

# Monetary Policy for a Bubbly World

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# Introduction

- We live in a *bubbly world*, which we define to be an environment with:
  - ▶ low interest rates
  - ▶ frequent boom-busts in asset prices (Japan, US, Eurozone)
- What is the role of monetary policy?
- This paper: focus on salient feature of recent crises
  - ▶ Liquidity traps and expansion of central bank balance sheets
  - ▶ Markets turned to central banks for stores of value
  - ▶ Fivefold expansion of monetary base in US and Eurozone
- Emphasize role of money as a store of value (as opposed to unit of account)
  - ▶ Can central banks provide stores of value?
  - ▶ Should they do so?
  - ▶ How should they react to bubbles?

# The view: ingredients

- Productive and unproductive agents:
  - ▶ Entrepreneurs issue assets to invest
  - ▶ Savers demand assets as stores of value
- Financial frictions limit supply of “backed” assets
  - ▶ i.e., backed by future output (non-bubbly)
- And they open the door for unbacked assets
  - ▶ i.e., supported only by the expectation of their future value (bubbly)
- Effects of unbacked assets:
  - ▶ Wealth effect: cheap to produce, provide rents to originator
  - ▶ Overhang effect: displace capital accumulation

# The view: implications

- Two types of unbacked assets:
  - ▶ Private: “bubbles”
    - ★ Wealth effect accrues to private sector  $\implies$  fuel investment
    - ★ Value driven by market psychology (unstable)
  - ▶ Public: “money”
    - ★ Rent of creation accrues to central bank  $\implies$  how is seigniorage used?
    - ★ Value under control of central bank (stable)
  - ▶ Both have overhang effects
- Crucial role of monetary policy: stand ready to supply assets
  - ▶ Markets generically fail to supply the right amount of unbacked assets
  - ▶ Monetary policy *can* intervene: manage and stabilize total supply
  - ▶ Monetary policy *should* intervene: characterize constrained optimal policy
- Crucial role *despite* restrictive assumptions on central bank
  - ▶ No fiscal backing, limited use of seigniorage, unable to affect market psychology

# Related literature

- Traditional view on rational bubbles and money as store of value
  - ▶ Samuelson (1958), Tirole (1985), Wallace (1981)
- New view on rational bubbles and financial frictions
  - ▶ Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006), Farhi and Tirole (2010), Martin and Ventura (2011, 2015, 2016), Galí (2014, 2016), Dong, Miao and Wang (2016)
- Financial accelerator
  - ▶ Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
- Liquidity traps
  - ▶ Krugman (1998), Eggertson and Woodford (2003), Werning (2011), Eggertson and Mehrotra (2014), Buera and Nicolini (2014), Benigno and Fornaro (2015)

# Preferences and Technology

- Two-period OLG structure
- *Preferences*: continuum of agents that maximize  $U_t^i = E_t^i C_{t+1}^i$ ,
- *Technology*:  $F(K_t, L_t) = K_t^\alpha \cdot (\gamma^t \cdot L_t)^{1-\alpha}$ , ( $\gamma \geq 1$ )
  - ▶ Young endowed with one unit of labor; competitive factor markets
  - ▶ Capital produced with consumption goods and depreciates fully
- *Agent types*:
  - ▶ *Entrepreneurs* ( $\varepsilon$ ): invest in capital, sell assets in markets
  - ▶ *Savers* ( $1 - \varepsilon - v$ ): do not invest in capital, purchase assets in markets
  - ▶ *Money holders* ( $v$ ): do not invest in capital, do not participate in asset markets

# Private assets

- Issued by entrepreneurs, purchased by savers
- *Backed assets*: debts collateralized by capital, subject to intermediation costs
  - ▶ Each unit of credit is backed by  $(1 + \phi)^{-1}$  units of capital
  - ▶  $R_{t+1}^K$ : marginal product of capital
  - ▶ Return:  $\frac{R_{t+1}^K}{1 + \phi}$  (determined by technology, marginal product)
- *Unbacked assets*: non-collateralized debts, not subject to intermediation costs
  - ▶  $B_t$ : value of old or pre-existing bubbly assets
  - ▶  $N_t$ : value of newly created bubbly assets
  - ▶ Return:  $\frac{B_{t+1}}{B_t + N_t}$  (determined by expectations, capital gain)

