## Financial Integration and Risk Sharing: The Role of the Monetary Union

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#### **Motivation**

- 1. Financial integration is of utmost importance for the euro area:
  - Transmission of single monetary policy
  - Smooth operation of payment systems
  - Financial stability
- 2. Financial integration has real effects on the economy:
  - Economic growth
  - Business cycles
  - Volatility of output and consumption
  - Risk sharing
- 3. Important for policy makers and for central bankers:
  - Volatility and synchronization of business cycles are central to monetary policy
  - Risk sharing is central for the optimality of a currency area

#### **Outline**

#### First Part: The Euro and Financial Integration

- 1. State of financial integration in the euro area
- 2. Impact of the Euro and harmonization policies in the financial sector (FSAP) on banking integration

#### **Second Part: The Real Effects of Financial integration**

- 3. Banking integration and business cycle synchronization
- 4. Banking integration and macroeconomic volatility
- 5. Banking integration and cross-country risk sharing

#### **Summary and policy implications**

## Overview of Financial Integration Across Market Segments in the Euro Area

Market	State of integration	Policy initiatives
Money markets		
Unsecured/secured money market	Very high	TARGET / TARGET2
Commercial paper	Low	STEP
Bond markets		
Government bond markets	High	
Corporate bond markets	Fair	TARGET2-Securities
Equity markets	Low	TARGET2-Securities
Banking markets		Banking directives, FSAP
Wholesale activities	Advanced	TARGET / TARGET2
Retail banking	Very low	SEPA

Source: Special edition of the ECB Monthly Bulletin (May 2008)

## **Our Focus: Banking Integration**

- Banks are the key financial intermediaries.
- Most euro area member countries' financial systems are "bank-based"
- Bank assets have reached unprecedented levels over the past decade.
- Strong correlation with other types of capital flows
  - (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2006)

#### Data

## BIS panel dataset between 1978-2007 on external bank assets and liabilities both for each country (aggregate) and per pair of countries (bilateral)

- All international on balance sheet exposure of the banking sector across all sectors (banking and non-banking) plus some off-balance sheet items
- Mostly wholesale bank activity

#### 20 high-income countries:

- 12 initial euro area countries
- 3 non-euro EU countries: GBR, DNK and SWE
- 5 high income countries (control group): AUS, CAN, CHE, JPN, USA

## **Specification: Euro and Banking Integration Difference-in-difference specification**

$$BANKINT_{i,j,t} = \alpha_{i,j} + \alpha_t + \beta_1 EZ2_{i,j,t} + \beta_2 EZ1_{i,j,t} + \beta_3 EU2_{i,j,t} + \beta_4 EU1_{i,j,t} + \gamma FSAP_{i,j,t} + \varepsilon_{i,j,t}$$

BANKINT: Bilateral (time-varying) cross-border bank stocks-flows. (using BIS data)

- EZ2 (EU2): Indicator (dummy) variables that equal one in the year that both counterparts join the euro zone (or the EU).
- *EZ1 (EU1)*: Indicator (dummy) variables that equal one if only one of the two countries is a member of the euro zone (or the EU). [account for unilateral effects of euro area or EU membership]
- FSAP: Bilateral measure of the harmonization of financial policies using EU Commission data on the transposition of the directives of the Financial Service Action Plan, launched in 1999

## The Euro and Bilateral Banking Integration

	Banking In	tegration Index	based on Bilat	teral Stock	S
	All co	All countries		EU15	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	<del>_</del>
Euro area both (EZ2)	0.39	0.39	0.48	0.37	7
t-stat	4.03	3.94	2.06	2.50	
Euro area one (EZ1)	-0.09	-0.09	-0.46	-0.55	
t-stat	-0.71	-0.70	-0.91	-1.39	Increase in
EU both (EU2)	-0.06	-0.06			bilateral stocks of 44%.
t-stat	-0.65	-0.64			01 4470.
EU one (EU1)	-0.30	-0.30			
t-stat	-1.91	-1.87			
Country-pair FE and Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Country-specific time trends	No	Yes	No	Yes	
Observations	4188	4188	2312	2312	
Country-pairs	189	189	105	105	8

# **Financial Sector Harmonization and Bilateral Banking Integration**

	Banking Inte	gration Index b	ased on Bilate	eral Stocks
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
FSAP Both	0.08	0.05	0.05	0.05
t-stat	2.84	2.37	7.23	3.45
Euro area both (EZ2) t-stat			0.50 2.58	0.33 3.50
Euro area one (EZ1) t-stat			0.06 0.36	-0.09 -0.76
EU both (EU2) t-stat			-0.18 -0.98	-0.05 -0.55
EU one (EU1) t-stat			-0.59 -3.30	-0.28 -1.81
Country-pair FE and Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-specific time trends	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	4188	4188	4188	4188

