In 2014 all ECB publications feature a motif taken from the €20 banknote.

NOTE: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the European Central Bank (ECB). The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the ECB.
Macroprudential Research Network

This paper presents research conducted within the Macroprudential Research Network (MaRs). The network is composed of economists from the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), i.e. the national central banks of the 27 European Union (EU) Member States and the European Central Bank. The objective of MaRs is to develop core conceptual frameworks, models and/or tools supporting macro-prudential supervision in the EU.

The research is carried out in three work streams: 1) Macro-financial models linking financial stability and the performance of the economy; 2) Early warning systems and systemic risk indicators; 3) Assessing contagion risks.

MaRs is chaired by Philipp Hartmann (ECB), Paolo Angelini (Banca d’Italia), Laurent Clerc (Banque de France), Carsten Detken (ECB), Simone Manganelli (ECB) and Katerina Šmídková (Czech National Bank) are workstream coordinators. Javier Suarez (Center for Monetary and Financial Studies) and Hans Degryse (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven and Tilburg University) act as external consultants. Fiorella De Fiore (ECB) and Kalin Nikolov (ECB) share responsibility for the MaRs Secretariat.

The refereeing process of this paper has been coordinated by a team composed of Gerhard Rünstler, Kalin Nikolov and Bernd Schwaab (all ECB).

The paper is released in order to make the research of MaRs generally available, in preliminary form, to encourage comments and suggestions prior to final publication. The views expressed in the paper are the ones of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the ECB or of the ESCB.

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Abstract

This paper examines the degree of fragmentation in the Euro overnight unsecured money market during the period June 2008 – August 2013 using interbank loans constructed from payments data. After controlling for cross-country differences in bank risk, we document several episodes of significant market fragmentation. While non-standard measures such as the provision of long-term liquidity were successful in reducing tensions, considerable signs of market fragmentation remained at the end of the sample period.

JEL Classification: G1, E5

Keywords: Money Markets, Financial Integration, Sovereign Debt Crisis, Monetary Policy Implementation
Non-technical summary

This paper provides a quantitative assessment of fragmentation in the overnight unsecured Euro money market during the period June 2008 – August 2013. The analysis relies on a new dataset of interbank loans constructed from payments settled on the TARGET2 platform. We define the market to be fragmented in terms of borrowing costs if there is evidence for country-specific premia that are not explained by individual bank risk (proxied by credit ratings). Similarly, we uncover restrictions in the access to interbank funding by contrasting banks’ borrowing with their reliance on the ECB’s weekly main refinancing operations, which effectively acts as a liquidity backstop under the full allotment policy. Our measures identify several episodes of significant market fragmentation which are broadly consistent with the timeline of events throughout the heights of the sovereign debt crisis. Moreover, the results indicate that non-standard measures such as the three-year long-term refinancing operations (LTROs) proved successful in reducing market tensions. However, a considerable degree of market fragmentation remained at the end of the sample period.
1. Introduction

The overnight money market represents the initial element in the monetary transmission chain and is therefore of vital importance for the design and conduct of monetary policy. Since the onset of the financial crisis in 2007, central banks around the globe have been spending large efforts in order to contain stress in short-term interbank markets. This has been particularly true for Europe, where the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis in 2010 led to a reversal of the long-term trend of financial integration that was induced by the adoption of the single currency in 1999 (see e.g. ECB, 2013). Accordingly, several of the ECB’s policy measures were taken with the aim of preserving the “singleness” of monetary policy.

Unfortunately, there is little quantitative evidence on the development of the Euro money market throughout the sovereign debt crisis because trading in the interbank market usually takes place over-the-counter. This paper presents an assessment of the degree of fragmentation in the Euro Area overnight unsecured money market for the period mid 2008 – mid 2013 based on interbank loans constructed from payments data.

2. Data

Our principal dataset consists of unsecured overnight interbank loans identified from payments data in the ECB’s TARGET2 settlement system via the Furfine (1999) algorithm. Importantly, the data allows for the identification of the ultimate originator and beneficiary and, accordingly, does not suffer from the large error rates that plague similar dataset based on Fedwire (see Armantier & Copeland, 2012). For each loan, the data comprises of the transaction date, the amount, and the annualized interest rate. The sample period is June 2008 - August 2013.