# Money

- Issued by central bank and distributed to old, purchased by money holders and savers
- Let  $M_t$  and  $\mu_t \geq 1$  denote the real value and (gross) growth rate of money
  - ▶  $\frac{M_t}{\mu_t}$ : value of old or pre-existing money
  - ▶  $\frac{\mu_t - 1}{\mu_t} \cdot M_t$ : value of newly created money (seigniorage), distributed to old
- Return:  $\pi_{t+1}^{-1} = \mu_{t+1}^{-1} \cdot \frac{M_{t+1}}{M_t}$
- Why hold money?
  - ▶ (Small) demand by money holders
  - ▶ Savers demand it as store of value if return sufficiently high: liquidity trap!



# Equilibrium

- Law of motion of unbacked assets (as share of wages):

$$m_t = \max \left\{ v, \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \cdot [1 + \phi \cdot (\varepsilon + n_t) - m_t - b_t] \cdot E_t \left\{ \frac{m_{t+1}}{\mu_{t+1}} \right\} \right\}$$

$$b_t + n_t = \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \cdot [1 + \phi \cdot (\varepsilon + n_t) - m_t - b_t] \cdot E_t \{ b_{t+1} \}$$

- ▶ Value of unbacked assets today is tomorrow's value discounted (capital gain)
  - ▶ Value of money is bounded below by demand from money holders
- Sources of uncertainty: asset price and monetary policy shocks

# Equilibrium

- Law of motion of capital stock and consumption (detrended):

$$\gamma \cdot k_{t+1} = \frac{1 + \phi \cdot (\varepsilon + n_t) - m_t - b_t}{1 + \phi} \cdot (1 - \alpha) \cdot k_t^\alpha$$

$$c_t = [\alpha + (1 - \alpha) \cdot (m_t + b_t)] \cdot k_t^\alpha$$

- Recursive structure:
  - ▶ First, for the evolution of unbacked assets  $m_t$ ,  $b_t$ ,  $n_t$
  - ▶ Second, solve for the capital stock  $k_t$
  - ▶ Third, solve for consumption  $c_t$
- From now on: focus on  $v \approx 0$

# Equilibrium: non-bubbly world

- If  $\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \geq \max \left\{ 1 + \phi \cdot \varepsilon, \frac{1}{4} \cdot \frac{1+\phi}{1-\varepsilon} \right\}$ , world is non-bubbly
  - ▶ In all competitive equilibria:  $\{b_t, n_t, m_t\} = \{0, 0, 0\}$  for all  $t$  and  $h^t$ .
  - ▶ Monetary policy irrelevant
- Supply of backed assets/interest rate is high: no demand for unbacked assets!

# Equilibrium: bubbly world


- If  $\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} < \max \left\{ 1 + \phi \cdot \varepsilon, \frac{1}{4} \cdot \frac{1+\phi}{1-\varepsilon} \right\}$ , world is bubbly
  - ▶ Multiple equilibria with different paths of  $b_t$ ,  $n_t$  and  $m_t$ .
  - ▶ Monetary policy potentially important
- Supply of backed assets / interest rate is low: demand for unbacked assets!
- We focus throughout on bubbly world

# Dealing with multiplicity

- Equilibrium depends on market psychology and monetary policy
- Focus on family of market psychologies:
  - ▶ Initial value  $b_0$  and sequence of shocks  $s_t = \{u_t, n_t\}$  for all  $t$  and  $h^t$ :
    - ★ Bubble-return shocks:  $u_{t+1} \equiv \frac{b_{t+1}}{E_t b_{t+1}} - 1$
    - ★ Bubble-creation shocks:  $n_t \geq 0$
  - ▶ Shocks follow a Markov chain on a finite state space  $S$ , with constant transition probabilities.
- Procedure:
  - ▶ First: select feasible market psychology, i.e.,  $k_t \geq 0$ ,  $b_t \geq 0$  for all  $t$  and  $h^t$ .
  - ▶ Second: select feasible monetary policy, *given* market psychology.


