- 2) Heterogeneity of the housing market → Disaggregated policy impact assessment along:
  - Geographic (neighborhoods, counties, regions),
  - Social (income, FTB vs HO vs. BTL)
  - Economic (LTV, DSTI)

dimensions.

#### MODEL CHARACTERISTICS





Mérő, B., Borsos, A., Hosszú, Z., Oláh, Z., & Vágó, N. (2023). A high-resolution, data-driven agent-based model of the housing market. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 155, 104738.

- Stochastic (vs. deterministic)
- Non-linear (vs. linear)
- Dynamic (vs. static)
- Discrete time (vs. continuous)
- Iterative (vs. fixed-point)
- Asynchronous updating (vs. synchronous)
- Data-driven (vs. "toy" model):  $\{x_{i,t}\} \sim P(\{x_{i,\tau < t}\}, \theta)$

where the parameters  $(\theta)$  and the state variables (x) are initiated from empirical micro data.

#### 1:1 SCALE MAPPING



- All of the 4 million Hungarian households
- Occupational classification, income, social welfare benefits, education, age, sex, place of living, etc.
- Central Administration of National Pension Insurance
- Demographic Yearbook

- cc. 200K flats (realtors)
  - + all transactions (NTA)
  - + aggregated statistics of HCSO micro census → 4M flats
- Reconstructing the housing stock such that it mimics the agg. statistics
- 3 characteristics: neighborhood, size, quality attributes.


#### Households

Flats Loans

- All 700K housing loan contracts
- Central Credit Registry
- Start date, contracting value, maturity, principal outstanding, payment, interest rate, nonperforming status, nonperforming start date

# THE MODEL IN A NUTSHELL 1/5 – HOUSEHOLDS






- Standard consumption theory
  - Based on consumer surplus (CS)
- Each household has been assigned a uniquely calibrated reservation price function with which they can assess the CS of each flat.
- The higher a flat's consumer surplus is for a HH, the higher the probability will be for the HH to bid on the flat.
- Moving probability is also influenced by the neighborhood preferences, the demographic status and the financial situation of the HHs.

# THE MODEL IN A NUTSHELL 2/5 – INVESTORS






- Representative professional investor + HHs
- Demand is influenced by the obtainable capital gain, so their decisions are determined by
  - price changes and
  - vacancy rates.
- The supply and demand sides can be temporarily detached → disequilibrium
- The endogenous change in the prices and in the rental markups ensures the long term convergence to equilibrium

## THE MODEL IN A NUTSHELL 3/5 – CONSTRUCTION





#### The construction sector


- is represented by a representative firm,
- which estimates demand for newly built flats heterogeneously for neighborhoods and flat categories.

#### Construction process:

- The construction sector builds high quality flats.
- It needs **land site** to build, so it buys the flats with the lowest unit price for sale in the neighborhood where it wants to build.
- Construction takes 18 months, but the construction firm can sell the flats even before they are finished.
- Construction costs are proportional to the regional average salary (and higher than the renovation cost).

#### THE MODEL IN A NUTSHELL 4/5 – RENTAL MARKET





We distinguish between shortterm (maximum one month) and long-term renting.

- Short-term
  - represents online market place platforms (e.g. Airbnb), which mostly serve the demand coming from tourism.
  - → time-dependent, exogenously given external demand for every for neighborhoods and flat categories based on empirical data
- Long term
  - If a household does not have an own home, it can go to the rental market.

#### THE MODEL IN A NUTSHELL 5/5 – CREDIT MARKET

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- There are housing mortgage loans, bridge loans and also consumer loans for renovation.
- There are fix and variable rate loans as well.
- A household is eligible for a loan if:
  - (1) it meets the LTV and DSTI rules:
  - (2) its expected income covers the credit payments and a minimal consumption level:
  - (3) and it did not have a defaulting loan in the past five years.
- There can be only one mortgage on one flat

**Credit types** 

**Constraints** 

Bank behaviour

**Default** 

- The bank increases and reduces the credit supply procyclically.
- The bank determines the credit margins with a regression model estimated on actual empirical data.

In case of non-performance, households first try to reduce their consumption → the bank restructures the loan → finally the collateral will be liquidated.



### MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY APPLICATION

#### ANALYTICAL STRATEGY

# Macroeconomic environment

# Official macro. numbers until 2022Q1, central bank forecasts until 2024Q4:

- **2018-19:** high growth rate, low unemployment, inflation and interest rate
- 2020: COVID slowdown
- **2021:** recovery in GDP, but growing unemployment, inflation and interest rate
- 2022-24: Very high inflation and interest rate environment

#### **Versatile conditions:**

- → richer results
- → higher validity

# Policy scenarios

### 3-3 versions of LTV and DSTI:

■ Either unchanged, or +/-10 percentage point change (3x3)

#### +1 "No limit" scenario:

 No regulatory rules, only credit history and consumption constraints

The results are always relative to the current official regulatory framework in Hungary:

