How Do Wages Respond to Shocks? Discussion Conference on Wage Dynamics in Europe, European Central Bank

Jim Malcomson

University of Oxford

25 June 2008

• Could take as text for my discussion: "Never believe a piece of data until it has been confirmed by theory."

- Could take as text for my discussion:
 "Never believe a piece of data until it has been confirmed by theory."
 - Quote from some died-in-the-wool economic theorist?

- Could take as text for my discussion:
 "Never believe a piece of data until it has been confirmed by theory."
 - Quote from some died-in-the-wool economic theorist?
 - No, Sir Arthur Eddington, one of great astronomers of early 20th century.

- Could take as text for my discussion:
 "Never believe a piece of data until it has been confirmed by theory."
 - Quote from some died-in-the-wool economic theorist?
 - No, Sir Arthur Eddington, one of great astronomers of early 20th century.
- Plan for discussion:

- Could take as text for my discussion:
 "Never believe a piece of data until it has been confirmed by theory."
 - Quote from some died-in-the-wool economic theorist?
 - No, Sir Arthur Eddington, one of great astronomers of early 20th century.
- Plan for discussion:
 - In spirit of text:


- Could take as text for my discussion:
 "Never believe a piece of data until it has been confirmed by theory."
 - Quote from some died-in-the-wool economic theorist?
 - No, Sir Arthur Eddington, one of great astronomers of early 20th century.
- Plan for discussion:
 - In spirit of text:
 - say things about theory that relate to several papers in session;

- Could take as text for my discussion:
 "Never believe a piece of data until it has been confirmed by theory."
 - Quote from some died-in-the-wool economic theorist?
 - No, Sir Arthur Eddington, one of great astronomers of early 20th century.
- Plan for discussion:
 - In spirit of text:
 - say things about theory that relate to several papers in session;
 - what can we infer from way wages respond to firm-specific shocks?

- Could take as text for my discussion:
 "Never believe a piece of data until it has been confirmed by theory."
 - Quote from some died-in-the-wool economic theorist?
 - No, Sir Arthur Eddington, one of great astronomers of early 20th century.
- Plan for discussion:
 - In spirit of text:
 - say things about theory that relate to several papers in session;
 - what can we infer from way wages respond to firm-specific shocks?
- Make some comments specific to paper by Carlos Marques.

Wages and firm-specific shocks: perfectly competitive labour markets


• Perfectly competitive labour market: firms take wage as given.



- Consider firm-specific shock shifting labour demand from 1 to 2.
- Employment responding, wage not, no more evidence of wage rigidity than of perfectly competitive labour market.

- Wages respond to firm-specific shocks when:
 - firm's have labour market power (monopsony):
 - differences in wage response reflect differences in degree of market power;
 - there are turnover costs;
 - wages governed by contracts negotiated:
 - to share risk;
 - to protect investments (avoid hold-up);
 - by collective bargaining.
- Say a little about each of these.

 With turnover costs: max wage firm will pay > min wage worker will accept (if continued employment efficient).




- Line for firm affected by firm-specific shocks, line for employee not.
- Bargaining (individual or collective) typically means wage responds to firm-specific shocks;
 - efficient bargaining implies employment occurs if and only if efficient;
 - so: model no role for employment policy.

Malcomson (Oxford)

Wages & shocks

Insuring employees


- Limited commitment model (Thomas and Worrall, REStuds, 1988);
 - most plausible because no legally enforceable contracts.



• Wage for individual firm sometimes responds to firm-specific shocks;

Insuring employees

- Limited commitment model (Thomas and Worrall, REStuds, 1988);
 - most plausible because no legally enforceable contracts.




• Wage for individual firm sometimes responds to firm-specific shocks;

• but amount of response depends on where in gap currently are, not independent of history.

Insuring employees


- Limited commitment model (Thomas and Worrall, REStuds, 1988);
 - most plausible because no legally enforceable contracts.



• Wage for individual firm sometimes responds to firm-specific shocks;


- but amount of response depends on where in gap currently are, not independent of history.
- Employment efficient, so model no implications for employment policy.

• To protect general investments when turnover costs, MacLeod and Malcomson (*AER*, 1993) show illustrated contract efficient.






• To protect general investments when turnover costs, MacLeod and Malcomson (*AER*, 1993) show illustrated contract efficient.



separation

• Exactly like insurance model, except


• To protect general investments when turnover costs, MacLeod and Malcomson (*AER*, 1993) show illustrated contract efficient.





- Exactly like insurance model, except
 - wage can be rigid in nominal terms (for insurance, must be real terms).

• To protect general investments when turnover costs, MacLeod and Malcomson (*AER*, 1993) show illustrated contract efficient.



separation IIM

- Exactly like insurance model, except
 - wage can be rigid in nominal terms (for insurance, must be real terms).
- Employment efficient: wage rigidity still no implications for employment policy.

