

# The Labor Market Impact of Immigration in Western Germany in the 1990's

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# Key findings in this paper

## Methods


Imperfect substitutability between natives and migrants  
Focus on both wage and employment effects  
The analysis is carried out not only between home and migrant workers  
but also between old and new migrants

## Main Results

Migrants are not competing with home workers, but between them.  
Substantial effect on employment levels, negligible on wages.

## Policy implications

With EU enlargement, active migration policies are not an option:  
policy experiment shows that an increase in labor market flexibility




Administrative Dataset (IAB): 2% simple random sample of  
all workers liable of social security contributions  
(roughly 80% of the employed workforce), period 1987-  
2001. Daily spells. Marginal workers are not included.

Preliminary tobit regression to impute wages above  
social contribution ceiling  
(reported wages are right censored)

Further refinements to take into account ethnic Germans  
naturalizations


# Descriptive statistics

## Share of migrants on total workers



# Descriptive statistics: wages


Percentage growth of real daily wages



explanations for this result:

# Descriptive statistics: employment

## Evolution of the Unemployment Insurance recipient rate



# theoretical framework

approach

*general equilibrium approach* in order to analyse the full impact of immigration on the labour market (Pikoras QJE 2003, Card Lemieux QJE 2001)

employment effects: rigidities could cause employment changes rather than wage effects of immigration (Kocher and Velling, RES 1997; Razin Sadka AER 1995; Schmidt et al. JPubEc 1994)

the standard assumption of perfect substitutability between Domestic and Foreign workers within education and experience levels is removed

long-run capital adjustment: the level of capital

## oretical framework

ally, we consider a CRS production function:  $Y_t = A_t L_t^\alpha K_t^{1-\alpha}$

h  $\alpha \in (0,1)$

s a CES aggregate of different types of labor

s different levels of education:  $L_t = \left[ \sum_{k=1}^3 \theta_{kt} L_{kt}^{\frac{\delta-1}{\delta}} \right]^{\frac{\delta}{\delta-1}}$

$L_{kt}$  aggregates across different experience

els:  $L_{kt} = \left[ \sum_{j=1}^8 \theta_{kj} L_{kjt}^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}} \right]^{\frac{\eta}{\eta-1}}$

## oretical framework

urther decompositions: between Native and Migrant Workers

$$L_{kjt} = \left[ \theta_{Hkjt} H_{kjt}^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + \theta_{Mkjt} M_{kjt}^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}$$

d, within Migrants, between those who migrated  
the last 5 years (*New*) or before (*Old*)

$$M_{kjt} = \left[ \theta_{MkjOLDt} M_{kjOLDt}^{\frac{\lambda-1}{\lambda}} + \theta_{MkjNEWt} M_{kjNEWt}^{\frac{\lambda-1}{\lambda}} \right]^{\frac{\lambda}{\lambda-1}}$$

# oretical framework

ompetitive equilibrium:

$$= \ln\left(\alpha A_t \frac{K_t^{1-\alpha}}{L_t^{1-\alpha}}\right) + \frac{1}{\delta} \ln(L_t) + \ln \theta_{kt} - \left(\frac{1}{\delta} - \frac{1}{\eta}\right) \ln(L_{kt}) + \ln(\theta_{kjt}) - \left(\frac{1}{\eta} - \frac{1}{\sigma}\right) \ln(L_{kjt}) + \ln \theta_{Hkjt} - \frac{1}{\sigma} \ln(H_{kjt})$$

the total percentage effect of immigration on native wages is (in the long run):

$$\left(\frac{\Delta W_{mit}}{W_{mit}}\right)^{Total} = \frac{1}{\delta} \sum_m \sum_i \left( s_{Mmit} \frac{\Delta M_{mit}}{M_{mit}} + s_{Hmit} \left( \frac{\Delta H_{mit}}{H_{mit}} \right)_{response} \right)$$

$$- \frac{1}{\delta} \left( \frac{1}{s_{kt}} \right) \sum_i \left( s_{Mkit} \frac{\Delta M_{kit}}{M_{kit}} + s_{Hkit} \left( \frac{\Delta H_{kit}}{H_{kit}} \right)_{response} \right)$$

$$- \frac{1}{\eta} \left( \frac{1}{s_{kjt}} \right) \left( s_{Mkjt} \frac{\Delta M_{kjt}}{M_{kjt}} + s_{Hkjt} \left( \frac{\Delta H_{kjt}}{H_{kjt}} \right)_{response} \right)$$

$$\left( \frac{\Delta H_{kjt}}{H_{kjt}} \right)$$

## Instrumental estimates

employment regressions:

$$\frac{Workforce_{kjt} - Workforce_{kjt-1}}{Workforce_{t-1}} = D_k + D_j + D_t + \gamma \frac{M_{kjt} - M_{kjt-1}}{Workforce_{t-1}} + u_{kjt}$$

The same applies between "Old" and "New" migrants

1 *no employment effects*

1 *positive employment effects*

1 *negative employment effects*

γ: positive if migrants clustered in booming education-experience cells,  
negative otherwise

Endogeneity is addressed with an IV strategy: East-West Migration



## parameter estimates: elasticity

estimates of the elasticities of substitution (sigma)

$$\ln\left(\frac{w_{Hkjt}}{w_{Mkjt}}\right) = -\frac{1}{\sigma} \ln(H_{kjt}/M_{kjt}) + \ln(\theta_{Hkjt}/\theta_{Mkjt})$$

$$\ln(w_{Hkjt}/w_{Mkjt}) = D_k + D_k + D_t - \frac{1}{\sigma} \ln\left(\frac{H_{kjt}}{M_{kjt}}\right) + u_{kjt}$$

and similarly for  $\lambda$

homogeneity is addressed with an IV strategy: East-West Migration



## ometric results

o negative employment effects between home and  
migrant workers

egative employment effects between migrants

=  $\infty$  migrants are perfect substitutes in production

e 22 home and migrant workers are imperfect substitutes,  
ult in line with

aviano and Peri (2006) and Manacorda et al. (2006)  
pectively for US and UK

## Impact of migration

	<i>"Old" Migrants</i>				<i>Natives</i>
	I True immigration effect (A)	Wages II Response effect (B)	III Total effect (A+B)	Wage Bill IV Total effect	Wages I Total effect
Occupational Education	-1.46%	0.76%	-0.70%	-11.0%	1.68%
High School Education	-0.88%	0.69%	-0.19%	-21.6%	-0.14%
Less than High School Education	-2.65%	1.54%	-1.11%	-39.5%	-1.01%
Age	-1.29%	0.78%	-0.51%	-17.6%	-0.02%

## y experiment

Previously migrated workers born negative employment effects due to rigidities. We simulate their market clearing wages in the absence these rigidities: the overall amount of wages paid to these workers would decrease by 40 million of euros

The cost of the only Unemployment Insurance for displaced workers who would have saved their job if wages were at the market clearing level is 365 million, more than enough to compensate the losers

Reducing the rigidities in the labor market would improve efficiency