Given our focus on bank funding, we only consider gross borrowing. Because most banks transact rather irregularly, we aggregate information on amounts and (weighted average) interest rates at the monthly frequency and at the banking group level. To generate a stable sample, we only consider banks with at least 1 loan in the first and last 6 months of the
sample and stem from one of the following 12 countries: AT, BE, DE, ES, FI, FR, GR, IE, IT, NL, LU, PT. This leaves us with a final sample of 198 banks. Table 1 details the geographical composition, while Figure 1 depicts the evolution of activity over time.

Table 1: Country breakdown of banks
This table provides an overview of the total number of participants by country as well as some statistics on their participation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>DE</th>
<th>BE</th>
<th>AT</th>
<th>ES</th>
<th>FI</th>
<th>FR</th>
<th>GR</th>
<th>IE</th>
<th>IT</th>
<th>LU</th>
<th>NL</th>
<th>PT</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Active</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>124.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min Active</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max Active</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We also collect data on banks’ credit ratings from the three major rating agencies (Fitch, Moody’s, S&P). Banks are grouped into risk categories based on their average credit rating across all agencies (in case of multiple ratings) in a given month: high (AAA to AA-, or Moody’s equivalent), medium (A+ to A-) and low (BBB+ and lower). The averaging across ratings follows Beaver et al. (2006). Non-rated banks are collected in a fourth category, not rated (NR).

Figure 1: Borrowing amounts and participation
This figure depicts the total monthly borrowing amount (in trillion EUR) as well as the monthly number of borrowing banks.

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4 Most Portuguese banks join TARGET2 in March 2009, so that we require at least one loan in the first 6 months after this date.
Finally, the dataset is complemented with data from banks’ participation in the ECB’s weekly main refinancing operations (MROs).

3. Methodology

The purpose of this paper is to examine market fragmentation both in terms of funding costs and the ability to meet funding needs. Our methodology is motivated by the law of one price, which states that assets with identical payoffs and risks should command the same price. Accordingly, in a perfectly integrated market, the rate charged for unsecured overnight interbank loans should not vary systematically across countries after controlling for differences in credit risk.

Let \( \bar{r}_{it} \) denote the weighted average borrowing rate paid on unsecured overnight loans by bank \( i \) in month \( t \), and decompose it into a risk-free rate \( (\bar{r}_t) \), a risk premium based on the bank’s risk category \( r \) \( (\bar{r}_{ir}) \), and a country (or country group) premium \( (\bar{r}_{ic}) \):

\[
\bar{r}_{it} = \bar{r}_t + \bar{r}_{ir} + \bar{r}_{ic} + \epsilon_{it}
\]

Perfect integration implies that \( \bar{r}_{ic} = 0 \) for all countries \( c \) and at each point in time \( t \).

The above decomposition can also be applied to banks’ ability to access the market for overnight unsecured loans. A market where banks of comparable credit quality face differences in their ability to tap other financial institutions for short-term funding should be considered as fragmented. In order to control for banks’ (unobservable) demand for short-term funding, we rely on the idea that institutions that are not able to borrow from other counterparties will ultimately have to resort to the central bank. Let \( \bar{B}_{it} \) denote the total overnight interbank borrowing by bank \( i \) in month \( t \), and let \( MRO_{it} \) be the liquidity drawn from the ECB’s weekly main refinancing operation (with 7 days maturity) during the same period. This yields the following measure of banks’ (market) funding ability:

\[
\phi_{it} = \frac{\bar{B}_{it}}{\bar{B}_{it} + MRO_{it}}
\]

5 We adjust for the fact that interbank liquidity borrowed on a Friday has a maturity of 3 days. Our results are qualitatively unchanged if we additionally consider resort to the infrequently used marginal lending facility (MLF) and 1-week unsecured interbank loans (constructed via the Furfine algorithm).
In case a bank does not borrow at all in a given month (neither in the market nor from the 
Eurosystem), we set $\phi_{t,z} = 1$ because the bank does not resort to public liquidity. This 
measure can be decomposed in the same fashion as $y_{t,z}$.

4. Results

The decomposition in equation (1) for borrowing rates and the corresponding equivalent for 
banks’ funding ability, $\phi_{t,z}$, can be easily estimated via OLS regression on a set of indicator 
variables corresponding to time-period fixed effects, time-period*country (or country group) 
fixed effects and time-period*rating-category fixed effects. In all estimations, we cluster 
standard errors at the bank level.