## The Real Effects of Financial Integration

- 1. Business cycle synchronization and banking integration
- 2. Business cycle volatility and banking integration
- 3. Risk sharing and banking integration

## **Brief Summary: Theoretical Literature**

- Consumers insure against idiosyncratic country risk via global capital markets
  - (Obstfeld, 1994; Lewis, 1996; Sorensen and Yosha, 1998)
- Diversification across borders shifts investment towards high return sectors, inducing specialization
  - (Helpman and Razin, 1978; Obstfeld, 1994)
- Financial integration amplifies GDP differences as capital flows to countries with high productivity and workers substitute leisure with labour
  - (Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland, 1992; Baxter and Crucini, 1995)
- Corporate finance models: focus on banking, yield similar predictions, although the effect could differ depending on the nature of shocks
  - (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997; Morgan, Rime, Strahan, 2004; Allen and Gale, 2000)
- International diversification is more appealing in regions-countries with less correlated returns and thus less synchronized GDP growth rates
  - (Heathcote and Perri, 2008)

### "Standard" Theoretical Predictions

#### A higher degree of financial integration:

- 1. Less synchronized, more divergent business (GDP) cycles
- 2. Higher output volatility
- 3. But, lower consumption volatility (due to risk sharing and consumption smoothing).

## **Brief Summary: Empirical Literature**

#### 1. Financial integration and business cycle synchronization:

- Cross-country: positive relationship between integration and synchronization
  (Imbs, 2004, 2006)
- Panel (US states): banking integration lead to more synchronized state cycles (Morgan, Rime, and Strahan, 2004)
- Studies (focus on within federations): a negative relationship between financial integration and synchronization via the specialization channel
  (Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen, Yosha, 2001, 2003)

#### 2. Financial integration and macroeconomic volatility:

- Cross-country: Weak and inconclusive (Kose, Prasad, Terrones, 2006)
- Panel (US states): banking integration lead to lower state output volatility (Morgan, Rime, Strahan, 2004)

#### 3. Financial integration and risk sharing:

- A higher level of foreign assets and liabilities increases income and consumption risk sharing (Sorensen, *et al.*, 2007; Fratzscher and Imbs, 2007)
- Increase in consumption risk sharing in the Euro area since the 1990s
  (Giannone and Reichlin, 2006)
- Some increase in income risk sharing via bank M&A since the 1990s (Demyanyk, Ostergaard, Sorensen, 2008)

## **Banking Integration and Business Cycle Synchronization: Specification**

$$SYNCH_{i,j,t} = \alpha_{i,j} + \alpha_t + \beta \ BANKINT_{i,j,t-1} + CONTROLS_{i,j,t-1} + \varepsilon_{i,j,t}$$
 
$$where \ SYNCH1_{i,j,t} = -\left|\ln(GDP_{i,t}/GDP_{i,t-1}) - \ln(GDP_{j,t}/GDP_{j,t-1})\right|$$
 
$$and \ SYNCH2_{i,j,t} = corr \ (cyclical \ component \ of \ GDP)$$

#### Merits of panel estimation:

- 1. <u>Country-pair fixed-effects control for sources of time-invariant bilateral</u> characteristics
  - Distance, political ties, legal system similarities, cultural ties...
  - Previous research shows these affect both business cycles and integration
- 2. Year (period) fixed-effects accounts for global trends
  - Business cycle patterns (may) have changed and integration has increased

## **Banking Integration and Synchronization: Panel results (annual and five-year frequency)**

### **→** Higher integration leads to less synchronized cycles

	Ban	Banking Integration Index based on Stocks			
	Annu	al Data	5-year Averaged Data		
	Between	Between Within		Within	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Banking Integration	0.03	-0.25	0.02	-0.09	
t-stat	0.68	5.37	3.02	3.88	
Period FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	
Country-pair FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	
Observations	4188	4188	953	953	
Country-pairs	189	189	189	189	

## **Banking Integration and Macroeconomic Volatility: Specification**

$$FLUCT_{i,t}^{GDP,C} = \alpha_i + \alpha_t + \beta BANKINT_{i,t-1} + CONTROLS_{i,t-1} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

- Are increases in the degree of financial integration associated with higher or lower consumption and output fluctuations?
- Panel: control for global trends, country-specific unobservable characteristics.
- Use both annual data and non-overlapping 5-year periods.
- Two measures:
  - *FLUCT1*: Deviation of output and consumption growth from global and country mean (Morgan, Rime, Strahan, 2004)
  - FLUCT2: Standard deviation of output and consumption growth over each 5-year period.