# Dealing with multiplicity

Set of equilibria




# Dealing with multiplicity

## 1. Feasible market psychology



# Dealing with multiplicity

## 2. Feasible monetary policy





# What can the central bank do? Laissez-faire


- If central bank does not supply unbacked assets:

$$m_t \approx 0$$


- This requires  $E_t \mu_{t+1}^{-1}$  to be low, so that credit dominates money
  - ▶ Thus, the economy is outside the liquidity trap!
- Two effects of bubbles:
  - ▶ Overhang effect: old bubbles divert resources away from investment
  - ▶ Wealth effect: new bubbles lower costs of intermediation

# Running example 1: bubble return shocks


### Bubble-return shock




### Unbacked assets



### Output




### Consumption




# Running example 2: bubble creation shocks


### Bubble-creation shock




### Unbacked assets



### Output



### Consumption



# What can the central bank do? Intervention

- Are there feasible policies that manage the supply of stores of value?
  - ▶  $n_t$  = intragenerational transfers
  - ▶  $x_t \equiv b_t + m_t$  = intergenerational transfers
  - ▶  $\{k_t, c_t\}$  depend on  $\{n_t, x_t\}$ :


$$\gamma \cdot k_{t+1} = \frac{1 + \phi \cdot (\varepsilon + n_t) - x_t}{1 + \phi} \cdot (1 - \alpha) \cdot k_t^\alpha$$

$$c_t = [\alpha + (1 - \alpha) \cdot x_t] \cdot k_t^\alpha$$


- ▶ *Answer:* yes! Central bank can fully stabilize  $x$ !

# Running example 1: bubble return shocks


## Bubble-return shock




## Unbacked assets



## Output




## Consumption




# Running example 2: bubble creation shocks


## Bubble-creation shock




## Unbacked assets



## Output



## Consumption



# What should the central bank do?



- Objective:

- ▶ We construct a boundary function  $\Omega : (x_t, n_t) \mapsto \mathbb{R}$  such that:
  - ★ Allocations are Pareto efficient if  $x_t \geq \Omega(x_t, n_t)$  for all  $h^t$  and  $t \geq t_0$
  - ★ Allocations are Pareto inefficient if  $x_t < \Omega(x_t, n_t)$  for all  $h^t$  and  $t \geq t_0$

- Intuition:

- ▶ As usual: stores of value eliminate inefficient investment
- ▶ Novelty: inefficient investment depends on financial friction ( $\phi$ ) and market psychology ( $n$ )

# Pareto Frontier





# Constrained optimal policy

- Define  $x^* = \Omega(x^*, \bar{n})$ , where  $\bar{n} = \max_s n_s$
- Consider constrained optimal policy: central bank sets

$$x_t = \begin{cases} v + b_L & \text{if } x^* < v + b_L \\ x^* & \text{if } x^* \in [v + b_L, v + b_H] \\ v + b_H & \text{if } x^* > v + b_H \end{cases}$$

- This policy stabilizes asset supply at Pareto optimal level, *unless it is not feasible*.
  - ▶ Stabilizes the economy
  - ▶ Raises consumption
  - ▶ Reduces capital by crowding out inefficient investment

# Extensions

- Fiscal backing:
  - ▶ Not needed to stabilize  $x$ , but stabilization may require volatile inflation
    - ★ If inflation volatility costly, fiscal backing may be important
    - ★ If money cannot be inflated away, must be redeemed through taxes (i.e., may require  $\mu < 1$ )
- Distribution of seigniorage:
  - ▶ What if CB could distribute seigniorage to entrepreneurs?
  - ▶ Monetary policy, like bubbles, has an expansionary wealth effect: even more powerful!
  - ▶ Paradoxically, may lead to multiple equilibria on money: loss of control by monetary policy
- Effect on market psychology:
  - ▶ What if central bank moves before market sets its psychology?
  - ▶ Possible for monetary policy to rule out certain equilibria

# Key takeaways

- Bubbly world: scarcity of backed assets fosters demand for unbacked assets
- Key role for monetary policy: stand ready to supply assets!
  - ▶ Emphasis on money as a store of value
- Crucial: *net* provision of assets by central bank
  - ▶ Gross provision (i.e., balance sheet expansion) irrelevant *per se*
  - ▶ No need for fiscal backing
- Open questions: interaction between money as store of value and unit of account