4.1. Borrowing rates

For illustration, we begin by presenting the results for an estimation based on two country 
groups, stressed (ES, GR, IE, IT, PT) and non-stressed (the rest). In the notation of equation 
(1), we have $c \in \{S,N\}$. Fig. 2 depicts the monthly time series of $\beta_{t}^{S}$, the estimated average 
premium paid by banks from stressed countries relative to banks from non-stressed countries 
with a comparable credit rating. Overall, the results suggest that the overnight unsecured 
interbank market was reasonably well integrated in late 2008 and throughout all of 2009. 
While the Lehman bankruptcy led to an increase in the dispersion of borrowing rates, there is 
little evidence of widespread fragmentation across borders. Overall, one can identify four 
periods of significant market fragmentation: May – Jul 2010 (Greek request for financial 
support), Sep 2010 – Mar 2011 (Irish and Portuguese requests for financial support), Jun – 
Dec 2011 (crisis spreads to Italy and Spain), and Jun-Jul 2012 (re-ignition of crisis). The 
third period clearly marks the most intense episode of fragmentation, when the average 
premium paid by banks from stressed countries peaked at above 70 bps in November and 
December 2011. Evidently, the decision to provide liquidity to banks’ via 3-year long-term 
refinancing operations (LTROs) proved successful in reducing market tensions.

The first four columns of Table 2 report the coefficient estimates (based on sub-periods for 
parsimony) for the average premium for stressed countries as well as the premia associated
As expected, we find that lower rated banks tend to face higher borrowing costs. However, the effect appears to be largely concentrated in periods of market tensions, consistent with lenders being wary of counterparty risk.

Figure 2: Premium paid by banks from stressed countries
This figure depicts the estimated average premium (in bps) for borrowing by banks from stressed countries relative to banks from non-stressed countries based on the decomposition in equation (1). The dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence interval based on standard errors clustered at the bank level.

We proceed by estimating the country-specific premia, relative to German banks, via a separate estimation on the full set of country*time effects. The results are detailed in the remaining columns of Table 2, where the coefficients for credit risk are omitted for brevity. Due to confidentiality requirements, we also omit the coefficients for countries that display month with less than three active banks (BE, FI, IE, and LU).

Our estimates suggest that German banks were in fact facing higher borrowing costs than their foreign peers in the months following the Lehman bankruptcy, consistent with their considerable exposures to the US subprime mortgage market. However, the effect is statistically significant in only one case (Italy). It can be seen that there were very few instances where banks from non-stressed countries paid borrowing costs that differed significantly from those of their German peers. Turning to the stressed countries, one can see

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6 The sub-periods are: Pre Lehman (06/08–08/08), Post Lehman 1 (09/08 – 02/09), Post Lehman 2 (03/09 – 04/10), Post GR bailout (05/10 – 09/10), Post IE bailout (10/10 – 05/11), Post PT bailout (04/11 – 06/11), Summer 2011 (07/11 – 10/11), Fall 2011 (11/11 – 12/11), Post LTROs (01/12 – 05/12), Summer 2012 (06/12 – 08/12), Post London Speech (after 08/12).
that Portuguese and Greek banks were the first to face considerable premia for overnight borrowing, starting already before the Greek rescue package. Italian and Spanish banks held up relatively well until the summer of 2011, but ultimately faced a dramatic surge in funding costs that only came to a halt after the first 3-year LTRO. The re-ignition of the European sovereign debt crisis in summer 2012 particularly hit Spanish institutions, while Italian banks appeared to have been largely insulated against this shock. While Draghi’s speech in London and the successive OMT announcement reduced market tensions significantly, some market segments still remained fragmented at the end of the sample period.

