Inflation expectations, adaptive learning and optimal monetary policy

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Key developments in monetary economics
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The opinions expressed are our own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Banco de Portugal, ECB or Sveriges Riksbank.
... has become the modern mantra of central banking:

- **Trichet (2009):** “It is absolutely essential to ensure that inflation expectations remain firmly anchored in line with price stability over the medium term”

- **Bernanke (2007):** “The extent to which inflation expectations are anchored has first-order implications for the performance of inflation and the economy more generally”

- **Volcker (2006):** “I have one lesson indelible in my brain: don’t let inflation get ingrained. Once that happens, there is too much agony in stopping momentum”
Anchoring has been successful…

… in the euro area

- HICP inflation
- HICP excluding unprocessed food and energy inflation
- HICP inflation expectations (SPF) for the two-year period ahead
- HICP inflation expectations (SPF) for the five-year period ahead
- Upper bound of definition of price stability
- Longer-term inflation expectations (Consensus Economics Forecasts)
... and in many other industrial countries
... and in many other industrial countries
... even at shorter horizons.
... even at shorter horizons.
Modelling inflation expectations

• **Standard approach** is to assume rational or “model-consistent” expectations: e.g. HB chapter by Mike Woodford;

• **Important benchmark, but**
  - Credibility (distinction between discretion and commitment) is a binary variable: the central bank either has the credibility to commit to future policy actions or not (HB Chapter by Bob King);
  - Some implications are counterfactual: e.g. costless disinflations;
  - RE is an extreme assumption given the pervasive model uncertainty economic agents are facing.
Modelling inflation expectations

• There are RE alternatives:
  – Limited processing power and rational inattention (e.g. HB chapter by Sims, Mackowiak and Wiederholt, Adam, ...)
  – Limited information and signal extraction (e.g. Erceg and Levin, Schorfheide, ...)

• But:
  – Even trivial models become extremely cumbersome to solve;
  – Assumes quite knowledgeable individuals (not even trained economists can work out the optimal price-setting plans... without considerable effort!)
Modelling inflation expectations

• A reasonable alternative is “adaptive learning” or “constant-gain least squares learning”:
  – Agents are endowed with an econometric specification, which may be consistent with the reduced form of the rational expectations equilibrium;
  – As time goes by, they update their knowledge and the associated forecasting rule;
  – Constant gain takes into account the possibility of breaks and time-varying parameters.

• Moreover, such specifications work empirically:
  – Orphanides and Williams (2004),
  – Milani (2005),
  – Slobodyan and Wouters (2009)
Objective of this chapter

- Characterize optimal monetary policy responses when agents use adaptive learning to form inflation expectations;
- Assess the robustness of policy rules that are optimal under rational expectations (RE) to small deviations from RE.
- The chapter builds on the work by:
  - Orphanides and Williams (2005, ...)
  - Gaspar, Smets and Vestin (2005)
  - Molnar and Santoro (2006)
• Evans and Honkapohja (2001) and many related papers:
  – Analyze how least-squares learning affects the stability and determinacy of macro-economic equilibria under various monetary policy interest rate rules
  – See Evans and Honkapohja (2008) for an excellent survey.

• This chapter focuses on the implications of targeting rules taking the non-linearity of the expectation formation process into account.
Large literature on monetary policy making under uncertainty (e.g. Hansen and Sargent, Taylor and Williams)

A few papers analyse the interaction with learning by the private sector:

- Orphanides and Williams (2007) study the interaction of imperfect knowledge by the central bank and constant gain learning by private agents.
- Evans and Honkapohja (2003a,b)
- Woodford (2005) analyses optimal policy when agents’ expectations may be distorted away from rational expectations.
Related literature

- **Alternative types of learning:**
  - Branch and Evans (2007) and Brazier, Harrison, King and Yates (2006) assume that private agents may use different forecast models, with the proportion changing over time with relative forecast performance.
  - Arifovic, Bullard and Kostyshyna (2007) and De Grauwe (2007) use social learning
  - Bullard, Evans and Honkapohja (2007)
Outline

• New Keynesian model and its solution under rational expectations.