- With efficient bargaining and no private information, bargaining ensures employment takes place whenever efficient.
- All wage negotiation does is divide the gains;
 - if inhibited employment, in interests of both parties to renegotiate.
- Implications:

- With efficient bargaining and no private information, bargaining ensures employment takes place whenever efficient.
- All wage negotiation does is divide the gains;
 - if inhibited employment, in interests of both parties to renegotiate.
- Implications:
 - when assessing wage response to shocks, not obvious testing risk sharing;

- With efficient bargaining and no private information, bargaining ensures employment takes place whenever efficient.
- All wage negotiation does is divide the gains;
 - if inhibited employment, in interests of both parties to renegotiate.
- Implications:
 - when assessing wage response to shocks, not obvious testing risk sharing;
 - Wage rigidity per se not reason for inefficient labour market;

- With efficient bargaining and no private information, bargaining ensures employment takes place whenever efficient.
- All wage negotiation does is divide the gains;
 - if inhibited employment, in interests of both parties to renegotiate.
- Implications:
 - when assessing wage response to shocks, not obvious testing risk sharing;
 - Wage rigidity per se not reason for inefficient labour market;
 - need to know more than that wage rigidity exists to know whether has implications for employment policy;

- With efficient bargaining and no private information, bargaining ensures employment takes place whenever efficient.
- All wage negotiation does is divide the gains;
 - if inhibited employment, in interests of both parties to renegotiate.
- Implications:
 - when assessing wage response to shocks, not obvious testing risk sharing;
 - Wage rigidity per se not reason for inefficient labour market;
 - need to know more than that wage rigidity exists to know whether has implications for employment policy;
 - Inot clear makes sense to look for coefficient of *current* wage response to *current* shocks that independent of history.

- Concerned with economy-wide wage and price responses to macro shocks;
 - underlying model is union bargaining.
- In view of restricted time, limit myself to a few points concerning:
 - theoretical model;
 - 2 estimation;
 - identification and interpretation of shocks;

that might help improve what is overall a thoughtful and carefully written paper.

Marques: Wage and price dynamics in Portugal Model

- Underlying model explicitly union bargaining;
 - only union model with inherent dynamics I know of is "insider-outsider", which not model in paper;
 - dynamics left to be captured non-theoretically by VAR.
- As somebody interested in theory, disappoints me because many of distinguishing characteristics of theories concern dynamics;
 - but recognise that is a somewhat personal point of view.
- Could generate theoretical dynamics by models discussed above?
 - *Conjecture:* those models apply if efficient bargaining union model, though must aggregate for macro effects studied in paper.
 - If so, history still matters for shocks correlated across firms.
- VAR allows for history but possibly not in appropriate way;
 - small changes in opposite direction from previous period should produce no wage change.

Marques: Wage and price dynamics in Portugal Estimation

- Identifies model empirically by assuming wage responds to consumer price with coefficient 1 and independent of producer price;
 - latter seems at odds with gain sharing in bargaining.
- Treats government employment as determined in same way as private.
- Estimation conditional on unemployment rate (i) weakly exogenous in wage determination, and (ii) an l(1) variable;
 - passes tests but seems appropriate to ask to confirm with theory;
 - (i) possibly consistent with "efficient bargaining" union model;
 - but not with "right to manage", which actually seems more in tune with what done in paper;
 - (ii) hard to believe given long-run properties of unemployment rates.

- Identification of shocks depends on weak exogeneity of unemployment rate, productivity, and import prices.
- Import prices: affect producer mark-up but exogenous proportion of consumer prices: theoretically consistent with
 - 1 consumer choice theory?
 - 2 weak exogeneity of import prices?
- Procedure to identify shocks is to impose sufficient zeros in matrices of long-run and contemporaneous responses to ensure just identified;
 - then: interpret shocks in terms of model;
 - for example: shock with no long-run effect on real variables interpreted as import price shock;
 - *implication:* should interpret statements like variation in forecast errors of prices is attributable "mainly to import price shocks" as "mainly to *what interpret as* import price shocks"?

Concluding remarks

- Interpreting slow adjustment of wages as wage rigidity requires careful thinking about model:
 - non-response to firm-specific shocks consistent with perfectly competitive labour market, response with monopsony;
 - insurance implies response history-dependent.
- Wage rigidity *per se* does not necessarily imply employment inefficiency;
 - so unclear what policy conclusions follow from empirical estimates;
 - unless can attribute to a particular cause through a model.
- Different models have many of same empirical implications, even about dynamics;
 - so: to attribute measured wage rigidity to a particular cause need to test implications about which models differ.
- As Eddington said, need to have evidence confirmed by theory to make believable.