■ LTV: 80%


■ DSTI: 50%


# Disaggregated results

|   | Output variables            | Disaggregation dimensions |                   |     |              |  |  |  |  |
|---|-----------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------|-----|--------------|--|--|--|--|
|   |                             | Capital/<br>Countryside   | Income<br>deciles | Age | LTV,<br>DSTI |  |  |  |  |
|   | House price index           | Х                         |                   |     |              |  |  |  |  |
|   | Number of transactions      | Х                         |                   |     |              |  |  |  |  |
| ) | Newly built transactions    | х                         |                   |     |              |  |  |  |  |
|   | Credit Availability Index   | Х                         | Х                 | Х   |              |  |  |  |  |
|   | Housing Affordability Index | х                         | х                 | х   |              |  |  |  |  |
|   | Gross credit flow           | х                         | х                 |     | х            |  |  |  |  |
|   | Purhcases for investment    |                           |                   |     | х            |  |  |  |  |
|   | Default rate                |                           |                   |     |              |  |  |  |  |

#### PRICE INDEX DECOMPOSITION BASED ON REGIONS







**Figure 1:** Changes in the house price index relative to the 12 | baseline scenario decomposed based on regions of the country

# Looser (or no) LTV house price boom (especially in Budapest)

- "no limit" → bubble bursts endogenously
- Loose LTV → bubble bursts only in the crises

#### Stricter LTV →


- Does not decrease considerably the volatility of the house prices
- Effect is similar in the whole country


#### DSTI

only relevant when the LTV is looser

# DECOMPOSITION OF TRANSACTION NUMBERS BASED ON THE PURPOSE OF PURCHASE








**Figure 2:** Transaction numbers on the housing market relative to the baseline scenario decomposed based on the purpose of the purchase

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- Macroprudential tightening (easing) leads to lower (higher) transaction numbers
  - This is driven by owner occupiers
  - And only minimally by buy-to-let investors as they are far less credit constrained
- The direction of change is the opposite for BTL transactions:
  - Professional investors tend to be more countercyclical (they focus more on fundamentals)
  - More first-time buyer households can buy an own flat
    - → lower demand on the rental market
    - → downward pressure on ROI

# CREDIT AVAILABILITY (CA)







**Figure 4-5:** Credit availability in the baseline (upper) and in the no limit scenario disaggregated based on income deciles and on FTB-OO categories, aggregated between 2018-2024.

#### Credit availability (Kelly et al. 2018)

- What is the most restrictive constraint for a household to buy a fair, "justifiable" flat?
- "Justifiable": average flat in the region and income decile of a given household

#### Home owners


- They can mostly buy their "fair" flat.
- LTV/consumption constraints only below median income.

#### First-time buyers

- Without LTV/DSTI → First 3 deciles: not eligible for credit. Even in the 7th decile only 50% eligible.
- With LTV/DSTI → Barely anyone is eligible for credit. (Even in the 10th decile 50% is not eligible.)

#### **OPTIMAL POLICY MIX**








# **CONTACT DETAILS**


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#### **DEFAULT RATES**






**Figure 3:** Annual average default rates of mortgage loans in the 10 different scenarios.

- No limit scenario →
  - 2-3 times higher default rate
- Loose LTV →
  - Considerably higher default rate for the end of the time horizon
- Stricter LTV →
  - No relevant effect
- Looser LTV + stricter DSTI →
  - Only 0.1 percentage point increase in default
  - BUT large jump in transaction numbers and credit flow (without additional risk)



#### HOUSING STOCK QUALITY






**Figure 6:** Percentage change of the renovated square meters (by one "state unit") relative to the baseline scenario.

- Energy efficiency and social wellbeing considerations
- Large difference on the time horizon
- The effect is limited in all cases,
   but
- In this case DSTI is similarly influential than the LTV
- This is because there are households, who cannot buy a flat with any policy mix, but looser DSTI can help them to renovate at least.

#### **CALIBRATION**





House prices in million HUF

| Monthly averages                             | 2018Q1-2019Q2 |        |  |
|--|---------------|--------|--|
| Monthly averages                             | Actual        | Model  |  |
| Number of transactions on the housing market | 15 148        | 14 752 |  |
| Number of transactions of newly built flats  | 1 966         | 1 897  |  |

- Parameters are calibrated such that the dynamics of the observable variables match the empirical data:
  - average regional prices,
  - the number of transactions
  - newly built housing stock
- We used data from 2018/19.
- In the evaluation of the simulation results one can disregard this first two years.

#### **VALIDATION**






Figure 4: Distribution of the volume of newly issued housing loans in 2018 and 2019 based on the income deciles of the households. (Source: MNB.)

| Yearly<br>averages | New credit flow<br>(billion HUF) |       | Number of contracts |       |  |
|--------------------|----------------------------------|-------|---------------------|-------|--|
|                    | Actual                           | Model | Actual              | Model |  |
| 2018-<br>2020      | 895                              | 1136  | 79744               | 75967 |  |

- We tested whether the variables of the model which were not calibrated follow the empirical data.
- We used mainly lending market variables:
  - Number of loan contracts,
  - New credit flow,
  - Distribution of loans based on income deciles, LTV and DSTI categories.
- But also some disaggregated housing market statistics:
  - # of transactions at the regional level
  - Average neighborhood quality of flats in transactions