### **Banking Integration and GDP Fluctuations**

## **→** Higher output volatility due to high external liabilities

	Banking Integration Index based on Flows				
	Annual Data		5-year Averaged		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Banking Integration - Aggregate	0.01		0.00		Weak effect of
t-stat	1.71		0.66	_	aggregate index
Banking Integration - Assets		0.00		-0.01	
t-stat		-0.51		-1.24	
Banking Integration - Liabilities		0.01		0.02	
t-stat		2.51		2.27	
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	574	574	119	119	
Countries	20	20	20	20	17

## **Banking Integration and Consumption Fluctuations**

### **→** Lower consumption volatility due to high external assets

	Banking Integration Index based on Flows				<del>_</del>
	Annual Data		5-Year Averag	5-Year Averaged Data	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	<u> </u>
Banking Integration - Aggregate	0.00		0.00	<b>→</b>	Weak effect of
t-stat	<u>-1.92</u>		<u>-1.24</u>		aggregate index
Banking Integration - Assets		-0.01		-0.02	
t-stat		-2.08		-2.93	
Banking Integration - Liabilities		0.00		0.01	_
t-stat		0.95		1.19	
Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	574	574	119	119	
Countries	20	20	20	20	_ 18

## Robustness (in both synchronization and volatility specifications)

- Control for trade (Frankel and Rose, 1998)
- Control for industrial specialization (Krugman, 1991)
- Control for financial development
- Alternative measures for business cycle synchronization and volatility
- Alternative measures of banking integration

## **Banking Integration and Risk Sharing Specification**

The result that banking integration (external assets) is negatively correlated with consumption volatility suggests that banking integration improves risk sharing

#### We ask: *How much?*

1<sup>st</sup> model: 
$$(\Delta \log C_{i,t} - \Delta \log C_t) = \mu_i + \kappa (\Delta \log GDP_{i,t} - \Delta \log GDP_t) + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

2<sup>nd</sup> model: 
$$(\Delta \log GNI_{i,t} - \Delta \log GNI_t) = \mu_i + \kappa (\Delta \log GDP_{i,t} - \Delta \log GDP_t) + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

where

$$\kappa = \kappa_0 + \kappa_1 \left(t - \frac{1}{t}\right) + \kappa_2^{Assets} \left(BANKINT_{i,t-1} - BANKINT_{t-1}\right) + \kappa_2^{Liab} \left(BANKINT_{i,t-1} - BANKINT_{t-1}\right)$$

Following Kalemli-Ozcan, et al. (2003); Melitz & Zumer (1999); Sorensen et al. (2007)

## **Banking Integration and Consumption Risk Sharing**

### **→** 14% additional RS by doubling external assets

Dep. Variable: Idiosyncratic Consumption Growth	Total	Household
	(1)	(2)
Idiosyncratic GDP growth	0.62	0.66
t-stat	21.51	21.30
Idiosyncratic GDP growth x Banking Integration-Assets	-0.17	-0.14
t-stat	-3.00	-2.00
Idiosyncratic GDP growth x Banking Integration-Liabilities	0.08	0.07
t-stat	1.61	1.52
Idiosyncratic GDP growth x Trend	-0.01	-0.01
t-stat	-2.74	-3.05
Country FE	Yes	Yes
Observations	574	574
Countries	20	20

## **Banking Integration and Income Risk Sharing**


### **→** 18% additional RS by doubling external liabilities

Dep. Variable: Idiosyncratic Income (GNI) growth	
Idiosyncratic GDP growth t-stat	0.88 2.76
Idiosyncratic GDP growth x Banking Integration-Assets t-stat	0.08 1.10
Idiosyncratic GDP growth x Banking Integration-Liabilities t-stat	-0.18 -3.52
Idiosyncratic GDP growth x Trend t-stat	-0.02 -1.91
Country FE	Yes
Observations Countries	574 20

### **Summary**

- 1. The euro has spurred cross-border bilateral banking integration
  - Monetary union
  - Legal-regulatory financial sector harmonization
- 2. In line with standard theory, country-pair banking integration is associated with less synchronized, more divergent cycles
- 3. Country level banking integration (external liabilities) has increased the volatility of GDP growth
- 4. Country level banking integration (in form of external assets) has reduced the volatility of consumption growth
- 5. Country level banking integration has increased consumption and income risk sharing

# Policy Implications: RS increases ex-post optimality of the currency area



## **Policy implications:**

#### RS increases ex-post optimality of the currency area

- Countries might decide to specialize in high-return sectors or invest in relatively high potential regions because they spread the risk of production in EU-wide capital markets due to financial integration
- This might increase the asymmetry and variability of output.
- But it should reduce the consumption fluctuations
- To the extent that risk-sharing allows consumption smoothing, it represents a key counteracting mechanism against output asymmetries
- This mechanism reduces the need for policy intervention in dealing with such asymmetries

#### Synthesizing our (five) empirical results

→ The increased cross-border banking integration — due to the euro — has improved ex-post the optimality of the currency union by improving consumption and income risk sharing