Table 2: Regression coefficients for borrowing rates

This table contains the regression coefficients from estimating the decomposition of banks’ borrowing rates in equation (1). The first four columns are based on an estimation for two country groups (stressed and non-stressed) and report the average premium paid by banks from stressed countries relative to banks from non-stressed countries as well as the effects of being in the respective rating category, relative to banks with a high credit rating. The remaining columns are based on an estimation with the full set of country*time fixed effects and tabulate the estimated premia for banks from individual countries, relative to Germany. P-values in brackets are based on standard errors clustered at the bank level, and ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The sub-periods are defined in footnote 5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-period</th>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>None</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre Lehman</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>-7.56</td>
<td>-1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>-0.89</td>
<td>-0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Lehman 1</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.51</td>
<td>-6.92</td>
<td>-1.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>-5.24</td>
<td>-0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Lehman 2</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
<td>-0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post OMT support</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
<td>-6.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>-5.24</td>
<td>-0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summers 2011</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.87</td>
<td>19.52</td>
<td>17.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>16.73</td>
<td>15.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post LTROs</td>
<td></td>
<td>17.25</td>
<td>-0.54</td>
<td>13.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10.86</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
<td>-0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Speech</td>
<td></td>
<td>13.51</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>-3.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2. Funding ability

As in the previous section, we first present the results based on an estimation with only two country groups. Fig. 3 depicts the estimated time-series for $\phi_k^2$, the relative funding ability of...
banks from stressed countries. An estimate of -0.1 implies that a bank from a stressed country is able to satisfy 10% less of its funding needs from the private market compared to bank from a non-stressed country with comparable credit risk. The regression coefficients based on sub-periods are tabulated in the first column of Table 3.

Figure 3: Relative funding ability for banks from stressed countries

This figure depicts the estimated average funding ability for banks from stressed countries relative to banks from non-stressed countries based on applying the decomposition in equation (1) to the measure \( \phi_{\Delta \gamma} \). The dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence interval based on standard errors clustered at the bank level.

Overall, the results from this analysis closely mirror the above results on fragmentation in borrowing rates. The first incidence of fragmentation in terms of funding ability occurs in May 2010, coinciding with the Greek bailout programme. In the following, short periods of relief take turns with episodes of stress on peripheral sovereigns, and the largest extent of fragmentation is reached in December 2011 just before the allotment of the first 3-year LTRO. Clearly, the ability to obtain cheap long-term funding significantly reduced banks' need to resort to the ECB’s weekly operations. While the market displayed a slow movement towards re-integration in the following months, considerable fragmentation in terms of access to short-term funding remained at the end of the sample period.

The coefficients on the different rating categories in Table 3 (columns 2 to 4) reveal that banks of lower credit quality find it more difficult on average to obtain funding in the private market. However, as for rates, this effect appears to have been largely confined to periods of severe market stress.
Turning to the results for the individual countries (again resulting from a separate estimation using the full set of country*time effects), we observe that banks from most countries relied less on public funding that the average German bank around the Lehman Bankruptcy, which is consistent with our earlier observations on borrowing rates. Throughout the Euro sovereign debt crisis, there was relatively little variation in funding ability among non-stressed countries. For stressed countries however, one can observe the same two-sided 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The sub-periods are defined in footnote 5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Individual Countries (relative to DE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre Lehman</td>
<td>0.25***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.04]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Lehman 1</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.04]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Lehman 2</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.04]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post LTRO Support</td>
<td>-0.20***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.04]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post K Support</td>
<td>-0.20***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.04]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post FF Support</td>
<td>-0.20***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.04]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer 2011</td>
<td>-0.03***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.04]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fall 2011</td>
<td>0.05***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.04]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre Speech</td>
<td>-0.22***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.04]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Regression coefficients funding ability

This table contains the regression coefficients from estimating the decomposition of banks’ funding ability in equation (1). The first four columns are based on an estimation for two country groups (stressed and non-stressed) and report the average funding ability of banks from stressed countries relative to banks from non-stressed countries as well as the effects of being in the respective rating category, relative to banks with a high credit rating. The remaining columns are based on an estimation with the full set of country*time fixed effects and tabulate the estimated funding ability for banks from individual countries, relative to Germany. P-values in brackets are based on standard errors clustered at the bank level, and ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The sub-periods are defined in footnote 5.
6. Conclusion

This paper has examined the degree of fragmentation of the Euro Area overnight unsecured money market from June 2008 to August 2013 based on loans identified from payments data. Our analysis is based on (risk-adjusted) borrowing rates and banks' ability to satisfy their funding needs, controlling for resort to short-term central bank liquidity. Several episodes of market fragmentation are identified. Overall, the evidence suggests that non-standard measures such as long-term liquidity operations were broadly effective in dampening market tensions. However, considerable market fragmentation remained at the end of the sample period.

References


