

Global Supply Chain Pressures, International Trade and Inflation

Comment on Di Giovanni, Kalemli-Özcan, Silva and Yildirim [DKSY]

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Agenda

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- Short Recap of DKSY results and comments
 - Some more stylized facts
 - Insulation and decoupling: simulation results
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DKSY's Key Equation and Questions

- DKS_Y: $d \log CPI = \Lambda' d \log W \Rightarrow d \log CPI = d \log GDP - \Lambda' d \log L$ and hence AD shock ζ is backed out using

$$d \log \zeta = d \log CPI + \Lambda' d \log L$$

- A useful/simple way of disentangling (sectoral) supply and aggregate demand shocks
- Complex IO-Links hiding in Λ'
- Key result: Supply shocks explain 40-50% of inflation in Eurozone; about 30% in US

Limitations

- Low level of granularity of IO-data may underestimate the price effects of supply shocks
- Role of trade costs? GVC-stress? New protectionism...
- Not robust to imperfect competition: in general one would expect supply shocks to lead to firm exit, less competition, and hence higher prices
- No monetary policy at all ...

Further important insights from DKSY


- (1) Recovery of goods trade after Corona looks strong but would have been stronger in absence of supply chain bottlenecks due to demand shift towards tradeables
 - (2) Effective trade elasticities are reduced due to supply chain bottlenecks
 - (3) With nominal wage rigidity, a single sector negative supply shock coupled with relative demand shifts can create country-wide inflation
 - (4) Foreign shocks and global supply chain bottlenecks played an outsized role relative to domestic aggregate demand shocks in explaining Euro area inflation 2020-21; the opposite is true in the US
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- All results very plausible, even if model framework is stylized
 - Tightening of monetary policy in the Euro area is unlikely to eliminate excess inflation while supply chain bottlenecks persist (Or: achievable only at a very high output cost)

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Goods Trade: Fast Recovery after Corona-Drop, Different than Lehman

Monthly global quantity indicators of goods trade (Dec. 2019 = Jul 2008 = 100)




- Trade response after Corona-Shock differs strongly from GFC
- Pre-shock performance of world goods trade different
- Does this insight suggest that supply chain issues are of minor relevance?
- DKSY: Not so fast ...
- Need to compare to right counterfactual

Source: CPB, own calculations and illustration. Last data point: March 2022.

Industrial Production (IP): Corona versus Lehman

Monthly global industrial production (Dec. 2019 = Jul 2008 = 100)




- Trade reacted less strongly to changes in IP in corona crisis than in GFC
- IP dynamics reflect shift in spending towards tradeable (durables consumption) goods
- See DKSY on similar results regarding GDP versus trade ...


Source: CPB, own calculations and illustration. Last data point: March 2022.

Maritime Bottlenecks: Ambiguous Signals

Ocean delivery times, days%




Idle global container ship capacity, %



Source: Kiel Institute, own illustration (last date 21.6.2022); Flexport Research.

FRBNY Global Supply Chain Pressure Index: Corona vs. Lehman


GSCPI (Dec. 2019 = Jul 2008 = 100), standard deviations from average



Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, own illustration.

FRBNY Global Supply Chain Pressure Index: Corona vs. Lehman

GSCPI (Dec. 2019 = Jul 2008 = 100), standard deviations from average




- Before the shock, run-up to Corona crisis shows some supply chain stress
- On impact, totally different responses of GSCPI reflecting different nature of crisis (supply shock vs. demand shock dominating)
- Post-shock, supply chain stress build up, but much more in Corona case

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, own illustration.


Lack of material still prevalent in Eurozone

Production impediments in manufacturing, balances in %, seasonally adjusted



Source: Business Cycle Surveys of the EU Commission, Macrobond. Last data point: Q1 22.

Monthly Index of Goods Market Globalization



- Real goods trade relative to industrial production
- Stronger trade response relative to IP in GFC
- But the real interesting break occurred before Lehman shock – reasons?
- **Rise in protectionism (export restrictions) adds to supply chain stress**
- Worrying implications for inflation dynamics

Source: CPB, own calculations and illustration. Last data point: March 2022. Index relates global index of goods trade to a global index of industrial production.

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Decoupling Global Value Chains (GVCs)


Eppinger, Felbermayr, Krebs and Kukharsky (CESifo, 2021): effects of foreign output (supply) shocks on welfare with and without GVC trade

- Strong similarities to DKSY, but many countries and sectors
 - Ricardian quantitative trade GE model with full intra- and international IO-linkages (as DKSY)
 - Separation between final goods trade and GVC trade and respective trade costs
 - Stochastic sectoral labor reallocation brake
 - IO data from WIOD project (updated from base year 2014)
 - Two different sets of trade elasticities (long-run vs. short-run)
 - Foreign labor supply shock calibrated to China lock down in winter/spring 2020
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- Simulation of effects of GVC decoupling, of foreign supply shocks, and of their interaction on
 - Changes in **welfare_i** = $1/P_i$

Source: Eppinger, Felbermayr, Krebs und Kukharsky (2021).


Decoupling of GVC would yield substantial welfare costs

Percentage change in long-run welfare costs (real GDP per capita)



Source: Eppinger, Felbermayr, Krebs und Kukharsky (2021).

Decoupling insulates from foreign supply shocks, but at massive cost




- Uniform shock to labor productivity of -29% in country on x-axis.
- Cells show difference between per capita income effect in baseline (GVCs) and decoupling (No GVCs)
- Cell values mostly positive, but very small
- Costs of decoupling, on the other hand, are very pronounced
- Decoupling of GVCs makes spillover effects consistently smaller
- But decoupling has direct negative effects that are an order of magnitude larger

Source: Eppinger, Felbermayr, Krebs und Kukharsky (2021).

Unilateral decoupling effects on transmission of global shocks – short run analysis

Short-run welfare effects (real GDP per capita), percentage changes



Source: Eppinger, Felbermayr, Krebs und Kukharsky (2021).

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