• Adaptive learning consistent with discretionary RE equilibrium: Simple rules and optimal policy.
  – Model calibration and results.
  – The workings of optimal policy.
  – Sensitivity analysis.

• Conclusions.
The New Keynesian model

- **Monopolistic competition**
- **Sticky prices with partial indexation**
  \[
  \pi_t - \gamma \pi_{t-1} = \beta E_t (\pi_{t+1} - \gamma \pi_t) + \kappa x_t + u_t
  \]
- **Loss function**
  \[
  L_t = (\pi_t - \gamma \pi_{t-1})^2 + \lambda x_t^2
  \]
- **Use output gap \((x(t))\) as policy instrument**
• Under RE, there is a distinction between optimal policy under discretion and commitment:

• Under discretion:

\[
x_t = -\frac{\kappa}{\kappa^2 + \lambda} u_t \quad \pi_t = \gamma \pi_{t-1} + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa^2 + \lambda} u_t
\]

• Under commitment:

\[
z_t = -\frac{\lambda}{\kappa} (x_t - x_{t-1}) \quad \text{with} \quad z_t = \pi_t - \gamma \pi_{t-1}
\]

\[
x_t = \delta x_{t-1} - \frac{\kappa}{\lambda} u_t \quad \pi_t = \gamma \pi_{t-1} + \frac{\lambda(1-\delta)}{\kappa} x_{t-1} + \delta u_t
\]
Impulse response to a cost-push shock
Impulse response to a cost-push shock

![Impulse response graph](image)
Adaptive learning

- Agents estimate AR(1) for inflation:
  \[ \pi_t = c_t \pi_{t-1} + \epsilon_t \]
- Consistent with reduced-form of RE equilibrium under discretion
- Recursive updating:
  \[ c_t = c_{t-1} + \phi R_t^{-1} \pi_{t-1} (\pi_t - \pi_{t-1} c_{t-1}) \]
  \[ R_{t+1} = R_t + \phi (\pi_t^2 - R_t) \]
Which info is available to agents when?

Simultaneity problem in forward-looking models.

One solution: lagged information

Here: agents use current inflation in the forecast but not in the updating of the parameters:

\[ E_t \pi_{t+1} = c_{t-1} \pi_t \]

Implies:

\[ \pi_t = \frac{1}{1 + \beta(\gamma - c_{t-1})} \left( \gamma \pi_{t-1} + \kappa x_t + u_t \right) \]
Optimal targeting

• Formulate value function

\[ V(u_t, \pi_{t-1}, c_{t-1}, R_t) = \max_{x_t} -\pi_t - \gamma \pi_{t-1} + \lambda x_t^2 + \beta E_t V(u_{t+1}, \pi_t, R_{t+1}, c_t), \]

• Maximize subject to Phillips curve, learning equations and forecasting equation
Calibration

### Key parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \beta )</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \gamma )</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \lambda )</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \theta )</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \alpha )</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \phi )</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \kappa )</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \sigma )</td>
<td>0.004</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

- Discount rate
- Degree of indexation
- Weight on output gap
- Elast. of subst.
- Fraction of non-optimal prices
- Constant gain
- Slope of Phillips curve
- Std. of shocks

\[
\pi_t - \gamma \pi_{t-1} = \beta E_t (\pi_{t+1} - \gamma \pi_t) + \kappa \chi_t + u_t
\]

\[
L_t = (\pi_t - \gamma \pi_{t-1})^2 + \lambda \chi_t^2
\]
### Results: losses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RE</th>
<th>Adaptive Learning</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>1.09</td>
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</table>

- Optimal policy about 20% improvement
- RE commitment rule comes close to optimal policy outcome
### Results: Variances and autocorrelations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RE</th>
<th>Learning</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Com.</td>
<td>Disc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Var(Output)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Var(Inflation)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cor(Output)</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cor(Inflation)</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Lower persistence of inflation under C-rule helps reducing inflation volatility at low cost in terms of output volatility.
- C-rule and optimal yield similar outcomes but different mechanism at play.
Outcomes

Distribution of inflation persistence

- Optimal
- Commitment rule
- Simple rule
Characterising optimal policy

\[ x_t = \frac{-\kappa}{\kappa^2 + \lambda \chi_t^2} u_t + \frac{\kappa \gamma (\chi_t - 1) + \beta \kappa \chi_t \phi R_t^{-1} E_t V_c}{\kappa^2 + \lambda \chi_t^2} \pi_{t-1} + \beta \frac{\kappa \chi_t}{\kappa^2 + \lambda \chi_t^2} E_t V_\pi \]

If \( \pi_{t-1} = 0 \)
then:

\[ x_t = \frac{-\kappa}{\kappa^2 + \lambda \chi_t^2} u_t \]

where \( \chi_t = 1 + \beta (\gamma - c_{t-1}) \)

If \( \gamma = c_{t-1} \) then equal to discretionary rule: intratemporal trade-off.
Characterising optimal policy

\[ x_t = -\frac{\kappa}{\kappa^2 + \lambda \chi_t^2} u_t + \frac{\kappa \gamma (\chi_t - 1) + \beta \kappa \chi_t \phi R_t^{-1} E_t V_c}{\kappa^2 + \lambda \chi_t^2} \pi_{t-1} + \beta \frac{\kappa \chi_t}{\kappa^2 + \lambda \chi_t^2} E_t V_\pi \]

- However, in general optimal policy under learning will also respond to lagged inflation – resembles history dependence;
- If \( \gamma = c_{t-1} \) then:
  \[ x_t = + \frac{\beta \kappa \phi E_t V_c}{\kappa^2 + \lambda} \pi_{t-1} + . . . \]
- Captures intertemporal trade-off between stabilising output gap and steering the perceived degree of inflation persistence by responding more aggressively to inflation
Mean dynamic response of output gap

Output gap

\[ c = 0.32 \]
\[ c = 0.52 \]
\[ c = 0.12 \]

Inflation

\[ c = 0.32 \]
\[ c = 0.52 \]
\[ c = 0.12 \]
Mean dynamic response of persistence

- $c = 0.32$
- $c = 0.52$
- $c = 0.12$

Graph showing the dynamic response with different values of $c$. The x-axis represents time (1 to 8), and the y-axis represents the response values. The graph includes three lines corresponding to different values of $c$.
Reaction function: no shock
Sensitivity analysis

Average estimated persistence as a function of the gain…

[Graph showing a downward trend in mean(c) as \( \phi \) increases.]
Sensitivity analysis

... and as a function of degree of price stickiness

![Graph showing sensitivity analysis]

- Alpha = 0.75
- Alpha = 0.66
Sensitivity analysis

Estimated persistence as function of weight on output gap
• Management of inflation expectations remains important under adaptive learning;
  – In addition to the usual intratemporal trade-off, central banks face an intertemporal trade-off between current output stabilisation and management of future inflation expectations;
  – The mechanism is different: In case of RE it works through expectations of future policy; in the case of AL, it works through perceived inflation persistence as function of past and current policy.
  – Both policy responses are history dependent; but AL optimal policy response is time-varying depending on the perceived persistence of inflation.

• Nevertheless, commitment rule under RE comes very close to optimal policy under learning.
To do list

• **Encompass the commitment equilibrium in the learning specification:**
  - Simplify model to forward-looking specification and analyse learning about price level persistence;
  - Introduce output gap in learning model; use stochastic gradient learning to limit state space.

• **Investigate the transition from a discretion rule to the optimal regime under adaptive learning**;

• **Embed the analysis in the learning literature**.
Outcomes

- Optimal
- Commitment rule
- Simple rule
Symmetry: response of inflation

- $u_t > 0, \pi_{t-1} < 0$
- $u_t < 0, \pi_{t-1} > 0$
Symmetry: response of output

\[ u_t > 0, \pi_{t-1} < 0 \]
\[ u_t < 0, \pi_{t-1} > 0 \]
Reaction function: response to shock